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Constructivist Concept Learning is one’s meaningful understanding production 
based on her/his mental constructions of her/his own conceptions of the world. 
 
Farshad Badie 
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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
 
The central focus of this Ph.D. research is on ‘Logic and Cognition’ and, more 
specifically, this research covers the quintuple (Logic and Logical Philosophy, 
Philosophy of Education, Educational Psychology, Cognitive Science, Computer 
Science). The most significant contributions of this Ph.D. dissertation are conceptual, 
logical, terminological, and semantic analysis of Constructivist Concept Learning 
(specifically, in the context of humans’ interactions with their environment and with 
other agents). This dissertation is concerned with the specification of the 
conceptualisation of the phenomena of ‘learning’, ‘mentoring’, and ‘knowledge’ 
within learning and knowledge acquisition systems. In this research, the phenomena 
of ‘learning’ and ‘mentoring’ are interpreted as active processes of ‘knowledge 
construction’. Accordingly, this interpretation has provided the most considerable 
presupposition of further developments. Constructivism as an epistemology and as a 
model of knowing and, respectively as a theoretical model of learning builds up the 
central framework of this research.  
 
The most significant question that I have tried to focus on is “How one’s constructed 
concepts could be followed by her/his own constructed meanings and, accordingly, 
by her/his meaningful understandings?”. Consequently, relying on the framework of 
constructivism, the major objectives of this dissertation are as follows: 
 
 Conceptualisation and characterisation of concepts in humans’ minds and in 
machines’ knowledge bases.  
 Conceptualisation of humans’ concept construction processes and, 
correspondingly, of logical descriptions and of formal analysis of concept 
constructions. 
 Conceptualisation of humans’ conceptions that are produced in order to express 
their constructed concepts.  
 Conceptual, logical, and terminological analysis of concept representation in both 
humans’ minds and in machines’ knowledge bases. 
 Conceptual, logical, and terminological analysis of human concept 
understanding, or equivalently, understandings over constructed concepts and 
produced conceptions. 
 Conceptualisation, logical, and terminological description/analysis and formal[-
semantic] analysis of concept learning (by human beings and by machines 
metaphorically understood as learners) and their interconnections. 
Another important question that I have tackled to focus on is “How knowledge may 
reasonably and logically be assumed to be constructed by a learner in the framework 
of constructivism and, also, in the context of her/his interactions?”. This question is 
highly relevant to the learners who are at their elementary, high school, and 
undergraduate levels of studies. Note that the HowNess and the quality of knowledge 
construction varies from learner to learner. This attribute is heavily concerned with 
any individual learner’s mental models of her/his knowings. Accordingly, it shall be 
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stressed that there is a strong dependency between the phenomenon of ‘knowledge’ 
and ‘any individual learner’s mental models of knowings’.  
 
My proposed theoretical model is strongly dependent on my ideas of the concepts of 
‘classification’ and ‘induction’. It means that my theoretical model expresses that 
learners’ reasoning processes are mainly structured over their mental abilities of 
classification and induction. Subsequently, the expression ‘concept learning’ will be 
analysed based upon classification and induction.  
 
According to this dissertation, any human being becomes concerned with her/his 
specification(s) of her/his own conceptualisation through concept learning processes. 
It shall be stressed that there are, obviously, no compelling reasons to claim that 
concept learning must necessarily be structured based on the processes supported by 
constructivism. I do, though, strongly believe that there is an epistemological junction 
between ‘constructivism’ and ‘concept learning’. In fact, in my opinion, 
 
 constructivism could provide a proper supportive base for description of concept 
construction processes, and 
 constructivism, as an epistemology, could support so-called ‘constructivist 
concept learning’, if it is seen as an individual’s conditional reasoning in a 
learning and a pedagogical context.  
It shall be emphasised that this research has mainly focused on constructivist concept 
learning by ‘human beings’. A few of my publications—which are included in this 
thesis—have had contributions in machine learning, artificial intelligence, and 
human-machine interactions, but it shall be drawn into consideration that those 
publications’ central focuses have been on human beings. Actually, their contributions 
have been on the terminological, logical, and semantic analysis of constructivist 
‘training’ with regard to humans’ conceptions of their mental constructed concepts. 
In more technical words, this dissertation has not dealt with the HowNess of 
adaptation and conformation of machines and machines’ knowledge bases to human 
beings and their minds. It has, though, been concerned with the transformation of 
humans’ conceptions from their minds into machines’ knowledge bases as well as 
ontological descriptions in information systems.  
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DANSK RESUME1 
 
Denne ph.d.-afhandlings fokus er ‘logik og kognition’, og derudover kan man mere 
specifikt sige at forskningsfeltet dækker fem faglige områder: logik og logikkens 
filosofi, uddannelsesfilosofi, uddannelsespsykologi, kognitionsvidenskab og 
computervidenskab. Afhandlingens mest betydningsfulde bidrag omhandler 
begrebslig, logisk, terminologisk og semantisk analyse af ‘Constructivist Concept 
Learning’, nærmere bestemt i konteksten ‘menneskers interaktion med omgivelserne 
og med andre handlende subjekter’. Afhandlingen drejer sig om bestemmelsen af 
begrebsliggørelsen af fænomenerne ‘læring’, ‘mentorering’ og ‘viden’ i forbindelse 
med læring og videnstilegnelses-systemer. Indenfor dette forskningsfelt forstås 
fænomenerne ‘læring’ og ‘mentorering’ som aktive processer af ‘videnskonstruktion’. 
Som følge heraf fungerer denne forståelse som den mest betydningsfulde antagelse 
som grundag for den videre behandling. Hvad der opbygger den centrale 
rammeforståelse i dette forskningsbidrag er Konstruktivisme set som epistemologi og 
som videns-model, og herudover som teoretisk lærings-model. 
 
Det vigtigste spørgsmål som jeg har prøvet at fokusere på er “hvordan en persons 
konstruerede begreber vil kunne opfølges af personens egne konstruerede betydninger 
og, således, af personens meningsfulde forståelse”. På grundlag af Konstruktivisme 
er, som følge heraf, hovedmålene for denne afhandling følgende: 
 
 Begrebsliggørelse og karakteristik af menneskers begreber som de 
forekommer i menneskers tankeverdener (‘minds’) og i maskiners 
vidensbaser. 
 Begrebsliggørelse af menneskers begrebskonstruktions-processer og, 
således, af logiske beskrivelser og formale analyser af 
begrebskonstruktioner. 
 Begrebsliggørelse af menneskers konceptioner som bliver skabt for at 
udtrykke de konstruerede begreber. 
 Begrebslig, logisk og terminologisk analyse af begrebs-repræsentation i både 
menneskers tankeverdener (‘minds’) og i maskiners vidensbaser. 
 Begrebslig, logisk og terminologisk analyse af menneskers 
begrebsforståelse, eller, anderledes udtrykt, forståelsen af konstruerede 
begreber og konceptioner. 
 Begrebsliggørelse og logisk og terminologisk beskrivelse/analyse og 
formal[semantisk] analyse af begrebs-læring (foretaget af mennesker og af 
maskiner forstået som metaforisk som ‘learnere’) og forbindelserne mellem 
disse. 
 
Et andet vigtigt spørgsmål som jeg har forsøgt at fokusere på er “hvordan man 
rimeligvis og logisk kan antage at viden konstrueres af en ‘learner’ indenfor 
Konstruktivismens ramme, og i ‘learnerens’ interakstions-sammenhæng”. Dette 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Dr. Hans Götzsche for translating and proofreading this section. 
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spørgsmål er i høj grad relevant for ‘learnere’ som befinder sig på skole- eller 
uddannelsesniveau. Man skal her bemærke at ‘hvordan-heden’ (‘HowNess’) og 
kvaliteten af videnskonstruktionen varierer fra enkeltmenneske til enkeltmenneske. 
Det drejer sig her afgørende om hver enkelt ‘learners’ mentale modeller af 
vedkommendes vidensindhold. Det skal derfor understreges at der er en stærk 
afhængighed mellem videns-fænomenet og den enkelte ‘learners’ mentale modeller 
af vidensindholdet. 
 
Den af mig forelåede teoretiske model er éntydigt baseret på mine idéer om 
begreberne ‘klassifikation’ og ‘induktion’. Det medfører at min teoretiske model 
udtrykker den opfattelse at en ‘learners’ tankeprocesser (‘reasoning processes’) 
hovedsageligt er struktureret over vedkommendes mentale forudsætninger 
(‘capacities’) hvad angår klassifikation og induktion. Følgelig vil udtrykket ‘begrebs-
læring’ (‘concept learning’) blive analyseret ud fra klassifikation og induktion. 
 
Ifølge opfattelsen i denne afhandling så vil ethvert menneske blive optaget af 
hvorledes vedkommende bestemmer (‘her/his specification(s) of’) sin egen 
begrebsliggørelse igennem begrebslærings-processer. Det skal understreges at der 
ikke er tvingende grunde til at hævde at begrebslæring nødvendigvis struktureres 
baseret på de processer som fremhæves af Konstruktivismen. Men jeg tror selv afgjort 
på en epistemologisk forbindelse mellem ‘Konstruktivisme’ og ‘begrebslæring’. Det 
er således min opfattelse at 
 
 Konstruktivisme vil kunne bidrage med en ægte underbyggelse af hvorledes 
begrebskonstruktions-processer bør beskrives, og 
 Konstruktivisme vil, som epistemologi, kunne underbygge såkaldt 
‘konstruktivistisk begrebslæring’ hvis det opfattes som den enkeltes 
betingede (‘conditional’) tankeprocesser (‘reasoning’) i en lærings- og 
pædagogisk sammenhæng. 
 
Det skal understreges at disse forskningsresultater hovedsageligt har fokuseret på 
læring i forbindelse med ‘mennesker’. Enkelte af mine publikationer, som er med i 
denne afhandling, har indeholdt bidrag indenfor områderne maskinlæring, kunstig 
intelligens og menneske/maskine-interaktion, men det skal fastholdes at disse 
udgivelser faktisk har fokuseret på mennesker. Således har nævnte udgivelser handlet 
om terminologiske, logiske og semantiske analyser af ‘konstruktivistisk’ træning hvad 
angår menneskers begrebsligørelse af deres konstruerede begreber. Udtrykt mere 
teknisk så handler denne afhandling ikke om ‘hvordan-heden’ (‘HowNess’) i 
hvorledes maskiner og maskiners vidensbaser tilpasses mennesker og deres 
tankeverden. Den handler også om hvorledes menneskers begrebsliggørelser 
transformeres til maskiners vidensbaser og ontologiske beskrivelser i 
informationssystemer. 
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THESIS DETAILS 
 
This Ph.D. dissertation consists of three main sections and two appendices.  
 
 
SECTION I. THE OUTLOOKS 
 
This section is structured in two parts:  
 
 Constructivism, and 
 Constructivist Concept Learning. 
 
This section focuses on describing and specifying the fundamental expressions in 
order to provide a supportive background for section II. Note that some pieces and 
products of section II are either directly or indirectly used in this section. 
 
 
SECTION II. ARTICLES 
 
This part is structured based on sixteen articles (A) – (P) in a revised layout. Twelve 
of the articles (A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, M) are already published, two (L, N) 
are accepted for publication, and two (O, P) are submitted for publication. The 
included figures and diagrams have been, graphically and not contextually, improved 
and updated. I have obtained permission from all the publishers to use their 
copyrighted material. The articles are mainly presented in chronological order. I have 
been the sole author of all of the included publications in this dissertation. I shall, 
though, emphasise that all articles have been submitted and published under the direct 
supervision of my supervisor, Dr. Hans Götzsche. In addition, Hans has supervised 
me through editing processes of all articles. The articles are as follows: 
 
[A] Farshad Badie (2015): “A Semantic Basis for Meaning Construction in 
Constructivist Interactions”. Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on 
Cognition and Exploratory Learning in Digital Age (Maynooth, Greater Dublin, 
Ireland). ISBN: 978-989-8533-43-2. International Association for Development of 
the Information Society (IADIS). Pages: 369–376. 
 
[B] Farshad Badie (2015): “Towards a Semantics-based Framework for Meaning 
Construction in Constructivist Interactions”. Proceedings of the 8th International 
Conference of Education, Research and Innovation (Seville, Spain). ISBN: 978-84-
608-2657-6. ISSN: 2340-1095. International Association of Technology, Education 
and Development (IATED). Pages: 7995–8002. 
 
[C] Farshad Badie (2017): “A Conceptual Mirror: Towards a Reflectional 
Symmetrical Relation Between Mentor and Learner”.  International Journal of 
Information and Education Technology: IJIET 2017, Vol.7(3). ISSN: 2010-3689.  
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Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Education and Psychological 
Sciences (Florence, Italy, 2016). Pages: 199–203 (This paper has received the best 
paper of session award) 
 
[D] Farshad Badie (2016): “A Semantic Representation of Adult Learners’ 
Developing Conceptions of Self Realisation through Learning process”. Proceedings 
of the 10th Annual International Technology, Education and Development Conference 
(Valencia, Spain). ISBN: 978-84-608-5617-7. ISSN: 2340-1079 International 
Association of Technology, Education and Development (IATED). Pages: 5348–
5353. 
 
[E] Farshad Badie (2016): “Concept Representation Analysis in the Context of 
Human-Machine Interactions”. Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on 
e-Society (Algarve, Portugal). ISBN: 978-989-8533-48-7. International Association 
for Development of the Information Society (IADIS). Pages: 55–62. 
 
[F] Farshad Badie (2016): “Logical Characterisation of Concept Transformations 
from Human into Machine Relying on Predicate Logic”. Proceedings of ACHI 2016: 
9th International Conference on Advances in Computer-Human Interaction (Venice, 
Italy). ISSN: 2308-4138. ISBN: 978-1-61208-468-8. International Academy, 
Research and Industry Association (IARIA). Pages: 376–379. 
 
[G] Farshad Badie (2016): “Towards Semantic Analysis of Training-Learning 
Relationships within Human-Machine Interactions”. Proceedings of ACHI 2016: 9th 
International Conference on Advances in Computer-Human Interaction (Venice, 
Italy). ISSN: 2308-4138. ISBN: 978-1-61208-468-8. International Academy, 
Research and Industry Association (IARIA). Pages: 323–326. 
 
[H] Farshad Badie (2016): “A Conceptual Framework for Knowledge Creation Based 
on Constructed Meanings within Mentor-Learner Conversations”. In Smart Education 
and e-Learning 2016, Springer International Publishing. Volume 59 of the series 
Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies. ISBN: 978-3-319-39690-3. 
Pages:167–177. 
 
[I] Farshad Badie (2016): “Towards Concept Understanding relying on 
Conceptualisation in Constructivist Learning”. Proceedings of the 13th International 
Conference on Cognition and Exploratory Learning in Digital Age (Mannheim, 
Germany). ISBN: 978-989-8533-55-5. International Association for Development of 
the Information Society (IADIS). Pages: 292–296. 
 
[J] Farshad Badie (2017): “A Conceptual Framework over Contextual Analysis of 
Concept Learning within Human-Machine Interplays”. In Emerging Technologies for 
Education. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 10108. Springer International 
Publishing. ISBN: 978-3-319-52836-6. Pages: 65–74 (Proceedings of International 
Symposium on Emerging Technologies for Education. Rome, Italy) 
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[K] Farshad Badie (2017): “Towards Semantic Analysis of Mentoring-Learning 
Relationships within Constructivist Interactions”. In Emerging Technologies for 
Education. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 10108. Springer International 
Publishing. ISBN: 978-3-319-52836-6. Pages: 107–116 (Proceedings of 
International Symposium on Emerging Technologies for Education. Rome, Italy) 
 
[L] Farshad Badie (Accepted Chapter, 2017): “Knowledge Building 
Conceptualisation in Smart Constructivist Learning Systems”. Book title: “Smart 
Universities: Concepts, Systems, Research”. The Smart Innovation, Systems and 
Technologies book series. ISSN: 2190-3018. Springer International Publishing AG. 
 
[M] Farshad Badie (2017): “A Formal Semantics for Concept Understanding Relying 
on Description Logics”. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Agents 
and Artificial Intelligence (Porto, Portugal). Volume 2: ICAART. ISBN 978-989-
758-220-2. Pages 42–52 (This paper has been selected to be included in ‘Lecture 
Notes in Artificial Intelligence’, Springer) 
 
[N] Farshad Badie (Accepted Article, 2017): “On Logical Characterisation of Human 
Concept Learning based on Terminological Systems”. Journal of Logic and Logical 
Philosophy. ISSN: 2300-9802. Nicolaus Copernicus University. Poznań, Poland. 
 
[O] Farshad Badie (submitted, 2017): “Logical Foundation of Inductive Meaning 
Constructing in Constructivist Interactions”. 
 
[P] Farshad Badie (submitted, 2017): “From Concepts to Predicates within 
Constructivist Epistemology”. 
 
Figure a represents the logical relationships between the included papers and their 
significant products in different areas. In this network, all dashed arrows are 
expressing ‘supports’, e.g., Paper A supports Paper B.  
 
 
SECTION III. TERMINOLOGY  
 
This section proposes a covering terminology for the dissertation. Most of the terms 
are either defined by me or re-described in a revised version relevant to this research.  
 
APPENDICES  
 
This section is structured in two parts: 
 
 Appendix I (Clarifications) that clarifies some possible confusions. 
 Appendix II (Revisions) that reports some minor [contextual] changes in 
included articles.  
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Figure a. The Conceptual Relationships between Papers and their Final Contributions 
 
 
A THEORETICAL MODEL FOR MEANING CONSTRUCTION THROUGH CONSTRUCTIVIST CONCEPT LEARNING 
20 
PH.D. ACTIVITIES  
 
ONE  
 
This Ph.D. research has been carried out in the period October 2014 – April 2017 at 
the Department of Communication and Psychology, Faculty of Humanities at Aalborg 
University. The research was conducted alongside with obligatory Ph.D. courses that 
have been equal to 30 ECTS.  
 
TWO  
 
In parallel with my Ph.D. progress and publications, that are included in this 
dissertation, I have had fruitful collaborations with Hans Götzsche in our projects, (i) 
New Perspective on Semantics and (ii) Meaning of Language. These collaborations 
have been summarised in the following abstracts and papers. In these researches, I 
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SECTION I 
 
THE OUTLOOKS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART I. CONSTRUCTIVISM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constructivism is the philosophical and scientific position that knowledge arises 
through a process of active construction. 
(Mascolol & Fischer, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
Constructivism can be defined as a mapping from the phenomenon of ‘learning’ into 
individualistic knowledge structures. 
(Badie, 2017)
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1. THE PHENOMENON OF ‘LEARNING’  
 
The point of departure is my special focus on the phenomenon of ‘learning’. I shall 
begin with reviewing and summarising some significant definitions and notions of 
‘learning’. Subsequently, I will focus on conceptualising the summarisations in order 
to use them in my research.  
 
According to (Oxford Online Dictionaries, 2017), the term ‘learning’ is defined as 
“the acquisition of knowledge or skills through study, experience, or being taught”. 
Also, (Cambridge Online Dictionary, 2017) defines ‘learning’ as “the activity of 
obtaining knowledge”. According to (Wallace, 2015), learning, rather than teaching, 
is the central purpose of [any] education. It is usually defined as a change in someone’s 
behaviour, knowledge, level of skill, or understanding which is long-lasting or 
permanent and is acquired through experiences rather than through the process of 
growth or ageing. Regarding (Colman, 2015), learning is any lasting change in 
behaviour resulting from experience, especially conditioning. Furthermore, (Colman, 
2015) interprets learning as the act (or process) of acquiring knowledge or skill, or 
knowledge gained by study. According to (Honderich, 2005), ‘learning’ can be 
interpreted as the acquisition of a form of knowledge or ability through the use of 
experience. In addition, (Honderich, 2005) states that not all modifications of 
behaviour as a result of experience involve learning, although behaviourist theories of 
learning tend to assume otherwise. Furthermore, (Honderich, 2005) believes that it’s 
far from clear that changes of behaviour brought about by conditioning should be 
thought of as involving learning; the same applies to the biological phenomenon of 
‘imprinting’, whereby something that happens at a certain point of an animal’s life 
determines a subsequent form of behaviour. Considering (McFarland, 2014), the 
phenomenon of ‘learning’ can be interpreted as an irreversible change in response to 
particular stimuli, as opposed to the reversible changes that result from changes in 
motivation. (McFarland, 2014) also expresses that learning is characterised by 
changes in memory of the contiguity of stimuli and of the consequences of responding 
to stimuli. Finally, regarding (Hine and Martin, 2015), leaning is a process by which 
an animal’s experience may permanently alter their future behaviour, usually in a 
beneficial way. Also, (Hine and Martin, 2015) emphasises that the phenomena of 
‘learning’ and ‘memory’ are intimately interconnected, because new information can 
be linked to past experience recorded in memory and new associations formed.  
 
Taking into account the afore-mentioned descriptions, specifications, and 
characteristics of the phenomenon of ‘learning’, it shall be concluded that learning, 
as a process of acquiring knowledge through the use of experience, causes long-
lasting or permanent changes in an individual’s level of knowledge and depth of 
understanding. Note that it’s extremely important to interpret the phenomenon of 
‘learning’ as a ‘process’ and, in fact, as a ‘series of actions and changes’. In fact, we 
shall take into consideration that any process is a series of changes with some sort of 
unity, or unifying principle, to it. Hence ‘process’ is to ‘change’, or ‘event’, rather like 
‘syndrome’ is to ‘symptom’, see (Whitehead, 1979; Honderich, 2005). Consequently, 
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the process of ‘learning’ could produce different changes in any organism, and the 
produced changes could be relatively permanent, see (Schacter et al., 2009).  
 
It’s worth mentioning that ‘learning’ can be also interpreted as the involvement of the 
self, by any individual, in increasing knowledge about a phenomenon. This 
phenomenon could be a subject, object, process, or event. Accordingly, human beings 
could become concerned with [and be involved in] a learning process within their, 
e.g., education, schooling, storytelling, game playing, adventuring, consulting, 
training, and instructing. Actually, any learner can be characterised as an individual 
who attempts to be concerned with [and be involved in] the process of learning and, 
in fact, she/he tackles to do learning. In addition, any mentor can be described as an 
individual who opens the world to the learner and opens the learner to the world in 
order to support and guide the learner through the learning process. 
 
From a general point of view, human beings can be connected with the phenomenon 
of ‘learning’ based on either their specific goals or their own motivations and, in fact, 
learning could occur either as a goal-oriented or as a motivation-based process. There 
are many approaches in biology, genetics, neuropsychology, cognitive psychology, 
educational psychology, learning sciences, and pedagogical sciences that focus on 
analysing of the HowNess of occurrences of learning processes. 
 
 
 
 
A Country School. Painting by Edward Lamson Henry (1890), Yale University Art Gallery 
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2. LEARNING AND CONSTRUCTING    
 
As mentioned, learning can be interpreted as a process of acquiring knowledge (over 
experiences) that could cause long-lasting or permanent changes in an individual’s 
level of knowledge and depth of understanding. I shall, therefore, claim that the 
phenomenon of ‘learning’ could be interpreted as the process of constructing 
[something] and, in fact, as an ‘activity of construction’. It is worth mentioning that 
some approaches (like (Selvi, 2013)) define ‘learning’ as “the process of creating and 
constructing knowledge”. Correspondingly, the creation and construction of 
knowledge could be considered to be the main issues in the learning (and, of course, 
mentoring) processes. I take into consideration (Oxford Online Dictionaries, 2017) 
and (Cambridge Online Dictionary, 2017) and become more specific on the term 
‘construction’: 
 
 Construction is the action of building something or some structure. 
 The term ‘construction’ can express “the creation of an abstract entity”. For 
example, relying on this conception, we could say that languages play 
fundamental parts in human beings’ constructions of reality. It’s worth 
mentioning that there are ontological problems implied by saying that there 
exists ‘abstract entities’, see ‘abstract objects’ in (The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, 2017). 
 The term ‘construction’ is, indirectly, interrelated with the phenomenon of 
‘interpretation’ and, respectively, with the phenomenon of ‘explanation’. For 
example, we can say that “a passionate teacher could put a helpful construction 
upon her/his students’ questions”. 
 The term ‘construction’ has a specific usage in many languages and, in fact, it 
expresses the way in which the words (as parts and building blocks of 
sentences and phrases) are arranged and serialised. So, we can see that 
‘construction’ could be strongly related to (and dependent on) arrangements 
and serialisations.  
 
I shall, therefore, conclude that construction is an action and process of producing 
and making. It has strong interrelationships with interpretation, explanation, 
arrangement, and serialisation. 
 
Note that any expressed interpretation, as well as an explanation of the concept of 
‘learning’, could, subsequently, link the interpreter (and explainer) to some [more-
]specific denotations of ‘learning’, like, e.g., (i) interpreting ‘learning to learn’ (Nisbet 
and Shucksmith, 1984), (ii) interpreting ‘learning about learning’ (Säljö, 1979; 
Watkins et al., 2000), (iii) interpreting ‘learning how to learn’ (Novak and Gowin, 
1984), (iv) interpreting ‘learning to think’ (Ritchhart and Perkins, 2005), and (v) 
interpreting ‘how learning supports making and producing’ (Papert, 1993; 
Ackermann, 2002). Therefore, I shall conclude that understanding the phenomenon 
of ‘learning’ as ‘the activity of construction’, leads us to a number of categories, like, 
e.g., 
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a) constructing something for learning something,  
b) producing mental, logical, conceptual, and physical constructions of ‘learning’ 
something, 
c) producing mental, logical, conceptual, and physical constructions for 
describing how to learn something, 
d) producing mental, logical, conceptual, and physical constructions as the models 
of learning something, 
e) constructing models of thinking for supporting learning something, and 
f) sharing the concept of ‘construction’ through progressive internalisation of 
learners’ activities. 
 
 
 
 
Construction is the process of producing and making. It has strong interrelationships with 
interpretation, explanation, and arrangement.   
 
 
3. CONSTRUCTIVISM   
 
Constructivism has become the central backbone of my Ph.D. research. From a 
general perspective, according to (Cambridge Online Dictionary, 2017) and (Oxford 
Online Dictionaries, 2017), constructivism could be seen as a theory that (i) interprets 
learning as an active process. Also, according to this theory, (ii) people gain 
knowledge and understanding through the combination of their experiences and ideas. 
Obviously, the most significant presupposition is that constructivism is correlated 
with and corresponds to the process of building, making, and constructing. Therefore, 
it’s possible to relate ‘learning as an activity of construction’ to ‘constructivism’.  
 
It shall be stressed that constructivism as a style, movement, and HowNess can have 
various meanings and outcomes in different areas. Thus, I need to be very specific. 
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For this purpose, I shall focus on the relevant and underpinning conceptions and 
theories of a number of scientists, psychologists, and philosophers who influenced the 
concept of ‘constructivism’. Subsequently, I will uncover the key points, fundamental 
characteristics, and essences of constructivism, and thus, I will clarify what this 
dissertation means by constructivism. 
 
 
 
The Most Influential Constructivists  
3.1.  Giambattista Vico (1668–1744)  
 
Giambattista Vico was an Italian philosopher. It could be claimed that he was the first 
philosopher who proposed an explicit formulation of a constructivist theory of 
knowledge in his little-known Latin treatise, see (Vico, 1710). Vico coined the phrase 
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“verum est ipsum factum” and explained that “to know something means to know 
what parts it is made of and how they have been put together”, see (Glasersfeld, 1995). 
 
Ernst von Glasersfeld in (Glasersfeld, 1995) has written that “Vico’s notions that we 
can rationally know only what we ourselves have made, and that the knowledge of 
poets and myth-makers is of a different kind, fitted well between some of the 
disconnected ideas [about constructivism] in my head. Only very much later did I 
come to read Vico’s treatise on epistemology (1710), which, as far as I know, is a first 
explicit formulation of constructivism”. Regarding Vico’s ideas, the objective and 
ontological reality, therefore, may be known to a creator, who constructed it, but not 
to a person who has access only to subjective experiences. According to (Vico, 1710, 
Ch. l, par.III, 2), “This is the norm to which all human truths should be compared; this 
is to say, among human cognitions those are true, whose elements are within ourselves 
and co-ordinated by ourselves and which, by means of postulates we continue to 
produce ad infinitum; and as we put together these elements, we become the makers 
of the truths that we know by composing them”. 
 
3.2.  John Dewey (1859–1952) 
 
John Dewey was an American philosopher, psychologist, and educational reformer. 
Dewey is known as one of the main founders of functional psychology. He is 
especially well-known for his philosophical school of pragmatism. Dewey can be seen 
as the philosophical founder and the organiser of the philosophical foundations of 
constructivism, see (Jennings et al., 2016). In fact, he rejected the notion that learning 
environments should focus on repetitive and rote memorisation. Dewey suggested a 
method of ‘directed living’, according to which, students would engage in real-world, 
practical workshops in which they would demonstrate their knowledge through their 
creativities and collaborations. He believed that students should be provided with 
opportunities to think by themselves. Dewey believed that learning environments 
must be filled with real experiences. More specifically, he believed in ‘Experience 
and Education’ and, more deeply, he put ‘progressive education’ against ‘traditional 
education’. He wrote: “If you have doubts about how learning happens, engage in 
sustained inquiry: study, ponder, consider alternative possibilities and arrive at your 
belief grounded in evidence”, see (Ültanır, 2012). One may conclude that his main 
purpose of focusing on ‘progressive education’ was facilitating the naturally 
developing tendencies and potential of the children, see (Matthews, 2003). 
 
According to (Dewey, 1938; Dewey, 1998), and taking into consideration the 
conclusions of (Ültanır, 2012), the history of the theory of education has been shaped 
by two opposing ideas: the first idea expresses that education is an internal 
development based on the student’s natural talent. On the other hand, the second idea 
argues that education is a process of external building, independent from talent or 
abilities. This process is one in which tendencies are replaced by the process of habits 
gained with the help of external interventions. Taking Dewey’s school of pragmatism 
into account, I shall conclude that his pragmatist constructivism holds that the 
phenomena of ‘meaning’ and ‘truth’, with regard to multiple conceptions of learners 
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and mentors, are some functions of those conceptions’ practical outcomes. I shall, 
therefore, conclude that there can be strong conceptual connections between 
‘semantics’ and ‘pragmatics’ in the framework of constructivism. 
 
3.3.  Maria Montessori (1870–1952)  
 
Maria Montessori was an Italian physician and educator. She is acclaimed for her 
educational method that builds on the way children naturally learn. The field of 
Philosophy of Education bears her name as well, see (American Montessori Society, 
2016). She developed her educational method based on a few premises (see 
‘Montessori method’ in (Learning Theories, 2005–2016)) as follows: 
 
1. Montessori had a special respect for children’s choices and options. She believed 
that children must explore and discover the world in order to be prepared to 
become independent learners. This means that information shall not be presented 
to them from above. 
2. Montessori believed that children are, constantly, learning in an inherent process 
of their everyday life. What any child absorbs is highly dependent on what types 
of information and experiences cross her/his paths, see (Montessori, 1949). 
3. Montessori believed that children become ripe to learn different types of skills at 
specific points in their developments, see (Montessori, 1936). She believed that 
the age at which each sensitive period occurs varies from one child to another. In 
her opinion, teachers must be strongly aware of when the right time is to introduce 
concepts to each individual learner. 
4. Montessori believed that classrooms as well as any other learning environment 
should be filled with readily available and well-organised learning materials, 
should be aesthetically pleasing, and only include things that the teacher wants 
the child to experience and to learn about. Such an environment should contain 
materials that children of different ages, different personal characteristics and 
backgrounds, and different interests could all engage in. 
5. Montessori believed in educating children by themselves. It is also known as 
‘auto-education’. In her opinion, an appropriate learning environment gives 
multiple choices to learners. Additionally, different learners of different ages can 
assist and support, as well as collaborate with, each other through their learning 
processes. 
 
3.4.  Jean Piaget (1896–1980) 
 
Jean Piaget was a Swiss biologist and clinical psychologist. He is well-known for his 
theory of cognitive development and, especially, for his theory of children’s cognitive 
development. Piaget was highly interested in expressing the HowNess of ‘meaning 
making’ by human beings with regard to their own experiences and ideas of the world. 
According to that, he became concerned with the concept of ‘constructivism’. 
Regarding (Piaget, 1971), the fundamental principle of constructivism states that “the 
mind organises the world by organising itself”. Jean Piaget is known as a genetic 
epistemologist and cognitive constructivist. Genetic epistemology is a study of the 
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origins (genesis) of knowledge and it is strongly related to the developmental theory 
of knowledge, see (Berly, 1977; Vuyk, 1981; Driscoll, 1994). In fact, the central focus 
of genetic epistemology has been on relating ‘knowledge and its existence’ with ‘the 
individual human’s model of knowledge construction’. 
 
According to (Guenther, 1998; Merriam and Caffarella, 1991; Campbell, R. L., 2002), 
Piaget’s theory of constructivism stresses that the development of knowledge 
representation and manipulation is not genetically programmed into the brain of 
human beings. Jean Piaget used to observe children as young scientists who are driven 
to understand their world, and to change their understanding in the face of mistaken 
predictions about the world. Changes in knowledge structures drive changes in 
fundamental cognitive capabilities. According to Piaget this seemingly natural 
progression of cognitive capabilities emerges in an orderly way. This means that 
certain ways of thinking support subsequent ones. It shall be emphasised that the latter 
ones cannot emerge until the early ones have been mastered and specified. 
 
3.5.  Lev Vygotsky (1896–1934) 
 
Lev Vygotsky was a Soviet psychologist and his main focus area was developmental 
psychology. He was the founder of a theory of human cultural and bio-social 
development; commonly referred to as cultural-historical psychology, see (Vygotsky, 
1978a; Vygotsky, 1980; Wertsch, 1991; Crawford, 1996). In my opinion, Vygotsky’s 
theory has strongly developed constructivism with regard to the importance of 
humans’ social interactions.  
 
According to Vygotsky’s constructivist theory of learning described in (Learning 
Theories, 2005–2016), his social learning theory asserts three major themes regarding: 
 
a. social interactions,  
b. the more knowledgeable other, and 
c. the zone of proximal development.  
 
Vygotsky believed that the first theme, ‘social interaction’, plays a fundamental role 
in the process of humans’ cognitive development. In (Vygotsky, 1978a) he states: 
“Every function in the child’s cultural development appears twice: first, on the social 
level, and, later, on the individual level; first, between people (inter-psychological) 
and then inside the child (intra-psychological)”.  
 
Regarding the second theme, ‘the more knowledgable other’, he believed that the 
more knowledgable other (= MKO) refers to any individual who has a better 
understanding or a higher ability level than the learner with respect to a particular task, 
process or concept. According to the second theme, it could be assumed that MKO 
expresses ‘being a mentor as well as teacher, instructor, or tutor’.  
 
Finally, regarding the third theme, the zone of proximal development (= ZPD) is, in 
fact, the distance between a learner’s ability to perform a task under adult guidance 
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and/or with peer collaboration, and the learner’s abilities in solving the problems 
independently. It shall be emphasised that Vygotsky believed that the phenomenon of 
‘learning’ occurred in this zone. This means that the learners do learning in this zone, 
see (Vygotsky and Cole, 1978b; Stanlaw, 2005). 
 
3.6.  Heinz von Foerster (1911–2002) 
 
Heinz von Foerster was an Austrian-American physicist and philosopher. Together 
with Warren McCulloch (American neurophysiologist: 1898–1969), Norbert Wiener 
(American mathematician and philosopher: 1894–1964), John von Neumann 
(Hungarian-American mathematician, physicist and computer scientist: 1903–1957), 
and others, he was the architect of cybernetics. In particular, he was the developer of 
new (see (Pask, 1996)) or second-order cybernetics that focuses on (i) self-referential 
systems and (ii) the importance of eigen-behaviours for the explanation of complex 
phenomena.  Foerster tried to attach the origin of second-order cybernetics to classical 
cybernetics in order to construct a model of the mind, see “the Heinz von Foerster’s 
page on (Univie, 1996–2010)”.  
 
Foerster had essential influences on many cognitive scientists and radical 
constructivists. The ‘radical’ version of constructivism was developed, independently, 
by Heinz von Foerster and Ernst von Glasersfeld. Knowledge, from the perspective 
of radical constructivism, is not a representation of ‘objective’ facts, see (Foerster, 
1981; Segal, 2001). As a radical constructivist, Foerster believed that “Objectivity is 
a subject’s delusion that observing can be done without him. Involving objectivity is 
abrogating responsibility – hence its popularity”, cited in (Poerksen, 2004, p.3). See 
more about Foerster’s influences in (Foerster, 1973; Foerster, 1984; Stewart, 1994; 
Varela, 1995). 
 
3.7.  Ernst von Glasersfeld (1917–2010) 
 
Ernst von Glasersfeld was a German philosopher and psychologist. As mentioned 
earlier, the radical version of constructivism was developed independently by Foerster 
and Glasersfeld. Glasersfeld stated that “constructivism was introduced in the modern 
era by Jean Piaget as a way of thinking about cognition and knowledge, not as a 
metaphysical theory about what might exist”.  
 
Note that knowledge, through the lens of radical constructivism, is not a 
representation of objective facts and, respectively, of objective procedures. 
Knowledge, though, is a compendium of concepts, conceptual relationships, and rules 
that have proven useful in domesticating humans’ experiential world, see 
(Glasersfeld, 1989; Glasersfeld, 1990; Glasersfeld, 1992; Glasersfeld, 2001). 
Glasersfeld believed that “...learners construct understanding. They do not simply 
mirror and reflect what they are told or what they read. Learners look for meaning and 
will try to find regularity and order in the events of the world even in the absence of 
full or complete information”, see (Watzlawick, 1984) that is the English translation 
of (Glasersfeld, 1981; Glasersfeld, 1984).  
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The learners’ subjective interpretation of texts and mentors’ discourse and, thus, the 
subjective view of linguistically presented problems is increasingly being taken into 
account in educational practice and research (Glasersfeld, 1983). Such a constructivist 
perspective has noteworthy consequences. Glasersfeld in (Glasersfeld, 1995) wrote: 
“Twenty years ago, when Charles Smock and I put together our research report on 
epistemology and education, we chose as subtitle: ‘The implications of radical 
constructivism for knowledge acquisition’ (1974). It was the first time that the word 
‘radical’ was associated with Piaget’s genetic epistemology. Charles, who had worked 
with Piaget at Geneva, sent a copy of the report to the master. who had introduced the 
constructivist approach to cognition in the 1930s. A few weeks later, Charles received 
a most encouraging acknowledgment: ‘I always appreciate what you write,’ Piaget 
said, ‘you are one of the few Americans who have understood me’ (April, 1975) …”. 
 
3.8.  George Kelly (1905–1967) 
 
George Kelly was an American psychologist. He developed a theory of personality 
known as personal construct psychology whose focus has been on the distinctive ways 
in which individuals construct and reconstruct the meanings of their lives, see (Scheer, 
2016). Because of the breadth of Kelly’s approach, personal construct concepts and 
methods have been used to study such topics as cognitive complexity, psychological 
disturbance, the development and breakdown of close relationships, vocational 
decision making, education, and organisational behaviour. However, in keeping with 
Kelly’s original focus on psychotherapy, his thinking has had its greatest impact in 
the areas of clinical and counselling psychology. 
  
Regarding Kelly’s ‘personal construct theory (constructivism)’, human beings 
interpret and understand their world and, correspondingly, construct their own 
versions (conceptions) of reality. Kelly believed that any individual tries to understand 
the world in different ways, see (Kelly, 1955; Kelly, 1963).  
 
3.9.  Jerome Bruner (1915–2016) 
 
Jerome Bruner was an American psychologist and educationalist. According to 
Bruner’s theoretical framework, learning is an active process and learners construct 
their new ideas or concepts based upon their existing knowledge. He believed that 
‘knowing’ is how human beings get “beyond the information given” and, that 
knowing, getting to know the world, is not just perceiving something; it’s constructing 
it. This means that Bruner believed that learning, as an active process of construction, 
includes information selection and information transformation, decision making, 
generating hypotheses, and making meaning from information and experiences. 
Bruner’s theories emphasise the significance of categorisation (classification) in 
learning and, in fact, he believed that all cognitive activities of human beings involve 
categories. He stated that “To perceive is to categorize, to conceptualize is to 
categorize, to learn is to form categories, to make decisions is to categorize”. More 
specifically, Bruner believed that categorisation is the process of constructing and it 
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is dependent on representations and humans, by categorisation, make sense of their 
world. Furthermore, in his opinion, incoming information is organised in terms of pre-
existing categories, or humans create new ones. Where humans cannot perceive 
things, they go beyond the information given and make inferences based on what they 
do know, see (Bruner et al., 1956; Bruner, 1974; Bruner, 1986; Bruner, 1990; 
Lefrancois, 1995; Bruner and Kalmar, 1998).  
 
For Bruner, interpreting information and experiences by similarities and differences 
was a key concept. It could be assumed that his central focus was on ‘Constructivism 
and Discovery Learning’. There are four features of Bruner’s theory of instruction: 
 
a) ‘Predisposition to learn’ that, as a feature, specifically states the experiences 
which move the learner towards a love of learning in general, or of learning 
something in particular. 
b) ‘Structure of knowledge’ that expresses that it’s possible to structure 
knowledge in a way that enables the learner to most readily grasp the 
information. 
c) ‘Modes of representation’ (e.g., visual representations, words, and symbols), 
and 
d) ‘Effective sequencing’ that expresses no one sequencing will fit every 
learner, but in general, increasing difficulty. Sequencing, or lack of it, can 
make learning easier or more difficult, see (Bruner, 1960).  
 
Jerome Bruner proposed, based on his theory of constructivism, a discovery-oriented 
approach in schools. According to that, learning is developed as a process of 
constructing new ideas based on current/past knowledge. Students are encouraged to 
discover the facts and relationships for themselves and continually build on what they 
already know. 
 
3.10.  Paul Watzlawick (1921–2007) 
 
Paul Watzlawick was an Austrian theoretician in communication theory and radical 
constructivism. He supervised the publication of (Watzlawick, 1984) as one of the 
most important contributions to constructivism. According to Watzlawick, “Radical 
constructivism, thus, is radical because it breaks with convention and develops a 
theory of knowledge in which knowledge does not reflect an objective ontological 
reality”.  
 
3.11.  Edgar Morin (1921– …) 
 
Edgar Morin is a French sociologist and epistemologist. He is especially well-known 
for his researches and theories in “complexity [of thoughts]”. His research areas have 
been politics, sociology, education, systems biology, and visual anthropology, see 
(Morin, 2001; Morin and Montuori, 2008). 
 
3.12.  Humberto Maturana (1928– …) 
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Humberto Maturana is a Chilean biologist. He was one of the designers of the second-
order cybernetics. He is well-known for creating the term ‘autopoiesis’. This term 
expresses a living system which re-organises itself. Such a system is self-generating 
and has a self-maintaining structure, see (Maturana and Varela, 1973/1980). 
Maturana’s work has influenced the concept of ‘constructivism’ in systems’ thinking 
and cybernetics. 
 
4. WHAT DOES THIS RESEARCH MEAN BY CONSTRUCTIVISM? 
 
As presented above, there are a number of scholars in different areas who have 
influenced the concept of ‘constructivism’. Anyway, it must be accepted that Jean 
Piaget was the introducer of the theory of constructivism. As mentioned, Glasersfled 
believed that “constructivism was introduced in the modern era by Jean Piaget as a 
way of thinking about cognition and knowledge”. Accordingly, the relevant chapters 
of this dissertation have cited Piaget as the originator of the theory of constructivism 
as well as the constructivist theory of learning. In the following I shall extract the most 
significant characteristics of constructivism in this research. The following itemised 
characteristics (under A and B) are conceptualised based on (i) my articles’ outcomes 
regarding the concept of ‘constructivism’, and (ii) the theories of Dewey, Montessori, 
Piaget, Vygotsky, Glasersfeld, Kelly, and Bruner (I am personally in favour of the 
theories of Piaget, Vygotsky and Bruner). The following items represent the most 
significant characteristics of ‘the constructivist model of knowing’ and ‘the 
constructivist model of learning’ in my dissertation. 
 
A. The Constructivist Model of Knowing 
 
1. Constructivism is an epistemology and is strongly supported by the study of the 
origins (genesis) of knowledge. Accordingly, it is a style of thinking about the 
phenomenon of ‘knowledge’. More specifically, the philosophy of constructivism 
focuses on epistemological junctions between the phenomena of ‘knowledge’ and 
‘cognition’.  
 
2. Constructivist epistemology is strongly concerned with the questions of 
 
a. how to know and to produce ‘knowing’?   
b. how knowledge may reasonably be constructed? 
 
3. The central focus of constructivist epistemology is on the origin of any 
individual’s constructed knowledge. Accordingly, any constructed knowledge is 
recognised to be idiosyncratic.  
 
4. Constructivism deals with ‘the developmental theory of knowledge’ and with 
‘how knowledge may reasonably be assumed to be built up in an individual’s 
cognitive systems’.  
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5. The most significant attribute of the constructivist model of knowing is that there 
are strong interrelationships between the phenomenon of ‘knowledge’ and ‘the 
individualistic constructed and to-be-constructed models of knowledge’.  
 
6. Constructivism expresses that any mind organises the world by organising itself. 
It is a philosophical viewpoint on how humans’ minds form and modify their 
personal understandings of reality. Consequently, it shall be taken into account 
that the phenomenon of ‘understanding’ cannot be imposed on a human being 
from outside (e.g., from other agents), because it only comes from the human’s 
within.  
 
7. In the framework of constructivism, human beings interpret and, subsequently, 
understand their world. This means they can construct their own versions of the 
world based on their own conceptions.  
 
8. In the framework of constructivism, there are very strong correlations  
 
a. between ‘constructing’ and ‘interpreting’, and  
b. between ‘constructing’ and ‘explaining’.  
 
9. In the framework of constructivism, human beings, relying on their own 
conceptualisations of the world, provide supportive backgrounds for producing 
their own understandings. 
 
10. Social Constructivism is a sociological theory of knowledge. According to that, 
the constructivist epistemology could be applied in social forms. Any human’s 
construction(s) in the framework of ‘social constructivism’ doesn’t negate her/his 
self-development and self-regulation, but, on the other hand, this kind of 
construction can aid the human beings in promoting the quality as well as 
supporting the HowNess of their self development processes.  
 
11. In the framework of constructivism, human beings construct their own meanings 
with regard to their own conceptions of the world.  
 
12. In the framework of constructivism, the semantic phenomenon of ‘meaning’ can 
be recognised as a function from any individual’s conceptions into her/his own 
updated and developed conceptions.  
 
13. In the framework of constructivism, the constructed meanings by any individual 
become, directly, reflected in her/his personal understandings of the world.  
 
B. The Constructivist Model of Learning 
 
14. In the framework of constructivism, the phenomenon of ‘learning’ is interpreted 
as an active and dynamic process of knowledge construction. 
 
A THEORETICAL MODEL FOR MEANING CONSTRUCTION THROUGH CONSTRUCTIVIST CONCEPT LEARNING 
44
 
15. In the framework of constructivism, the process of ‘learning’, as a role of the 
individual ‘learner’, corresponds strongly with her/his own constructed ‘model of 
knowing’. Therefore, it shall be assumed that knowledge is not passively 
received, but, it can be—dynamically—built up. 
 
16. Constructivist learning is learner-centered and progressive. It states that the 
phenomenon of ‘learning’ is not an output of a process and it’s not a product of a 
development. Constructivist learning does, however, recognise the phenomenon 
of ‘learning’ as a development. 
 
17. According to constructivist learning, any learner must be driven to understand the 
world and to change her/his understanding in the face of mistaken predictions 
about the world. It shall be stressed that constructivist learning highly respects 
any individual learner’s choices, admirations, and backgrounds.  
 
18. Constructivist learning is strongly concerned with any individual human’s  
 
a. self-organisation and re-organisation and, respectively, self development, 
b. self-regulation, and 
c. auto-education.  
 
19. Constructivist learning motivates any individual learner to explore and discover 
the world by her(him)self. We shall take into consideration that these explorations 
are how learners can make sense of the world and of themselves.  
 
20. In the framework of constructivism, learners must be given open-ended problems.  
 
21. In the framework of constructivism, knowledge could be interpreted to be 
constructed over humans’  
 
a. constructed concepts and their produced conceptions,  
b. constructed conceptual relationships between concepts and, subsequently, 
between their own conceptions, and  
c. produced rules based on their inferences and reasoning processes.  
 
Note that all these items become constructed and produced though humans’ 
[experience-based] constructed world.  
 
22. In the framework of constructivism, learners must be allowed to express their 
own conceptions of the world. Their existing conceptions must be taken 
seriously. If not, learners will revert back to their own conceptions of the world 
outside of the learning environment.   
 
23. In the framework of constructivism, learners 
 
a. relate their new conceptions to their pre-conceptions and experiences, 
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b. integrate their knowledge into interrelated conceptual structures,  
c. design personal patterns for themselves, and 
d. reflect on their own understanding of the world. 
 
24. In the framework of constructivism, learners construct their own meanings [of 
what they learn] with regard to their own experiences and conceptions of the 
world.  
 
25. In the framework of constructivism, a mentor is an individual who has higher 
abilities in particular domains. She/he must be interpreted as an advanced learner. 
Mentors are required to act as facilitators whose main functions are to help 
learners become active participants and constructors.  
 
26. In the framework of constructivism, the process of mentoring proceeds towards 
developing constructed knowledge structures.  
 
27. Any constructivist interaction and conversational exchange between a learner and 
her/his mentor as well as other learner(s) share multiple conceptions, cognitive 
contents, and understandings with varying degrees of consciousness and 
intentionality between them.  
 
28. Any constructivist interaction and conversational exchange can be interpreted as 
agents’ co-activations consisting of their shared actions and transactions. More 
specifically, both agents and, in fact, constructors, are concerned with their co-
activations (i.e., their collaborations, co-operations, and co-ordinations), see 
(Allwood, 2013). In such a framework, mentor and learner exchange questions, 
answers, actions, and transactions concerning their multiple descriptions, 
specifications, explanations, and justifications.  
 
29. Any learner, through her/his constructivist interactions and conversational 
exchanges, can  
 
a. construct her/his personal model (i.e., mental representation as well as 
mental construction) of knowledge, and 
b. explore the key elements that could lead her/his progress to the creation and 
shared understanding of various phenomena.  
 
4.1.  CONSTRUCTIONISM  
 
As mentioned, interpreting the phenomenon of ‘learning’, could also link us to some 
[more-]specific denotations of ‘learning’. For example, we can have various 
interpretations of (i) learning to learn, (ii) learning about learning, (iii) learning how 
to learn, and (iv) how learning supports making and producing. Such concepts are 
mainly interpretable by ‘constructionism’. The central focus of constructionism, as a 
learning theory, is on the constructivist presupposition that ‘learners create, as well as 
develop, their own constructions of knowledge by constructing their personal 
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conceptualisations and conceptual (as well as mental) representations’. It could be 
assumed that the central focus of constructionism is on: 
 
a. conceptualising the phenomenon of ‘learning’, and 
b. learning how a human being can learn.  
 
Papert’s theory of constructionism is concerned more with the ‘art of learning’.  
Papert’s constructionism is strongly related with ‘making’ and ‘productivity’ through 
learning processes, see (Papert, 1993; Ackermann, 2002).  Papert was interested in 
interpreting and expressing how learners could relate themselves with either their own 
or other’s knowledge construction(s). Consequently, he was interested in analysing 
how these relations ultimately facilitate the construction of more-organised 
knowledge structures.  
 
In my opinion, constructivism and constructionism are not two distinct and separated 
concepts, but they are strongly tied together and support each other. Actually, 
constructionism is a constructivist learning theory as well. The most significant 
mutual goals of constructivism and constructionism is creating one’s own knowledge 
by constructing conceptual (and mental) representations. Conceptual representations 
might be recognised to be of the most important cognitive functions in human beings, 
see (Hampton and Moss, 2003). Furthermore, it shall be taken into account that 
constructionism is a complement for constructivism. This means that constructionism 
shares constructivism’s view of learning as ‘building knowledge structures’ through 
progressive internalisation of processes. It’s plausible to conclude that:  
 
• the main idea of constructionism is that human beings learn effectively through 
creating, constructing, and developing [by themselves].  
 
At this point, I shall stress that what I have analysed, and will analyse, under the label 
of ‘constructivism’, could be expressed by constructionism (and to be shared with 
constructionism) as well. In fact,  
 
a. the most central framework of this PhD research has been ‘constructivist model 
of knowing and constructivist theory of learning’, and 
b. the constructivist model of knowing has analysed ‘personal knowledge building 
by constructing personal conceptual representations’. 
 
It shall be taken into consideration that the afore-mentioned items could be believed 
to cover constructionism as well. 
 
5. CONSTRUCTIVISM AND MEANING CONSTRUCTION  
The meaning of something is what it expresses or represents, see (Cambridge Online 
Dictionary, 2017). Meanings are related to the importance, value, worthiness, 
authentication, authenticity, and precision of what they express. A process of 
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meaning making by a human being, or so-called ‘meaning construction’, is strongly 
related to her/his own ‘interpretation’ and ‘construing’, see (Ignelzi, 2000).  
 
Human beings, by constructing meanings for themselves, move towards making sense 
of their world, their lives, their goals, and themselves. It can be assumed that there is 
a logical bi-directional relationship between ‘meaning construction’ and 
‘constructivism’. According to (Hein, 1999), ‘meaning construction’ and 
‘constructivism’ are related to each other in important ways. These two concepts can 
be realised to be the conclusions of each other in different contexts.  
 
The modern educational and pedagogical theories have stressed the learners’ active 
interconnections with the phenomenon of ‘learning’ and with their active 
participations in ‘learning environments’. It’s undeniable that significant 
contributions of modern researches in learning and knowledge acquisition sciences 
have been achieved based on special focuses on the processes that human beings use 
and/or become concerned with, more than based on the structure and context of the 
material to be learned. It shall be taken into consideration that all humans, constantly, 
organise and select the information their senses take in from the natural world as well 
as from the symbolic and cultural worlds of words, signs, and symbols. This is how 
any individual human being makes sense of her/his world.  
 
Meaning construction and making sense of the world is beyond ‘learning’, but it is all 
about being ‘human’, being intelligent, and having interaction with self and with the 
environment. As mentioned, Piaget believed that human beings, with regard to their 
own experiences and ideas of the world, become concerned with meaning making. 
Piaget strongly believed in construction of meanings by human beings with regard to 
their own made senses of the reality and conceptions of the world. I assume that 
Piaget’s belief in the concept of ‘meaning construction’ motivated him to focus on the 
development of his theory of constructivism. Piaget’s theory of constructivism argues 
that humans produce knowledge and form meanings based upon their experiences.  
 
In this dissertation, ‘meaning construction’ is considered the most significant task of 
constructivist learning. This means that ‘meaning construction’ is located at the center 
of constructivist learning/mentoring processes. In my theoretical model, learning is 
 
 an active and dynamic process of knowledge construction, 
 a role of learners that corresponds with their own constructed models of 
knowing, and  
 strongly correlated with learners’ own built-up constructions of meanings.  
 
More specifically, human beings construct meanings in order to make proper linkages 
between ‘their conceptions of the world’ and ‘their understandings of the world’. 
More clearly, in the framework of constructivism, there are strong connections 
amongst  
 
a. Models of Knowings,  
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b. Knowledge Construction, 
c. Meaning Construction, and  
d. Meaningful Understanding Production 
 
According to Figure 1, the produced meaningful understandings are supported by 
constructed meanings. Also, the constructed meanings are created and developed by 
the constructed knowledge as well as the models of knowings. It shall be emphasised 
that ‘any constructed knowledge by an individual is an outcome of her/his modelled 
knowings’. In other words, the constructed knowledge has strong roots in how 
humans, mentally, shape and sketch what they know. In addition, as the most 
significant conclusion of Figure 1, it must be stated that the constructed meanings are 
conceptual as well as semantic linkages between the constructed knowledge and the 
produced understandings. 
 
It shall be claimed that the constructed meanings by any individual human being are 
the basic materials of her/his produced meaningful understandings. This conception 
is highly in line with (Selvi, 2013). For example, Selvi has stated that (i) ‘knowing’ 
refers to making meanings and (ii) ‘knowing’ is the creative process of becoming 
‘self-being’ in life-world. In addition, he has expressed that (iii) learning is the way 
of knowing that occurs during the search for meaning, which is an individualistic 
process.  
 
At this point, I also feel the need to pick up a quote by Bruner that states: “In reference 
to right answers – Knowing is a process, not a product”. In my opinion, “knowing, as 
an active process of ‘being a human’, formulates and constructs meanings in order to 
become valuable and influential and, consequently, to support meaningful 
understandings”.  
 
 
Figure 1. From Knowing to Understanding in the Framework of Constructivism  
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5.1.  MEANINGS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF CONSTRUCTIVISM  
 
In this research, meanings are ‘conceptual structures’. As such, in the framework of 
constructivism, meanings, to a large extent, influence the individuals’ constructions 
and developments of their personal experiential reality and even their fictions. Hence, 
in the framework of constructivism, meanings, as conceptual structures, are 
constructed based on conceptual entities. Additionally, meanings, as open-ended 
conceptual structures, are shaped based on undetermined numbers of developments 
and updatings of the linked collection(s) of the conceptual entities. By a metaphor, 
any conceptual entity could be described as a building block of a conceptual structure. 
Furthermore, in my opinion, conceptual entities are made of mental entities. More 
specifically, regarding my theoretical model, human beings’ mental images of 
conceptual entities are visualised based on their mental structures. Also, the mental 
structures are constructed based on the mental entities.  
 
At this point, I shall stress that we can have different conceptions of conceptual 
entities and, of course, there is no absolute schema for conceptual entities. In my 
theoretical model, any conceptual entity is known as what some approaches, like, e.g., 
(Bartlett, 1932; Peacocke, 1992; Zalta, 2001), have called ‘concepts’. Therefore, in 
my model, any conceptual entity, as a representation of a part of reality/fiction in 
individual’s mind, is a building block of a meaning. In parallel, we cannot have an 
absolute conception of mental entities. As Piaget argued, all learning was mediated 
by the construction of mental entities (schemata). I also believe that these mental 
entities are equivalent to what I have expressed under the label ‘mental entities’, see 
Figure 2. I will propose a more specific description of Figure 2 in Part II 
(Constructivist Concept Learning).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. From Meanings to Schemata in the Framework of Constructivism 
 
5.2. MEANING CONSTRUCTION IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERACTIONS  
 
Constructivism has a stable root in the analysis of communication between language 
users, see (Postlethwaite and Husén, 1994). According to (Shannon, 1948), Shannon’s 
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mathematical theory of communication confirmed that only directives of choice and 
combination could travel and be transformed between communicators, but not the 
meanings that have to be ‘selected’ and ‘combined’ to interpret a message. Therefore, 
it shall be taken into consideration that any human being, as a language user, builds 
up her/his own meanings on the basis of her/his individual experiences. Hence, the 
meanings remain subjective and internal; no matter how much any constructed 
meaning becomes modified, developed, and homogenised through the subject’s 
interactions with other humans.  
 
In the context of social interactions, learners internalise their constructed meanings. 
Respectively, they construct their personal meanings with regard to their interactions 
with other agents and, thus, they internalise those meanings. This seems to be in line 
with Vygotsky’s analysis of meaning making processes, see (Holbrook, 2012).  
 
In the context of human-human communications and interactions, every individual 
constructs her/his own experiential reality and, respectively, produces her/his own 
realisation and meaningful understanding. For example, one can find some 
applications of this approach in psychotherapy, e.g., (Elkaïm, 1983; Keeney, 1983), 
or some approaches in literary studies, e.g., (Schmidt, 1983). According to (Schmidt, 
1983), meanings are not materially inherent in words as well as texts which are 
becoming transformed between agents, but they must be supplied by any human from 
her/his individual stores of experiential abstractions.  
 
 
 
Meaning influences one’s constructions of her/his personal experiential reality/fiction 
(Painting: Sun in Hand by Ian Lee Oliver) 
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PART II. CONSTRUCTIVIST CONCEPT 
LEARNING 
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1. CONCEPTS 
 
As you will see in section II, there has always been a general problem concerning the 
sense, notion, and concept of ‘concepts’, in linguistics, psychology, philosophy, and 
computer science. Over the years, the concept of ‘concepts’ has not been used 
consistently and it is not always transparent 
 
 if concepts are some mental representations (images) of various phenomena, or 
 whether they always have to be bound up with some linguistic expression (in 
order to be expressed).  
There is no doubt that the concept of ‘concepts’ is rather vague and imprecise. Note 
that this research doesn’t deal with the historical and basic epistemological treatment 
of concepts. This is taken up by, e.g., (Gauker, 2011) including the modern relevance 
of the historical notions. This dissertation, regarding the heuristic question of how 
knowledge may reasonably and logically be assumed to be constructed by a human 
being in order to be meaningful and be understood, focuses on logical 
conceptualisation of concepts. In order to conceptualise a concept from the 
perspective of logics, we need to consider it as a logical-assessable phenomenon (e.g., 
logical mathematical phenomenon). Consequently, such a logical-assessable 
phenomenon can be applied to different contexts, e.g., learning and knowledge 
acquisition systems.  
 
My research has aimed at providing a conceptual, logical, terminological, and 
semantic analysis of the application of concepts and thus, I have needed to assume 
concepts’ usages in order to be comprehensible in descriptions, theorisations, and 
logical formalism. In this research, ‘concepts’ are the main conceptual constituents. 
They have been considered as the primary and fundamental units of humans’ 
[background and to-be-constructed] knowledge, and as the basic materials of humans’ 
[pre-constructed and to-be constructed] meanings. I have decided to focus on the 
concept of ‘concepts’ and assess them through the lenses of Predicate Logic and Set 
Theory. This means I have perceived any concept as a ‘class’. In fact, a concept has—
mainly—been utilised, analysed, and applied as a ‘set’ or as a ‘collection of multiple 
sets’. Accordingly, I have assumed that any individual phenomenon, as a member of 
a class, holds its own characteristics and attributes. Respectively, all members of a 
class share, at least, one significant characteristic with each other. The common 
characteristic(s) which is/are sharable by: 
 
i. all members of a class (as elements of a set), and  
ii. all sub-classes of a class (as subsets of a set)  
 
could be seen as the conceptual label(s)/index(es) of that class. In addition, different 
classes are relatable to each other by means of logical symbols and operations. My 
included articles in Section II, either directly or indirectly, focus on denotational 
(extensional) and connotational (intensional) aspects in learning contexts. 
Specifically, the articles (M, N, O) focus on logical analysis of these aspects. 
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1.1.  MANAGING CONCEPTS 
 
My theoretical model has focused on concepts through the lenses of Predicate Logic 
and Set Theory. This means that my model is strongly dependent on the concept of 
‘classification’. I have also had a special attention to the concept of ‘induction’. 
Correspondingly, the model expresses that human beings’ reasoning processes are 
mainly structured over their mental abilities of classification and induction. 
Consequently, (a) Classification-based Learning and (b) Induction-based Learning 
(Inductive Learning) are the most central reasoning as well as learning theories within 
my approach. You will see that Concept Learning has been specified and analysed 
based upon these two theories and relying on a constructivist model of learning.   
 
 
 
There has always been a general problem concerning the sense, notion and concept of 
‘concepts’. 
 
2. CLASSIFICATION-BASED LEARNING 
 
This section focuses on the question of how we can find a conceptual and 
epistemological linkage between the concepts of ‘classification’ and ‘constructivism’. 
According to Bruner, “To perceive is to categorise, to conceptualise is to categorise, 
to learn is to form categories, to make decisions is to categorise”. In his opinion, there 
are bi-conditional and supportive relationships between the phenomenon of 
‘classification’ and the phenomena of ‘perceivedness’, ‘conceptualisation’, ‘learning’, 
and ‘decision making’. More particularly, 
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a. there is a strong correlation between ‘perceiving something’ and ‘classifying 
that thing’, and 
b. conceptualising something is strongly related with classifying that thing and 
considering it as a member of a class.  
 
These two items are highly in line with my ideas. I shall draw your attention to the 
most important points regarding the classification-based learning theory in the 
framework of constructivism, 
 
 In the framework of constructivist epistemology, the classification-based 
learning, as a theory of reasoning and learning, assesses concepts as ‘classes’. 
According to ontological conceptions, ‘classes’ could be seen as ‘entities’. In my 
opinion, constructivist epistemology interprets these entities as ‘conceptual 
entities’, see Figure 2 (that was presented in Part I). 
 
 There are, of course, ontological problems implied by saying that ‘concepts’ are 
‘materials’ and, subsequently, they are the makers of the phenomenon of 
‘semantics’. Taking the phenomenon of ‘class’ into consideration, I shall specify 
this conception and say that, in the framework of constructivist epistemology, the 
theory of classification-based learning can interpret ‘concepts’ as: 
  
a. basic materials of meanings, and 
b. fundamental constructors of semantics.  
 
 In the framework of constructivist epistemology, the theory of classification-
based learning can provide a supportive background for concepts to become 
‘manifested’ and, accordingly, to become ‘expressed’.  
 
 In the framework of constructivism, the phenomenon of ‘classification’ can be 
interpreted as a ‘process of constructing’. 
 
 In the framework of constructivism, the concept of ‘constructing’ is highly 
interrelated with the concept of ‘representation’. 
 
 In the framework of constructivism, any ‘classification’ corresponds to an 
‘assignment’. In other words, ‘classifying’, as a task as well as role of human 
beings, deals with their ‘assigning’. 
 
 In the framework of constructivism, classifications are actualised with regard to 
one’s determined and specified labels on the basis of her/his own 
‘conceptualisations’. 
 
 In the framework of constructivism, humans create multiple either related or non-
related classes in their minds in order to construct as well as develop knowledge 
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based on those classes. Respectively, they can construct and develop knowledge 
based on the members of those classes.  
 
 The previous process might be activated inversely. In fact, humans may move 
from the elements of classes (‘children’) to the main classes (‘parents’) in order 
to focus on developing their constructed knowledge.  
 
 In the framework of constructivism, classes are representable in the form of 
conceptual entities in individuals’ minds and within their own conceptual 
structures. More specifically, classifications are strongly dependent on mental 
representations of one’s constructed as well as to-be-constructed conceptual 
constructions, see Figure 2.  
 
 In the framework of constructivism, the mental structures become built up based 
on mental entities (schemata), see Figure 2. 
 
 In the framework of constructivism, the concept of ‘construction’ can express 
‘the creation of an abstract entity’. Accordingly, there is a logical equivalence 
between 
 
a. the creation of an abstract entity, and 
b. the creation of a class as a conceptual entity.  
 
 In the framework of constructivism, there is a strong bi-conditional relationship 
between 
 
a. classification (classifying a phenomenon as belonging to a class) regarding 
hierarchical viewpoints, and 
b. construction (providing a mental construction and representation of a 
phenomenon).  
 
 In the framework of constructivism and through the process of classification-
based learning, the notions of ‘classification’, ‘representation’, ‘construction’, 
and ‘abstraction’ are linked with each other. 
 
 In the framework of constructivism, human beings, with regard to their own 
conceptions of the world, make their own sense of the world by their own 
classification and, subsequently, their own construction processes based on their 
own conceptual structures, conceptual entities, mental representations, mental 
structures, and mental entities, see Figure 2.  
 
3. INDUCTION-BASED LEARNING 
 
Through induction-based (= inductive) reasoning, human beings extrapolate and 
analogise their own body of evidences, which are achieved based on their own 
experiments, to more extended situations in the form of logical conclusions. Inductive 
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reasoning as well as inductive learning processes based on the concept of ‘induction’ 
provide the humans with a mental system of evidential support that extends the 
concept of ‘deduction’, as well as the process of deductive reasoning, to less-than-
certain inferences. Note that deductive reasoning is the process of reasoning from a 
set of established, certain, and meaningful logical premises. 
 
Human beings construct logical (and meaningful) premises for their own inductive 
inferences/arguments in order to become prepared to be capable of providing some 
degree of support for coming up with their own logical (and meaningful) conclusions. 
Therefore, it’s assumed that the obtained meaningful conclusions work as conceptual 
as well as logical linkages between their own body of evidences and their own 
meaningful understandings, see Figure 3.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Meanings within Inductive Reasoning (and Learning)  
4. CONCEPT LEARNING  
 
In this research, the expression ‘Concept Learning’ will be analysed based upon the 
concepts of ‘classification’ and ‘induction’. The mechanism is assumed to be 
supported by the supposition that the generated logical premises presumed any 
individual human being are collectable, classifiable, and archivable in her/his mind. 
Therefore, these are some important assumptions: 
 
 Through concept learning processes, the quality and HowNess of mental 
representations of logical premises are collectable, classifiable, and serialisable 
in the form of ‘hypotheses’ in order to be induced.  
 
 Any human being deals with specification, with various degrees of complexities, 
of her/his own conceptualisations through her/his concept learning processes.  
 
 Concept learning is meaningful and activable  
 
a. based on humans’ preconceptions,  
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b. over humans’ background knowledge with regard to their own 
conceptualisations of significant characteristics and properties of concepts, 
and 
c. through experiencing various groups of examples [that share the central 
characteristics] of those concepts. 
 
5. CONSTRUCTIVIST CONCEPT LEARNING 
 
Certainly, there is no compelling reason to claim that concept learning must 
necessarily be structured based on the processes supported by constructivism. I do, 
though, strongly believe that there is a considerable epistemological junction between 
constructivism and concept learning that could support me in assessing and 
interpreting ‘concept learning’ with regard to a constructivist model of knowing as 
well as learning. Concerning this epistemological interconnection, the following 
conclusions can be offered: 
 
 Constructivism as an epistemological framework is capable of generating 
Constructivist Concept Learning, see Figure 4. 
 
 Constructivist Concept Learning might be seen as any individual’s conditional 
reasoning with regard to her/his own pre-constructed, constructed, and to-be-
constructed concepts.  
 
 Relying on the previous conclusion, Concept Learning is theorisable as one’s 
conditional reasoning with regard to her/his own pre-conceptions, conceptions, 
and to-be-expressed conceptions of the world. 
 
 In the framework of constructivist concept learning, the conceptual and logical 
interrelationships between ‘meanings (as conceptual structures)’ and ‘concepts 
(as basic materials)’ establish a kind of semantics based upon humans’ personal 
conceptions of the world.  
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Figure 4. The Structure of Constructivist Concept Learning 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Regarding constructivism as a learning philosophy and/or a model of knowing, a 
person (learner or mentor) based on her/his preconceptions and on personal knowings 
could actively participate in an interaction with another person (learner or mentor) in 
order to construct her/his personal knowledge. In this research, I will analyse 
‘meaning construction’ in the framework of constructivism. I will focus on a semantic 
loop that the learner and mentor as intentional participants move through and organise 
their personal constructed conceptions in order to construct meanings and produce 
their individual meaningful comprehensions. Subsequently, I will provide a semantic 
framework for analysing the process of meaning construction based on personal 
knowings and personal conceptions within constructivist interactions. This research 
could propose a new scheme for interpretation based on semantics and on interaction. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
An interaction between learners and mentors as intentional participants could 
exchange questions and answers concerning, e.g., description, specification, 
explanation, argumentation, analysing, justification, formulation, theorising etc. The 
multilevel agreement-oriented interactions among learners and mentors could be 
considered, be interpreted and be analysed based on the models of the underlying 
processes involved in complex human learning. As such they could be seen as a 
radical constructivist account of human cognition and comprehension. They are 
actually shaping a kind of ontology of human beings. They enable learners (and 
mentors) to develop their own understandings of the complex real underlying 
systematic processes, and also of themselves, see (Scott, 2001). Learning based on 
constructivism with reference to Conversation Theory, which is designed by Gordon 
Pask, the enterprise begins with the negotiation of an agreement between learners and 
mentors to converse about a given domain and learn about some particular topics and 
skills in that domain. It could work as an explanatory, heuristic and developmental 
framework. For more detailed information see (Pask, 1975; Pask, 1980).  
 
In fact, learning based on constructivism could heuristically be concerned with the 
questions focusing on ‘What is/does ...?’, ‘Why is/does ...?’ and ‘How is/does …?’. A 
person whose insights are based on her/his pre-structured knowledge, personal 
knowings and preconceptions may ask these heuristic questions and ask the 
interlocutor to produce some heuristic answers or some modified heuristic questions. 
What could be offered by learning based on constructivist interaction is a framework 
for thought and a semantic model to account for the emergence of the domain of 
human conceptual knowledge. As an abstract model, it is able to explain how the 
interactions lead humans to construct personal knowledge. In this framework, the 
learner (mentor) manages to construct her/his personal knowledge within interaction. 
Consequently, she/he gains an opportunity to attain a deeper personal understanding 
and greater motivation. According to constructivism, a learner is highly concerned 
with active ‘creation’ of personal mental structures. Constructivism requires 
negotiation of ‘meaning’ and ‘reflection’ of prior and new knowledge. Jean Piaget, 
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the originator of constructivism, argued that all learning was mediated by the 
construction of ‘mental objects’ that he called ‘schemata’. For Piaget, schemata first 
emerge as concrete actions and then gradually develop into more abstract and 
conceptual mental entities, see (Husén and Postlethwaite, 1989; Spiro et al., 1992; 
McGaw and Peterson, 2007; Sawyer, 2014). 
 
In this research, I will, from a new perspective, analyse meaning construction as the 
most significant production of learning based on constructivism. I will analyse the 
semantic loop that the learner (and mentor) move through in order to construct their 
personal meanings. I will deal with how the learner (mentor) 
 
i. organises the personally constructed concepts,  
ii. produces meaningful meanings, and 
iii. attains a deeper comprehension.  
 
I will finally provide a framework in order to demonstrate different steps of meaning 
construction based on personal constructed concepts within constructivist 
interactions. 
 
2.  CONCEPTS  
I shall emphasise that there is a general problem concerning the notion of ‘concept’, 
in linguistics, in psychology, in philosophy, in metaphysics, in computer and 
information sciences, but, for now, I assume the use of the expression concept to be 
comprehensible in the context. Walter Parker writes: “concepts are the furniture of 
our minds. A well-furnished mind is a source of success and lifelong learning. When 
a student forms a concept from its examples, he or she knows more than the definition 
of a term. This is deep conceptual learning rather than superficial knowledge of a 
vocabulary word” (Link a). He also says that “a concept is defined by critical 
characteristics shared by all examples of the concept. For something to be an example 
of a concept, it must contain all these critical characteristics”, see (Parker, 2008). 
Generally, a concept is a unifying theme for something. In ontology, a concept is a 
fundamental category of existence. Following (Margolis and Lawrence, 2011), 
concepts could be understood as the mental representations, where concepts are 
entities that exist in the brain. They could also be understood as abstract objects, where 
objects are the constituents of propositions that mediate between thought, language, 
and referents. In my research, a concept is an idea which corresponds to some ‘distinct 
entity’ or ’class of entities’ or to its ‘essential features and attributes’. It can determine 
the application of a term (especially a predicate), and thus plays a part in the use of 
reason or language (cf. Rudolph, 2011; Baader et al., 2010). Analytically, a concept 
is a linkage between linguistic expressions and the mental images (representations of 
the world, of inner experiences etc.) that humans have in their minds, see (Götzsche, 
2013).  
 
I focus on concepts (classes) because concepts and the relationships between them are 
used to establish the basic terminology adopted in my modelled pedagogical domain 
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regarding the hierarchical structure. For example, relying on Description Logics (see 
(Baader et al., 2010)), the concept ‘Mentor’ can be analysed as a ‘concept description’ 
(descriptions mainly follow the inductive rules) that demonstrates the mentor as “a 
person who has a learner and the learner is a person”. Formally: Mentor ≡ Person ⊓ 
∃hasLearner.Person.  This concept construction is able to support the formal, explicit 
specification of a shared conceptualisation of Mentor based on the constructor’s 
conceptions. 
 
3.  DEFINITION AND DEFINITENESS 
A definition could semantically be seen as a kind of equation whose left-hand side is 
a concept and whose right-hand side is a description. They are used to introduce 
symbolic names for complex descriptions. In a pedagogical system learners and 
mentors could define something based upon multiple concept descriptions. Actually, 
these definitions could be constructed based on their own conceptions and background 
knowings. Logically, a set of definitions is (and must be) ‘explicit’ and ‘unequivocal’, 
ie. not vague and not ambiguous. In fact, ‘explicitness’ and ’unequivocality’ are the 
prerequisites and preconditions for definiteness. So, a set of someone’s definitions in 
a category of her/his constructed concepts could provide a backbone for any 
construction. Then the provided backbone supports the person in defining more 
complex concepts and descriptions over abstract concepts. Subsequently, the learner 
(mentor) could employ inductive rules on her/his personal definitions of abstract 
concepts in order to produce more complex definitions for more complicated 
described concepts. For example, considering the description ‘Person ⊓ Male ⊓ 
∃hasLearner.Person’ for ‘MaleMentor’, the ‘MaleMentor’ has been defined by being 
associated to a description. 
 
4.  SEMANTIC INTERPRETATION  
Generally, the act of elucidation, explication and explaining the meaning of something 
is called interpretation, see (Simpson and Weiner, 1989). Humans need to attempt to 
provide a way to determine the truth values of sentences. Linguistically, interpretation 
is the continually adjusted relation between the conventional meanings of 
sentences/statements and the actual mental universe of the individual (based on 
accumulated experience of that individual). Logically, an interpretation is an 
assignment of meanings to non-logical symbols. For instance, it can not assign 
meaning to logical symbols {Not (¬), And (⊓), Or (⊔), Equality (=), Equivalency (≡)}. 
Actually, we cannot assign any meaning to a description until the non-logical symbols 
are given interpretations. Considering C and D as two concepts and R(C,D) as any 
possible binary relationship between them, one could have different types of 
interpretations based on them. More specifically, the interpretation I assigns to C a set 
that contains the interpretation(s) of C, and it also assigns to R a binary relation 
between the elements of two sets (interpretation(s) of C and interpretation(s) of D).  
Actually, in translating from an informal (commonly English) language into a formal 
language, we need to provide symbolisation keys, which are the interpretations of all 
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the non-logical symbols we use in the translation, see (Prior, 1955). In case a given 
interpretation could assign the value True to a sentence (or theory), that interpretation 
is called a model of that sentence (or theory). In fact, designing a proper model can 
make the definitions adequate. 
 
5.  INTERACTION AND MEANING CONSTRUCTION  
A person who undertakes to learn (train) something within a constructivist interaction 
primarily focuses on ‘concept formation’. She/He initiates to ask some questions and 
answer other questions asked by the interlocutor. In my research, the most significant 
necessity of modelling meaning construction in a constructivist interaction is to 
consider the personal mental structures (schemata). They have been created regarding 
what the participants (both learner and mentor) have been affected by. The person 
inductively develops her/his mental entities. The learner (mentor) finds new concepts 
for herself/himself. Hearing different words from the interlocutor could be conducive 
to new conceptions. A person may have formed a concept before participating in the 
constructivist interaction and then, regarding the feedbacks produced by interlocutor, 
tackles to reform them. So, in fact, ‘forming’, ‘transforming’ and ‘reforming’ concepts 
are three significant matters in constructivist interactions. The individual has to 
‘generalise’ from different examples and this may lead her/him to discovering new 
concept(s). She/He searches for and lists attributes and properties that can be used to 
distinguish exemplars from non-exemplars of various concepts (classes). But what 
she/he really does is more than generalising from different examples that she/he hears 
or produces. More specifically, she/he identifies, specifies and relates the generalised 
examples and ‘compares’ different examples. In fact, a very efficient way to form a 
new concept and induce new categorisation rules in constructivism is to compare a 
few individuals when their categorical relation(s) is known. On the other hand, she/he 
could be able to make her/his personal labels for categorising the concepts in order to 
direct and employ different classes of concepts. 
 
5.1.  THE SEMANTIC PROCESS 
 
 
Figure 1. Meaning Construction within Constructivist Interaction 
 
At the beginning, the person, mentally, designs some ‘schemata’. Then, she/he 
gradually develops them and divides them into more abstract concepts (conceptual 
entities). A proposed schema describes a pattern of the person’s thought. I have 
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already said that she/he could either categorise different concepts or follow the 
categorised concepts. So, in fact, her/his designed schema could support her/him in 
managing those concepts. I label the first semantic phase ‘Concept Construction’ 
(presented in Figure 1), where the individual constructs her/his personal concepts and 
conceptions based on her/his personal schemata.  
 
Subsequently, she/he needs to focus on the ‘reflection’ of prior knowledge (what have 
been acquired/created before interaction) and new knowledge (what is being 
acquired/created during the interaction) and the initial meanings. So, in fact, she/he 
‘searches for the (initiative) meanings’ of the class/classes of constructed concepts 
and their significant relationships, see ‘Search for Meaning’ in Figure 1. Accordingly, 
she/he defines her/his constructed concepts and searches for the initial definitions of 
the constructed concepts.  
 
Consequently, she/he focuses on the ‘interpretation’ of the initial meanings and 
definitions. From the logical point of view, the interpretation of a constructed concept 
is a ‘function’. Generally, this function assigns a ‘meaning’ to a ‘symbol’. Formally: 
Interpretation: Meaning → Symbol. The Interpretation functions operate the person’s 
definitions based on her/his constructed concepts. Therefore, they ‘activate’ the 
meanings. This phase is presented as ‘Semantic Interpretation’ in Figure 1.  
 
Accordingly, concerning ‘Interpretation: Meaning → Symbol’, meaning is the 
product of the inverse of interpretation function (Symbol → Meaning). I label this 
phase ‘Meaning Balancing’, see Figure 1. There is a strong relationship between 
Semantic Interpretation and Meaning Balancing. The person could be able to balance 
and adjust the initial meanings based on the interrelationships between ‘the 
interpretation’ and ‘the inverse of the interpretation’.  
 
The conclusions make an appropriate background for verifying the [personally] found 
meanings based on personal constructed concepts. Meaning Balancing is quite 
supportive in balancing the personal definitions and vice versa, see ‘Meaning 
Formulation’ in Figure 1. The person formulates the balanced meanings based on the 
balanced definitions of her/his personal constructed concepts. There is an appropriate 
relationship between formulated meanings and balanced definitions. In fact, a 
meaning would be given a better shape after checking the balanced definitions.  
 
The formulated meanings organise (as well as re-organise) and reinforce the mental 
structures that the learner (mentor) uses them (as the pattern of her/his thought) in 
order to develop the individual conceptual knowledge. Subsequently, the formulated 
meanings are some applicable prerequisites for Meaningful Conceptual Structuring 
(see Figure 1) upon personally formulated meanings and based on personal 
constructed concepts. On the other hand, the meaningful conceptual structures could 
induce new formulated meanings on higher conceptual levels (presented by dashed 
arrow in Figure 1). And, furthermore, the new formulated meanings are considered as 
new schemata in constructing higher levels of conceptions.  
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Finally, the meaningful conceptual structures support her/him in providing 
meaningful meanings. The meaningful meanings highly reflect on the constructor and 
support her/him in proposing the modified schemata on higher conceptual levels. So, 
the person moves through this semantic loop in order to organise her/his personal 
constructed concepts, to construct her/his personal meanings, and to produce 
meaningful meanings. 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK  
Constructivism has been known as a learning philosophy and/or a model of knowing. 
In the framework of constructivism, two persons whose insights are based on their 
preconceptions and on personal knowings can actively participate in an interaction. 
The most important objective is to construct their personal knowledge, to learn from 
each other and to train each other. Therefore, they have an opportunity to attain a 
deeper personal understanding, comprehension and greater motivation. In this 
research, I have focused on ‘meaning construction’ as the most significant production 
of constructivist learning. I have worked on a semantic loop that the intentional 
participant in a constructivist interaction moves through. She/He constructs her/his 
personal concepts based on concept formation, defines them (produces individual 
definitions based on constructed concepts), and organises concepts and definitions in 
order to construct meanings and produce meaningful meanings. Meaningful meanings 
support her/him in constructing knowledge, producing meaningful comprehension 
and reacting more appropriately in front of the interlocutor’s acts. I have provided a 
framework for analysing meaning construction based on individual comprehension 
and personal concept constructions within constructivist interactions.  
 
In fact, the proposed loop, semantically, transforms multiple constructed concepts into 
meaningful meanings (and meaningful comprehensions). It could be observed as a 
new scheme for interpretation based on ‘semantics’ and on ‘interpretation’. 
Obviously, the proposed semantic loop is self-organised. Equivalently, it promotes 
itself on higher conceptual levels. In future research, I will focus on the logical 
analysis of meaning construction within constructivist interactions and work on its 
formal semantics. I will employ some fundamental descriptions in Concept Language 
(Description Logics: DLs) in order to analyse multiple semantic concepts within my 
progress and provide a DLs-based formal semantics for analysing meaning 
construction in constructivist interactions. Subsequently, I will be concerned with 
semantic analysis of meaning construction based on personal knowings and personal 
concept constructions within constructivist interactions. I will check the validity of 
the logical descriptions in conceptualising constructivist learning concerning the 
‘Structure of Observed Learning Outcomes (SOLO)’. The consequences will make a 
backbone for better conceptualisation of human’s understanding. And, the results will 
be employed in the analysis of formal semantics in terminological knowledge for 
pedagogical knowledge representation systems. They can conceptually analyse 
pedagogical developments in the framework of constructivism and in the context of 
interactions for promoting human’s understanding. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Constructivism is known as either a learning philosophy or a model of knowing. It is 
possible to say that a successful learning science may be constructed and developed 
based on the proper foundation that is provided by constructivism. Jean Piaget, the 
originator of constructivism, argued that all learning was mediated by the construction 
of mental objects that he called schemas. From his point of view, schemas gradually 
develop into more conceptual mental entities. According to constructivism, a learner 
and a mentor, can—based on their preconceptions (concept pre-formations), based on 
their pre-structured knowledge, and based on their personal knowings—actively 
participate in an interaction with each other in order to construct their personal 
knowledge. The most significant objective of constructivism is construction of 
personal knowledge and its development, and producing the own understanding of a 
world (universe of discourse) within the interaction. Therefore, the learner and mentor 
gain an opportunity to attain deeper personal understandings and greater motivations. 
The main contribution of the present research is the conceptual and logical analysis 
of meaning construction within constructivist interactions based on my 
conceptualisation of Definition and Definiteness, Meaning and Meaningfully, and 
Semantic Interpretation. In this research, I will analyse meaning construction and 
meaningful comprehension production within constructivist interactions. I will 
employ some fundamentals from ‘functions and functionality’ and ‘Description 
Logics (DLs)’ in order to analyse the semantics of concepts and conceptions in the 
course of work. I will provide a DLs-based formal semantics for analysing meaning 
construction in the framework of constructivism. The central focus will be on my 
proposed semantic loop that the learner and mentor as intentional participants move 
through, which organises their personal constructed conceptions in order to construct 
meanings and produce their meaningful comprehensions. This research will be 
concerned with meanings and definitions and proposes a new scheme for 
interpretation based on semantics and on interactions. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
An interaction between two (or more) agents exchanges a number of questions, 
answers and actions concerning their personal conceptions and conceptualisations. 
First, I shall emphasise that ‘concept’ is a term that should be used with caution and I 
need to explain what I mean by this term. The specification of concepts makes a proper 
background for describing and understanding of conceptions and conceptualisations. 
There has always been a general problem with concepts. For example, in linguistics, 
in psychology, in philosophy, in metaphysics and in information sciences we may 
have different notions and visions of what a concept is. So, what I will use and will 
express under the label of ‘concept’ aims at providing a comprehensible characteristic 
of conceptions and conceptualisations. In my semantic approach, a concept is a 
linkage between linguistic expressions and the mental images that a human may have 
in her/his mind, see (Götzsche, 2013). For instance, these mental images could be 
interpreted and seen as the representation of aspects of the world (and the universe of 
discourse). And, in fact, what is being identified as a conception of an agent within an 
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interaction is her/his act of visualising different concepts and linking her/his 
expressions with regard to individual mental images and schemas.  
 
The context of this research is the interaction between the learner and her/his mentor. 
Accordingly, I need to focus on multilevel agreement-oriented interactions among 
learners and mentors. Such an interaction could be viewed as a radical constructivist 
account of the learner’s (and mentor’s) cognition, comprehension and understanding, 
see (Scott, 2001) for more details. The constructivist account of an agent’s 
understanding is capable of enabling her/him in developing the individual 
understandings of the more specified (and complex) concepts with regard to her/his 
understanding of the general concepts. Producing one’s own understanding of a world 
and developing it during the interactions with the interlocutor could be said to be the 
most valuable product of the constructivist interactions. Understanding more specified 
concepts enable learners (and mentors) to develop their own understandings of the 
underlying systematic processes in reality, and also their understandings of 
themselves through the universe of discourse. 
 
I also need to be careful with the usage of the term ‘Constructivism’. Constructivism 
can be used in many disciplines, see (Baker et al., 2007). Generally, it can be classified 
into two main parts: 
 
i. Constructivism as a learning philosophy and an educational theory of learning, 
ii. Constructivism as a model of knowing.  
 
By all means there seems to be a very strong interrelationship between (i) and (ii). 
(Husén and Postlethwaite, 1989) has specified constructivism as a theory of 
knowledge with separated roots in philosophy, psychology and cybernetics. Also, I 
have observed constructivism as a ‘theory of knowledge and knowing’ in my semantic 
approach. In my opinion, knowledge is actively constructed based upon the agent’s 
comprehension of meanings with regard to the definitions of concepts. We will see 
that the knowledge of a part of the universe of discourse, will be more understandable 
and comprehensible by both agents after their interactions. The important common 
background of (i) and (ii) is that ‘a learner (and even a mentor) based on her/his 
personal knowings and on her/his pre-structured knowledge gains an opportunity to 
attain a deeper personal comprehension and to develop her/his understanding’. 
Accordingly, she/he will succeed in constructing knowledge. I acknowledge this as 
the most central assumption of the constructivist interactions.  
 
Jean Piaget, the originator of constructivism, argued that all learning was mediated by 
the construction of mental objects that he called ‘schemas’. For Piaget, schemas first 
emerge as concrete actions and gradually develop into more abstract and conceptual 
mental entities, see (KeithSawyer, 2014; Spiro et al., 1992; McGawand Peterson, 
2007; Husén and Postlethwaite, 1989; Moallem, 2001). Considering learning in the 
framework of constructivism with reference to Conversation Theory, which is 
designed by Gordon Pask, the enterprise begins with the negotiation of an agreement 
between the learner and the mentor to converse about a given domain and learn (and 
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train) about some particular topics and skills in that domain. It could work as an 
explanatory, heuristic and developmental framework. For more detailed information 
see (Pask, 1975; Pask, 1980; McIntyre Boyd, 2004).  
 
In this research, I will focus on the conceptual and the logical analysis of meaning 
construction within constructivist interactions. As mentioned, knowledge is actively 
constructed based upon the agent’s comprehension of meanings with regard to the 
definitions of concepts. So, it seems quite important to conceptualise ‘concept’, 
‘meaning’ and ‘definition’ and their interrelationships. I will need to analyse 
‘definition and definiteness’, ‘meaning and meaningfully’, and ‘semantic 
interpretation’ within my approach. In order to analyse concepts and conceptions in 
the process, I will provide a formal semantics based on Description Logics (DLs), see 
(Baader et al., 2010). DLs is the most well-known knowledge representation 
formalism. The concepts (and their interrelationships) are used to establish the basic 
terminology adopted in my modelled pedagogical domain regarding the hierarchical 
structure. 
 
I will analyse ‘meaning construction’ and ‘meaningful comprehension production’ 
within constructivist interactions. My main focus is on my own semantics-based 
framework, see (Badie, 2015). According to that, learner and mentor as intentional 
participants move through a semantic loop and organise their personal constructed 
conceptions in order to construct meanings, to improve the constructed meanings, and 
to produce their individual meaningful comprehensions. In this research, considering 
the analysis of definitions and meanings, I will develop my framework. What could 
be offered by learning constructively in this framework and in the context of 
interactions, is ‘a body of thought’ and ‘a semantic model to account for the 
emergence of the domain of the learner’s (mentor’s) conceptual knowledge’. 
 
2.  TERMINOLOGY 
 
Description Logics (DLs) is a well-known knowledge representation formalism and 
represents knowledge in terms of:  
 
 individuals or objects, 
 concepts or classes, and 
 roles or relationships.  
Individuals correspond to constants, concepts to unary predicates, and roles to binary 
predicates in First-Order (Predicate) Logic (FOL). In DLs individuals are the 
instances (or members) of a concept. For instance, John as an individual can also be 
recognised as an instance of the concept Person. Focusing on predicate P, which is 
one of the most important constructors of FOL-based expressions, we could say that 
P is capable of covering something, let me name that thing ‘variable X’. Then, we 
have a P(X). P(X) expresses that P is describing X, see (Borgida, 1994). Reconsidering 
the predicate P in DLs and naming it a role, we have achieved something that can 
establish a relationship between various individuals.  
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In DLs the concepts could be divided into two types: 
 
a. The Atomic Concepts (Concept Names), e.g., Person, Thing, Computer, Logic, 
Management. An atomic concept is identified by A in DLs. They are very general 
concepts and could be identified as the labels of the classes of ontologies within 
ontology representation systems. 
 
b. The Complex Concepts (the specified atomic concepts), e.g., FemalePerson, 
WhiteWing, ComputerScience, InductiveLogicProgramming, 
ManagementInformationSystems.  
 
Obviously, an agent (learner or mentor) could understand an atomic concept easier 
than its specified case. From another point of view, there are two kinds of atomic 
symbols.  
 
a. Atomic Concepts, 
b. Atomic Roles.  
From this perspective, atomic symbols are defined as the elementary descriptions 
from which humans inductively build and construct complex (specified) descriptions 
by means of ‘concept constructors’ and ‘role constructors’. The set of the main 
connectors in the base Description Logic is: 
 
{Conjunction (⊓ : and), Disjunction (⊔ : or), Negation (¬ : not),                        
Existential Restriction (∃ : there exists … ), Universal Restriction (∀ : for all ... ), 
Top Concept (⊤ : everything), Bottom Concept (⊥: nothing)}. 
 
A knowledge in DLs usually consists of the ‘terminological axioms’ and ‘assertions’. 
Considering C and D as concepts, R and S as roles, and a and b as individuals, we 
have the following terminological axioms:  
 
i. the Concept Inclusion: C ⊑ D, 
ii. the Role Inclusion: R ⊑ S, 
iii. the Concept Equality: C ≡ D, and 
iv. the Role Equality: R ≡ S.  
Additionally, C(a) and R(a,b) denote the concept and the role assertions, see 
(Schmidt-Schaulss and Smolka, 1991; Baader et al., 2010).  
 
Example. Anna has been asked to describe the concept ‘Teacher’. She conceptualises 
‘Teacher’ by “Teacher is a person who has [at least] one student”. This description 
has been built up following the inductive rules. Translated into DLs we have: Teacher 
≡ Person ⊓ ∃hasStudent.Person. This concept description supports the formal, 
explicit specification of the conceptualisation of the concept ‘Teacher’ based on 
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Anna’s conception. Obviously, her constructed description for ‘Teacher’ influences 
her other conceptions based on ‘Teacher’. On the other hand, it’s also obvious that 
Anna’s description of the concept ‘Teacher’ is dependent on the concept ‘Student’. 
Therefore, for a stronger and more specified conceptualisation of ‘Teacher’, she must 
describe ‘Student’ on one higher conceptual level. This conceptual dependency 
expresses that she has been concerned with the taxonomy of various concepts and 
with the explicit specification of the conceptualisation of the concept ‘Teacher’. 
Actually, she is indirectly getting concerned with an ontology. Suppose that she is an 
agent in an interaction, and that she will utter her conception of ‘Teacher’ (and, Thus, 
of ‘Student’) to her interlocutor. So, she has provided a prescription for building a 
block of a constructivist learning support system in the context of her interaction. 
  
3.  EXPLANATION 
In this research, I assume that an explanation is the actual explaining of definitions 
and meanings. The main objective of explanations is to shed light on the produced 
personal comprehension. In this section I will focus on analysis of definitions and 
meanings. They will be applied in section 5. 
 
3.1.  MEANING  
 
Linguistically, meaning can be realised as a context-update function, see (Larsson, 
2012). So, the input of the meaning function is a context and the output is its updated 
form. Considering X as a context and X´ as the updated form of X we have ‘Meaning: 
X → X´’. Any context comprises different types (and different numbers) of concepts, 
i.e. atomic concepts and specified concepts. Then, we terminologically have C ⊑ X. 
Therefore, I describe a ‘meaning’ as a ‘concept-update function’ like:                  
Meaning: C → C´. 
I will need to reconsider the meanings while I will be concerned with the interpretation 
functions in section 4. 
 
3.2.  DEFINITION AND DEFINITENESS 
 
In a semantics based system, a definition can be figured out as a kind of equation 
whose left-hand side is a concept (the concept that is going to be defined) and whose 
right-hand side is a description (generally built up using the inductive rules). In the 
current approach, a definition is a type of introduction. Actually, a description is 
expressed in order to introduce atomic (and complex) concepts and roles, and their 
possible combinations for constructing more specified descriptions. In a constructivist 
interaction, the learner and the mentor introduce and define different concepts, which 
are produced by their individual conceptions and based on multiple concept 
descriptions. All these definitions have been constructed over their pre-structured 
knowledge. Logically, a set of definitions must be ‘explicit’ and ‘unequivocal’, i.e., 
not vague and not ambiguous.  
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Example. Though the lenses of Bob’s conception, the concept ‘Spring’ can be defined 
as “the season of the moderate weather; when all the trees are green”. His description 
can be translated into a DLs-based formalism. Then,  
 
Spring ≡ 
 Season ⊓ ∃hasWeather.Moderate ⊓ ∀hasTree.Green. 
 
In fact, he has defined the concept ‘Spring’ by associating ‘Spring’ with a description, 
which has been built up based on his own conception.  
 
In a constructivist interaction, any of the agents may define a concept based on her/his 
individual conception. Accordingly, regarding the feedbacks of the interlocutor, 
she/he modifies and updates her/his definition. I have called it ‘definition updating’. 
Here are two important facts:  
 
i. A defined definition by the learner (mentor) provides a supportive backbone for 
performing a more developed (and organised) concept description(s).  
 
ii. A more developed (and more well-organised) concept description supports the 
learner (mentor) in providing a more understandable meaning on higher levels of 
interaction.   
 
In this example, the interlocutor can update the spring’s definition. For instance, 
she/he can make the definition more specified and can define Spring by “Spring is the 
season of the moderate weather; when all the trees are green. And April is one of its 
months”. Equivalently,  
 
Spring ≡ 
Season ⊓ ∃hasWeather.Moderate ⊓ ∀hasTree.Green ⊓ ∃hasMonth. April. 
 
4.  THE SEMANTIC INTERPRETATION 
Generally, to elucidate and to explicate what we mean by something, and to explain 
our meanings, is noticed as our interpretation of that thing, see (Simpson and 
Weiner,1989). An agent who constructively focuses on the concept description C in 
an interaction, needs to provide a way to determine the truth values of her/his 
sentences concerning C. Actually, these sentences have been explained based on 
her/his mental images of C. Subsequently, she/he transforms her/his mental images 
into some linguistic expressions. It’s possible to translate the final linguistic 
expressions into a description language like DLs. Linguistically, an interpretation is 
known as the continually adjusted relationship between two salient items: 
 
i. The conventional meanings of the agent’s sentences/statements. In other words, 
the agent’s intention behind her/his expression of those 
sentences/statements.  
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ii. The actual mental universe of C, which is based on the accumulated experience 
of that individual.  
 
From the logical point of view, an interpretation is an assignment of meanings to the 
non-logical symbols and to the non-logical parts of the sentences/statements. The 
interpretation cannot assign meanings to the logical symbols, like, e.g., not, and, or, 
equal, equivalent. An agent is not able to assign any meaning to a description until 
she/he interprets all the non-logical symbols of that description in her/his mind. 
Considering C and D as two concepts and R(C,D) as any possible binary relationship 
between them, an agent could have different interpretations over them. More 
specifically, the interpretation I assigns to the concept description C and D two sets 
that contain their interpretation(s). It also assigns to the role R a binary relationship 
between the elements of those two sets (between the interpretation(s) of C and the 
interpretation(s) of D), see (Prior, 1955). In case a given interpretation could assign 
the value True to a sentence (built up over a concept description), that interpretation 
is called a ‘model’ of that sentence. And if an agent’s sentence is assigned the value 
True for all possible interpretations, it would be a ‘tautology model’.  
 
Designing a proper model can make the definitions adequate. A compassionate 
mentor and a dutiful learner attempt to provide adequate models for their utterances. 
They also wish to perform a tautology model in order to satisfy all possible 
interlocutor’s interpretations and to satisfy the interlocutor’s mentality.   
 
From the formal point of view, I observe an interpretation as an assignment of 
meanings to the non-logical building blocks of the agent’s language and her/his 
linguistic expressions. In order to bring forth the formal semantics of the approach, I 
employ the function I from a non-empty set D into the set DI. Then: 
 
I : D → DI. 
 
D may contain multiple atomic concepts and concept descriptions that the agent has 
in mind. Therefore, the function I 
 
 assigns to every atomic concept A, a set like AI (formally, I : A → AI ), and  
 assigns to every concept C, a set like CI (formally, I : C → CI ),  
which are both the subsets of the set DI. This procedure is also definable on every 
atomic (and described) role. So, considering R as a binary relation between two 
concepts C and D, there is a I, such that: 
 
I : D  → DI ✕DI. 
 
As mentioned in the analysis of meanings, I need to reconsider the meanings 
concerning the interpretation functions. Here I figure out a ‘function’ as a ‘functional 
role’ between two concepts. Suppose that C is a concept. The interpretation I interprets 
Meaning as a functional role if and only if:  
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{(C,C1), (C,C2)} ⊆ MeaningI       ⇒    C1 = C2. 
 
Therefore: 
 
Meaning(C)  =  C1  =  C2. 
 
Suppose that C is a concept. C has been produced based on the agent’s conception. 
She/he—according to her/his interpretations—produces the Meaning function by 
meaning C (finding an adequate meaning for it) for her(him)self. 
 
5.  MEANING CONSTRUCTION: THE SEMANTIC PROCESS 
The primary step towards learning constructively within an interaction can be built up 
over an asked question or a committed action. The schemata could be seen as different 
types of concrete actions and questions. The learner (mentor) gradually develops and 
divides them into more general concepts. A person who undertakes to learn something 
and to understand it within a constructivist interaction primarily becomes concerned 
with various general concepts related to that thing. More specifically, she/he becomes 
concerned with forming (see Link a) or reforming concepts. 
 
5.1.  DESIGNING SCHEMATA 
 
Obviously, at the beginning the learner has a shallow understanding of what she/he 
directs to learn, and of its situation within the universe of discourse, see (Parker, 
2008). The preliminary understanding supports the learner in building various patterns 
in her/his mind, and any of these patterns describes the learner’s thought over a 
conception related to a matter. These patterns could be seen as the mental structures. 
The learner uses these mental structures to organise her/his conceptual knowledge, 
and to provide strong backbones for her/his interpretations. The learner gradually 
elaborates the network of her/his general mental structures. Any of these patterns 
could be named a ‘schema’, see (Bartlett, 1932) and (Link b, Link c). In my semantic 
approach schemata are employed to 
  
i. provide a background for the learner’s concepts, 
ii. specify the learner’s inferences and argumentations, 
iii. describe different theories based on terminological axioms and assertions, and 
iv. give sufficient and satisfying conditions for definitions of truth. 
 
The most primary phase is ‘Designing Schema’, see Figure 1. I shall emphasise that 
schemata are the most significant necessities of an adequate model for meaning 
construction and meaning production in my semantic approach. Note that all 
mentioned matters relevant for a schema are semantically valid in the case of the 
mentor as well. 
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5.2. CONCEPT CONSTRUCTION & MEANING FORMULATION 
 
From the methodological point of view, the learner is the developer of her/his personal 
conceptions over the individual designed schemata. She/He needs to employ inductive 
rules in order to expand her/his general concepts into more specified ones. 
Additionally, during the interaction she/he investigates new concepts and applies them 
in her/his concept constructions. Hearing any word from the interlocutor, e.g., why, 
tell, think, compare, mean, is conducive to new conceptions and new concepts. As 
mentioned, a learner may have formed a concept before participating in the 
interaction.  For example, Mary initially has conceptualised and defined the concept 
‘Information System’ by “the Information system is a system whose components are 
information”. This definition is translatable into ‘InformationSystem ≡ System ⊓ 
∃hasComponent.Information’. Suppose that she utters her definition. Later on, 
regarding the feedbacks produced by the mentor, she will be conduced to performing 
either a more specified (and accurate) definition or a modified (reformed) definition 
for the concept ‘Information System’. 
Figure 1. Meaning Construction in Constructivist Interactions 
 
Notice that the collection of ‘formation’, ‘transformation’ and ‘reformation’ of the 
concepts is a significant matter in the development of the concept constructions within 
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constructivist interactions. I identify the process  
 
‘forming the concept → transforming the concept → reforming the concept’ 
 
as the main basis of ‘Concept Construction’ in my framework, see Figure 1. The 
generalisation of various specified concepts supports the learner (and even the mentor) 
in discovering new concept(s). She/He searches for and lists attributes and properties 
that can be used to distinguish exemplars (of various concepts) from non-exemplars. 
But what she/he really does is more than just specifying and generalising from 
different examples that she/he hears or produces. She/He is also concerned with 
identifying and relating the induced examples. Then, she/he needs to ‘compare’ 
different achievements. The efficient way to induce a new categorisation method in 
the framework of constructivism is to compare a few individuals when their 
categorical relation(s) is known. Then, she/he can make her/his personal labels of the 
concepts categorisation in order to manage and direct different classes of concepts.  
 
According to the constructed concepts, the reflection of the prior knowledge (what 
has been acquired or created before interaction) and the new knowledge (what is being 
acquired or created during the interaction) and the initial definitions must be 
negotiated. So, the sequence  
 
‘Prior Knowledge → Definition → New Knowledge’ 
 
supports the learner in searching for the initiative meanings of the class/classes of 
constructed concepts and their relationships, see ‘Search for Meaning’ in Figure 1. 
This phase is highly affected by ‘Semantic Interpretation’. In fact, initiative meanings 
are needed to be interpreted in order to be balanced, see Figure 1. 
 
From the logical point of view, the interpretation of a defined constructed concept is 
a function. This function has turned a ‘definition’ into a ‘meaning’. Formally:  
 
Interpretation: Definition → Meaning. 
 
The Interpretation functions operate the person’s definitions based on her/his 
constructed concepts. Therefore, they activate the meanings. This transformation has 
been presented as ‘Semantic Interpretation’ in Figure 1. Accordingly, concerning 
‘Interpretation: Definition → Meaning’, the definition could be seen as the product of 
the inverse of interpretation function (Meaning → Definition). Logically, we have 
iterative loops between ‘definition’ and ‘meaning’. The agent could be able to balance 
and adjust the initial meanings based on the interrelationships between ‘interpretation’ 
and ‘the inverse of the interpretation’. The conclusions make an appropriate 
background for verifying the [personally] found meanings based on personal defined 
constructed concepts. Therefore, there are many transformations from ‘Search for 
Meaning’ into ‘Meaning Balancing’ and vice versa. Let me say that “a meaning would 
be given a better shape after checking the balanced definitions based on personal 
constructed concepts”. The conclusions will formulate meanings, see ‘Meaning 
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Formulation’ in Figure 1. In this phase the agent formulates the balanced meanings 
based on the balanced definitions for her/his personal constructed concepts. 
 
5.3. MEANING PRODUCTION  
 
The formulated meanings will be organised in order to be produced by the agent. 
Methodologically, any formulated meaning is a basis for providing a meaningful 
conceptual structure; let me name it ‘Meaningful Conceptual Structuring’. The 
meaningful conceptual structures are all personally formulated based on personal 
constructed concepts and definitions. On the other hand, the meaningful conceptual 
structures could induce new formulated meanings on higher conceptual levels and on 
higher levels of interaction.  
 
Furthermore, the new produced formulated meanings are considered as the developed 
schemata in constructing higher levels of conceptions. Finally, the meaningful 
conceptual structures support the agent in providing meaningful meanings. The 
meaningful meanings highly reflect on the constructor and support her/him in 
proposing the modified schemata on higher conceptual levels and on higher levels of 
interaction. So, the person has moved through this semantic loop in order to organise 
her/his personal constructed concepts, to construct her/his personal meanings, and to 
produce the meaningful comprehensions. 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS  
Constructivism is a learning philosophy and an educational theory of learning that 
could be known as a proper foundation for modern learning sciences. A learner and 
her/his mentor, whose insights are based on their preconceptions, on personal 
knowings and on pre-structured knowledge can actively participate in a constructivist 
interaction. The most salient aim could be recognised as ‘constructing the personal 
knowledge in the context of interaction’. Then the learner and the mentor may have 
the opportunity to attain a deeper personal comprehension and greater motivation 
within the universe of discourse.  
 
In this research, I have focused on the conceptual and the logical analysis of meaning 
construction in the framework of constructivism and in the context of mentor-learner 
interactions. I have been concerned with my own semantics-based framework. My 
framework considers the agents (learner and mentor) as two intentional participants. 
It represents a loop that the learner and mentor move through, which organises their 
personal constructed conceptions in order to construct meanings and produce their 
individual meaningful comprehensions. I have analysed ‘Definition and 
Definiteness’, ‘Meaning and Meaningfully’, and ‘Semantic Interpretation’ using 
Description Logics (DLs), and have employed the results in development of my 
framework. This research has proposed a new scheme for interpretation based on 
semantics and on interpretation. Obviously, the proposed semantic loop is self-
organised and can promote itself on higher conceptual levels and on higher levels of 
interaction. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The multilevel interactions between a mentor and her/his learner could exchange 
various conceptions (that are supported by their own conceptualisations) between 
them. Producing the own realisation of a world and developing it in the context of 
interactions could be said to be the most valuable product of the constructivist 
interactions. The most significant matter in meaning construction is producing the 
own meaningful understanding. Here the learner gets to know how to develop her/his 
thinking. In this research, I will focus on relating (i) meaning construction through the 
lenses of the learner’s conceptions and (ii) meaning construction through the lenses 
of constructivism. Constructivism is an educational theory of learning and a model of 
knowing. The main contribution of this research is analysing the symmetrical 
relationship between learner and mentor. I will analyse the logical dependencies 
between learner and mentor and will check their reflectional symmetrical relationship 
in a conceptual mirror. The conceptual mirror is a phenomenon that represents the 
meeting point of the mentor’s and the learner’s conceptual knowledge. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
In an interaction between a mentor and her/his learner a number of questions, answers, 
actions and reactions concerning their personal conceptions are exchanged. First, I 
shall emphasise that what I use and express under the label of a ‘concept’ aims at 
providing a comprehensible characterisation of conceptions and conceptualisations. 
In my approach, a concept is a linkage between linguistic expressions and the mental 
images (in a broad sense) that the learner (mentor) may have in her/his mind, see 
(Götzsche, 2013). For instance, these mental images could be interpreted and seen as 
the learner’s representation of aspects of the world (of the universe of discourse). 
Also, the mentor’s construction of the universe of discourse is another instance of 
mental images. According to the features of concepts just mentioned, a learner’s 
(mentor’s) conception within an interaction is equivalent to her/his act of imaging 
various concepts and linking her/his expressions with regard to the own mental images 
and schemata, see (Link a and Link b). In my approach, a learner’s (mentor’s) 
schemata (i) provide backgrounds for her/his concepts, (ii) specify her/his inferences 
and reasonings, (iii) describe various theories based on terminologies and world 
descriptions and, finally, (iv) give sufficient and satisfying conditions for definitions 
of truth.  
 
The multilevel, and commonly agreement-oriented, interactions between a mentor and 
her/his learner could be viewed as the radical constructivist account of the learner’s 
(and the mentor’s) realisation and comprehension, see (Spiro et al., 1992) for more 
details. The constructivist account of an agent’s realisation is capable of enabling 
her/him in developing the individual realisations of the concepts. Producing the own 
realisation (and thus, understanding) of a world and developing it during the 
interaction with the interlocutor could be said to be the most valuable product of the 
constructivist interactions. In a constructivist interaction learner and mentor develop 
their own realisations of the underlying systematic processes in reality, and also their 
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realisations of themselves through the universe of discourse.  
 
Constructivism is a model of knowing and an educational theory of learning. It 
conceives of learning as the process of construction. In the framework of 
constructivism, a learner attempts to construct knowledge based upon her/his 
preconceptions (pre-concept formations: see (Link c)) and pre-structured knowledge. 
The main focus of the mentor could be said to be on the learner’s knowledge 
construction. Consequently, the learner will have the opportunity to attain deeper 
personal realisations and greater motivations, see (Spiro et al., 1992; Piaget, 1967; 
Husén and Postlethwaite, 1989; McGaw and Peterson, 2007; Keith Sawyer, 2014; 
Jaworski, 1995). A learner, either by acquiring new concepts or by modifying existing 
concepts, decides to construct knowledge. And the mentor constructs parts of the 
learner’s mind by performing the constructive mentoring methods and theories. 
Actually, what a learner constructs could be analysed as the reflection of what the 
mentor has provided for her/him (e.g., asked her/him a question). Also, what a mentor 
constructs in the learner’s mind could be seen to be the reflection of what the learner 
has done (e.g., answered a question to the mentor).  
 
In this research, I see ‘learning’ from the functional point of view and think of 
causation in the process of ‘construction’. In my opinion, knowledge can actively be 
constructed based upon the learner’s realisation of the meanings of various concepts 
with regard to their descriptions and definitions. I have focused on this area in (Badie, 
2015a; Badie, 2015b). Kindly observe that the definition of a concept is an equation 
whose left-hand side is a concept and whose right-hand side is a description for that 
concept, see (Baader, et al., 2010). Also, I have defined a meaning as a concept-update 
function in my approach, see (Badie, 2015b).  
 
Focusing on the learners’ conceptions of successful learning and effective mentoring, 
a learner can describe the steps of learning from two distinct points of view in order 
to provide a satisfactory description of knowledge construction development: 
 
 the first one is her/his own point of view, and  
 the second one is her/his mentor’s point of view.  
Learners usually observe learning through the lenses of their mentors in order to see 
themselves and their own requirements. Additionally, a learner needs to realise and to 
figure out how her/his own conceptions of learning about an object may be reflected 
in the mentor’s conceptions of that object and vice versa.  
 
Now I take a model of students’ developing conceptions of learning into 
consideration. The model sketches on Säljö’s seminal studies on learning conceptions, 
see (Säljö, 1979). Säljö focused especially on describing learning from the learner’s 
point of view and identified five categories and levels for a learner’s developing 
conceptions of ‘learning’. Also, (Rossum and Schenk, 1984) suggested a new 
category and added it as the sixth level to the Säljö’s model. Here I summarise the 
model as the following items:  
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 Knowing More: The learner observes ‘learning’ as knowing new things. She/He 
wants her/his mentor to impart the well-structured information into separated and 
isolated facts.  
 
 Memorising: The learner reproduces what she/he has acquired and known. So, it’s 
all about memorising. She/He still tries to know more in order to reproduce more. 
  
 Selection: The learner selects and memorises the facts and might be able to apply 
her/his knowledge in practical approaches. She/He expects the mentor to shape 
and to motivate her/him during the interaction.  
 
 Meaning Construction: The learner is realising that constructing knowledge is very 
important and it will be plausible in the shadow of meaning construction. The 
mentor would guide the learner to find out how to think logically, analytically 
and productive.  
 
 Reality Interpretation: Learning as an interpretative process should support the 
learner in interpreting and understanding the reality. Then the learner 
characterises ‘learning’ as ‘the process of self development’.  
 
 Self Awareness: This category is about self realisation. This process is always going 
to be continued. The learner is always going to expand her(him)self. Obviously, 
this is the most excellent and the most transcendental conception 
 
In this article my main focus is on ‘Meaning Construction’ (level four). I have focused 
on meaning construction in the context of interactions and have written some of my 
research products in (Badie, 2015a; Badie, 2015b). In my opinion, this level is the 
most definitive level. Let me make a conceptual linkage between my own approach 
and Säljö’s model. Focusing on meaning construction, the learner deals with her/his 
individual concept constructions for developing her/his conceptualisations. So, I shall 
bring your attention to the fact that my approach recognises the collection {Concept 
Formation, Concept Transformation, Concept Reformation} as the most significant 
matter in the development of concept constructions within constructivist interactions. 
I have identified the process ‘Concept Formation → Concept Transformation → 
Concept Reformation’ as the process of Concept Construction (CC) in the context of 
interaction. The most significant expression at this level is ‘meaningful 
comprehension’. Here the learner gets to know (and gets to identify) how to relate 
different ideas. In fact, she/he is about to develop her/his thinking. In my opinion, 
knowledge can actively be constructed based upon the learner’s realisation of the 
meanings of various concepts with regard to their descriptions and definitions. So, 
meaning construction [in the framework of constructivism and in the context of 
interactions (and dialogues) between the learner and the mentor] finds its real 
significance here. Subsequently, the learner describes her/his individual concepts and 
attempts to produce meanings, to formulate them and to develop their constructions. 
At this level, the compassionate mentor is the developer of the learner’s thinking. This 
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development will support the learner in finding how to think logically, analytically 
and productive.  
 
The main focus of this research is on a reflectional symmetrical relation between 
learner and mentor. I will logically analyse it while I will focus on conceptual 
knowledge. Thus, I need to analyse the logical dependencies between learner and 
mentor, and see the reflections in a conceptual mirror. The conceptual mirror 
represents the meeting point of the mentor’s and the learner’s conceptual knowledge. 
In the following sections I will present the followings: The Learner’s Conceptual 
Knowledge, The Relationships between Learner and Mentor, Conceptual Mirror: A 
Reflection-Symmetry and Conclusions. 
 
2.  THE LEARNER’S CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE  
Bloom’s taxonomy
 
is a framework for classifying pedagogical objectives, which 
could be interpreted as the statements of what educators and mentors expect their 
learners to have learned, see (Furst et al., 1956; Krathwohl, 2002). According to 
Bloom’s researches, knowledge has a strong relationship with recognition of various 
materials, ideas, methods, processes, structures and settings. Bloom’s taxonomy 
divides a knowledge class into multiple classes (e.g., knowledge of terminologies, 
knowledge of ways and means, knowledge of trends and sequences, knowledge of 
classifications and categorisations, knowledge of criteria, knowledge of 
methodologies, knowledge of quantifications, knowledge of principles – 
generalisations and specifications, knowledge of theories and structures). Since then, 
(Krathwohl, 2002) has proposed a knowledge dimension in the revised version of 
Bloom’s taxonomy. The revised taxonomy consists of:  
 
 Factual Knowledge (e.g., terminological knowledge),  
 Conceptual Knowledge (e.g., knowledge of theories, models and structures), 
 Procedural Knowledge (e.g., knowledge of methods and algorithms), and 
 Metacognitive Knowledge (e.g., contextual knowledge, conditional 
knowledge).  
 
In fact, learning consists of a sort of Transformation functions from knowledge (that 
is going to be known) into the sets of ‘facts’, ‘procedures’, and ‘concepts’ in different 
‘contexts’. And subsequently, the learners transform facts, procedures and concepts 
into their minds. I formally describe learning as the conjunction of the following 
transformations:  
 
i. Knowledge  →  {Fact , Procedure , Concept}              
ii. {Fact , Procedure , Concept}  →  Mind. 
 
In this research my main concern is ‘concepts’. I am focusing on conceptual 
knowledge acquisition.  
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 In my opinion, there is a concept behind every fact. Then any factual knowledge 
can be supported by a conceptual knowledge. For instance, according to a 
fundamental characteristic of terminological knowledge (as a type of factual 
knowledge), we can represent terminologies within taxonomical structures. A 
taxonomy could be constructed based upon concepts. Then, a terminological 
knowledge has been supported by a conceptual knowledge. Also, as another 
instance, we can define a body of the related elements and interpret it as a set of 
constructors for denoting various concepts and their interrelationships. That’s 
how the concept languages and descriptive languages appear. Then, we could be 
able to represent knowledge over concepts, their instances and their relationships. 
 
 Additionally, in my opinion, any procedure could be observed as the conclusion 
of the sequence of a number of facts. Therefore: 
 
Fact  →  Fact  →  Fact  ...   ⇔   Procedure. 
 
And actually: 
 
1. A procedure could be viewed as a body of a few number of facts. 
2. A fact is supported by a concept.  
3. A procedure is supported by a concept. 
 
According to the afore-mentioned items, a learner acquires facts and procedures and 
they all become supported by concepts in her/his mind. These concepts are considered 
as the building blocks of her/his conceptual knowledge and can be considered as the 
elements and ingredients of a conceptual system and, thus, they support the learners’ 
developing conceptualisation of ‘learning’. Then, she/he can think of learning 
(mentoring), successful learning and satisfactory mentoring.  
 
Here I describe learning as the conjunction of the processes (i) and (ii): 
 
i. Knowledge →  {Fact , Procedure , Concept} →                                              
{Concept , Concept , Concept}. 
 
ii. {Concept , Concept , Concept} → {Fact , Procedure , Concept} →                                         
Mind . 
 
3.  THE LEARNER’S CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE 
In logic, the reflexive relation R is a binary relation between an object and itself. Let 
R be a relationship on set A. If and only if R relates every element of A with itself, 
then R is identified as a reflexive relation on A. Formally: 
 
∀ai∈A :   ai R ai. 
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A binary relation R between two elements of set A is identified as a symmetrical 
relation if and only if for any ai
 
and aj
 
belonging to A, in the case R relates ai
 
with aj, 
then R relates aj with ai as well. Formally: 
 
∀ai∈A    ∃aj∈A :     
ai R aj   ⇒   aj R ai. 
 
Let set E be a learning environment. A lot of elements could exist in a learning 
environment. The main focus of this research is on elements L and M, where L and M 
denote Learner and Mentor respectively. Formally:  
 
L∈E  ,  M∈E. 
 
M can, metaphorically, be seen as a mirror that shows the L’s self, see (Grow, 1991). 
In my opinion, the multi-level agreement oriented interactions between a mentor and 
her/his learner constructs a symmetrical relationship between them. Let me conclude 
that a real constructive and productive relationship between L and M is inherently a 
symmetrical relationship. It may not be symmetric (and may be asymmetric) in some 
existing relationships over E, but it is potentially a symmetry and may represent a 
willingness to achieve more symmetrical properties and preserve them in the context 
of interactions.  
 
A responsible learner (in parallel with her/his constructive and compassionate mentor) 
attempts to survive this symmetrical relationship. I see this characteristic as the most 
excellent and valuable realisation of the phenomenon of ‘learning’ in the context of 
relationships between mentor and learner. Moreover, any person is able to observe the 
reflection of her/his own conceptions of the phenomenon of ‘learning’ with regard to 
perceived facts, procedures and concepts, in her/his self (e.g., individuality, 
personality). In fact, this is also the most excellent and transcendental realisation of 
the phenomenon of ‘learning’. Similarly, ‘growing self awareness’ is the most 
valuable product of the complement model of Säljö’s model and has been manifested 
in the learner’s self. Thus, there exists a reflexive relationship between ‘growing self 
awareness’ and ‘self’. For another instance, the ‘reality interpretation’ is the product 
of the last level of Säljö’s model. I assume that reality interpretation is also reflected 
in L’s (and M’s) interpretations and these interpretations could be made in the shadow 
of the learner’s (and mentor’s) self. Further, ‘meaning construction’ as the product of 
layer four of Säljö’s model has been reflected in personal understanding based on 
individual interpretations in the shadow of the learner’s (mentor’s) self. 
 
4.  THE LEARNER’S CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE  
I will define the conceptual mirror in order to clarify the interrelationships between 
the learner’s and the mentor’s conceptual knowledge. A conceptual mirror can be a 
supportive point for mentor and learner. In fact, a mentor could have a better 
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understanding of her/his learner’s knowledge by looking in the mirror and the learner 
can have a better realisation of mentoring by looking in the mirror. 
 
 
Figure 1. A Conceptual Mirror 
 
I define the conceptual mirror on the meeting point of: 
 
A. The learner’s learning. 
B. The reflections of the learner’s conceptions in her(him)self.  
 
Similarly, the conceptual mirror is located on the meeting point of:  
 
C. The mentor’s mentoring. 
D. The reflections of the mentor’s conceptions in her(him)self.  
 
I shall emphasise that the learner’s trust is reflected in the learner’s self. Thus, the 
learner’s trust can be seen in the conceptual mirror at the meeting point of (B) and 
(D). 
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4.1. LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTUAL MIRROR  
 
There is a symmetrical relationship between Learner L and Mentor M that is 
represented by c in Figure 1. The symmetrical relationship c could be described as the 
product of the concatenation of two reflexive relationships. These reflexive 
relationships are represented by a and b in Figure 1. Let me clarify what this 
concatenation is. There are two important results: 
 
1. In this system, the learner sees the reflection of her/his individual conceptions of 
the phenomenon of ‘learning’ in the conceptual mirror. She/He also observes the 
reflection of the phenomenon of ‘mentoring’ (of the mentor) in the conceptual 
mirror and, subsequently, in her(him)self.  
 
2. On the other hand, the mentor has seen the reflection of the phenomenon of 
‘mentoring’ in the conceptual mirror. Moreover, the mentor observes the 
reflection of the learner’s conceptions of the phenomenon of ‘learning’ in the 
conceptual mirror and, thus, she/he sees the reflection of the phenomenon of 
‘mentoring’ in the learner’s self.  
 
As for the results 1 and 2, the learner observes the reflection of the phenomenon of 
‘mentoring’ in her(him)self and the mentor observes the reflection of the phenomenon 
of ‘mentoring’ in the learner’s self. This demonstrates a symmetrical relationship 
between a mentor and a learner. So, we have seen that the concatenation of the 
reflexive relation a and reflexive relation b could produce the symmetrical 
relationship c.  
 
Let Rr
 
and Rs
 
denote the reflexive and symmetrical relationships respectively. 
Therefore, we have the following system: 
 
i. L Rr L  
ii. M Rr M  
iii. (… Rr … )  Rs  (… Rr
 
… ) 
 
The first premise represents the reflexive relation between learner and her(him)self. 
Also, the second premise represents the reflexive relation between the mentor and 
her(him)self. The third premise represents that there is a symmetrical relation between 
two reflexive relations. Therefore, I can conclude that there is a symmetrical relation 
between ‘the reflexive relation between learner and her(him)self’ and ‘the reflexive 
relation between mentor and her(him)self’. Formally: 
 
(L Rr
 
L)  Rs
  
(M Rr M)      (I) 
 
As described, the learner and mentor observe the relationship of their interlocutors 
(mentor and learner) with themselves in the conceptual mirror. In fact, the 
symmetrical relationship ‘(L Rr
 
L)  Rs
  
(M Rr M)’ enters the conceptual mirror.  
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Reconsidering section 2, a learner, by learning, transforms knowledge into multiple 
concepts. Regarding the reflexive relationship between a learner and her(him)self in 
a learning process, I can conclude that her/his own conceptual knowledge (and 
produced concepts) reflects in her(him)self.  
 
Considering LC as a learned concept (a produced concept based on learning), and 
taking the result (I) into account, I can propose the following system: 
 
i .   LC Rr
 
LC
 
,
    
ii.   MC Rr
 
MC
 
,
 
iii.  (…Rr … )  Rs  (…Rr
 … ). 
 
The first premise represents the reflexive relation between a learned concept and itself. 
The second one represents the reflexive relation between a mentored concept and 
itself. Also, the third premise represents that there is a symmetrical relation between 
two reflexive relations. So, there is a symmetrical relation between a ‘reflexive 
relation between a learned concept and itself’ and a ‘reflexive relation between a 
mentored concept and itself’. Then, formally: 
 
(LC Rr LC)   Rs   (MC Rr MC) . 
 
Moreover, this conclusion denotes that the learner observes the reflection of the 
mentor’s conceptual knowledge in the conceptual mirror, where she/he has observed 
the reflection of her/his conceptual knowledge. Therefore:  
 
LC Rr LC   ⇔ MC Rr MC  . 
 
It can be divided into two conclusions: 
 
 i.  LC Rr LC  ⇒  MC Rr MC , 
ii.  MC Rr MC  ⇒  LC Rr LC . 
 
According to (i), the learner observes the learned concept in her(him)self. This 
concludes that the mentor observes the mentored concept in her(him)self. According 
to (ii), the mentor observes the mentored concept in her(him)self and, therefore, the 
learner observes the learned concept in her(him)self. These conclusions demonstrate 
an equivalence and stability between learner’s and mentor’s conceptual knowledge.   
 
5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
An interaction between a mentor and her/his learner could exchange their personal 
conceptions. The multilevel interactions between them could be viewed as the radical 
constructivist accounts of their realisations and comprehensions. Producing one’s own 
realisation of the world and developing it in the context of interaction could be said to 
be the most valuable product of the constructivist interactions. In this research, I have 
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employed Säljö’s model of students’ developing conceptions of learning and have 
focused on one of its levels, so-called ‘Meaning Construction’. The main reasons for 
this consideration have been my special interest in meaning construction in the context 
of interactions and my own research in the analysis of meaning construction through 
the lenses of the theory and philosophy of constructivism. I believe that this level is 
the most definitive and determinative level in Säljö’s model of students’ developing 
conceptions of learning. In my opinion, this level can appropriately describe the 
interrelationship between the learners’ and the mentors’ observations. And, in fact, at 
this level, the learner initiates the developing of her/his conceptualisations. The most 
significant matter at this level is the production of the own meaningful 
comprehension. Here the learner gets to know (and to identify) how to relate different 
ideas and how to develop her/his thinking. In this article, I have made a conceptual 
linkage between my own approaches and Säljö’s model. I have focused on the 
conceptual knowledge in the revised version of Bloom’s taxonomy with regard to my 
goals. The main contribution of this research has been logical representations and the 
analysis of the reflectional symmetrical relation between learner and mentor. Thus, I 
have analysed the logical dependencies between learner and mentor, and have 
checked their reflections in a conceptual mirror. A conceptual mirror is a phenomenon 
that represents the meeting point of (i) the learner’s learning and (ii) the reflections of 
the learner’s conceptions in her(him)self. It also represents the meeting point of (i) the 
mentor’s mentoring and (ii) the reflections of the mentor’s conceptions in 
her(him)self. Accordingly, a conceptual mirror represents the junction (and 
dependency) of the mentor’s and the learner’s conceptual knowledge in the context of 
their interactions. 
 
REFERENCES 
Baader Franz, Deborah L. McGuinness, Daniele Nardi and Peter F. Patel-Schneider 
(2010). The Description Logic Handbook: Theory, Implementation and 
Applications. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Badie, Farshad (2015a). A Semantic Basis for Meaning Construction in Constructivist 
Interactions. Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Cognition and 
Exploratory Learning in Digital Age (pp. 369-376). International Association for 
Development of the Information Society (IADIS). Maynooth, Ireland. 
 
Badie, Farshad (2015b). Towards a Semantics-based Framework for Meaning 
Construction in Constructivist Interactions. Proceedings of the 8 th International 
Conference of Education, Research and Innovation (pp. 7995-8002). IATED. 
Seville, Spain. 
 
Furst M. D., Hill E. J., Krathwohl W. H., Bloom D. R. And Engelhart B. S. (1956). 
Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Classification of Educational Goals. 
Handbook I: Cognitive Domain. New York: David McKay Company. 
 
Götzsche Hans (2013). Deviational Syntactic Structures. Bloomsbury Academic: 
 
101 
London / New Delhi / New York / Sydney. 
 
Grow, G. O. (1991). Teaching Learners to be Self-Directed. Adult Education 
Quarterly. 41, 125-149.  
 
Husén, T. and Postlethwaite, T. N. (1989). Constructivism in Education. The 
International Encyclopaedia of Education, Supplement Vol.1. Oxford/New York: 
Pergamon Press. 
 
Jaworski Barbara (1995). Constructivism in Education. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum.  
 
Keith Sawyer, R. (2014). The Cambridge Handbook of the Learning Sciences. 
Cambridge Handbooks in Psychology (2nd Edition). 
 
Krathwohl David R. (2002). A Revision of Bloom’s Taxonomy: An Overview. 
Theory into Practice. Routledge Publishers. 
 
McGaw B. and Peterson P. (2007). Constructivism and Learning. International 
Encyclopaedia of Education (3rd Edition). Oxford: Elsevier. 
 
Piaget J. (1967). Six Psychological Studies. Random House. 
 
Van Rossum, E. J. and Schenk, S. M. (1984). The Relationship Between Learning 
Conception, Study Strategy and Learning Outcome. British Journal of 
Educational Psychology. 
 
Säljö, R. (1979). Learning in the Learner's Perspective: Some Commonplace 
Misconceptions. Reports from the Institute of Education, University of 
Gothenburg 
 
Spiro Rand, Feltovich Paul, Jacobson Michael and Coulson Richard (1992). 
Cognitive Flexibility, Constructivism, and Hypertext: Random Access 
Instruction for Advanced Knowledge Acquisition in Ill-Structured Domains, 
Random access instruction for advanced knowledge acquisition. Educational 
Technology. Pages 24–33. 
 
 
Links 
 
Link a:  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schema 
 
Link b: http://www.britannica.com/topic/schema-cognitive 
 
Link c: http://teachinghistory.org/teaching-materials/teaching-guides/25184 
A THEORETICAL MODEL FOR MEANING CONSTRUCTION THROUGH CONSTRUCTIVIST CONCEPT LEARNING 
102
 
PAPER D. A SEMANTIC 
REPRESENTATION OF ADULT 
LEARNERS’ DEVELOPING 
CONCEPTIONS OF SELF REALISATION 
THROUGH LEARNING PROCESS 
 
 
Farshad Badie 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The paper has been published in the 
 
Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Technology, Education and 
Development Conference (INTED 2016) 
 
 
The layout has been revised. 
 
 
 
103 
ABSTRACT 
 
Learning is a reflective activity that enables the learner to draw upon her/his previous 
experiences and background knowledge to conceptualise, realise, understand and 
evaluate the present, so as to shape her/his future actions and to construct and develop 
new knowledge for her(him)self. Learning strongly depends on meetings of 
awarenesses (or self realisations) which we see as achieved through the experiences 
that mentors and learners undertake jointly. Self realisation is a type of self 
organisation process and always organises itself. In fact, self realisation is always 
going to be continued. This research will conceptually focus on multiple categories 
through the adult learners’ developing conceptions of learning. The focus will be on 
different categories from the basic conceptions to excellent ones. I will take an 
appropriate model of students’ developing conceptions of ‘learning’ into my 
consideration. The model sketches on Säljö’s seminal studies on learning in the 
learner’s perspective. I will employ the most significant characterised learning 
conceptions that are seen through the lenses of the adult learners. This characterisation 
will be applied over the most significant categories of learners’ developing 
conceptions of learning. Some categories like ‘Meaning Construction’, ‘Reality 
Interpretation’ and ‘Self Awareness (Self Realisation)’ could be known as the most 
excellent and the most transcendental conceptions used by learners. Consequently, I 
will employ the highlighted concepts in order to design a semantic representation of 
learners’ developing conceptions of learning. This semantic representation will be a 
graph whose nodes represent the main identified concepts and whose arcs represent 
the relations between the concepts. According to Description Logics and their 
descriptive features, a concept can be observed as an idea and that idea can be 
transformed into a hypothesis in order to be corresponded to a distinct entity [and, 
respectively, to a group of entities] or to its/their essential features. The ideas 
determine the applications of terms and phrases. An idea is a significant part in the 
use of reasons and languages. My desired semantic structure will provide a structural 
representation of the learners’ developing conceptions of learning that could support 
a kind of top-level ontology, i.e., an ontology representing the learners’ developing 
conceptions of learning based on educational informatics. I shall draw your attention 
to the fact that in information sciences an ontology is described as an explicit (and 
formal) specification of a shared conceptualisation on the domain of interest. 
Ontologies of a thing/phenomenon support different researchers in providing 
appropriate specified descriptions with regard to various concepts relevant for that 
thing/phenomenon. I shall emphasise that I will need to employ some descriptive 
features of Description Logics (DLs) for representing fundamental terminologies and 
world descriptions as the backbones of the desired semantic representation. 
Description Logics are the most well-known family of knowledge representation 
formalism. They are supported by First-Order Predicate Logic.  
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The state of knowledge representation art in information sciences has experienced 
significant improvements during last decades, see (Randall et al., 1993). Knowledge 
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representation systems could assist us in constructing ontologies, see (Staab and 
Studer, 2004; Grimm et al., 2007). From the philosophical point of view, an ontology 
is described as the science of ‘being’ and ‘existence’. The ontologies demonstrate the 
structure of the reality of a thing/phenomenon within the world. An ontology checks 
the attributes that belong to a thing because of its nature and its existence. On the other 
hand, in information sciences an ontology is described as an explicit and formal 
specification of a shared conceptualisation on a domain of interest. However, I shall 
claim that there is a very strong interrelationship between philosophical and 
informatical descriptions of the ontologies. In fact, any ontology within information 
sciences describes the world through the lenses of structuralism and existentialism 
and attempts to specify its viewpoint on different levels of its conceptualisation. In 
this article my notion of ‘ontology’ is beyond the use in the information sciences. A 
formalism based on formal and schematic ontologies can be represented over 
 
a. concepts (as the classes of individuals and objects), and 
b. their relations (i.e., roles of concepts).  
 
According to Predicate Logic and its descriptive features within information sciences, 
a ‘unary predicate’ has been supposed to be equivalent to a ‘concept’. Also, a concept 
has been realised and has been seen as an ‘idea’ which can be transformed into a 
‘hypothesis’ in order to be corresponded to a distinct entity [and, respectively, to a 
group of entities] or to its/their essential attributes, characteristics and properties. The 
hypotheses can describe theories relying on terminologies and world descriptions. 
Also, they support inferential and reasoning processes and satisfy the conditions for 
definitions of truth. I shall contemplate that they focus on both WhyNess and 
HowNess. Actually, considering the provided world descriptions and supported 
inferential processes, the hypotheses can determine the applications of predicates, 
statements and terms. Therefore, a hypothesis is a significant part in the use of reasons 
and languages.  
 
Let me go back to ontologies. The ontologies form the backbone of a huge number of 
semantic applications (in information sciences). The underlying Description Logics 
(Concept Languages) are now one of the most widely used knowledge representation 
formalism. They have emerged from semantic networks (Quillian, 1968) and frame-
based systems (Minsky, 1974) and help us to represent the inferential processes within 
knowledge representation systems. Reasoning over represented knowledge can be 
identified to be the most remarkable objective of knowledge representation systems, 
e.g., (Bader et al., 2010; Buchheit et al., 1993; Rudolph, 2011).   
 
In this article, I will focus on conceptualising learning within the upper ontology of 
adult learners’ developing conceptions of the phenomenon of ‘learning’. An upper (= 
top-level, foundation) ontology describes the general concepts that are the same across 
all knowledge domains. In fact, splitting a general concept into more specific ones is 
conducive to get from top-level ontology to the deeper ontologies with more specific 
information. This research focuses on the learners’ conceptions of successful and 
effective learning. Obviously, any learner can describe the steps and levels of learning 
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in order to provide a satisfactory description of the development of knowledge 
construction for her(him)self. I will take into consideration a model of students’ 
developing conceptions of learning that is based on Säljö’s seminal studies on learning 
conceptions and on learning in the learners’ perspectives, see (Säljö, 1979). Those 
studies have focused on description of learning from the learner’s point of view and 
identified five categories and levels for a learner’s developing conceptions of learning. 
Additionally, (Rossum and Schenk, 1984) suggested a new category and added it as 
the sixth level to the Säljö’s model. According to the final model, ‘self awareness’ and 
‘self realisation’ is recognised as the most excellent conception of learners. So, 
conceptually, it can include the other conceptions within lower categories. 
In this article, I will employ DLs to specify the adult learners’ conceptions of learning 
relying on Säljö’s model. Thus, I will highlight the most effective and advantageous 
concepts and roles within that model. The desired logical description can provide a 
proper foundation for formalising knowledge in order to denote the learners’ 
developing conceptions of the phenomenon of ‘learning’. The formalism will provide 
a supportive backbone for representing the main constructive concepts and their 
interrelationships. It also supports the specification of the conceptualisation of the 
learners’ grasping of the phenomenon of ‘learning’. In the following sections of this 
article you will be offered the followings: Knowledge Representation Formalism, 
Learners’ Developing Conceptions of Learning and Logical Representation, Semantic 
Representation, and Summary and Conclusions. 
2.  KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION FORMALISM 
According to (Baader et al., 2010) and (Schmidt-Schaulss and Smolka, 1991), 
Description Logics (DLs) are well-known knowledge representation formalism and 
represent knowledge in terms of concepts (classes), roles (relations) and individuals 
(objects). Concepts correspond to unary predicates, roles to binary predicates and 
individuals to constants in First-Order Predicate Logic (FOL). In DLs individuals are 
the instances (or members) of a concept. For instance, blue as an individual can also 
be recognised as an instance of the concept Colour. From certain point of view, atomic 
concepts and atomic roles are two kinds of atomic symbols. The atomic concepts and 
roles are defined as the elementary descriptions from which humans inductively build 
and construct complex (specified) descriptions by means of concept constructors and 
role constructors. The set of the main connectors in the basic Description Logic is:  
 
{Conjunction (⊓: and), Disjunction (⊔: or), Negation (¬: not), Existential Restriction 
(∃: there exists …), Universal Restriction (∀: for all ...), Top Concept (⊤: 
everything), Bottom Concept (⊥: nothing)}. 
 
A knowledge base in DLs usually consists of the terminological axioms (for 
terminological and grammatical descriptions) and assertions (for world descriptions). 
Let C and D be concepts, R and S be roles, and a and b be individuals. Then we have 
the following terminological axioms:  
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 Concept inclusion C ⊑ D (e.g., Bird ⊑ Animal), 
 Role inclusion R ⊑ S (e.g., walking ⊑ moving), 
 Concept equality C ≡ D (e.g., Person ≡ Human), and 
 Role equality R ≡ S (e.g., designing ≡ sketching).  
 
Additionally, C(a) and R(a,b) denote concept assertion and role assertion respectively. 
For example, Colour(blue) denotes a concept assertion and eating(Person,Apple) 
represents a role assertion.  
 
3.  LEARNERS’ DEVELOPING CONCEPTIONS OF LEARNING 
According to (Rossum and Hame, 2010) and (Pratt, 1992), learning conceptions play 
an important role in learners’ study behaviour in higher (tertiary) education. In fact, 
the human being views the world through the lenses of her/his conceptions, 
interpretations and actualisations in accordance with her/his realisation of the world. 
In this section I generally and succinctly describe different categories of the learners’ 
developing conceptions of the phenomenon of ‘learning’ with regard to Säljö’s [and 
Rossum’s] model.  
 
1. Knowing More. At this point, the learner identifies learning as knowing new 
things. Here the learner wants and needs her/his mentor to impart the well-
structured information into separated, isolated and realisable facts for her/him.  
 
2. Memorisation. Here the learner reproduces what she/he has acquired and what 
she/he has known. So, this category is all about memorising. The learner still tries 
to know more [and more] in order to reproduce more [and more] knowledge.  
 
3. Selection. The learner selects (chooses) and memorises the facts and might be 
able to apply her/his knowledge in the practical approaches. She/he expects the 
mentor to shape and to organise the information for her/him and to motivate 
her/him during their interactions.  
 
4. Meaning Construction. The learner is realising that constructing knowledge is 
very important. She/he understands that knowledge construction could be 
plausible with regard to ‘meaning construction’. The mentor would guide the 
learner to find out how to think logically, analytically and productive. Let me 
conclude that she/he has initiated to become concerned with developmental 
aspects of learning1. 
 
                                                 
1 Jean Piaget (1896 - 1980) is the originator of constructivism. Constructivism is a learning philosophy and 
a pedagogical theory of learning that can be recognised as a model and a theory of knowing. Piaget was the 
first psychologist to make a systematic study of cognitive development and developmental theory of 
learning. However, a learner may not know about the developmental theory of learning, but she/he, in levels 
4 and 5 of Säljö’s model has highly become concerned with developmental aspects of learning. 
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5. Reality Interpretation. Here the learner recognises learning as an interpretative 
process that could support her/him in realising and understanding the ‘reality’ of 
the world. According to this insight, the learner characterises learning as the 
process of ‘self development’. I shall claim that she/he has highly become 
concerned with developmental aspects of learning. 
 
6. Self Realisation. This category is about self awareness. It’s all about the 
appreciation of the self. The process of self realisation is always going to be 
continued. The learner will be going to expand her(him)self. Obviously, this is 
the most excellent and the most transcendental learning conception of a learner. 
 
Focusing on the afore-mentioned levels of conceptions, we can realise that there is a 
strong dependency between them. Any lower conception provides a conceptual [and 
logical] presupposition for its upper conception. And any upper conception is the 
consequence of its lower one. This is extremely advantageous in logical modelling of 
the learning conceptions using DLs. I have figured out the learners’ conceptions of 
their significant roles within learning processes in Figure 1. Figure 1 is represented 
with regard to Säljö’s and Rossum’s model. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Learners’ Conceptions of their Roles within Learning Processes 
 
3.1.  LOGICAL DESCRIPTION   
 
In this section I employ DLs to provide a formal description of the levels of the model 
and their specifications. I also employ concept inclusion and role inclusion axioms 
and role assertion to, formally, describe the significant roles of the learner.  
 
See the following formalism: 
 
1. Here I focus on formal description of ‘learning’ as a role of the concept ‘Learner’. 
The description is represented in the form of the conjunction of a number of role 
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inclusions. We have the following formal description: 
 
( learning ⊑ transforming )  ⊓   
( learning ⊑ memorising ) ⊓ 
( learning ⊑ reproducing ) ⊓  
( learning ⊑ selecting ) ⊓  
( learning ⊑ abstracting ) ⊓  
( learning ⊑ developing ) ⊓  
( learning ⊑ expecting ) ⊓   
( learning ⊑ beingAware ). 
 
2. As mentioned, any lower conception provides a logical premise for its upper 
conception and any upper conception is the logical consequence of its lower one. 
Thus, any lower conception supports its upper conception. For instance, 
Memorisation is a concept relevant for the role memorising. Memorisation 
supports Transformation as the concept relevant for the role transforming. 
Therefore, we have a number of conjunctions between various relevant role 
assertions. Additionally, we have one concept inclusion. This concept inclusion 
is “Transformation ⊑ Process” and denotes the fact that the most primary 
conception of ‘learning’ sees learning as transforming. Also, Transformation is the 
concept of the role transforming and is originally a process. We have following 
formal description: 
 
( Transformation ⊑ Process )  ⊓ 
support(Transformation,Memorisation)  ⊓ 
support(Memorisation,Reproduction)  ⊓ 
support(Reproduction,Selection)  ⊓ 
support(Selection,Comprehension)  ⊓                          
hasInput(Transformation,Fact)  ⊓ 
hasOutput(Transformation,Knowing)  ⊓                                    
support (Knowing,Learner)  ⊓ 
hasInput(Reproduction,Production)  ⊓  
hasOutput(Reproduction,Production)  ⊓ 
( Production ⊑ Process )  ⊓ 
hasInput(Production,Fact)  ⊓ 
hasOutput(Production,Fact)  ⊓ 
support(Expectation,Interpretation)  ⊓ 
support(Interpretation,Comprehension)  ⊓ 
hasInput(Comprehension,Concept)  ⊓   
hasOutput(Comprehension,Meaning)  ⊓ 
support(Meaning,Abstraction)  ⊓   
support(Abstraction,Development)  ⊓  
hasInput(Development,Thought)  ⊓   
hasOutput(Development,Thought)  ⊓ 
support(Development,Expectation)  ⊓   
support(Expectation,Realisation)  ⊓ 
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hasInput(Realisation,Self)  ⊓   
hasOutput(Realisation,Self)  ⊓  
support(Self,Awareness)  ⊓   
support(Awareness,Learner). 
 
4.  SEMANTIC REPRESENTATION  
As mentioned, in information sciences we tackle to provide an appropriate description 
of a thing/phenomenon and its structure concerning multiple concepts relevant for that 
thing/phenomenon. Considering ontologies as the specifications of the shared 
conceptualisations, they are definitely more descriptive in the shadow of the semantic 
networks and semantic representations. A semantic network is a graph (and is a 
representation) whose nodes represent concepts and whose arcs represent relations 
between the concepts (e.g., isA, produce, support, hasInput). Semantic representations 
can provide applicable structural representations of the statements about a 
thing/phenomenon within the domain of interest. In Figure 2, you see a semantic 
network that represents the main concepts that an adult learner is concerned with 
through her/his conceptions of the phenomenon of ‘learning’ (and, the concept 
Learning). I have designed this semantic network with regard to the provided logical 
description in section 3. In fact, the described world descriptions in DLs have been 
represented in Figure 2. Thus, you can see that the conceptual and logical relationships 
between the most significant hypotheses within the learner’s developing conceptions 
of learning are represented. This network is capable of supporting a proper 
background for building the top-ontology of the adult learners’ developing 
conceptions of learning. It can also support the educators’, curriculum designers’, 
educational psychologists’ and mentors’ reasoning processes for discovering the key 
points within their learners’ conceptions from ‘knowing, only, an isolated fact’ to ‘self 
realisation and self awareness’. 
 
5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
In this article, I have focused on specification and conceptualisation of the concept 
‘learning’ within the top-ontology of adult learners’ developing conceptions of 
successful learning. I have taken Säljö’s [and Rossum’s] model of students’ 
developing conceptions of learning into consideration. According to this 
epistemological model, self awareness and self realisation is the most excellent 
conception of learners. So, it can conceptually include all the other conceptions within 
lower categories. According to (Rossum and Hame, 2010), the model has proven its 
worth as an instrument for curriculum design, measurement of epistemological 
development and as a tool for staff development. I have employed Description Logics 
to describe and specify various categories of the explained model, and have 
highlighted the most effective concepts and roles. The proposed logical description 
has provided a proper foundation for a DLs-based formalism that describes the 
learners’ developing conceptions of learning. Also, the formalism provides a strong 
backbone for representing the main constructive concepts and their interrelationships.  
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Figure 2. A Semantic Representation of Learners’ Developing Conceptions of Learning 
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It has also supported the specification of the conceptualisation of learners’ grasping 
of the phenomenon of ‘learning’. Accordingly, regarding the proposed logical 
description I have sketched out a semantic representation. It can support an 
appropriate scheme for building the top-ontology of the learners’ conceptions of 
learning. Additionally, it can support educators, curriculum designers, educational 
psychologists and mentors in elaborating their realisation of their learners’ needs 
within educational systems. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This article attempts to make a conceptual and epistemological junction between 
human learning and machine learning. I will be concerned with specifying and 
analysing the structure of concepts in the common ground between a concept-based 
human learning theory and a concept-based machine learning paradigm. I will focus 
on (i) humans’ conceptual representations in the framework of ‘constructivism’ (as an 
educational theory of learning and a proper model of knowing) and ‘constructionism’ 
(as a theory for conceptualising learning) and (ii) concept representations in the 
framework of ‘inductive concept learning’ (as an inductive machine learning 
paradigm). The results will support figuring out the most significant key points for 
constructing a conceptual linkage between a human learning theory and a machine 
learning paradigm. Accordingly, I will construct a conceptual ground for expressing 
and analysing concepts in the common ground of educational and informatics sciences 
and in the context of human-machine interplays. 
 
1.  MOTIVATION  
Regarding a very general definition, the act [and the role] of learning can be identified 
as related to acquiring new or modifying existing knowledge. Often, the ability to 
acquire knowledge is seen as a sign of, or even a prerequisite for, intelligent 
behaviour. I shall stress that ‘knowledge’ is a very complicated and sensitive term that 
must be used with caution. Considering the structures of human and information 
sciences and their interrelationships, I need to focus on specifying knowledge and on 
analysing the phenomena that we can use under the label of ‘knowledge’. It seems 
quite important to investigate what the term ‘knowledge’ stands for (and can stand 
for) to be assumed and to be comprehensible in various frameworks of learning within 
different systems. This article attempts to construct a conceptual and epistemological 
linkage between human learning and machine learning and to analyse the structure 
and description of concepts in the common ground between a theory (and a 
philosophy) in the framework of human learning and a paradigm in the framework of 
machine learning. Before getting into the details, I contemplate the term ‘Machine 
Learning’. Later on, I focus on knowledge to provide a proper background for my 
desired contributions. 
 
Machine Learning has been recognised as a subfield of Artificial Intelligence and 
Computer Science. According to (Mitchell, 1997), “a machine learning approach 
attempts to develop strong algorithms that allow machines to improve [the 
productivity of] their performances on a given goal [and on an objective function]”. 
In machine learning, the word ‘learning’ has been utilised as a binary predicate for 
machine. Learning as a binary predicate describes a role that is being performed by a 
machine. It is important to focus on the term ‘learning’ within the context of the 
analysis of knowledge. My main goal is figuring out the most significant key points 
for building a conceptual link between humans and machines. 
 
In order to analyse knowledge I take Bloom’s taxonomy into consideration. This 
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taxonomy is a framework for classifying pedagogical objectives, which could be 
interpreted as the statements of what teachers [, tutors and mentors] expect their 
learners to have learned, see (Furst et al., 1956; Krathwohl, 2002). Consequently, 
knowledge has a strong relationship with recognition of materials, ideas, methods, 
processes, structures and settings. Bloom’s taxonomy divides a body of knowledge 
into multiple classes like, e.g., knowledge of terminologies, knowledge of ways and 
means, knowledge of trends and sequences, knowledge of classifications and 
categorisations, knowledge of methodologies, knowledge of universals and 
abstractions, knowledge of principles and generalisations, knowledge of theories and 
structures. Later on, (Krathwohl, 2002) has proposed a knowledge dimension in the 
revised version of Bloom’s taxonomy. The revised taxonomy consists of four 
categories: (1) Factual Knowledge (e.g., terminological knowledge), (2) Procedural 
Knowledge (e.g., knowledge of methods and algorithms), (3) Conceptual Knowledge 
(e.g., knowledge of theories, models and structures), and (4) Meta-cognitive 
Knowledge (e.g., contextual knowledge, conditional knowledge). According to this 
categorisation I can say that “knowledge acquisition consists of a sort of 
Transformation functions from reality into the sets and categories of facts, procedures, 
concepts and contexts”. The human being has this ability to deal with multiple classes 
of facts, procedures, concepts and contexts and can transform them into her/his mind.  
 
Transformations can be interpreted as the outcomes of self-involvement in increasing 
knowledge about a subject matter. In human sciences, a learner is someone who 
intentionally attempts to know more about something in order to construct her/his 
knowledge about that thing. Any human has a background knowledge and tackles to 
carry on constructing knowledge over her/his existing knowledge. This consideration 
conduces me to observe and to interpret human knowledge acquisition (and human 
learning) as the ‘activity of construction’. Any person tackles to develop her/his 
constructed knowledge constructions and to gain an opportunity to attain deeper 
realisations and understandings. Also, human’s deeper understandings support her/his 
greater motivations. Here I feel the need to concentrate on ‘conceptualisations’ in 
order to provide a supportive analysis of realisation and understanding.  
 
In my opinion, an understanding expresses a local manifestation of a global 
conceptualisation. More specifically, any understanding (based on a concept) could 
be interpreted as a local manifestation of a global conceptualisation (of that concept). 
It shall be claimed that human beings’ grasps of concepts could provide proper 
foundations for generating their own conceptualisations. Additionally, the personal 
conceptualisation could be identified as the action or the process of forming a concept 
with regard to the basis that has been provided by the individual realisation (see 
Appendix II: Concept Understanding and Conceptualisation). 
 
In this research, I will mainly focus on concepts, conceptions and concept 
representations. I have believed that the main focus of process of knowledge 
acquisition (and learning) is on concepts and concept representations in the ground of 
conceptualisations. Knowledge acquisition based on concepts can be based on the 
following definition. This definition draws out the key elements, which have 
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individual and social implications for intelligent learners, see (Watkins et al., 2002).  
 
 Knowledge acquisition is a reflective activity that enables the learner to draw 
upon her/his previous experiences (and her/his background knowledge) to 
conceptualise (and, respectively, understand) and evaluate the present, so as to 
build up and shape future actions and to construct (and develop) new knowledge. 
Let me go back to machines and machine learning. A machine program is said to learn 
from an experience if:  
 
1. there is a set of tasks for machine, 
2. there is a machine’s performance measure, and also  
3. the machine’s performance at those tasks, as measured, improves with its 
experiences.  
Here I present a problem in human learning to make a comparison between human 
learning and machine learning. This example can clarify what the afore-mentioned 
concepts in a machine learning problem are. Suppose we think of the problem that 
focuses on students’ mathematical problem solving. Considering this problem,  
 
 the most significant task of a student is ‘to find proper solutions for mathematical 
problems’,  
 the set of tasks must consist of ‘the student’s tasks and obligations for solving 
mathematical problems’, 
 the performance measure could be known as ‘the percentage of correctly solved 
problems’, and  
 the experience could consist of ‘the existing transformations and alterations 
between observed problems and solved problems’.  
 
Hence, a student can improve her/his ability in performing proper solutions for 
different mathematical problems after further experiments (experiencing more 
transformations). Subsequently, this student will have a better capability and more 
qualified competences in solving mathematical problems when more transformations 
(experiences) are provided for her/him. Providing more transformations for a student 
could be achievable by showing and providing her/him with more positive (sample) 
and negative (non-sample) examples of the solved mathematical problems.  
 
Here I shall claim that the word ‘learning’ in ‘machine learning’ is metaphorical, and 
is a reflection of human knowledge acquisition and learning in machines and artificial 
agents. Let me express that ‘machine learning’ is a metaphor that describes what 
ingredients and concepts are concerned with effective knowledge acquisition and 
learning within reality. In my opinion, the most important concepts in a machine 
learning problem (e.g., problem, experience, task, performance, ability, learning) are 
‘conceptual reflections’. They are some mappings from reality into usable and 
applicable labels. In the following sections I will focus on:  
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i. humans’ conceptual representations in the framework of constructivism (as 
an educational theory of learning and a proper model of knowing) and 
constructionism (as a theory for conceptualising learning that could be 
identified as a complement for constructivism), and   
ii. hypothesis generation and concept representation in the framework of 
inductive concept learning (as a supervised machine learning paradigm).  
Accordingly, the main contribution of this research is figuring out the most significant 
key points for ‘constructing a conceptual and epistemological linkage between a 
[concept-based] human learning theory and a [concept-based] machine learning 
paradigm’. I will analyse the structural and logical specifications of concepts and 
conceptual representations and will analyse a common ground for expressing and 
analysing concepts in the context of human-machine interplays. I will also relate my 
specifications with Kantian account of schemata (and schemata-based concepts). 
Consequently, I will provide a list of the most significant transformations (from 
human into machine) and reflections (of human in machine) that make conjunctions 
between human learning and machine learning. 
 
2.  CONCEPTUAL REPRESENTATION 
In this section I focus on (i) human conceptual representation in the framework of 
constructivism and constructionism and on (ii) hypothesis generation in the 
framework of inductive concept learning. 
 
2.1.  CONSTRUCTIVISM AND CONSTRUCTIONISM 
 
Constructivism is a philosophy that appears in a variety of guises, some of them 
pedagogical, some epistemological and some in complex combinations, see (Phillips, 
1995). In this research, I see ‘constructivism’ as a model of knowing with roots in 
philosophy, psychology and cybernetics that could support constructivist learning. In 
my opinion, the successful theories of learning are always getting supported by strong 
models of knowing, and thus, constructivism as a learning philosophy and as a theory 
of learning is highly dependent on constructivism as a model of knowing. According 
to these characteristics, it’s possible to say that ‘a successful theory of knowledge and 
an effective learning science may be constructed and developed based on the proper 
foundation that is provided by constructivism’. Jean Piaget, the originator of 
constructivism, argued that all learning was mediated by the construction of mental 
objects that he called schemata. Schemata gradually develop into more conceptual 
mental entities, see (Bartlett, 1932; Parker, 2008). Let me explain the schemata in 
more detail. In constructivist learning the human’s mental structures manifest 
themselves in the form of schemata. The schemata demonstrate the human’s 
realisation of the world. They conceptually represent the constituents of one’s 
thoughts for knowledge acquisition with regard to her/his realisation of the world. 
Anyhow, in the framework of constructivism, a human being with respect to her/his 
pre-structured knowledge and her/his preconceptions attempts to develop the 
construction of knowledge. The most significant objective of constructivism is 
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producing one’s own understanding of the world, see (Husén and Postlethwaite, 1989; 
Keith Sawyer, 2014; McGawand Peterson, 2007) for more detailed information. 
 
Constructionism is a framework central to the learning sciences, and it posits that 
‘learners create their own knowledge by the construction of conceptual 
representations’. Constructionism focuses on:  
 
 conceptualising learning, and 
 learning how a human can learn. 
 
Papert’s constructionism focuses more on ‘the art of learning’ and on ‘the significance 
of making and producing things in learning’. Papert is interested in 
 
 how learners engage in a relationship with [their own or other’s] knowledge 
construction(s), and 
 how these relations ultimately facilitate the construction of new knowledge.  
 
Constructionism is a constructivist learning theory. It shares constructivism’s view of 
learning as ‘building knowledge structures’ through progressive internalisation of 
action, see (Spiro et al., 1992; Ackermann, 2002; Papert, 1993). I may conclude that 
the main idea of constructionism is that human beings learn effectively through 
creating, constructing and developing things. Additionally, by adding experiences to 
the constructivism approach, constructionism attempts to conceptualise learning and 
to specify and analyse ‘learning to learn’. 
 
The most significant mutual objective of constructivism and constructionism is 
creating one’s own knowledge by constructing conceptual representations. According 
to (Hampton and Moss, 2003), conceptual representations are arguably the most 
important cognitive functions in humans. They stand at the centre of the information 
processing flow, with input from perceptual modules of differing kinds. Also, the most 
important building block of constructivism and constructionism is schemata, see 
(Bartlett, 1932). Schemata provide proper backgrounds for the learner’s concept [and 
conceptual] representations. They specify the learner’s inferences and can satisfy 
various conditions for definitions of truth.  
 
We saw that everything is about concepts and conceptual representations. Conceptual 
representations attempt to investigate the origins of human’s thought and roots of the 
constructed knowledge. In section 3 I will elaborate the description of schemata and 
will focus on structural and logical specifications of concepts as the key elements of 
the conceptual domains representation. 
 
2.2.  INDUCTIVE CONCEPT LEARNING (ICL) 
 
Machine learning problems can be seen and analysed from different points of view 
and be divided into several categories. One categorisation could divide them into 
supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement learning methods. In supervised learning 
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method, the pair (input,output) training examples are supplied by a trainer who is a 
human. So, the learner (that is a machine) searches for function mappings from the 
inputs into the outputs. In this research, I am dealing with ‘inductive learning from 
examples’, which is a subfield of supervised machine learning. To induce means to 
infer general principles and rules from specific facts as the instances. I shall emphasise 
that these facts are different from the facts presented in the revised Bloom’s taxonomy. 
All existing facts, procedures, concepts and contexts in Bloom’s taxonomy could be 
captured as some principles (i.e. actuality, objectivity and reality) in machines. In 
Inductive Learning, we describe the main terminologies, axioms and rules by 
descriptive logical languages, e.g., First Order Predicate Logic (FOL) and Description 
Logics (DLs).  
 
Inductive Concept Learning (ICL) is a specified Inductive Learning. ICL attempts to 
logically describe concepts and their relationships. It employs the members 
(instances) and non-members of a concept that may be known as a class. A 
characteristic feature of most inductive learning approaches is the use of background 
knowledge. This feature supports more complicated and specific learning scenarios, 
because not only the factual description of the given examples can be used by the 
machine, but structurally rich knowledge representations can be taken into account as 
well, see (Mitchell, 1997; Lehmann, 2010).  
 
In parallel with (Lavrac and Dzeroski, 1994), I focus on specification of concept 
learning with background knowledge. In concept learning with background 
knowledge, a machine with regard to the given set of training examples and 
background knowledge finds a ‘hypothesis’. A hypothesis can be expressible in 
concept description languages. Also, based on the background knowledge and given 
examples (to machine), a hypothesis can be complete and consistent, i.e. correct. So, 
one may assume that a hypothesis is generated based on ideas and can determine the 
applications of a term and a phrase. Furthermore, a hypothesis is a significant part in 
the use of reason and language. It has a very strong dependency to the background 
knowledge. 
 
3. CONCEPTS: STRUCTURAL AND LOGICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
There has always been a general problem concerning the notion of ‘concept’, in 
philosophy, in linguistics, in psychology and in computer and information sciences. 
This research is focusing on knowledge acquisition and learning relying on concepts 
and concept representations. Thus, I need to ascertain a realisable interrelationship 
between the description of concepts within human and information sciences. Actually, 
I am constructing a conceptual linkage between constructivism/constructionism and 
inductive concept learning. As mentioned, schemata provide proper backgrounds for 
the learner’s concept [and conceptual] representations. In a simplified version of 
Kantian philosophy, a non-empirical (pure) concept has been defined as a category. 
According to Kantian philosophy, schemata are the procedural rules by which a 
category is associated with a sense impression. Kant claimed that the schemata 
provide a reference to intuition in a way similar to the manner of empirical concepts. 
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According to the Kantian account of schemata there are three types of concepts that 
employ schemata: 
 
1. Empirical concepts: For instance, the concept ‘Spring’ can describe a rule 
according to which human’s imagination can visualise a general figure of ‘a 
green season with beautiful trees and colourful flowers’ without being restricted 
and closed to any particular and specific shape produced by experience, see (Link 
a).  
 
2. Pure mathematical concepts: They are the construction or mental drawing of what 
is common to several geometrical figures. They can be concerned with numbers, 
algebras and arithmetics. I shall stress that these concepts are not based on 
objective visual images, see (Link b). 
 
3. Pure concepts of the understanding: They focus on characteristics, predicates, 
attributes, qualities or properties of an object, that are, also objects in general or 
as such, see (Link c). 
 
The third employs transcendental schemata, see (Kant, 1781; Kant, 1790; Kant, 1999). 
Here I focus on some specifications of concepts and then relate them to the Kantian 
philosophy.  
 
Concepts are the furniture of human beings’ minds. A well-furnished mind can be a 
source of successful knowledge acquisition and learning, see (Parker, 2008). Concepts 
are realised (by some philosophers and psychologists) as representations of reality in 
mind. Regarding this grasp of concepts, they could be understood as some general 
objects and labels, where objects are the constituents of propositions that mediate 
between thought, language, and referents, see (Bartlett, 1932). From these 
characteristics, I conclude that it’s possible to say that concepts might be understood 
to be the representations of actualities and objectivities in humans’ minds. The mental 
representations of actualities can affect the human’s languages. More precisely, a 
concept can be said to be a linkage between linguistic expressions (descriptions) and 
the mental images (e.g., representations of the world, representations of inner 
experiences) that a human being has in her/his mind, see (Götzsche, 2013).  
 
Relying on logics and their descriptive features, a concept can be seen as an ‘idea’ and 
the idea can be transformed into a hypothesis in order to correspond to a distinct entity 
(or even to a group of entities) or to its/their essential features. The ideas determine 
the application(s) of terms and phrases. It’s really important to say that any idea is a 
significant part in the use of reason and language. 
 
These characteristics and properties become applied in order to support the 
metaphorical usages of concepts in machine applications. In fact, the existing linkages 
between mental images and linguistic expressions can be mapped (be transformed) as 
multiple ideas into hypotheses in order to determine different applications in artificial 
systems. As mentioned, a concept can be expressible in some concept description 
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languages and it’s possible only in virtue of terminologies. In fact, various concepts 
and the relationships between them can be used to establish the fundamental 
terminologies adopted in a modelled conceptual domain regarding the hierarchical 
structures.  
 
According to the characteristics of humans’ ideas, when a human being forms (see 
Link d) an idea from its examples, she/he gets to know more than just some 
definitions. This demonstrates the deep learning rather than superficial knowledge, 
see (Parker, 2008). I shall emphasise that the human learner is the developer of her/his 
personal conceptions over her/his own designed schemata. In my opinion, the 
relationships between ‘Kantian account of schemata’ and the ‘empirical concepts’ 
supports the human’s mental representations of the objects. It also sees a ‘pure concept 
of the understanding’ as a characteristic and predicate of an object (that can express 
what has been said about that object). The first one employs schemata and the second 
one employs transcendental schemata. In fact, this is how a learner deals with 
fundamental concepts through constructivist learning.  
 
Accordingly, the leaner employs inductive rules to expand her/his general ideas into 
more specified ones. The generalisation of various specified hypotheses (based on 
ideas) supports the learner in discovering new hypotheses and generating new ideas. 
She/He searches for and lists attributes and properties that can be used to distinguish 
exemplars (of various hypotheses) from non-exemplars. But what she/he really does 
is more than just specifying and generalising from different examples; she/he is highly 
concerned with identifying and relating the induced examples. Let me be more 
specific.  
 
As mentioned in 2.2, a machine with regard to the given set of examples and its 
background knowledge, finds hypotheses. The logical description of a concept, which 
arises during the knowledge acquisition and learning processes, is called a hypothesis, 
since it is an experimental explanation of why the objects are members (or non-
members) of the hypotheses (concepts). Also, considering a concept as a hypothesis, 
if an example belongs to a hypothesis, we are able to conclude that the hypothesis 
covers the example. Then, the example has all features and characteristics of that 
concept, see (Baader et al., 2010).  
    
3.1. CONCEPTS IN THE COMMON GROUND BETWEEN HUMAN 
CONSTRUCTIVIST LEARNING AND MACHINE ICL 
 
Obviously, there is an important characteristic of concepts held in common ground. 
The concepts in the common ground are the images of the Idea transformations (the 
transformations from human beings into machines). The mappings epitomise humans’ 
conceptual representations and generate hypotheses. In the common ground a concept 
is a specialised or generalised experience. The concepts could be recognised by their 
instances (that are concepts as well) and they all can be represented in different 
hierarchies.  
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In human scientific approaches an experimental explanation of why some objects are 
the members of a concept may support learners in representing their own ideas and in 
providing ideal (and conceptual) representations. In fact, the quality and the modality 
of the concept representation is affected by observing ‘empirical concepts’ and the 
‘pure concept of understanding’ with regard to a Kantian account of schemata and 
transcendental schemata. On the other hand, in machine learning approaches, a 
machine generates the represented concept from its given instances. In the common 
ground, an experimental and empirical explanation of WhyNess of existence of some 
‘concepts, ideas and hypotheses’ as the instances of other ‘concepts, ideas and 
hypotheses’ can provide a strong background for improving the quality of 
conceptualisations. Here are a number of transformations (from human into machine) 
and reflections (of human in machine) that make a conceptual and epistemological 
connection between human learning and machine learning:  
 
 Transformation of a human being’s knowledge and knowings into multiple 
principles (and axioms) in machines that are mainly object-oriented. 
Accordingly, the human being’s knowings get classified into the specified classes 
(and under the determined labels) in machine’s knowledge base.   
 
 Transformation of a human being’s experimental and empirical achievements 
into various categories of positive and negative examples in machines. Thus, the 
human being’s experiments become divided into exemplars and non-exemplars 
of the specified classes with determined labels.    
 
 Transformation of a human being’s real ‘problems’, real ‘tasks for solving 
problems’ and real ‘performances’ into provided classes with the same labels 
(Problem, Task and Performance) in machines.  
 
 The reflection of human learning and knowledge acquisition in machines and 
artificial agents. This reflection is equivalent to transforming a taken 
metaphorical image of learning and knowledge acquisition into machines and 
artificial agents.  
 
 The reflection of human concepts in the hypotheses. The linkages between a 
human being’s mental representations and linguistic expressions (and 
descriptions) are getting mapped as some ideas into hypotheses in machines. 
They correspond to multiple entities or to their essential features in order to 
express different significant parts in the use of reasons and languages. 
 
 The reflection of humans’ conceptual representations in hypothesis 
representations and representation of hierarchy of hypotheses in machines’ 
knowledge bases. 
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4.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
In this article, I have focused on a conceptual and epistemological linkage between 
concept-based human learning and concept-based machine learning. Regarding the 
structures of human-oriented sciences and information sciences and according to the 
fact that human-oriented sciences and information sciences support distinct types of 
frameworks, I have had to specify and to analyse knowledge, knowledge acquisition 
and learning from two separated points of view. In human systems, knowledge 
acquisition is a reflective activity that enables a human being to draw upon her/his 
experiences and background knowledge to conceptualise, understand and evaluate the 
present, so as to build up and shape her/his future actions and to construct and develop 
new knowledge. On the other hand, a machine program is said to learn (and acquire 
knowledge) from an experience if there is a set of tasks and a performance measure 
for it and, also, if its performance at those tasks, as measured, improves with its given 
experiences.  
 
In this article, according to (i) constructivism as a model of knowing and a theory of 
learning, and constructionism as a theory of conceptualising learning, and (ii) 
inductive concept learning as a supervised machine learning paradigm, I have focused 
on building a conceptual linkage between human learning and machine learning. The 
constructivist and constructionist theories of human learning and the [machine] 
inductive concept learning paradigm are shaped based upon concepts. The first two 
are focusing on concepts and conceptual representations and the third one focuses on 
representing concepts in informations sciences within electronic systems for 
hypothesis representation and hypothesis generation. My central focus has been on 
analysing concept representations in the mentioned frameworks and on their common 
ground. A concept can be seen as a linkage between linguistic expressions and the 
mental images that a human has in mind. It can be observed as an idea and be 
transformed into a hypothesis in order to be corresponded to entities or to their 
essential features. In fact, schemata provide proper backgrounds for the learner’s 
concept (and conceptual) representations. A Kantian account of schemata sees the 
empirical concepts in the human’s mental representation of the objects. It also sees a 
pure concept of the understanding as a characteristic and predicate of an object. It can 
express what has been said about a thing. The first one employs schemata and the 
second one employs transcendental schemata. In fact, this is how a learner deals with 
fundamental concepts within constructivist learning and, accordingly, she/he 
transforms her/his concepts into multiple hypotheses in order to apply them in 
inductive concept learning frameworks in machines. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Providing more human-like concept learning in machines has always been one of the 
most significant goals of machine learning paradigms and of human-machine 
interaction techniques. This article attempts to provide a logical specification of 
conceptual mappings from humans’ minds into machines’ knowledge bases. We will 
focus on the representation of the mappings (transformations) relying on First-Order 
Predicate Logic. Additionally, the structure of concepts in the common ground 
between humans and machines will be analysed. It seems quite necessary to pay 
attention to the philosophy of constructivism and constructivist models of knowing. 
This research constructs a conceptual ground for expressing and analysing concepts 
in the common ground between humanistic and informatics sciences and in the 
context of human-machine interplays. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
In an interaction between human beings (as intentional, aware and intelligent agents) 
and machines (as unaware and artificial agents), they exchange multiple actions and 
transactions concerning, e.g., identifications, descriptions, specifications and 
reasonings. According to (McIntyre Boyd, 2004) and based on our epistemological 
approach, the multilevel interactions between a trainer (a human being) and an 
artificial and a metaphorical learner (a machine), could be seen as a radical 
constructivist account of human cognition and comprehension. Also, these 
interactions could shape a kind of ontology. Obviously, the human-machine 
interactions are not agreement-oriented, because an aware agent cannot make an 
agreement with an unaware agent, but we suppose there is a type of agreement and 
convention between the human being and herself/himself to forward information 
about a given domain to the machine and to train the machine about some particular 
topics and concepts in that domain. In section two, we will focus on the expression 
‘concept’. In interactions between human beings and machines, humans can develop 
their non-evidential and non-axiomatical conceptions of the specified underlying 
systematic processes in the world. 
 
Training machines based upon personal mental images of reality in the context of 
human-machine interactions, could provide a proper ground for constructivist 
machine training. At this point, we take the philosophy of constructivism into 
consideration. Constructivism appears in a variety of guises (e.g., pedagogical, 
epistemological and complex combinatorial). It has been known as a philosophical 
theory of learning and as a model of knowing, see (Husén and Postlethwaite, 1989; 
Spiro et al., 1992; Phillips, 1995; McGawand Peterson, 2007). According to 
constructivism, a human being is always concerned with the active creation of 
personal mental representations. As for learning in the framework of constructivism, 
any agent generates her/his own schemata, see (Link a). Relying on our approach, any 
schema is the product of the trainer’s understanding of the world. It conceptually 
represents the constituents of the trainer’s thought about training something. Schemata 
support the trainer in constructing and in developing her/his concepts (that have been 
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constructed with regard to her/his own realisation of the world). Additionally, they 
provide strong backbones for the trainer’s interpretations and provide proper 
backgrounds for describing terminologies and world descriptions. The constructivist 
machine training framework is heuristic, explanatory and developmental for human 
being’s thoughts and reasoning. Actually, any constructivist machine training in the 
context of human-machine interaction is concerned with heuristic questions focusing 
on (i) ‘What/Which is …?’, (ii) ‘How is …?’, and (iii) ‘Why is …?’. The first group 
of questions focus on the factual, structural, existential and ontological aspects of the 
world, the second group focus on procedural, methodological and technical aspects of 
the world and the third group focus on inferential aspects of the world. 
 
This article attempts to construct a conceptual and logical linkage between human’s 
knowledge and machine learning. So, before getting into the details we contemplate 
the term ‘Machine Learning’. Machine Learning is a subfield of Artificial Intelligence 
and Computer Science. According to (Mitchell, 1997), a machine learning approach 
attempts to develop strong algorithms that allow machines to improve [the 
productivity of] their performances on a given goal [and on an objective function]. In 
machine learning, the word ‘learning’ has been utilised as a predicate for the 
expression ‘machine’. ‘Learning’ as a binary predicate describes a role that is being 
performed by the machine. More specifically, machines’ concept learning approaches 
try to provide appropriate logical descriptions and specifications for transformed 
concepts and their interrelationships after being transformed concerning their 
relationships with reality. A characteristic feature of most concept learning 
approaches is the use of background knowledge (e.g., internal knowledge base, 
ontological description). This feature supports more complicated and specific learning 
scenarios, because not only a factual (e.g., terminological) description of given 
examples can be used by the machine, but also, structurally, rich knowledge 
representations are taken into account, see (Mitchell, 1997; Lavrac and Dzeroski, 
1994). In concept learning with background knowledge, with regard to the given set 
of training examples and background knowledge a machine focuses on hypothesis 
generation. In this article, we will provide a logical specification of mental mappings 
from humans into machines. We will focus on representations of transformations from 
humans’ conceptions into machines’ knowledge bases relying on First Order 
[Predicate] Logic (FOL). The results will support figuring out and analysing the most 
significant components of the logical characterisation of concept transformations. In 
the second section, we will focus on concepts and transforming concepts. The third 
section will deal with concept transformation process consisting of logic of 
transformation and the analysis of transformation. Section four will summarises the 
conclusions. 
 
2.  CONCEPTS AND TRANSFORMING CONCEPTS 
First, we shall stress the fact that the notion of ‘concept’ is a very sensitive term that 
must be used with caution, but we assume the use of ‘concept’ to be comprehensible 
in this context and in the logical formalisms. In our opinion, a human being’s specified 
realisation of the world finds its real significance with regard to her/his grasp of the 
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various concepts. Concepts support thoughts. Thoughts are also highly dependent on 
a human’s interpretations and realisations of whether a given thing/phenomenon is an 
instance of a [constructed] concept or not. According to (Götzsche, 2013) and based 
on our conceptual approach, a concept is a linkage (relationship) between humans’ 
mental images of reality (for instance, “an image of the Spring”) and her/his linguistic 
expressions and statements (for instance, “Spring is one of the four conventional 
temperate seasons, following winter and preceding summer”).  
 
Let us represent the described linkage by —R—. In descriptive logical approaches, 
these expressions support the definitions. A ‘definition’ is a kind of equivalence 
between a term referring to a thing (the thing that is going to be defined) and a 
description (generally built up using the inductive rules). Also, there is a strong 
relationship between the mental images and the mental representations of different 
aspects of the world. In fact, human beings need to, logically, apply —R— in their 
world descriptions, e.g., in assertions about real-world objects, in assertions about the 
empirical world, in assertional knowledge representations, in assertions about the 
ontologies, and in descriptions of terminologies and terminological knowledge. 
Therefore, human being transform —R— into discrete classes of things in order to see 
its applications. Thus, transformations play a very efficient part in the use of reasons 
and languages. Actually, transformations allow human to divide a continuously 
varying world into discrete classes of things, see (Lake, 2014). 
 
At this point, we focus on the concept formation process (see (Parker: Concept 
Formation)) and acknowledge this process as the most fundamental step towards 
constructivist machine training. By forming concepts, a trainer (who is a human 
being) sorts her/his specific experiences and empirical studies into general classes [or 
even rules]. For instance, regarding the fact ‘Drinking is a sign of thirst’, she/he 
represents the classes Drinking and Thirst and the rule ‘Drinking → Thirst’ in the 
machine’s knowledge base. Consequently, the machine expresses the proposed 
classes and generates the proposed rule over the background knowledge in machine’s 
knowledge base and with regard to other experiences of the trainer. Moreover, the 
machine utilises the expressed classes and the generated rules in class-based and rule-
based reasoning processes. We have introduced the term ‘concept construction’ 
process in (Badie, 2015a; Badie, 2015b) and have interpreted it as the super-category 
of concept formation processes. A concept construction process consists of ‘forming 
concepts’ and ‘reforming constructed concepts’. The trainer is highly concerned with 
main characteristics and features of a thing/a phenomenon in order to consider it as an 
instance of a class. The trainer must employ the examples that can lead her/him to 
discovering new classes. She/he searches for [and itemises] the attributes and 
properties that can be used to distinguish exemplars from non-exemplars of various 
classes. Additionally, she/he identifies, specifies and relates the generalised examples 
and compares different examples. The following statements are derived from the 
above-mentioned characteristics of concepts. 
 
 The descriptive logical languages and logical techniques transform the 
relationships between a human’s mental images and her/his linguistic expressions 
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into various ideas that are representable in the form of entities (discrete classes of 
things). The ideas specify the human’s definitions (that are supported by 
linguistic expressions) by employing the logical rules that are (could be) existing 
between the same classes in the world. Accordingly, an idea is transformed into 
a hypothesis in order to correspond to a discrete class. 
 
 As for the fundamental characteristics of concepts, a human being’s conception 
within her/his interactions with a machine is equivalent to her/his act of 
representing various concepts and linking her/his explanations and, respectively, 
definitions, with regard to her/his own mental images. 
  
3.  CONCEPT TRANSFORMATION PROCESS 
 
As accounted from above, “a concept is a relation and, in fact, a binary predicate 
between humans’ mental images of the world and their linguistic expressions [and, 
thus, definitions]”. Obviously, the definitions always attempt to provide appropriate 
descriptions for the mental images. Subsequently, the existing interrelationships and 
dependencies between mental images and the provided descriptions support idea 
generation. At this point, we focus on the analysis of idea transformation from 
humans’ minds into machines’ knowledge bases. Suppose that the trainer has 
considered n objects. For instance, the set of n objects is equal to {sofa1, glass2, plate3, 
…, brownn}. We shall draw your attention to the logical description of the 
transformation process. 
 
3.1.  LOGIC OF TRANSFORMATION  
 
ONE. The trainer assigns her/his ideas to the objects and focuses on ‘idea assertion’. 
For instance, she/he assigns her/his first idea to the first object. So, she/he constructs 
Idea1(object1). For instance, she/he constructs Furniture(sofa) to express the fact that 
sofa is a furniture (or sofa is a member of the class Furniture). Similarly, she/he assigns 
the second [and, respectively, the third, fourth, …, and nth] ideas to the second [, third, 
fourth, …, and nth] objects. Therefore, there are totally n assignments like:  
 
Idea1(object1), Idea2(object2), …, Idean(objectn). 
 
This conclusion represents a linear model. Considering i ∈ [1,n] and relying on FOL, 
Ideai represents a unary predicate and objecti represents a constant symbol (as an 
instance of the unary predicate Ideai).  
 
TWO. The trainer makes a relation between her/his achievements. Employing FOL, 
there exists a  
 
Relation [Idea1(object1), Idea2(object2), …, Idean(objectn)]. 
 
For instance, she/he can relate the assertions (the world descriptions) Furniture(sofa) 
and Colour(brown) to each other. Then, Relation [Furniture(sofa), Colour(brown)] is 
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capable of representing different types of relationships between sofa and brown with 
regard to their labels in the trainer’s mind. Actually, the proposed world descriptions 
can actively develop her/his knowledge. Also, the relationship between the world 
descriptions can establish various expressions in her/his mind. Let us conclude that 
these relationships construct more specified ideas based upon the proposed world 
descriptions. Relying on FOL and considering p, q ∈ [1,n], Relation [Ideap(objectp), 
Ideaq(objectq)] represents a binary predicate between two unary predicates (between 
Ideap and Ideaq). This relation is also valid between objectp and objectq as the instances 
of Ideap and Ideaq respectively. In this step, the trainer has produced a linear relational 
model, see Table 1.  
 
 
Idea1(object1) 
 
… 
 
Idean(objectn) 
 
Table 1. Linear Relational Model 
 
THREE. The approached linear relational model is based on FOL. But it could also 
be represented in the form of a j-by-i matrix like I, where i, j ∈ [1, n]. This step 
represents the most significant assumption of the transformation. We shall stress the 
fact that we have represented the linear description ‘Relation [Idea1(object1), 
Idea2(object2), …, Idean(objectn)]’ in the form of a j-by-i matrix in order to allow the 
required linear transformation (that reflects the ideas) to be represented in a well-
structured format. Additionally, a matrix can appropriately be used in establishing a 
transformation. Here, we have a matrix (relational model), see Table 2. 
 
 
Idea1(object1) 
 
 
… 
 
Ideai(objecti) 
 
   … 
 
  
 
Ideaj(objectj) 
 
 
… 
 
Idean(objectn) 
 
Table 2. Relational Model 
 
FOUR. This step focuses on reflection. The idea assertion Idea1(object1) (that is 
located in the first row and the first column of Table 2) becomes reflected in 
Predicate1(constant1) (located in the first row and the first column of Table 3 that is 
the product of the transformation) and Idean(objectn) (located in the jth row and the 
ith column of Table 2) gets reflected in Predicaten(constantn) (located in the jth row 
and the ith column of Table 3). Thus, all cells in the relational model 2 are, 
collectively, reflected in an equivalent relational model (matrix), see Table 3.   
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Predicate1(constant1) 
 
 
… 
 
Predicatei(constanti) 
 
… 
 
  
 
Predicatej(constantj) 
 
 
… 
 
Predicaten(constantn) 
 
Table 3. Relational Model 
 
FIVE. Table 3, as a relational model, represents a relationship between  
 
Predicate1(constant1), Predicate2(constant2), …, and Predicaten(constantn). 
 
Therefore, we have a description like:  
 
Relation [Predicate1(constant1), …, Predicaten(constantn)]. 
 
Consequently, there are n assignments from the [unary] Predicate1 into constant1, 
from Predicate2 into constant2, …, and finally, from Predicaten into constantn. These 
assignments have been related with each other by means of n-ary Relation. Based on 
FOL, the effect of n-ary Relation is equivalent to:  
 
Predicate [Predicate1(constant1), Predicate2(constant2), …, Predicaten(constantn)]. 
 
Note that the outer predicate is n-ary and works on n internal unary predicates. Then, 
the trainer has produced a linear relational model, see Table 4. 
 
 
Predicate1(constant1) 
 
… 
 
Predicaten(constantn) 
 
Table 4. Linear Relational Model 
 
SIX. This step focuses on generating the ‘relational hypothesis model’. Actually, the 
effect of the first unary predicate on the first constant symbol generates the first 
hypothesis (or Hypothesis1), the effect of the second unary predicate on the second 
constant symbol generates the second hypothesis (or Hypothesis2), …, and the effect 
of the nth unary predicate on the nth constant symbol generates the nth hypothesis (or 
Hypothesisn). Subsequently, the outer n-ary predicate relates Hypothesis1, 
Hypothesis2, …, and Hypothesisn. Therefore, there is a relationship between all 
generated hypotheses. Thus, we have:  
 
Predicate [Hypothesis1, Hypothesis2, …, Hypothesisn]. 
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Therefore, we have a relational hypothesis model, see Table 5.  
 
 
Hypothesis1 
 
… 
 
Hypothesisn 
 
Table 5. Linear Relational Model 
 
SEVEN. Finally, there is a set like:  
 
{Hypothesis1, Hypothesis2, …, Hypothesisn} 
 
that represents the generated hypotheses for the machine.  
 
3.2.  ANALYSIS OF TRANSFORMATION  
Suppose that:  
 
i. In denotes the n-component linear relational model [Idea1(object1), 
Idea2(object2), …, Idean(objectn)], 
 
ii. Pn denotes the n-component linear relational model [Predicate1(constant1), 
Predicate2 (constant2), …, Predicaten(constantn)], and 
 
iii. Hn denotes the n-component linear relational model [Hypothesis1, Hypothesis2, 
…, Hypothesisn].  
 
First, we focus on the forward direction from human to machine. There are reflection 
functions like Ri from human being’s ideas into predicates. Let us represent the set of 
Ri by R. So:  
 
R: In → Pn . 
 
Then, R represents the transformed ideas into predicates. Semantically, the reflection 
functions R satisfy the n-component model [Hypothesis1, Hypothesis2, …, 
Hypothesisn] (i.e., provide proper models that attempt to satisfy the hypotheses). Then, 
there is a model like:  
 
R ⊨ Hn . 
 
Therefore, the reflection functions R, semantically, satisfy the set of hypotheses in the 
machine (Result 1).  
 
At this point, we focus on the backward direction from machine to human. There are 
various conformation functions like C such that:  
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Hn ⊨ C. 
 
Semantically, any conformation function becomes satisfied by a hypothesis like 
Hypothesisi belonging to the n-component relational model [Hypothesis1, Hypothesis2, 
…, Hypothesisn]. Note that C denotes the set of Ci. So, C represents the transformed 
predicates into ideas and formally: 
 
C: Pn → In     (Result 2). 
 
According to the results 1 and 2 we have: 
 
(R: In → Pn)     ⊨    Hn     ⊨     (C: Pn → In) . 
 
Then:      
 
In → Pn     ⊨    Hn     ⊨     Pn → In . 
 
In fact, the reflection transformations from ideas into predicates satisfy the 
hypotheses. And the hypotheses satisfy the inverse reflection transformations (or 
conformation transformations) from predicates into ideas. 
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
Training machines based upon personal mental images of the world in the context of 
human-machine interactions shapes the skeleton of constructivist human-machine 
interactions. Schemata in constructivist training frameworks could demonstrate the 
trainer’s realisations of the world. They conceptually represent the constituents of the 
trainer’s thoughts for training concepts. Schemata support the trainer in developing 
her/his constructed concepts (that have been constructed with regard to her/his own 
realisation of the world). In this article, we have provided a logical and 
epistemological specification of concepts and we have seen the linkages between 
humans’ mental images and their linguistic expressions as the origins of manifestation 
of concepts. Accordingly, we have logically specified the mental mappings from 
human into machine and, subsequently, we have focused on logical representations of 
transformations from human beings’ conceptions into machines’ knowledge bases 
relying on First-Order Predicate Logic. We have identified the transformations from 
humans’ minds into machines’ knowledge bases by ‘reflection transformations’ and, 
correspondingly, we have labeled the inverse cases by ‘conformation transformations’ 
in order to analyse the proposed logical descriptions. The reflection transformations 
from ideas into predicates satisfy the hypotheses. And the hypotheses satisfy the 
conformation transformations from predicates into ideas. In future research, we will 
employ the results in formal semantic analysis of concept transformations from minds 
into knowledge bases and in specifying their conceptualisations. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
In this article, First-Order Predicate Logic (FOL) is employed for analysing some 
relationships between human beings and machines. Based on FOL, we will be 
conceptually and logically concerned with semantic analysis of training-learning 
relationships in human-machine interaction. The central focus is on formal semantics 
and its role in the ‘relationship’ between human beings and machines. The analysed 
relationships between a human being and a machine will support our thoughts on and 
contemplations over the HowNess of establishing formal semantics within human-
machine interaction. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
Machine Learning is a subfield of Artificial Intelligence and Computer Science. A 
machine learning approach attempts to develop appropriate procedures and techniques 
that allow machines to improve the productivity of their performances concerning a 
given goal, see (Mitchell, 1997). In (Badie, 2016a), we have focused on conceptual 
analysis of human-machine interactions and we have provided a conceptual and 
epistemological junction between human beings’ minds and machines’ knowledge 
bases. According to (McIntyre Boyd, 2004) and relying on our epistemological 
approach, the multilevel interactions between a human being (as a trainer) and a 
machine (as a metaphorical learner) could be seen as a radical constructivist account 
of human cognition, realisation and comprehension. Let us bring up some 
fundamentals in order to clarify our conception and way of thinking about the 
metaphorical use of ‘learning’. In the expression ‘machine learning’, the word 
‘learning’ has been utilised as a binary predicate with the word ‘machine’. Learning 
as a binary predicate has been asserted to be a role that is being performed by a 
machine. Thus, the act of ‘learning’ for a machine could be interpreted as a reflection 
of human learning (the phenomenon of ‘learning’) in machines. In fact, machine 
learning is a metaphor that attempts to simulate the phenomenon of ‘learning’ with 
regard to the ingredients, components and concepts that are concerned with effective 
and successful learning processes in the real world. Let us bring the notion ‘concept’ 
into our explanation and be more specific on this research’s objectives. Machine 
concept learning approaches try to provide appropriate realisable logical descriptions 
for a human being’s constructed concepts and their interrelationships after being 
transformed (from a human’s mind into a machine’s knowledge base) with regard to 
their structures and to their interrelationships to the world. Note that ‘concept’ is a 
complicated term. We see a concept as a linkage between a human’s mental images 
of parts of reality (as things/phenomena), on the one hand, and a human’s linguistic 
expressions and statements concerning those things/phenomena on the other hand, see 
(Götzsche, 2013). In (Badie, 2016a), we have explained that concepts can be 
transformed in order to be represented and expressed within a machine’s knowledge 
base. For instance, concepts can be reflected in order to be represented in the form of 
the entities as classes of individuals and objects. In other words, a concept is 
understood and is seen as an idea that can be transformed into a hypothesis in order 
to correspond to a distinct entity [and, respectively, to a group of entities] or to its [and 
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their] essential attributes, features, characteristics and properties. The hypotheses can 
describe multiple theories based on terminologies and world descriptions. 
Accordingly, they support inferential and reasoning processes and satisfy multiple 
conditions for definitions of truth with regard to interpretation functions. 
 
In this article, we will employ First-Order [Predicate] Logic in order to focus on 
relationships between human beings and machines. FOL allows us to make arbitrarily 
complex relationships between different objects of a system. Based on FOL we will 
be conceptually and logically concerned with semantic analysis of training-learning 
relationships in human-machine interactions. We shall stress that our main focus is on 
the semantics of the ‘relationships’ between human beings and machines. The 
analysed relationships between a human being and a machine will support our 
thoughts about the HowNess of establishing a [formal] semantics concerning human-
machine interactions. According to (Blackburn, 2008), semantics is the study of the 
meanings and the relation of signs to the objects to which the signs are applicable. 
 
In the following sections, you will be offered the following: The Logical Specification 
of the Notion of Hypothesis, Preliminaries: Predicate Logic and Semantics in FOL, 
Formal Representation and Semantic Analysis of ‘Training-Learning’, and 
Conclusions and Future Work. 
 
2. THE LOGICAL SPECIFICATION OF THE NOTION OF 
HYPOTHESIS 
Based on Predicate Logic and focusing on Description Logics (Baader et al., 2010), a 
unary predicate is supposed to be logically equivalent to a concept. For instance, we 
can consider the unary predicate Set as a concept in order to employ it in concept 
learning (concept expression) processes. Additionally, a concept can be logically 
described by a hypothesis, see (Lehmann, 2010; Mitchell, 1997). For instance, the 
concept Set can be described as “a collection of the distinct things” in order to provide 
a foundation for a hypnosis. And, for instance,  
 
 {a, 5, Science, ∞, ∑} and {Book, ●} are two positive (constructive) examples of 
the proposed hypothesis, and  
 ‘{3, T’ and ‘Y’ are two negative examples of the proposed hypothesis.  
 
In our opinion,  
 
i. analysing the supportive inferential processes on a hypothesis, and  
ii. focusing on world descriptions using generated hypotheses relying on defined 
terminologies,  
could collectively determine the applications of predicates and, subsequently, the 
applications of terms and statements. Conceptually and logically, the hypotheses 
focus on describing the predicates. Then they are expected to describe the same 
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attributes, characteristics and properties. According to (Mitchell, 1997), a hypothesis 
as a logical description of a concept, arises during a machine learning process. 
Actually, it is a tentative explanation of why the objects are members (or non-
members) of the concepts. A characteristic feature of most concept learning 
approaches is the use of background knowledge. In concept learning with background 
knowledge, a machine, with regard to the given set of training examples and 
background knowledge, will focus on hypothesis generation. 
 
3. PRELIMINARIES: PREDICATE LOGIC 
 
The Propositional Logic and its formulae (i.e., the formal and mathematical 
relationships or rules expressed in Propositional Logic’s symbols) are constructed 
based on atomic objects. Note that the atomic objects and, accordingly, the 
propositional formulae, could only be either true or false. First-order Predicate Logic 
(FOL) is constructed over propositional logic by seeing objects as the elements of sets 
and by applying universal and existential quantifications (restrictions). That’s why 
some logicians and mathematicians interpret FOL as Quantification Theory, see 
(Mendelson, 1987; Ohlbach; 1985). FOL allows us for making arbitrarily complex 
(specified) relationships between various objects. There are two kinds of symbols in 
FOL: (i) logical symbols and (ii) non-logical symbols. The set of logical symbols in 
FOL is {Conjunction (∧), Disjunction (⋁), Negation (¬), Implication (→), Bi-
conditional (⟷), Equality (=), Existential Restriction (∃), Universal Restriction (∀), 
Tautology (⊤), Contradiction (⊥), Parentheses and brackets}. We shall stress that 
logical symbols always have the same meaning. It means that we are not allowed to 
interpret them and assign multiple values and definitions to them. The non-logical 
symbols are represented in the following forms: 
 
 Constant Symbols. For instance, john, 0 and blue are constant symbols. 
 
 Unary Predicates. In P(x) and Q(y), P and Q denote unary predicates. Also, x and 
y are variables (multiple constant symbols). These variables are the instances of 
P and Q. For instance, Person(john) denotes that ‘John is a person’. 
 
 Binary Predicates (Relations). R(m,n) is a binary predicate and makes a relation 
between two variables m and n. For example, Equals(m,n) can represent the 
‘equality between m and n’ (i.e., m equals n).  
 
  Function Symbols. f(x) is a function that f operates the variable x. For example, 
mother(john) can represent the ‘mother of john’. 
 
At this point, we shall draw your attention to the fact that the meanings of the non-
logical symbols are dependent on human being’ interpretations. So, we need to 
interpret the non-logical symbols to produce meanings and to clarify what we mean 
by them. 
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3.1. SEMANTICS IN FOL 
 
In formal languages, semantics is the study and analysis of the meanings of symbols 
and signifiers. Semantics focuses on the relationships between the signifiers of any 
language. In fact, the formal semantics employs the products of the human beings’ 
interpretations in order to produce meanings. In fact, we need to consider the 
interpretation I that consists of:  
 
 the domain of interpretation (that is a non-empty set like D), and 
 an interpretation function (like ▪I) that interprets the domain D in order to analyse 
the formal semantics of a term in FOL.  
Example. A = {Bob, Mary, Julian} could be interpreted (AI) to represent the list of three 
PhD researchers in Metaphysics. Obviously, a meaning has been produced.  
 
Example. The interpretation function assigns to every atomic unary predicate P (e.g., 
Apple, Red), a set like PI
 
⊆ DI. For instance, the interpretation of Apple (= AppleI) 
could express that “apple is a fruit and can be eaten”.   
 
Example. The interpretation function assigns to every atomic binary predicate R (e.g., 
Equals) a binary predicate RI
 
⊆ DI
 
× DI. Accordingly, the interpretation of Equals 
(EqualsI) could express that “Equals describes a kind of alignment between its right-
hand side and its left-hand side”.  
 
Here we feel the need to describe the logical conception of equivalence relationship 
between two predicates. Two unary predicates (either atomic or non-atomic) P and Q 
are equivalent (P ≡ Q), when for all interpretations I we have PI
 
=
 
QI. On the other 
hand, they are not equivalent when there exists an (at least one) interpretation like J 
such that PJ≠
 
QJ
 
. 
 
4. TRAINING-LEARNING: FORMAL REPRESENTATION 
In this section the central focus is on conceptual and logical analysis of formal 
semantics within a training-learning relationship in the context of human-machine 
interactions. This research aims at investigating where the formal semantics come 
from and when it appears within a relationship between a human being and a machine. 
Considering the human being as the trainer and the machine as the metaphorical 
learner, accept the following axioms. These axioms focus on the non-logical symbols 
of our formalism. They are the main building blocks of this research.  
 
• The symbols h and m denote ‘human being’ and ‘machine’ respectively. They both 
represent constant symbols. 
 
• The most significant unary predicates in our formalism are Learner and Trainer. 
Also, Learner(m) and Trainer(h) represent two unary predicate assertions (world 
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descriptions over unary predicates). They demonstrate that the constant symbol 
m is an instance of the unary predicate Learner and the constant symbol h is an 
instance of the unary predicate Trainer. In other words, m is a Learner and h is a 
Trainer. 
 
• Considering the unary predicates Learner and Trainer, the binary predicates 
TrainerOf and LearnerOf are defined. Consequently, TrainerOf(h,m) and 
LearnerOf(m,h) are two binary predicate assertions (or relation assertions, or 
world descriptions over binary predicates). The first relation describes that the 
human being h is the trainer of the machine m and the second one describes that 
the machine m is the learner of the human being h. 
 
• Two functions trainer(m) and learner(h) are defined in order to represent the 
‘trainer of machine’ and the ‘learner of human’ respectively. 
 
4.1. SEMANTIC ANALYSIS 
 
According to the proposed axioms and to the non-logical symbols, we shall claim that 
the binary predicate TrainerOf(h,m) logically produces (implies) the equality 
trainer(m) = h. In fact,  
 
TrainerOf(h,m)      (i) 
⇒  
 trainer(m) = h.      (ii) 
 
The equation (ii) expresses the fact that the trainer of the machine m has been realised 
to be the person h. Note that this equality is produced with regard to our interpretation. 
In fact, it has been achieved based on the interpreted non-logical symbols. Therefore, 
the equation (i) as a binary predicate, describes the interpreted relation between 
trainer(m) and h. We may claim that this equality is the root of the formal semantics 
within a training-learning relationship. The binary predicate ‘=’ (between trainer(m) 
and h) describes that the meanings of its right-hand side (or h) and its left-hand side (or 
trainer(m)) are the same. So, we shall emphasise that the achieved equality [as a binary 
predicate in FOL] aligns the meaning of trainer(m) and the meaning of h. Then we 
have:   
 
Equals (trainer(m), h).      (iii) 
 
We shall maintain that the binary predicate (iii) has provided a supportive background 
for introducing the formal semantics. Considering this binary predicate, the function 
trainer(m) (as a non-logical symbol) and the individual h (as a constant symbol) have 
been supposed to have the same meanings. Additionally, regarding the commutative 
laws, ‘the trainer of m is h’ and ‘h is the trainer of m’ are—logically—equivalent and, 
thus, they are—meaningfully—equal. Consequently, ‘the trainer of m implies h’ and ‘h 
implies the trainer of m’. Therefore: 
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[ trainer(m) = h ]   ⇒   [ ( trainer(m) → h )  ∧  ( h → trainer(m) ) ].      (iv) 
 
The logical term (iv) is inherently equal to: 
 
(function → constant) ∧ (constant → function).      (v) 
 
We have already deduced that the term “a function symbol implies a constant symbol 
and a constant symbol implies a function symbol” supports the analysis of our formal 
semantics. Note that the term (iv) has been deduced based on the binary predicate 
TrainerOf(h,m) (or (i)). Then, there is a bi-conditional relation between (i) and (iv). 
Therefore: 
 
TrainerOf(h,m)   ⟷   [ ( trainer(m) → h )  ∧  ( h → trainer(m) ) ].      (vi)       
 
Equivalently: 
 
[ TrainerOf(h,m)  →  [ ( trainer(m) → h )  ∧  ( h → trainer(m) ) ] ]      & 
 
[ [ ( trainer(m) → h )  ∧  ( h → trainer(m) ) ]  → TrainerOf(h,m) ]      (vii) 
 
The logical term (vii) is structurally equal to:    
 
[ Relation  →   [ ( function → constant )  ∧  ( constant → function ) ] ]      & 
 
[ [ ( function → constant )  ∧  ( constant → function ) ] →   Relation ].      (viii) 
 
 
In Figure 1, this logical conclusion has been figured out. 
 
 
Figure 1. The General Structure of Semantics within Relationships between Human Being & 
Machine 
 
Conceptually, taking the afore-mentioned conclusions into consideration, we need to 
focus on four fundamental relationships:  
 
I. The training relationship between human and machine (from human into 
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machine). 
 
II. The learning relationship between machine and human (from machine into 
human).  
 
III. The iterative loops between human and machine (from human into machine 
and from machine into human). 
 
IV. The iterative loops between machine and human (from machine into human 
and from human into machine).  
 
Therefore, the formal semantics of training-learning relationship in the context of 
human-machine interactions is definable over four constructive implications: 
 
I. Implying the ‘iterative loops between human and machine’ from the ‘training 
relation between human and machine’. Then: 
 
TrainerOf(h,m)  →   [ ( trainer(m) → h ) ∧ ( h → trainer(m) ) ].      (ix) 
 
II. Implying the ‘iterative loops between machine and human’ from the ‘learning 
relation between machine and human’. Then: 
 
LearnerOf(m,h)  →  [ ( learner(h) → m ) ∧ ( m → learner(h) ) ].      (x) 
 
III. Implying the ‘training relationship between human and machine’ from the 
‘iterative loops between human and machine’. This item is the inverse of the 
item (I). Then: 
 
[ ( trainer(m) → h ) ∧ ( h → trainer(m) ) ]  →  TrainerOf(h,m).      (xi) 
 
IV.  Implying the ‘learning relationship between machine and human’ from the 
‘iterative loop between machine and human’. This item is the inverse of the 
item (II). Then: 
 
[ ( learner(h) → m ) ∧ ( m → learner(h) ) ]  →  LearnerOf(m,h).      (xii) 
 
Therefore:  
 
• Fundamental I expresses:  
[ (Training Relation) → (Training Function ⟷ Learner Constant) ] . 
 
• Fundamental III expresses:  
[ (Training Function ⟷ Learner Constant) → (Training Relation) ] . 
 
• Fundamental II expresses:  
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[ (Learning Relation) → (Learning Function ⟷ Trainer Constant) ] . 
 
• Fundamental IV expresses:  
[ (Learning Function ⟷ Trainer Constant) → (Learning Relation) ]. 
 
According to the deduced results, we shall conclude that: 
 
I. the training relations (from human into machine) support the interrelationship 
between ‘the act of training’ and ‘the machine’,  
 
II. the learning relations (from machine into human) support the interrelationships 
between ‘machine learning’ and ‘human’,  
 
III. the interrelationship between ‘the act of training’ and ‘the machine’ supports 
the training relation (from human into machine) and, finally,  
 
IV. the interrelationship between ‘machine learning’ and ‘human’ supports the 
learning relation (from machine into human).  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this article, we have employed First-Order formalism in order to focus on 
relationships between human beings and machines. The context of this research has 
been the ‘training-learning relation between human and machine’. The central focus 
has been on logical description and logical analysis of the training-learning relations 
within human-machine interactions. The analysed relationships between human 
beings and machines have supported analysing the HowNess of producing the formal 
semantics. We have concluded that four fundamentals conceptualise meanings and 
express the structure of the formal semantics within relationships. Subsequently, it’s 
concluded that:  
 
• the implications between ‘relations’ and ‘the interrelationship of functions and 
constant symbols’ support the formal semantics of the training-learning 
relationships.  
The conclusion of this research has prepared a strong backbone for our future research. 
In future research, we will focus on semantic analysis of human concept learning with 
regard to the semantics of human’s relationships with machines. The central focus 
will be on the formal semantics of concept transformations from humans’ minds into 
machine’s knowledge bases with regard to (Badie, 2016b). We will also work on 
semantic analysis of hypothesis generation. Human beings generate hypotheses in 
order to make them corresponded to distinct entities or to their essential attributes, 
characteristics and properties. Semantically, we will focus on the question of how 
hypotheses can determine the applications of the predicates.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
Constructivism is a learning philosophy and an educational theory of learning. In the 
framework of constructivism, a human being with insights based on her/his pre-
structured knowledge and on background knowings could actively participate in an 
interaction with another human being. The central focus of this article is on 
construction of conceptual knowledge and its development. This research localises 
the constructivist learning in the context of mentor-learner interactions. It will analyse 
meaning construction relying on my own conceptual framework that represents a 
semantic loop. The learner and the mentor as intentional participants move through 
this semantic loop and organise their personal constructed conceptions in order to 
construct meanings and produce their meaningful comprehensions. This research is 
concerned with definitions, linguistic expressions and meanings within the 
developmental processes of personal world constructions. It proposes a scheme for 
interpretation based on semantics and in conversations. I shall conclude that the 
outcomes of this research could be able to support smart education and smart learning 
environments. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The dialogues and the conversational exchanges between mentors and their learners 
ask questions and give answers concerning their individual conceptions and 
realisations. I shall stress that what I will use and express under the label of ‘concept’ 
aims at providing comprehensible characteristics of human being’s conceptions and 
conceptualisations. In the section ‘related works and proposal’ I will focus on the 
works related to realisations of concepts. Constructivism is a learning philosophy and 
an educational theory of learning that can be recognised as a model (and theory) of 
knowing with roots in philosophy as well as in psychology and cybernetics, see 
(Husén and Postlethwaite, 1989). A constructivist conversation could be seen as a 
radical constructivist account of the learner’s and the mentor’s realisations and 
understandings, see (Scott, 2001). This account is capable of enabling the mentor and 
the learner to develop their own understandings of the specified concepts with regard 
to their understandings of the more general concepts. Producing the personal 
understanding of a world (a universe of discourse) and developing it during the 
conversation could be said to be the most valuable product of a constructivist 
conversation. When a mentor and her/his learner start a conversation, then, based on 
their personal knowings and on personal pre-structured knowledge, they attain deeper 
realisations of the world. Conversation supports them to develop their understandings 
of the world (and of each other and of themselves). Jean Piaget, the originator of 
constructivism, believed that human being’s mental objects (or schemata) gradually 
develop into more abstract (= general) and conceptual mental entities, see 
(McGawand Peterson, 2007; Moallem, 2001; Spiro et al., 1992). In fact, according to 
constructivist learning, the human being’s mentality manifests itself in the form of 
schemata (Bartlett, 1932). I will explain some details in the next section. Considering 
learning in the framework of constructivism with reference to Conversation Theory 
(CT), which is conceived and elaborated by Gordon Pask, the enterprise begins with 
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the negotiation of an agreement between the learner and the mentor to converse about 
a given domain and to learn/train about some particular topics and skills in that 
domain. It could work as an explanatory, heuristic and developmental framework, see 
(Pask, 1975; Pask, 1980). The CT is fundamentally an explanatory ontology combined 
with an epistemology, which has wide implications for psychology and educational 
technologies. Pask’s main premise is that the reliable knowledge exists, is produced, 
and evolves in action-grounded conversations, see (McIntyre Boyd, 2004). 
 
In this research, I will work on a conceptual framework that represents the process of 
meaning construction in constructivist conversational exchanges between mentors 
and learners. My main reference is my own semantics-based framework (see (Badie, 
2015a; Badie, 2015b)) and this research attempts to develop my framework for 
analysing ‘conceptual knowledge creation based on constructed meanings within 
conversational exchanges between mentor and learner’. According to (Badie, 2015a; 
Badie, 2015b), the learner and the mentor as intentional participants move through a 
semantic loop and organise their personal constructed conceptions in order to 
construct meanings, to improve the constructed meanings, and to produce their 
individual meaningful comprehensions. What could be offered by conceptual 
knowledge construction in the developed framework is ‘a body of thought’ and ‘a 
semantic model to account for the emergence of the domain of the learner’s and of the 
mentor’s conceptual knowledge’. It can express how the produced meanings based on 
human being’s constructed concepts could support her/him in constructing the 
personal worlds and in creating her/his conceptual knowledge.    
 
2. RELATED WORKS AND PROPOSAL 
 
The most momentous building block of this research is ‘concept’, thus I shall start 
with the realisation of concepts. The reference (Parker, 2008) identifies concepts as 
the furnitures of human beings’ minds. According to this realisation, a well-furnished 
mind can be a source of successful knowledge acquisition (and learning). According 
to (Götzsche, 2013), a concept is a linkage between the human being’s linguistic 
expressions and the mental images (of all kinds of perceptions) that she/he may have 
in her/his mind. Regarding (Götzsche, 2013) and taking (Bartlett, 1932) into 
consideration, the human being may represent a concept as a ‘thing’ under a specified 
label. Consequently, the labels are the constituents of propositions that mediate 
between thought, language, and referents. My conceptual approach has relied on this 
realisation and grasp of concepts with regard to (Bartlett, 1932; Götzsche, 2013). I 
assume that a concept can also be seen as an ‘idea’ that corresponds to a distinct entity 
or to its essential features, attributes, characteristics and properties. As mentioned, 
concepts are the conjunctions between the human being’s linguistic expressions and 
her/his mental images. Focusing on conversational exchanges between mentors and 
learners, the mental images may be seen as the representation(s) of the aspects of the 
world (a universe of discourse). Taking this realisation into consideration, any 
conception of a leaner/mentor within a conversation can be identified as her/his act of 
visualising (in a broad sense) different concepts by linking her/his expressions (and 
specifications) to her/his own mental images [that have been visualised over various 
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schemata). Let me be more specific. First, I focus on clarifying schema and schema-
based knowledge constructions and, consequently, I will draw your attention to the 
interrelationships between ‘specified characteristics of concepts in my approach’ and 
‘the Kantian philosophy and Kantian account of schemata’. 
 
In my opinion, knowledge can actively be constructed over human being’s 
constructed concepts and conceptions. I believe that knowledge is built up (created) 
based upon the learner’s/mentor’s comprehensions of concept meanings with regard 
to their definitions. I shall stress that the definitions are highly influenced by the 
learner’s/mentor’s world descriptions based on their linguistic expressions. Also, the 
linguistic expressions have been assigned to their mental images of phenomena within 
the world (the universe of discourse). Reconsidering the introductory section, when a 
mentor and her/his learner start a conversation, then, based on their personal knowings 
and on personal pre-structured knowledge, they attain deeper realisations of the world. 
Conversation supports them to develop their understandings of the world [and of each 
other and of themselves]. As mentioned, in constructivist learning a human being’s 
mentality manifests itself in the form of schemata. It’s important to say that the 
schemata demonstrate the human being’s realisation of the world. They conceptually 
represent the constituents of the learner’s/mentor’s thoughts for knowledge 
acquisition [and learning/mentoring] with regard to their realisations of the world.  
 
Now, let me focus on the interrelationships between specified characteristics of 
concepts in my approach and the Kantian account of schemata. Regarding (Kant, 
1999; Kant, 1790), Kant defines a non-empirical (or pure) concept as a category. 
According to Kantian philosophy, schemata are the procedural rules by which a 
category is associated with a sense impression. Kant claimed that the schema provides 
a reference to intuition in a way similar to the manner of empirical concepts. 
According to the Kantian account of schemata, empirical concepts (see (Link a)) are 
the most fundamental types of concepts that employ schemata. For instance, the 
concept ‘Liquid’ can be explained by a rule according to which a human being’s 
imagination can visualise a general figure of a description like “A state and a distinct 
form that matter takes on” without being restricted and closed to any particular and 
specific shape produced by human being’s experience. The empirical concepts 
provide the origin of what I have brought under the label of concepts. In fact, a human 
being proposes various linguistic expressions in order to describe her/his mental 
images of a phenomenon. This description is directly dependent on her/his own 
schemata, which have been designed and shaped over her/his experiences. Moreover, 
regarding the Kantian account of schemata, the human being is concerned with ‘pure 
concepts of the understanding’ see (Link b). According to a human being’s realisation 
and grasp of the pure concepts of understanding, she/he focuses on characteristics, 
features, attributes, qualities and properties of an object, that are also other objects in 
general or as such. They all support her/him in producing better understanding of the 
things/phenomena in the world. At this point, I shall emphasise that my conceptual 
analysis may look a bit like Wittgenstein I (Wittgenstein, 1922), but I will make no 
use of Wittgenstein’s approach. 
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3. CONVERSATIONAL LEARNING THEORY 
 
According to (Laurillard, 1993; Laurillard, 2002) and (Link c), Laurillard’s 
framework can be interpreted as a learning theory and as a practical framework for 
designing educational and pedagogical environments. This framework includes four 
important components:  
 
i. Mentor’s concepts (and conceptions) 
ii. Mentor’s constructed learning environment [that produces her/his 
constructed world] 
iii. Learner’s concepts [and conceptions] 
iv. Learner’s specific actions [that construct her/his world].  
 
Regarding Laurillard’s framework, we need to consider different forms of 
communication and associated mental activities. The main constructors of the 
associated mental activities are: 
 
1. Discussion,  
2. Adaptation,  
3. Interaction, and 
4. Reflection.  
 
In fact, relying on Pask’s Conversation Theory and focusing on Laurillard’s 
framework, there are four kinds of human being’s activities that take place in different 
kinds of flow between the components of Laurillard’s framework: 
 
 Discussion between the mentor and the learner on their conceptions, 
descriptions, realisations and reasonings. 
 Adaptation of the learner’s actions and of the mentor’s constructed 
environment. There is a type of adaptation of the learner’s world and of the 
mentor’s world. 
 Interactions between the learner and the environment which is defined by the 
mentor. 
 Reflection of the learner’s performance by both the mentor and the learner. 
 
I have illustrated the above-mentioned characteristics in the framework represented in 
Figure 1. For instance, relying on the conversational learning framework and 
reconsidering the concept ‘Liquid’, the existed knowledge about the individual 
‘liquid’ is strongly dependent on the interrelationships between learner and mentor, 
 
 i.e., ‘learner → mentor → learner’. 
 
In fact, the learner incorporates the internalised mentor and the mentor incorporates 
the internalised learner. Thus, the interactions and the discussions about ‘liquid’ 
(initially, over the empirical concept of Liquid) starts. Accordingly, regarding the pure 
concepts of understanding, learner and mentor focus on multiple characteristics, 
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predicates, attributes, qualities and properties of the individual ‘liquid’. Consequently, 
the learner and the mentor converse and exchange their conceptions in order to 
construct and develop their conceptual knowledge.  
 
 
Figure 1. Conversational Learning Framework  
 
4. MEANING CONSTRUCTION  
 
I have assumed that the definitions and meanings based on a human being’s 
conceptions strongly support her/him in knowledge construction processes in the 
framework of constructivist learning/mentoring and in the context of mentor-learner 
conversations. I also assume that an explanation is the actual act of explicating 
definitions and meanings. I shall emphasise that the main objective of the learner’s 
(and the mentor’s) explanations are to shed light on the produced personal realisations 
and understandings. In this section I focus on definitions and meanings, which are the 
main building blocks of my framework. 
 
4.1. FROM DEFINITIONS TO MEANINGS  
 
In a logical and semantics-based system a definition can be figured out as a kind of 
equivalency (and, semantically, as a kind of equality,) whose left-hand side is a 
concept (the concept that is going to be defined) and whose right-hand side is a 
description in the form of a number of expressions. For instance, a person defines 
Liquid by  
 
Liquid ≐                                                                                                                     
“A state and a distinct form that matter takes on. Also, the matter in this state 
maintains a fixed volume, but has a variable shape that adapts to fit its container”.  
 
I shall stress that this definition has proposed a concept definition (a type of 
equivalence between the right-hand side and the left-hand side). It also presents a 
A THEORETICAL MODEL FOR MEANING CONSTRUCTION THROUGH CONSTRUCTIVIST CONCEPT LEARNING 
152
 
semantical equivalence between the right-hand side and the left-hand side. This 
semantical equivalence represents two concurrent implications;  
 
i. one from the left-hand side into the right-hand side, and  
ii. one from the right-hand side into the left-hand side.  
 
In a constructivist conversation, any of the agents may define a concept based upon 
her/his individual conception. Subsequently, regarding the feedbacks of the 
conversant, she/he modifies and updates her/his definition. I have called it ‘definition 
updating’. Let me point to the fact that that the learner and the mentor interact with 
each other in order to adapt and to conform their ‘personally constructed worlds’. 
They also discuss in order to exchange their personal conceptual knowledge (their 
constructed knowledge over concepts and conceptions) and to develop it. 
Consequently, any proposed definition provides a supportive backbone for 
performing more developed and more well-organised concept descriptions. 
Additionally, a more developed concept description supports both the agent and the 
interlocutor in providing the more understandable explanations of meanings. At this 
point, considering the specified realisation of definitions, I focus on the expression 
‘meaning’. I have assumed the following descriptions to be comprehensible in the 
context and in my framework. Linguistically, meaning is, according to one approach, 
realised as a context-update function, see (Larsson, 2012). So, meaning is regarded as 
a function from a context into a context. Any context comprises different types of 
(general and specified) concepts. Therefore, I describe a meaning as a function from 
a concept into its updated form. In fact, in my conceptual and logical approach a 
meaning is seen as a ‘concept-update function’. 
 
4.2. A FRAMEWORK FOR MEANING CONSTRUCTION  
 
In (Badie, 2015a; Badie, 2015b), I have analysed a conceptual and semantic loop that 
the learner and the mentor move through in order to organise their personal 
constructed concepts, in order to: 
 
• describe their definitions, 
• construct and formulate the meanings, and 
• produce their individual meaningful comprehensions.  
 
See the yellow sections of Figure 2. The proposed semantic loop is self-organising 
and can promote itself on higher conceptual levels and on higher levels of interaction 
and conversation. It has proposed a scheme for interpretation based on semantics and 
interactions. The most primary building block of learning in the framework of 
constructivist conversational learning can be built up over an asked question. 
Regarding empirical concepts and the human being’s experimental conceptions, the 
one who undertakes to learn/train something and to produce her/his (deeper and 
deeper) understanding within a constructivist conversation, primarily becomes 
concerned with various general concepts related to that thing. Later on, she/he focuses 
on main characteristics, attributes, qualities, and properties of that  
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Figure 2. Constructivist Conversation: Meaning Construction and Knowledge Creation 
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thing in order to be concerned with realisation of that thing and to recognise its state 
and its condition within the world. More specifically, she/he focuses on forming (see 
Link d) [and reforming] concepts. 
 
A mentor who has defined the concept ‘Liquid’ as “a state and a distinct form that 
matter takes on. Also, the matter in this state maintains a fixed volume, but has a 
variable shape that adapts to fit its container” is directly and indirectly concerned with 
a number of general concepts (e.g., State, Form, Matter, Volume, Shape, Container).  
Therefore, the learner needs to conceptualise these notions and to discuss her/his 
conceptions with the mentor. The preliminary understanding supports the learner in 
building various patterns in her/his mind and any of these patterns describes her/his 
thought over a conception. These patterns could be seen as the mental structures 
(consisting of mental objects or schemata). Accordingly, the learner relies on her/his 
mental structures to organise her/his conceptual knowledge and to provide strong 
backbones for her/his interpretations and explanations. In fact, the collection of the 
rules and processes that manage various linguistic expressions (and, respectively, 
definitions) based upon logical foundations do not (and cannot) have any meaning 
until the non-logical words1 of the language are given interpretations. And the human 
being’s mental structures support her/his personal interpretations. The collection of  
 
1. concept formation, 
2. concept transformation (from the mentor’s mind into the learner’s mind and 
vice versa), and  
3. concept reformation  
 
is the most significant matter in the development of the concept constructions within 
constructivist conversations. I have identified the process ‘1 → 2 → 3’ as the main 
basis of ‘Concept Construction’ in my framework. Taking the constructed concepts 
into consideration, the reflection of the prior knowledge (what has been acquired or 
created before participating in the conversation) and the new knowledge (what is 
being acquired or created during the conversation) and the initial definitions must all 
be negotiated. So, the sequence  
 
‘Prior Knowledge → Definition → New Knowledge’ 
 
supports the learner in searching for the appropriate initial meanings of the 
class/classes of her/his constructed concepts. This phase is highly affected by 
‘interpretations’. In fact, the initial meanings are being interpreted in order to be 
balanced. The interpretation of a defined constructed concept is a function from a 
‘definition’ into a ‘meaning’. Logically, we may have iterative loops between 
‘definitions’ and ‘meanings’ (consisting of functions from definitions into meanings 
                                                 
1 The words like, e.g., and, or, not, since, then, so, all, every, any, have logical consequences and are 
identified as the logical words in a natural language with regard to classical symbolic logic and predicate 
logic. 
 
155 
and inverse functions from meanings into definitions). The agent could be able to 
balance and adjust the initial meanings based on the interrelationships between 
‘interpretation’ and ‘the inverse of the interpretation’ (by comparing the subject of 
interpretation before and after being interpreted). The conclusions make an 
appropriate background for verifying the personally found meanings. Therefore, a 
meaning would be given a more appropriate shape after checking the balanced 
definitions based on the personal constructed concepts. The conclusions will support 
the agent in formulating the balanced meanings. Any formulated meaning is a basis 
for providing a supportive conceptual structure of meaning production. These 
conceptual structures are all personally formulated over personal constructed concepts 
and definitions. On the other hand, they induce new formulated meanings on higher 
conceptual levels and on higher levels of conversation. Finally, the supportive 
conceptual structures support the agent in producing meanings. Note that the produced 
meanings reinforce the meaningful comprehensions. I shall emphasise that the 
produced meanings support the construction of the individual mental worlds. Any 
produced meaning has been designed, shaped, balanced, formulated and produced 
based upon the learner’s/mentor’s formatted concepts, constructed concepts, 
expressed definitions and interpreted definitions.  
 
Any produced meaning reflects in the constructor’s self and supports her/him in re-
shaping and developing her/his schemata on the next levels of her/his conversation. 
Thus, the learner’s and the mentor’s produced meanings are employed in the 
developmental processes of personal world construction. As you may have realised, 
at this point, I have entered Laurillard’s conversational learning framework. The 
dashed arrows in Figure 2 show that my framework is getting connected with the 
simplified Laurillard’s framework. As mentioned, regarding Piaget’s developmental 
theory of learning, constructivist learning is concerned with how the individual human 
being goes about the construction of knowledge in her/his own cognitive apparatus. 
Therefore, the most important output of my ‘meaning construction’ framework is an 
input for the developmental processes of personal world construction. 
 
5. THE OUTCOMES WITHIN SMART LEARNING SYSTEMS 
 
I shall draw your attention to the relation between the main objectives of this research 
and the main concepts of smart education and smart learning. Considering the 
following items, I might claim that this research has proposed a conceptual analysis 
of a constructivist paradigm within smart learning systems. 
 
a) The smart learning approaches (Link e) motivate higher levels of learners’ 
understandings. Similarly, this research has focused on conceptual analysis of 
knowledge creation [based on produced understandings] in the framework of 
constructivism and in the context of mentor-learner conversations. Let me say 
that this research focuses on higher [and deeper] levels of learners’ 
understandings with regard to their produced meanings and their generated 
meaningful comprehensions. 
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b) Through the various processes within the framework of smart learning, the 
learner initially activates background knowledge, identifies goals for her/his 
personal learning, focuses on information processing and focuses on self 
regulations. In a corresponding manner, this research is structured over the 
learner’s [and the mentor’s] background knowledge. It sees learning as the 
process of construction over personal background knowledge. It focuses on a 
human being’s realisation of her/his objectives and specifies a self-organising 
process on the part of the learner.  
 
c) Regarding the framework of smart learning, the learner transforms learning into 
demonstrations of understanding and, accordingly, reflects on her/his own 
learning. In a very similar way, the most significant matter in this research has 
been ‘transforming learning phenomena into knowledge construction that has 
been achieved over constructed concepts and conceptions’. Also, this research 
focuses on transforming learning into the learner’s/mentor’s comprehensions of 
concepts’ meanings with regard to their definitions. These two important matters 
could support learners in reflecting on their learnings [and on themselves]. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
This research has focused on constructivist conversational learning. A constructivist 
conversation has been seen as a radical constructivist account of the learner’s and the 
mentor’s comprehensions and understandings. Regarding Piaget’s developmental 
theory of learning, constructivist learning is concerned with how the individual human 
being goes about the construction of knowledge in her/his own cognitive apparatus. I 
have proposed a conceptual framework that represents the process of meaning 
construction in constructivist conversational exchanges between mentors and 
learners. The proposed framework represents the processes of conceptual knowledge 
creation based on constructed meanings within conversational exchanges between 
mentor and learner. I have assumed that the definitions and meanings based on human 
being’s conceptions strongly support her/him in the process of conceptual knowledge 
creation. I have also assumed the explanation as the actual explaining of definitions 
(and meanings). The backbone of this research is my proposed semantic loop. The 
learner and the mentor move through this semantic loop in order to organise their 
personal constructed concepts. Therefore, they will be supported in constructing 
meanings, to improve the constructed meanings, and to produce their individual 
meaningful comprehensions. This article’s proposed framework is ‘a body of thought’ 
and ‘a semantic model to account for the emergence of the domain of the learner’s 
(mentor’s) conceptual knowledge’. It expresses how the produced meanings based on 
the constructed concepts could support personal world constructions. The personal 
worlds are employed by Laurillard’s conversational learning framework that is a 
learning theory and a practical framework for designing educational and pedagogical 
environments. It values discussions, adaptations, interactions and reflections. In future 
research, I will focus on logical and semantic analysis of conceptual knowledge 
creation based on constructed meanings within mentor-learner conversations relying 
on First-Order Predicate Logic and Description Logics. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This research works within the framework of constructivist learning (based on 
constructivist epistemology) and examines learning as an activity of construction. It 
also posits that knowledge acquisition (and learning) are transformative through self-
involvement in some subject matter. I will mainly focus on conceptual and 
epistemological analysis of humans’ conceptualisations based on their own mental 
entities (schemata). Subsequently, I will propose an analytical specification of 
humans’ conceptualisations and understandings over their mental structures in the 
framework of constructivism and, accordingly, I will clarify my logical [and semantic] 
conceptions of humans’ concept understandings. This research focuses on philosophy 
of education and on logics of human learning. It connects with the topics ‘cognition 
in education’ and ‘mental models’. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Perceived by a very general definition, the act of learning is identified as related to 
acquiring or modifying knowledge. Learning can be seen as the involvement of the 
self in increasing knowledge about a thing/phenomenon. We can interpret learning as 
a process that causes changes in a human’s mind. The learner is someone who 
attempts to learn something and to acquire knowledge on that thing and the mentor is 
someone who opens the world to the learner and opens the learner to the world. All 
the characteristics mentioned are conducive to interpreting learning as the ‘activity of 
construction’. In this article, I will focus on the constructional dimension of learning. 
At this point, I feel the need to focus on describing and specifying ‘knowledge’. 
Regarding (Furst et al., 1956; Krathwohl, 2002), knowledge has a strong relationship 
with recognition [and understanding] of materials, ideas, methods, processes, 
structures and settings. Accordingly, a body of knowledge may cover (satisfy) 
multiple branches like, e.g., terminologies, ways and means, trends and sequences, 
classifications, methodologies, universals and abstractions, quantifications and 
qualifications, conditionings, principles and generalisations, and theories and 
structures. I may conclude that knowledge acquisition [and, respectively, learning] 
processes consist of a sort of ‘Transformation functions’ from reality into the sets and 
categories of various disciplines and systematic enterprises. I have focused on this 
subject in (Badie, 2016a; Badie, 2016b). According to these references, a human being 
has the ability to deal with different disciplines and systematic enterprises, and can 
transform them in her/his mind. I shall interpret these transformations as the outcomes 
of the self-involvement in increasing knowledge about a subject matter. In human 
systems, a learner is an intentional participant (agent) and attempts to know more 
about something in order to construct her/his knowledge about that thing. Any human 
has a background knowledge and tackles to carry on constructing knowledge over 
her/his existing knowledge. She/He attempts to develop her/his knowledge 
constructions and to get the opportunity to attain deeper comprehensions and 
understandings.  
 
Constructivism is a philosophy that forms the backbone of this research. It is a 
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learning philosophy and a pedagogical theory of learning that can also be realised as 
a model and a theory of knowing with separate roots in philosophy, psychology and 
cybernetics. According to the existential element of constructivism, the construction 
of knowledge is an active process, but the activity itself can be described in terms of 
individual cognition [and personal understanding] in different processes, see (Phillips, 
1995). As for Piaget’s developmental theory of learning1, constructivist learning is 
concerned with how the individual learner goes about the construction of knowledge 
in her/his own cognitive apparatus. This article will, conceptually and 
epistemologically, analyse human understanding and conceptualisation based on the 
proper foundation that has been provided by the constructivist model of knowing (and 
constructivist epistemology). I will focus on the analysis of humans’ schemata-based 
concept representations, where schemata form humans’ mental structures. In my 
opinion, the central focus of constructivist knowledge acquisition and learning is on 
schemata-based conceptual representations and conceptualisations. Accordingly, this 
article will propose an analytical description of humans’ schema-based 
understandings [of concepts] in the ground of their conceptualisations and in the 
framework of constructivism. Before offering specifications, I shall describe what I 
mean by the act and the process of constructivist knowledge acquisition and learning 
with regard to concepts. The following definition draws out the key elements of 
constructivist knowledge acquisition and learning, which have individual and social 
implications for humans, see (Watkins et al. 2002).  
 
“Knowledge acquisition is the reflective activity which enables the humans to draw upon 
their previous experiences [and background knowledge] to conceptualise [and, respectively, 
to realise and to understand in order to] evaluate the present, so as to build up and shape 
future actions and to construct [and, subsequently, to develop the construction of] new 
knowledge”. 
 
At this point, I shall emphasise that there is, obviously, no reason to claim that concept 
construction, as such, must be based on the processes described by constructivism. 
The aim of this study is that I will use constructivism to describe human concept 
construction as a kind of ‘conditional reasoning’ in a learning context and accordingly, 
I am trying to analyse concept construction in that context relying on constructivist 
epistemology. Therefore, in my opinion, constructivism could provide a proper base 
of description of the concept construction process, if it is seen as an individual’s 
conditional reasoning in a learning context.  
 
2. CONCEPTUALISATION AND CONCEPT UNDERSTANDING 
 
According to constructivist knowing [and learning], human beings’ mental structures 
manifest themselves in the form of mental objects (schemata2), see (Bartlett, 1932; 
Parker, 2008). Schemata conceptually represent the constituents of human’s thoughts 
                                                 
1 Jean Piaget (1896 - 1980) was the originator of constructivism. He was the first psychologist to make a 
systematic study of cognitive development and developmental theory of learning, see 
www.piaget.org/aboutPiaget.html. 
2 Piaget argued that all learning was mediated by the construction of mental objects that he called schemata. 
Schemata gradually develop into more conceptual mental entities. 
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for knowledge acquisition with regard to her/his perception of [parts of] the world. 
Regarding (Piaget and Cook, 1952), a schema is a “cohesive, repeatable action 
sequence possessing component actions that are tightly interconnected and governed 
by a core meaning”. In constructivist learning and constructivist knowledge 
acquisition, schemata, in a broad sense, support humans in constructing concepts, 
developing (forming and reforming) their constructed concepts, in providing their 
semantic interpretations and in processing their meaning construction, for more details 
about concept formation see (Link a). I shall, therefore, conclude that a human’s 
elucidation, explication and explaining abilities all become supported by her/his 
schemata. Subsequently, relying on semantic interpretations, humans become 
concerned with meanings of their mental entities associated with different 
objects/phenomena. In my opinion, schemata determine the locus of meanings and, 
thus, support world descriptions and reinforce the structural and descriptive analysis 
of mental entities. Moreover, the semantics as the scrutiny and the analysis of 
meanings could focus on various conditions for definitions of truth. Then, it connects 
with humans’ inferences and reasonings which attempt to give satisfying conditions 
for definitions of truth. Accordingly, it seems possible to conclude that humans’ 
inferences are given shapes over their designed schemata. In my conceptual approach, 
a concept is a linkage between the mental representations of linguistic expressions and 
the other mental images (e.g., representations of the world, representations of inner 
experiences) that a human has in her/his mind, see (Götzsche, 2013). Considering this 
idea of concepts, humans may be said to transform the collection of (i) linguistic 
expressions, (ii) images of the world, and (iii) their interrelationships in the form of 
[psychological] entities and utilising generic and specific labels. I could say that 
concepts might be understood to be representations of actualities and objectivities in 
humans’ minds, and those representations can affect humans’ reasoning processes. 
 
2.1. UNDERSTANDING, EXPLANATION AND CONCEPTUALISATION IN 
THE FRAMEWORK OF CONSTRUCTIVISM 
 
From the perspective of constructivist learning, human beings focus on knowledge 
construction and on developing the constructed knowledge over their background 
knowledge. The most significant objective of constructivism is producing one’s own 
understanding of the world, see (Husén and Postlethwaite, 1989; McGawand 
Peterson, 2007; Keith Sawyer, 2014). Let me take into consideration the SOLO3 
taxonomy in order to focus on understanding in the framework of constructivism. 
According to SOLO, the sequence ‘pre-structured knowledge → uni-structured 
knowledge → multi-structured knowledge → related knowledge → extended 
abstracts’ represents a flow from shallow understanding to deep understanding, see 
(Burville Biggs, 1982). A shallow understanding of a thing/phenomenon may support 
humans in identifying some isolated facts and matters related to that 
thing/phenomenon. On the other hand, a deep understanding of a thing/phenomenon 
supports humans in linking lots of related facts (as conceptions) about that 
                                                 
3 Structure of Observed Learning Outcomes (SOLO) taxonomy is a proper model that can provide a 
structured framework for who acquires knowledge in order to promote the efficiency of her/his knowledge 
acquisition. 
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thing/phenomenon and in linking those conceptions to other complicated conceptions. 
Additionally, deep understanding of a thing/phenomenon supports analysing, 
justifying, criticising, hypothesising and theorising about that thing/phenomenon.  
 
Before getting into details I shall emphasise that ‘understanding’ is a very complicated 
term in philosophy, psychology and cognitive science. In my opinion, there cannot be 
any absolute and comprehensive description for understanding, but there can be 
acceptable descriptions of ‘realisations of understanding’. Actually, there could be a 
very strong relationship between ‘understanding’ and ‘explanation’. Explanation (i.e. 
the actual process of explaining something) can shed light on the produced personal 
understandings of that thing. I have assumed that humans’ linguistic expressions and 
the produced meanings [based on humans’ conceptions], strongly support knowledge 
construction processes and understanding in the framework of constructivist learning. 
Thus, an explanation could also be assumed to be the actual explanation of expressions 
and meanings. Therefore, humans rely on their own explanations in order to shed light 
on their produced personal comprehensions and understandings. 
 
At this point, I focus on the term ‘conceptualisation’ in order to provide a supportive 
specification of understanding (see Appendix II: Concept Understanding and 
Conceptualisation). In (Badie, 2016b), I have described an understanding (of a 
concept) as “a local manifestation of a global (and universal) conceptualisation”. I 
concluded that a specific concept understanding provides a local manifestation of a 
universal conceptualisation. Furthermore, a human’s grasp of concepts provides a 
proper foundation for generating her/his own conceptualisations. So, the personal 
conceptualisation could be elaborated by the outputs of the processes of concept 
formation and reformation with regard to the basis that is provided by the individual 
realisation. When a human forms her/his conception (as an outcome of her/his 
constructed concept) from its attributes, qualities, properties and its relationships with 
other conceptions, she/he gets to know and to understand more than just some isolated 
facts about that conception (and of that concept). This qualifies deep knowledge 
acquisition rather than superficial knowledge acquisition over concepts. Note that 
(Parker, 2008) has also (from another point of view) focused on this subject in 
analysing inductive teaching strategies.  
 
A person who understands something, directly or indirectly, gets concerned with the 
taxonomy of various concepts. I have focused on the last statement from the 
structuralist point of view. The structuralist description and analysis of understanding 
supports me in explaining a variety of facts about ‘understanding’ and ‘understanding 
something’. The individual who understands something, needs to move through a 
chain of various related concepts. Then, we could see ‘Concept’ and ‘Generality’ as 
two significant aspects that support the structuralist account of understanding. 
According to (Kuczok, 2014), the notion of conceptualisation pertains to central terms 
in cognitive linguistics. According to (Langacker, 1991), it can be defined as the locus 
of meaning or even equated with meaning in lexical semantics, which should describe 
abstract entities like thoughts and concepts through structural analysis. So, 
considering the analysis of schemata and the humans’ mental structures, I conclude 
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that conceptualisations are highly dependent on schemata. 
 
3. SEMANTICS OF CONCEPT UNDERSTANDING 
 
In this section, I clarify my logical conceptions of ‘understanding’ and focus on logical 
description of understanding concepts through the lenses of semantics. The 
conclusions will be used for proposing a semantic expression of humans’ concept 
understanding. Suppose that a person undertakes to acquire knowledge about a 
concept and to understand it. Concept understanding, as a relation, could relate ‘the 
characteristics and attributes of a concept’ with ‘a description’. More specifically, 
understanding is a function (mapping) from a concept into some propositions (and 
statements) which could be interpreted as ‘concept descriptions’. In fact, the 
characteristics and properties of a concept by means of the understanding function 
could become mapped into concept descriptions (see Appendix II: Concept 
Understanding as a Relation).  
 
I interpret an understanding as the limit (or as a type) of a conceptualisation, see (Link 
b). Considering understanding as a limited conceptualisation, it could be explained as 
a kind of process of forming [and reforming] concepts. So, an understanding focuses 
on concepts on the basis that is provided by a conceptualisation. Then, one who 
undertakes to understand something, needs to have that thing conceptualised.  
 
As mentioned, an understanding (of a concept) is a local conceptualisation. Therefore, 
all understandings (of concept C) are conceptualisations (of concept C). Therefore, 
understanding C has been interpreted as the subset of conceptualising C. But not all 
conceptualisations are understandings. In fact, all conceptualised concepts may not be 
understood, but all understood concepts have been conceptualised. Considering the 
person P and the concept C,  
 
“P understands C”, then: “P conceptualises C”. 
 
Now I shall draw your attention to the concept formation process. Relying on concept 
formation processes, a person gets concerned with manipulating, formatting, 
classifying and structuring concepts. Accordingly, these processes all provide 
supportive foundations for her/his concept understanding process. Concept formation 
and concept reformation are the salient products of conceptualisation in constructivist 
learning. From the methodological point of view, the person needs to focus on the 
attributes, characteristics, qualities and properties of something in order to consider it 
as an instance of the concept C. One person may have focused on formation of C 
before acquiring knowledge about it, and thus, she/he reconsiders her/his initial 
formations after reconstructing her/his knowledge in order to reform C in her/his 
mind. On the other hand, another person may not have focused on C before the 
knowledge construction is processed, and then she/he can form C with insights based 
on acquired knowledge. I have identified the sequence ‘Concept Formation → 
Concept Transformation → Concept Reformation’ as the main foundation of the 
concept construction within meaning constructions, see (Badie, 2015a; Badie, 2015b). 
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Note that the formed concepts could be affected by acquired knowledge within 
constructivist discussions, dialogues and interactions in order to be transformed and 
to support concept reformations. Therefore, understanding the constructed (or 
reconstructed) concepts could be realised to be the limit of conceptualisation. Then, 
the person gets concerned with the attributes, characteristics, qualities and properties 
of concepts in order to distinguish them when they belong to different categories. In 
fact, she/he identifies, specifies and relates the generalised concepts. Subsequently, as 
a salient product of understanding, she/he could be able to make her/his personal 
labels and identifiers for identifying the [understood] concepts. These labels could be 
employed in categorising different things.  
 
Moreover, by engaging the personal interpretation the person explicates what she/he 
means by the concept C. The interpretations make bridges between a person’s 
‘expressions and explanations’ and ‘semantics and meanings’. Taking semantics into 
my analysis, it’s possible to infer that someone who has focused on the concept C, 
needs to provide a manner of determining the truth values of her/his statements, 
expressions, theories and explanations concerning C. Consequently, I identify all 
understandings [of concept C] as the interpretations [of concept C]. Therefore, 
understanding C has been interpreted (and is expressed) as the subset of interpreting 
C. But, all interpretations are not understandings. In fact, all interpreted concepts 
could not be understood, but all understood concepts certainly have been interpreted. 
Considering the person P and the concept C,  
 
“P understands C”, then: “P interprets C”. 
 
More specifically, the collection of the rules and the processes that manage different 
terms and descriptions in linguistic expressions, do not (and cannot) have any meaning 
until the non-logical parts2 and constructors of the language are given interpretations 
and are interpreted. The interpretations prepare the person for producing her/his 
personal meaningful [and understandable] concept descriptions. By learning and 
acquiring knowledge in the framework of constructivism, a human being attempts to 
provide a way to determine the truth values of the non-logical parts through her/his 
conceptions. Consequently:  
 
I. The understanding (as a conceptualisation) focuses on the domain of 
conceptualisation. Actually, it conceptualises the objective of 
conceptualisation and, respectively, focuses on the objective of 
understanding. Therefore, the understanding focuses on the domain of 
understanding.  
 
II. The understanding (as an interpretation) focuses on the domain of 
interpretation. In fact, it focuses on the objective of interpretation and, 
respectively, on the objective of understanding. Therefore, the understanding 
                                                 
2 The words like, e.g., and, or, not, since, then, so, all, every, any, have logical consequences and are 
identified as the logical parts (words) in a natural language with regard to classical symbolic logic and 
predicate logic. 
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focuses on the domain of understanding. 
 
III. The understanding (as a conceptualisation) conceptualises the concepts 
belonging to the domain of conceptualisation. Therefore, the understanding 
understands the concepts (works on the concepts). 
 
IV. The understanding as an interpretation interprets the concepts belonging to the 
domain of interpretation. Therefore, the understanding understands the 
concepts (works on the concepts). 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Constructivist learning is concerned with how the individual learner goes about the 
construction of knowledge in her/his own cognitive apparatus. Conceptually and 
epistemologically I have focused on analysis of human understanding and 
conceptualisation. I have been concerned with human concept representations over 
her/his schemata. Schemata support humans in constructing concepts, and developing 
their constructed concepts, in providing their semantic interpretations and in 
processing their meaning construction. According to this research, a concept 
understanding is a local manifestation of global/universal conceptualisations. 
Consequently, I have focused on a more specific logical description of 
conceptualisations and concept understandings based upon individual constructed 
concepts. The conclusions have been applied in a logical and semantic description and 
representation of ‘concept understanding’. This research has formed a building block 
of my PhD research, which is dealing with semantic analysis of constructivist concept 
leaning. In future research, I will, logically and semantically (mainly based on 
Description Logics), focus on formalising and analysing humans’ concept 
understanding and on proposing a semantic model for concept understanding in the 
framework of constructivism. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This research provides a contextual description concerning existential and structural 
analysis of ‘Relations’ between human beings and machines. Subsequently, it will 
focus on conceptual and epistemological analysis of (i) my own semantics-based 
framework [for human meaning construction] and of (ii) a well-structured machine 
concept learning framework. Accordingly, I will, semantically and epistemologically, 
focus on linking those two frameworks for logical analysis of concept learning in the 
context of human-machine interrelationships. It will be demonstrated that the 
proposed framework provides a supportive structure over the described 
contextualisation of ‘relations’ between human beings and machines within concept 
learning processes.  
1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION  
Machine Learning as a subfield of Artificial Intelligence and Computer Science works 
on creating and developing appropriate procedures and techniques that allow 
machines to improve the productivity of their performances concerning a given goal, 
see (Mitchell, 1997). Regarding (Mitchell, 1997), a machine program is said to learn 
from an experience if: 
 
i. there is a set of tasks for machine, 
ii. there is a machine’s performance measure, and 
iii. the machine’s performance at those tasks, as measured, improves with its 
experiences.  
 
Concept Learning as a paradigm of machine learning has been structured over a set of 
theories and methodologies that focus on a kind of task in which a machine is trained 
[by a human being] in order to classify things (objects). Additionally, regarding 
Concept Training, the human being, as the trainer, shows the sets of example and non-
example objects to the machine. Subsequently, the main machine’s task is a type of 
simplification. Actually, the machine compares the given thing with the provided 
examples. Thus, a characteristic feature of most concept learning approaches is the 
use of background knowledge. In concept learning with background knowledge, a 
machine, with regard to the given set of training examples and background 
knowledge, focuses on hypothesis generation. According to (Lehmann, 2010; Lehman 
et al., 2014), machine concept learning approaches lead to the construction of concepts 
(classes). The concept learning problems are tackled as a search through a space of 
candidate descriptions in the reference representation guided by exemplars of the 
target concepts. Also, the same algorithms can be adapted to solve the ontological 
problems. Note that these ontological problems are defined over the usage of 
ontologies in information and computer sciences. According to (Gangemi and 
Presutti, 2009), an ontology in information sciences is a formal and explicit 
specification of a shared conceptualisation on a domain of interest.  
 
It shall be emphasised that the central focus of this research is on conceptual and 
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epistemological issues of the expressions ‘concept’, ‘concept learning’ and ‘concept 
training’ within human-machine interplays. So, I will need to be careful with these 
terms. In this research, I will focus on epistemological analysis of concept learning 
while I will claim that “Machine Concept Learning approaches tackle to provide 
comprehensible logical representations for:  
 
i. describing human beings’ constructed concepts, and 
ii. describing the interrelationships between the constructed concepts after 
having been transformed (from humans’ minds into machines’ knowledge 
bases and ontological descriptions)”. 
 
In (Badie, 2016a), I have focused on conceptual analysis of concept representation in 
the context of human-machine interactions. This paper has provided a conceptual and 
epistemological junction between human beings’ minds and machines’ knowledge 
bases (and ontological descriptions). In (Badie, 2016b), I have offered a description 
saying that the word ‘learning’ in machine learning has been utilised as a binary 
predicate with the word ‘machine’. ‘Learning’ as a binary predicate has been asserted 
(with regard to the language of descriptive logics) and has been described to be a role 
that is being performed by a machine. Thus, the act (role) of learning for a machine 
could be interpreted as a reflection (or mirroring) of the [human] learning 
phenomenon in machines. This research has been built on the basis of (Badie, 2016b; 
Badie, 2016c). So, I will, conceptually and epistemologically, summarise their 
conclusions in the framework of concept learning and in the context of human-
machine interrelationships. Subsequently, I will show that they can provide a 
contextual description concerning existential analysis of ‘relations’ between human 
beings and machines. Later on, I will focus on conceptual analysis of my own 
semantics-based framework (for meaning construction by human beings) and a well-
structured machine concept learning framework and on their junctions. Accordingly, 
it will be shown that this framework provides a supportive structure underpinning the 
described contextualisation of ‘relations’ between human beings and machines within 
concept learning processes. 
 
2. BACKGROUND OF THOUGHT 
 
First, I shall take up the notion of ‘concept’ and integrate it into my line of thought. 
The term ‘concept’ is an especially intricate term in philosophy, linguistics, 
psychology, epistemology, cybernetics and computer sciences. In my approach, 
concept has been understood to be, on the one hand, a linkage between a human’s 
mental images of parts of reality and, on the other hand, a human’s linguistic 
expressions and statements concerning those images, see (Götzsche, 2013). In 
machine concept training approaches, a concept is transformed into a [logically] 
equivalent form in order to be represented and be expressed in machines’ knowledge 
bases and ontological descriptions. For instance, relying on descriptive logical 
approaches, concepts can be reflected and, subsequently, be represented in the form 
of ‘entities’ and as the classes of objects, see (Baader et al., 2010; Hitzler et al., 2009a; 
Hitzler et al., 2009b). Regarding my research in (Badie, 2016c), human beings refine 
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their constructed concepts into various conceptions that are representable in the form 
of hypotheses. Accordingly, the represented hypotheses could become corresponding 
to distinct entities or to their essential attributes, features, characteristics and 
properties. A hypothesis
 
is a supposition or proposed explanation made on the basis 
of limited evidence as a starting point for further investigation, see (Link a). So, this 
supposition is capable of describing the multiple theories based on terminologies and 
in the form of world descriptions for a particular technical application and within the 
domain of interest. Consequently, the hypotheses created over the defined and 
analysed terminologies support inferential and reasoning processes and satisfy 
multiple conditions for definitions of truth with regard to interpretation functions. 
 
This article focuses on (Badie, 2016b) that has been structured over Predicate Logic 
(PL), see (Mendelson, 1987). PL has supported me in the formal semantic1
 
analysis 
of the term ‘relationships’ within human-machine interplays. Consequently, the 
conclusions supported my thoughts about the HowNess of establishing a formal 
semantics concerning human-machine interactions. Based on Predicate Logic and 
focusing on Description Logics (see (Baader et al., 2010)) a unary predicate is 
supposed to be logically equivalent to a concept. Relying on descriptive logical 
approaches we can translate a unary predicate into a concept in order to employ it in 
concept expression (so-called ‘concept learning’) processes. Furthermore, according 
to the afore-mentioned characteristics of hypotheses, a concept can be logically 
described by a hypothesis, see (Mitchell, 1997; Lehmann, 2010). Regarding (Mitchell, 
1997), “a hypothesis, as a logical description of a concept, arises during a machine 
learning process”. It is a tentative explanation of ‘why the objects are members (or 
non-members) of the concepts’. Conceptually and logically, the hypotheses focus on 
describing the predicates. Then, they are expected to describe the same attributes, 
characteristics and properties. In my opinion, the outcomes of:  
 
1. providing a strong logical description for amalgamation of mental 
representations of a thing’s linguistic expressions and its other mental images 
in the form of hypotheses,  
  
2. analysing the supportive inferential processes on those hypothesis, and  
  
3. focusing on world descriptions using generated hypotheses relying on defined 
 terminologies 
 
could determine the applications of predicates and, subsequently, the applications of 
terms and statements.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Semantics is the study of the meanings, and the relation of signs to the objects to which the signs are 
applicable. In formal languages semantics is the study and analysis of the meanings of symbols and 
signifiers. Semantics focuses on the relationships between the signifiers of any language. In fact, the formal 
semantics employs the products of the human beings’ interpretations in order to produce meanings. 
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3. FORMAL SEMANTIC ANALYSIS 
 
The following axioms in Predicate Logic focus on defining the outcomes of my 
interpretations. They will be employed for formal semantic analysis of relationships 
between ‘human’ and ‘machine’:  
 
a. The terms ‘human’ and ‘machine’ are constant symbols. 
 
b. The most significant unary predicates in the formalism are Learner and Trainer. 
According to this interpretation, Learner(machine) and Trainer(human) 
represent two world descriptions over unary predicates. They represent the facts 
that ‘the machine is a learner’ and ‘the human is a trainer’ respectively.  
 
c. Considering the unary predicates Learner and Trainer, the binary predicates 
TrainerOf and LearnerOf can be defined. Consequently, 
TrainerOf(human,machine) and LearnerOf(machine,human) are two world 
descriptions over binary predicates. For instance, the relation 
TrainerOf(human,machine) describes that the human is the trainer of the 
machine. 
 
d. The functions trainer(machine) and learner(human) can be defined in order to 
represent the ‘trainer of machine’ and the ‘learner of human’ respectively.  
 
Based on these four axioms, we may conclude that: 
  
TrainerOf(human,machine)  →   
[ (trainer(machine) → human) & (human → trainer(machine)) ]  
 
AND 
 
[ (trainer(machine) → human) & (human → trainer(machine)) ]  →   
TrainerOf(human,machine).     
 
 
This logical term is structurally equal to:  
 
Relation  →  
[ (function → constant)  &  (constant → function) ]   
 
AND 
 
[ (function → constant)  &  (constant → function) ] → 
Relation. 
 
Obviously, this logical description (let me name it ‘RFC’) has been structured based 
on four fundamentals:  
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1. The training relationship between human and machine (from human into 
machine). 
2. The learning relationship between machine and human (from machine into 
human). 
3. The iterative loops between human and machine (from human into machine 
and then from machine into human). 
4. The iterative loops between machine and human (from machine into human 
and then from human into machine).  
 
Therefore, the formal semantics of training-learning relationship in the context of 
human-machine interactions is definable and analysable over two constructive bi-
conditions:  
 
I. Indicating the existence of the ‘iterative loops between human and machine’ 
from the ‘training relation between human and machine’. Inversely, 
indicating the truth (or the existence) of the ‘training relationship between 
human and machine’ from the ‘iterative loops between human and machine’. 
  
II. Indicating the existence of the ‘iterative loops between machine and human’ 
from the ‘learning relation between machine and human’. Inversely, 
indicating the truth (or the existence) of the ‘learning relationship between 
machine and human’ from the ‘iterative loops between machine and human’. 
  
According to the deduced results, the followings are valid: 
 
I. The process of machine training (as a relation between human and machine) 
supports the interrelationships between ‘the act and the process of training’ 
and ‘the machine (as the learner)’, and inversely, the interrelationships 
between ‘the act of training’ and ‘the machine (as the learner)’ support the 
machine training (as a relation between human and machine). 
 
II. The process of machine learning (as a relation between machine and human) 
supports the interrelationships between ‘the act and the process of learning’ 
and ‘the human (as the trainer)’, and inversely, the interrelationships between 
‘the act and the process of learning’ and ‘the human (as the trainer)’ support 
the machine learning (as a relation between machine and human).   
 
More specifically, by taking ‘concepts’ into consideration and limiting the ‘Learning’ 
task to ‘Concept Learning’, we can come up with the following consequences:  
 
A. The concept training relations (from human into machine) support the 
interrelationships between ‘the act and the process of concept training’ and ‘the 
machine (as the learner)’. Subsequently, interrelationships between ‘the act and 
the process of concept training’ and ‘the machine (as the learner)’ support the 
concept training relations (from human into machine). 
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B. The concept learning relations (from machine into human) support the 
interrelationships between ‘the act and the process of concept learning’ and ‘the 
human (as the trainer)’. Subsequently, the interrelationships between ‘the act and 
the process of concept learning’ and ‘the human (as the trainer)’ support the 
concept learning relations (from machine into human).   
 
Proposition. The combination of (A) and (B) provides a contextual description 
concerning existential analysis of ‘relations’ between human beings and machines. 
This contextual description has been supported by the fact that the formal semantics 
of ‘relations’ between human beings and machines is describable over six components 
(i.e., two constants, two functions, and two relations) as can be seen in the logical 
description RFC. 
  
4. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The central focus of this section is on building and analysing a conceptual framework 
over the proposed contextual and conceptual analysis of ‘relations’ between human 
beings and machines. This framework expresses “the junction of humans’ meaning 
construction processes and machines’ concept learning over humans’ constructed 
concepts”. This framework provides a supportive structure over the described 
contextualisation of ‘relations’ between human beings and machines within concept 
learning processes. It has been built over the separated components [a] and [b]. The 
component [b] represents the process of concept learning (by machine) and the 
component [a] represents the process of meaning construction (by human being). It 
shall be claimed that the interrelationships between a human being (as a trainer) and 
a machine (as a learner) could be represented as the reflection of [a] in [b], and as the 
conformation of [b] on [a]. In (Badie, 2016c), I have focused on logical 
characterisation of ‘reflection’ and ‘conformation’ transformations. 
 
4.1. COMPONENT [b]: CONCEPT LEARNING BY MACHINE 
 
As mentioned, a very important and determinative feature belonging typically to all 
machine concept learning approaches is using background knowledge. Generally, the 
background knowledge could be classified as concept descriptions in knowledge 
bases and in ontological descriptions. However, there are strong dependencies 
between concept descriptions and ontological descriptions. For instance, in semantics-
based technologies the background knowledge could be categorised as:  
 
i. Ontology Languages, e.g., OWL (Link b), that represent specified knowledge 
about various things and objects,  
 
ii. internal knowledge bases, 
 
iii. Question-Answering and querying endpoints [that focus on querying a 
knowledge base using the querying languages, e.g., SPARQL (Link c)], and 
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iv. the collection of the interrelated datasets, e.g., Linked Data (Link d).  
 
 
 
Figure 1. A Conceptual Framework for Concept Learning within Human-Machine Interplays 
 
(Lehmann, 2009) has focused on analysing a successful component-based framework
 
for concept learning in Description Logics and in OWL, see (Link e). The architecture 
of this component-based framework has been structured over four components. 
Actually, besides the ‘Knowledge Source’ component (see Figure 1), the ‘Machine 
Learning Problem’ component (e.g., definitions of atomic concepts by more specified 
descriptions, providing subsumption and equality axioms in terminological 
knowledge, providing positive and negative examples of classes of objects), the 
‘Machine Learning Algorithm’ component, and the ‘Reasoning System’ component 
are related to each other, see Figure 1.  
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I shall stress that the architecture of this framework could clarify what ingredients (as 
the building blocks) are effective within concept learning processes and how those 
ingredients could be connected to each other. You will see the interconnections of this 
Framework and my developed Framework in the next section. 
 
4.2 COMPONENT [a]: MEANING CONSTRUCTION BY HUMAN BEING 
 
For analysing meaning construction (and production), I rely on my own semantics-
based framework, see (Badie, 2015a; Badie, 2015b; Badie, 2016d). I shall start with 
this conception that “a human being, before becoming a trainer of a machine, is the 
developer of her/his personal conceptions (of her/his constructed concepts) over the 
individual designed schemata (or mental entities)”, see ‘Designing Schema’ in 
Framework 1. Schemata are cohesive, repeatable action sequence possessing 
component actions that are tightly interconnected and governed by a core meaning, 
see (Piaget and Cook, 1952) and (Link f, Link g). In my semantic approach, schemata 
(or mental entities) support humans in constructing their own concepts (and in linking 
their mental images of the world and their linguistic expressions). Furthermore, 
schemata support humans (who are the trainers of machines) in developing their 
constructed concepts and in producing their own conceptions in order to employ them 
in generating hypotheses, see ‘Concept Construction’ in Framework 1. The 
constructed concepts provide strong backbones for humans’ semantic interpretation 
and meaning construction processes within their concept training. I shall claim that 
the most significant importance of the proposed contextual and conceptual description 
of concept learning [and concept training] regarding interrelationships between 
humans and machines is that “they have been analysed over schemata-based 
conceptualisations and conceptual representations”. Considering (Badie, 2015a; 
Badie, 2015b; Badie, 2016d), the trainer needs to employ inductive rules in order to 
expand her/his constructed general concepts into more specified ones. Additionally, a 
human being during her/his interactions (with the environment, with her/his 
experiences and with machines) investigates and forms new concepts (or reforms the 
old ones) and applies them in her/his concept construction processes, and accordingly, 
in her/his hypotheses generation. This fact clearly shows that the trainer has become 
concerned with ‘definitions’ and ‘concept descriptions’ in his training process, see 
‘Definition Production’ in Framework 1.  
 
Note that I already have discussed these descriptions in the ‘Machine Learning 
Problem’ component within machine concept learning process (i.e., the component 
[b]). Furthermore, the generalisation of various specified concepts support the trainer 
in discovering [and constructing] new concepts. Accordingly, she/he focuses on the 
characteristics, attributes and properties that can be used to distinguish exemplars (of 
various concepts) from non-exemplars. Again, these products are employed in the 
‘Machine Learning Problem’ component within the machine concept learning process 
[b]. In fact, the trainer is highly concerned with identifying, establishing, indicating 
[and relating] the induced examples of her/his conceptions. Subsequently, she/he can 
make her/his personal labels of the concept categorisations in order to manage 
different classes of concepts in the form of hypotheses. Note that these hypotheses are 
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considered as the reflections of her/his created concepts in various classes of objects, 
and as analysed earlier, they are used in constructing the background knowledge in 
the ‘Knowledge Source’ component (see Figure 1). According to the afore-mentioned 
characteristics of humans’ conceptions and definition productions within schemata-
based concept training processes, the sequence  
 
‘PriorKnowledge → Definition → New Knowledge’ 
 
supports the trainer in searching for the initiative meanings of the class/classes of 
constructed concepts and their relationships, see ‘Meaning Production’ in Framework 
1. It’s only possible by means of semantic interpretations, see ‘Semantic 
Interpretation’ in Framework 1. From the logical point of view, the interpretation of a 
defined constructed concept is a function. This function has turned a definition into a 
meaning. The Interpretation functions operate the trainer’s definitions over her/his 
constructed concepts. Therefore, the interpretations ‘activate’ the meanings of her/his 
constructed concept. Consequently, the productions have made appropriate 
backgrounds for verifying the personally found meanings based on personal defined 
constructed concepts. I shall stress that “a meaning would be given a better shape after 
checking the balanced definitions based on personal constructed concepts”. So, there 
could be a number of loops between Definitions and Meanings. Methodologically, 
meanings are the supportive backbones for providing meaningful conceptual 
structures. The meaningful conceptual structures are all personally organised based 
on individual constructed concepts and definitions. On the other hand, the meaningful 
conceptual structures could induce more developed meanings on higher conceptual 
levels (and after gaining more experience within interactions with environment, self, 
and the machine). The produced meanings could be employed in developing the 
individual schemata through higher levels of conceptions.  
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Concept Learning as a paradigm of machine learning has been structured over a set of 
theories and methodologies that focus on a kind of task, in which machines are trained 
[by human beings] in order to classify various things (objects). A characteristic feature 
of most concept learning approaches is the use of background knowledge. In concept 
learning with background knowledge, a machine, with regard to the given set of 
training examples and background knowledge, focuses on hypothesis generation. 
Through the lenses of logics and relying on descriptive logical approaches, the 
machine concept learning paradigm tackles to provide comprehensible logical 
representations in order to (a) describe humans’ constructed concepts, and (b) describe 
the interrelationships between the constructed concepts after having been transformed 
(from humans’ minds into machines’ knowledge bases and ontological descriptions). 
The central focus of this research has been on conceptual and epistemological issues 
of the expressions ‘concept’, ‘concept learning’ and ‘concept training’ within human-
machine interplays. Regarding my previous researches on: 
 
i. concept representation analysis in the context of human-machine 
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interactions, 
ii. conceptual analysis of concept representation in the context of human-
machine interactions, 
iii. epistemological junctions between human beings’ minds and machines’ 
knowledge bases and ontological descriptions, and  
iv. meaning construction over humans’ constructed concepts,  
 
I have initiated this research with the conception that ‘a human being, before being a 
trainer of a machine, is the developer of her/his personal conceptions over her/his 
designed schemata’.  
 
This research has provided a contextual description concerning existential and 
structural analysis of ‘Relations’ between human beings and machines. It has been 
suggested that the most significant importance of provided contextual [and 
conceptual] description of concept learning (as well as concept training) regarding the 
interrelationships between humans and machines, has been established over 
schemata-based conceptualisations and conceptual representations. Subsequently, I 
have focused on conceptual and epistemological analysis of:  
 
i. my own semantics-based framework for meaning construction based on 
human’s constructed concepts, and 
ii. a well-structured component-based machine concept learning framework 
that works based on Description Logics and within ontological languages.  
 
Accordingly, I have focused on linking those two frameworks for logical analysis of 
concept learning in the context of human-machine interrelationships. It has been 
demonstrated that the proposed framework provides a supportive structure over the 
described contextualisation of ‘relations’ between human beings and machines within 
concept learning processes. This research has formed a building block of my PhD 
research, which is dealing with Semantic Analysis of Constructivist Concept Leaning.  
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ABSTRACT 
The multilevel conversational exchanges between a mentor and a learner could be 
seen as a radical constructivist account of their comprehensions. The process of 
knowledge construction could be realised to have a significant importance in the 
context of mentor-learner interactions. The most important fundamental is that ‘the 
conversational exchanges between mentors and learners ask questions and give 
answers concerning their individual conceptions, comprehensions and reasonings’. 
These questions and answers are the main building blocks of the ‘Relations’ between 
mentors and learners. In this article, I will employ Predicate Logic in order to focus 
on the relationships between learners and mentors. This research will, conceptually 
and logically, be concerned with [formal] semantic analysis of mentoring-learning 
relationships in the context of constructivist interactions. The conclusions will shed 
light on how a [formal] semantics for constructivist interactions is established. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The multilevel interactions and conversational exchanges between a human being (as 
a mentor, trainer, teacher) and another human being (as a learner, student) could be 
seen as a radical constructivist account of their cognitions, realisations and 
comprehensions, see (Scott, 2001). First, I shall draw your attention to some 
fundamentals that will clarify my conception of, and my way of thinking about, the 
use of the term ‘learning’ in this article. Relying on First-Order Predicate Logic 
(FOL), in the expression ‘human learning’, the word ‘learning’ has been utilised in 
the form of a predicate with the word ‘human’. Thus, learning can describe something 
about a human being who is being discussed and interpreted. In other words, learning 
in human learning has been described in the form of a predicate to model a role that 
is being performed by a human being. I shall emphasise that I am fully aware of the 
basic principle in linguistic analysis that there is a fundamental difference between 
the phrase human learning and a sentence/clause like the human is learning. In fact, 
relying on linguistic analysis, assertions [and statements] can only be made by 
sentences (and not by phrases), but the central focus of this research is on logical 
analysis of the term ‘human learning’ and its formal semantics. According to the 
proposed logical conception, a subject could be related to Human by means of 
Learning. Through the lens of cognition, ‘learning’ (as a human’s act) could be 
interpreted and explained from different perspectives. In this research learning is 
recognised as the act of [knowledge] construction. And the most central assumption 
of this research is ‘considering learning as the activity (and the developmental 
process) of knowledge construction’. Knowledge construction (that is a salient 
product of constructivist learning) could be realised to have a significant importance 
in the context of mentor-learner interactions and in their conversational exchanges; 
for more details about constructivist learning1
 
see (Piaget, 1964; Phillips, 1995; 
                                                 
1 Jean Piaget is the originator of the theory of constructivism. He argues that humans generate knowledge 
and meaning from an interaction between their experiences and their ideas, see (Piaget, 1946; Piaget, 1967). 
Piaget’s developmental theory of learning contemplates that the constructivist learning is concerned with 
how a human being goes about constructing her/his individual knowledge structures. In philosophy of 
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McGawand Peterson, 2007). The most important fundamental is that ‘the 
conversational exchanges between mentors and learners ask questions and give 
answers concerning their individual conceptions, comprehensions and reasonings’. In 
my opinion, these questions and answers are the main building blocks of the 
[constructivist] relations between mentors and learners. In the following section I will 
be more specific about the concept of ‘relation’. The processes of knowledge 
acquisition, knowledge construction and knowledge development could work 
illustratively, interpretively, instructively and heuristically in the framework of 
Conversation Theory (CT), which is conceived and elaborated by Gordon Pask, see 
(Pask, 1975; Pask, 1980). Pask’s main premise is that reliable knowledge exists, and 
it evolves in action-grounded conversations, see (McIntyre Boyd, 2004). Relying on 
CT and regarding my achievements in meaning construction, the framework of 
conversational learning is inherently a semantic model that accounts for the 
emergence of the domain of the learner’s and of the mentor’s constructed knowledge. 
Semantics as the study of the meanings can express how the produced meanings based 
upon learners’ and mentors’ constructed concepts could support them in constructing 
their universal knowledge. Furthermore, producing one’s own understanding of world 
and developing it during the interaction could be said to be the most valuable product 
of a constructivist interaction. A constructivist interaction supports the mentor and the 
learner in: 
 
i. exchanging their own conceptions (based on their conceptualisations) with 
each other, and 
ii. conceptualising their own and the interlocutor’s produced comprehensions.  
 
In this article, the interactions will be analysed with respect to developmental 
processes2
 
of humans’ world constructions over their conceptions and concept 
constructions (I will explain more about concepts). I contemplate that the 
developmental processes of personal world constructions [by mentors and learners] 
provide supportive backbones for a semantic model that accounts for the meeting of 
their constructed knowledge. In this article, First-Order Predicate Logic (FOL) will 
be employed in order to analyse the relationships between learners and mentors. 
Predicate Logic allows us to make arbitrarily specified relationships between different 
objects of the conversational learning system. This research will, conceptually and 
logically, be concerned with [formal] semantic analysis of mentoring-learning 
relationships in the context of constructivist interactions. The conclusions will shed 
light on how a [formal] semantics for constructivist interactions is established.  
 
2. ABOUT CONCEPTS  
 
                                                 
education, Constructivism as a theory and as an epistemology-based model focuses on knowledge 
construction in human beings’ own cognitive apparatus.   
 
2 Developmental Processes of Learning could be seen as the product of Developmental Theory of Learning 
and Cognitive Development, see (Link a).  
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The notion of ‘concept’ is a very sensitive term that must be used with caution, but I 
assume the use of concept to be comprehensible in this context and in the following 
logical formalisms. Concepts play fundamental parts in the use of reasons and 
languages, see (Simpson and Weiner, 1989). According to (Götzsche, 2013), a 
concept is an interrelationship between humans’ mental images of [parts of] 
reality/fiction and their linguistic expressions (and descriptions). Also, my conceptual 
approaches in (Badie, 2015a; Badie, 2015b; Badie, 2016a) are based on this 
theoretical notion of ‘concept’. In this research, I consider the collection of (i) mental 
images [of an object/phenomenon], (ii) linguistic expressions [about that 
object/phenomenon], and (iii) the interrelationships between (i) and (ii) as a 
conceptual entity and name it Concept. This article is tackling to propose a logical 
description of concept analysis in the context of mentor-learner interaction, so I shall 
propose that the concepts could be represented by hypotheses in order to correspond 
to a distinct entity or to its essential attributes, features and properties. Subsequently, 
assessed by logics, the entities determine the applications of terms and phrases, and 
can manifest themselves in the form of [unary] predicates (you will see about them in 
the next section). Therefore, FOL-based predicates could be employed in logical and 
formal analysis of this research’s objectives.  
 
3. PREDICATE LOGIC AND PREDICATION 
 
Propositional Logic and its formulae3
 
are constructed based on atomic objects. The 
statements involving atomic objects and, subsequently, the statements involving non-
atomic formulae could only be either true or false. Predicate Logic (as the logic of 
predication) is constructed over propositional logic by considering objects as the 
elements of sets, and by applying universal and existential quantifications 
(restrictions) on different objects, see (Barwise, 1977; Mendelson, 1987). The 
fundamental symbols in Predicate Logic are divided into logical and non-logical 
symbols. The logical symbols are: Conjunction (∧), Disjunction (∨), Negation (¬), 
Implication (→), Bi-conditional (⟷), Equality (=), Existential Restriction (∃), 
Universal Restriction (∀), Tautology (⊤), Contradiction (⊥) and Parentheses. Any of 
the logical symbols have the same meaning in different contexts and conditions. This 
statement means that we are not allowed to interpret them and assign multiple values 
and definitions to them. Besides logical symbols, the non-logical symbols are 
interpreted and represented in the following forms (obviously, we need to interpret 
the non-logical symbols of a logical system in order to produce meanings and to 
clarify what we mean by those symbols):  
 
A. Constant Symbols (beginning with a lower-case letter): For instance, martin, 
apple, yellow, and ∏ denote constants.  
 
B. Unary Predicates (beginning with an upper-case letter): In P(a) and Q(b), P and 
                                                 
3 The logical relationships and rules expressed in Propositional Logic’s symbols are known as Propositional 
Logic’s Formulae.  
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Q, respectively, denote unary predicates. Also, a and b are variables (multiple 
constant symbols) and are the instances of P and Q respectively. For example, 
Fruit(apple) denotes that “apple is a fruit”. Also, one may claim that it denotes 
that “all apples are fruits”. So, what it actually means is that a specific individual 
denoted by the constant apple is a Fruit and the individual ‘apple’ belongs to the 
set (and class) of Fruits. As mentioned, the unary predicates could represent 
concepts. So, the unary predicate Fruit denotes a concept and the constant apple 
denotes an instance of the concept Fruit. 
 
C. Binary Predicates or Relations: R(m,n) is a binary predicate and represents a 
relation between two variables m and n. For example, FatherOf(john, mary) can 
represent the fact that ‘John is the father of Mary’. 
 
D. Function Symbols (beginning with a lower-case letter): f(x) is a function that has 
operated the variable x. For example, father(john) can represent the ‘father of 
john’.  
 
4. CONVERSATIONAL LEARNING THEORY 
 
According to (Laurillard, 1993; Laurillard, 2002), Laurillard’s framework can be 
interpreted as a learning theory and as a practical framework for designing educational 
and pedagogical environments. This framework includes four important components:  
 
i. Mentor’s concepts (and conceptions), 
ii. Mentor’s constructed learning environment (that produces the mentor’s 
constructed world), 
iii. Learner’s concepts (and conceptions), and 
iv. Learner’s specific actions (that construct the learner’s world).  
 
Regarding Laurillard’s framework, we need to consider different forms of 
communication and associated mental activities. The main constructors of the 
associated mental activities are discussion, adaptation, interaction, and reflection.  
 
In fact, relying on Pask’s Conversation Theory and focusing on Laurillard’s 
framework, there are four kinds of human activities that take place in different kinds 
of flows between the components of Laurillard’s framework: 
 
1. Discussion between the mentor and the learner [on their conceptions, 
descriptions, comprehensions, and reasonings]. 
2. Adaptation of the learner’s actions and of the mentor’s constructed 
environment. There is a kind of adaptation of the learner’s mental universe 
and of the mentor’s mental universe. 
3. Interactions between the learner and the environment that is defined by the 
mentor. 
4. Reflection of the learner’s performance by both the mentor and the learner.  
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Figure 1. The Conversational Learning Framework 
 
I have illustrated the above-mentioned characteristics in the framework represented in 
Figure1. I have analysed meaning construction over this framework in (Badie, 2016b). 
In this framework, the learner and the mentor are incorporated. They converse and 
exchange their conceptions in order to construct and develop their knowledge. This 
framework provides a contextual ground for semantic analysis of mentor-learner 
interactions and relationships. 
 
5. SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF M-L RELATIONSHIPS  
 
This research aims at investigating where the formal semantics come from and when 
it appears within a relationship between a mentor and a learner. I shall draw your 
attention to four fundamental axioms that clarify what could be offered by the non-
logical symbols within my formalism. Defining axioms is the most important 
prerequisite for bridging the gap between formalism and the meanings. 
 
1. The symbols m and l denote mentor and learner respectively. They both represent 
constant symbols. 
 
2. The atomic concepts in logical analysis of interactions between learner and 
mentor are Learner and Mentor. Transforming them into predication, the unary 
predicates Learner and Mentor are the fundamental unary predicates in the 
logical system. Also, Learner(l) and Mentor(m) represent two world descriptions 
over unary predicates. They demonstrate that the constant symbol l is an instance 
of the unary predicate Learner and the constant symbol m is an instance of the 
unary predicate Mentor. In other words, l is a Learner and m is a Mentor.  
 
3. Considering the unary predicates Learner and Mentor, the binary predicates 
MentorOf and LearnerOf are definable. Consequently, MentorOf(m,l) and 
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LearnerOf(l,m) are two world descriptions over relations that express the facts 
that “the individual m is the mentor of the individual l” and “the individual l is 
the learner of the individual m” respectively. These two world descriptions have 
described the most fundamental (atomic) relationships between two human 
beings in the form of binary predicates. 
 
4. The functions mentor(l) and learner(m) are defined for representing the concepts 
of “the mentor of the individual l” and “the learner of the individual m” 
respectively. These functions are introduced in order to make a logical linkage 
between an individual and the role of her/his interlocutor. 
 
According to the proposed axioms, I shall claim that the binary predicate 
MentorOf(m,l), logically, implies that “the mentor of the individual l is (equality) the 
individual m”. In fact, a world description over the relation between a mentor and a 
learner has supported the conclusion that there is an alignment between an agent 
(mentor and learner) and her/his role (mentoring and learning) for her/his interlocutor 
(learner and mentor).  
 
Let me focus on the mentor’s perspective in order to provide the formal analysis:  
 
MentorOf(m,l)     (i)  ⇒ 
 
mentor(l) = m.     (ii)  
 
The equality (ii) is the product of interpretation and the binary predicate (i) describes 
the interpreted relation between mentor(l) and m. I shall claim that this equality is the 
root [and the origin] of the formal semantics within all mentoring-learning 
relationships including the relationships in the context of constructivist interactions. 
The equality in the form of a binary predicate describes that the meanings of mentor(l) 
and m are the same. Then we have:  
 
Equals (mentor(l) , m).     (iii) 
 
Considering the binary predicate (iii), the function mentor(l) that is a non-logical 
symbol, and the person (individual) m that is a constant symbol, have been expressed 
to have the same meanings. Relying on commutative laws, mentor(l) = m and m = 
mentor(l) are logically and meaningfully equivalent. Therefore:  
 
Equals (m , mentor(l)).     (iv) 
 
Accordingly, (iii) and (iv) are the conclusions of (ii). So, 
 
• the mentor of l implies m, and 
• m implies the mentor of l  
 
are the conclusions of “the mentor of l is m”. Therefore:  
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[mentor(l)= m ]   ⇒   [ ( mentor(l) → m ) ∧ ( m → mentor(l) ) ].     (v) 
 
The logical term (v) is inherently equal to:  
 
(function → constant)  &  (constant → function).     (vi) 
 
I have already deduced that my central focus has been on the interrelationships 
between function symbols and constant symbols. Note that there is a bi-conditional 
relation between (i) and (v). Therefore:  
 
MentorOf(m,l)  ⟷  [ ( mentor(l) →  m ) ∧ ( m  →  mentor(l) ) ].     (vii) 
 
Equivalently:  
 
MentorOf(m,l)  →  [ ( mentor(l) →  m ) ∧ ( m  →  mentor(l) ) ] 
& 
[ ( mentor(l) →  m ) ∧ ( m  →  mentor(l) ) ]  →  MentorOf(m,l).     (viii) 
 
 
The logical term (viii) is structurally equal to:  
 
Relation  →  [ ( function → constant ) ∧ ( constant → function ) ]   
&  
[ ( function → constant ) ∧ ( constant → function ) ]  →  Relation.     (ix) 
 
 
In Figure 2, this logical conclusion has been figured out.  
 
 
Figure 2. The General Structure of the Formal Semantics within Mentor and Learner 
Relationships 
 
Regarding (viii) in the form of (ix), the logical system of (i) has been constructed over 
four fundamental relationships: 
a. The mentoring relationships [from mentor into learner]. 
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b. The learning relationships [from learner into mentor]. 
c. The iterative loops between mentor and learner (beginning from mentor into 
learner). 
d. The iterative loops between learner and mentor (beginning from learner into 
mentor).  
Therefore, the formal semantics of mentoring-learning relationship in the context of 
mentor-learner conversational exchanges is definable over four constructive 
implications as follows (that are all extracted from viii).  
 
I.   Implying (c) from (a). Formally:  
 
MentorOf(m,l)  →  [ ( mentor(l) →  m ) ∧ ( m  →  mentor(l) ) ].     (x) 
 
It expresses:  
 
[ Mentoring Relation   →   (Mentoring Function ⟷ Learner Constant) ]. 
 
 
II. Implying (d) from (b). Formally:  
 
LearnerOf(l,m)  →  [ ( learner(m) → l ) ∧ ( l → learner(m) ) ].     (xi) 
 
It expresses:  
 
[ Learning Relation   →   (Learning Function ⟷ Mentor Constant) ] . 
 
 
III.  Implying (a) from (c). Formally:  
 
[ ( mentor(l) → m ) ∧ ( m → mentor(l) ) ]  →  MentorOf(m,l).     (xii) 
 
It expresses:  
 
[ ( Mentoring Function ⟷ Learner Constant )  →  Mentoring Relation ]. 
 
 
IV.  Implying (b) from (d). Formally:  
 
[ ( learner(m) → l ) ∧ ( l → learner(m) ) ]  →  LearnerOf(l,m).     (xiii) 
 
It expresses:  
 
[ ( Learning Function ⟷ Mentor Constant )  →  Learning Relation ]. 
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According to the deduced results, the unification of the following four items gives 
meaning (based on formal logic) to the relationship between mentor and learner, see 
Figure 3.  
 
I. The mentoring relations (from mentor into learner) support the interrelationships 
between ‘the act of mentoring’ and ‘the learner’.  
 
II. The learning relations (from learner into mentor) support the interrelationships 
between ‘the act of learning’ and ‘the mentor’.  
 
III. The interrelations between ‘the act of mentoring’ and ‘the learner’ support the 
mentoring relations (from mentor into learner).  
 
IV. The interrelations between ‘the act of learning’ and ‘the mentor’ support the 
learning relations (from learner into mentor). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Establishing Meaning in the Relationship between Mentor and Learner 
 
Consequently, 
 
• by merging (I) and (III),  
• by merging (II) and (IV), and  
• focusing on constructivist interactions,  
 
we have the following conceptual conclusions:  
 
A. The constructivist mentoring relations (from mentor into learner) support the 
interrelationships between ‘the act of constructivist mentoring’ and ‘the learner’. 
Subsequently, the interrelations between ‘the act of constructivist mentoring’ and ‘the 
learner’ support the constructivist mentoring relations (from mentor into learner). 
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Taking the conversational learning framework into account, the constructivist 
mentoring relations are adapted [and provided] by the mentor’s conceptual 
knowledge. Then the mentor’s conceptual knowledge supports the interrelationships 
between ‘the act of constructivist mentoring’ and ‘the learner’. Additionally, the 
interrelations between ‘the act of constructivist mentoring’ and ‘the learner’ support 
the mentor’s conceptual knowledge.  
 
B. The constructivist learning relations (from learner into mentor) support the 
interrelationships between ‘the act of constructivist learning’ and ‘the mentor’. 
Subsequently, the interrelations between ‘the act of constructivist learning’ and ‘the 
mentor’ support the constructivist learning relations (from learner into mentor). 
Relying on the conversational learning framework, the constructivist learning 
relations (from learner into mentor) are adopted [and provided] by the learner’s 
conceptual knowledge. Then, the learner’s conceptual knowledge supports the 
interrelationships between ‘the act of constructivist learning’ and ‘the mentor’. 
Moreover, the interrelationships between ‘the act of constructivist learning’ and ‘the 
mentor’ support the learner’s conceptual knowledge.  
 
Summary 
 
The mentor’s conceptual knowledge and the learner’ conceptual knowledge are being 
transformed and exchanged during the constructivist interaction. Furthermore, 
conversational learning’s main premise is that the reliable knowledge exists and 
evolves in action-grounded interactions and conversations. So, the discussions 
between the mentor’s and the learner’s conceptual knowledge make a balance in their 
united [and global] reliable conceptual knowledge. This reliable knowledge affects 
both A and B. Accordingly, A and B have interconnections with each other. The 
results of the interactions between A and B are reflected in reliable united conceptual 
knowledge.  
 
Regarding the proposed conceptual analysis, there are strong interrelationships 
between two classes of concepts. And in fact, in a broad sense, the multiple 
interconnections between these classes give meaning to (and establishes the semantics 
of) the mentor-learner relationships within constructivist learning systems.  
 
 
CLASS 1 
 
 The mentor’s conceptual knowledge. 
 The learner’s conceptual knowledge. 
 The reliable united conceptual knowledge. 
 The adaptation of the reliable united conceptual knowledge in the mentor’s world. 
 The adaptation of the reliable united conceptual knowledge in the learner’s world. 
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CLASS 2 
 
 The reflection of the constructivist mentoring relations (from mentor into learner) 
in the reliable united conceptual knowledge and, respectively, in the mentor’s 
conceptual knowledge. 
 The reflection of the interrelationships between ‘the act of constructivist 
mentoring’ and ‘the learner’ in the reliable united conceptual knowledge and, 
respectively, in the mentor’s conceptual knowledge. 
 The reflection of the constructivist learning relations (from learner into mentor) in 
the reliable united conceptual knowledge and, respectively, in the learner’s 
conceptual knowledge. 
 The reflection of the interrelationships between ‘the act of constructivist learning’ 
and ‘the mentor’ in the reliable united conceptual knowledge and, respectively, 
in the learner’s conceptual knowledge. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the expressions ‘human learning’ and ‘human mentoring’, the words ‘learning’ and 
‘mentoring’ are utilised as binary predicates (roles) with the word ‘human’. 
Knowledge construction as the most important objective of constructivist learning is 
a significant matter in the context of mentor-learner interactions. The most central 
focus of this article has been on ‘Relations’ between mentors and learners. I have 
focused on the process of knowledge construction in the framework of Conversation 
Theory (CT) and have assumed that conversational learning is inherently a semantic 
model to account for the emergence of the domain of the learner’s and of the mentor’s 
conceptual knowledge. The developmental processes of personal world constructions 
[by mentors and learners] provide supportive backbones for that semantic model. 
Furthermore, I have considered the fact that conversational learning could express 
how the produced meanings based upon constructed concepts could support mentor 
and learner in constructing their universal conceptual knowledge. In this article, 
Predicate Logic has been employed in order to provide a logical basis for relationships 
between learners and mentors. Relying on Predicate Logic, this research, conceptually 
and logically, has been concerned with semantic analysis of mentoring-learning 
relationships in the context of constructivist interactions. I have thought of the 
establishment of meaning (in a broad sense) in the relationships between mentors and 
learners. Taking the results into consideration and reconsidering the framework of 
constructivist conversational learning, it has been checked how the produced 
meanings could be related to the discussions between the mentors’ and the learners’ 
conceptual knowledge. Consequently, relying on the semantic ground of 
conversational learning framework, it has been realised that the produced meanings 
are interrelated in order to get reflected (mirrored) in the [mentor’s and learner’s] 
united conceptual knowledge. This research has formed a building block of my PhD 
research which is dealing with Semantic Analysis of Constructivist Concept Leaning. 
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ABSTRACT 
This chapter focuses on the meeting of Constructivism (as a learning theory) and 
Smart Learning and, thus, theorises Smart Constructivist Learning. The main field of 
research is Smart Learning Environments. Relying on the phenomena of ‘meaning 
construction’ and ‘meaningful understanding production’ in the framework of smart 
constructivism, we will focus on analysing Smart Constructivist Knowledge Building. 
Accordingly, we analysed Learning-and-Constructing-Together as a smart 
constructivist model. The outcomes of this chapter could support the developments of 
smart learning strategies.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION  
 
The process of knowledge building leads to changes in humans’ minds. In the context 
of cognitive developmental psychology, conceptual change is a type of process that 
focuses on the conversion of a human’s conceptions and the relationships between 
her/his old and new conceptions, see (Chi, 1992; Limon, 2002). Thus, the most salient 
effect of knowledge building could be recognised to be on conceptual change of the 
learners’/mentors’ conceptions over the course of time. We shall begin this chapter 
with our special focus on the fact that knowledge acquisition (that is the most 
determinative process within knowledge building processes) is a reflective activity 
that enables learners and mentors to draw upon their previous (and accumulated) 
experiences and reflect on their background as well as existing knowledge, see 
(Watkins et al., 2002). The reflective activity of knowledge acquisition supports 
learners and mentors in reflecting on themselves, on their society and on their 
environment. Knowledge acquisition enables learners and mentors to conceptualise 
and understand. Subsequently, it enables learners to evaluate both their present and 
past, so as to build up and shape their future actions (i.e., operations, practices, 
proceedings, movements, contributions and manners) as well as to construct and 
develop the construction of their latest pre-structured and pre-constructed knowledge. 
As described, ‘understanding’ has been recognised as the consequence of 
‘conceptualisation’. Our research (in (Badie, 2016a; Badie, 2016d)) has concluded 
that “an understanding could be realised to be a local manifestation of a global 
conceptualisation”. 
 
It is important to account for the fact that human beings become concerned with 
various construction processes over their pre-formed knowledge in order to obtain the 
opportunities to develop their constructed knowledge and to produce their deeper 
understandings (i.e., meaningful comprehensions). Constructivist Learning (based on 
constructivist epistemology and constructivist models of knowing) has become the 
central framework of this research. Relying on this framework, our supposedly 
theoretical model of learning deals with how knowledge can assumedly be built by a 
learner/mentor. Through the lens of cognitive psychology, Piaget’s developmental 
theory of learning says that constructivist knowledge acquisition (and knowledge 
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building) is concerned with how an individual goes about the construction of 
knowledge in her/his own mental apparatus, see (Piaget, 1936; Piaget, 1952). 
Accordingly, for any learner or mentor, knowledge acquisition could be recognised 
as the activity of seeking knowledge regarding different objects, processes, events and 
phenomena with regard to her/his background knowledge. As for the structural and 
existential characteristics of constructivism, the construction of knowledge is 
conceived of as a type of dynamic process. It can be informally described in terms of 
personal understanding in multiple actions. Consequently, constructivist learning is 
highly concerned with the active generation of personal understandings, see (Badie, 
2016d; Badie, 2016c). 
 
This chapter focuses on ‘Smart Constructivist Learning Systems’, which are a specific 
sub-class of constructivist learning systems where ‘constructivism’ meets ‘smart 
learning’. In accordance with the subject of this book, though, we look at the area of 
‘Smart Learning Environments’. According to (Uskov et al., 2016a), “smart education 
represents an integration of smart objects and systems, smart technologies, smart 
environments, smart features (smartness levels), smart pedagogy, smart learning and 
teaching analytics systems”. Relying on the framework of smart education, section 
we will focus on the development of a conceptual framework for analysing knowledge 
building in the framework of smart constructivism and over the flow of the learners’ 
understandings. Correspondingly, we will characterise the main components of a 
smart constructivist pedagogy (and a smart constructivist model of learning). It may 
justifiably be assumed that the outcomes of this chapter will support designing and 
developing innovative learning and mentoring strategies as the products of smartness. 
We will conceptualise and prove that there are strong interrelationships between 
‘smart constructivist model of learning’ and ‘collaborative learning strategy’.  
 
According to (Uskov et al., 2016a; Uskov et al., 2016b), research in the area of smart 
learning systems should not only focus on software/hardware/technology features, but 
also on smart ‘features’ and the ‘functionality’ of smart systems. Furthermore, in order 
for smart learning systems to be effective and efficient for different learners, or 
mentors, there are certain smartness levels (smart distinctive features). The most 
significant feature in this research is analysing the phenomenon of ‘smart learning’ in 
the framework of constructivism. So, it is concerned with acquiring new knowledge 
and building knowledge over existing (and background) knowledge and over the 
accumulated experiences by agents. Also, this research aims at identifying and 
recognising the concept of ‘understanding’ toward awareness of learners. Therefore, 
this chapter will be highly concerned with ‘learning/self learning’ feature. 
Additionally, our approach will rely on logical descriptions using, e.g., assumptions, 
implications and different logical rules over conceptual analysis of the phenomenon 
of ‘smart learning’ and concept of ‘understanding’. So, this research is—essentially—
structured over logical reasoning processes and could support researchers’ thoughts 
for developments of inferential and logical reasoning processes within smart learning 
systems.  
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Note that this research has been designed over our own approaches in the analysis of 
‘meaning construction’ and ‘understanding production’ processes, see (Badie, 2015a; 
2015b; 2016c; 2017a). Our ideas have been based on a new scheme for interpretation 
based on semantics and interaction. Interaction consists of: 
 
a. interactions between learner and her/his self, 
b. interactions between learner and other agents (e.g., mentors, other learners and 
smart programs), and 
c. interactions between learner and her/his environment. 
 
2. BACKGROUND OF THOUGHT  
 
In this research, our conceptualised scheme for interpretation (based on semantics and 
interaction) will be analysed in the framework of smart constructivism. In our opinion, 
learning in the framework of constructivism is highly concerned with the active 
generation of personal meaningful understandings. This is based on personal 
constructed meanings and over personal mental objects. More specifically, we believe 
that the phenomenon of ‘understanding’ could be valid (and meaningful) based on 
learners’ constructed meanings. In fact, this belief is the main building block of this 
research. This means that this chapter is specially concerned with ‘meaning 
construction’, ‘meaningful understanding production’ and ‘knowledge construction’ 
in the framework of smart constructivism. We strongly believe that there is a bi-
conditional relationship between ‘understanding production’ and ‘meaning 
construction’ in the framework of smart constructivism. Accordingly, it shall be 
claimed that the phenomenon of ‘understanding’ could be valid (and meaningful) 
based on learners’ and mentors’ constructed meanings in the framework of 
constructivism and, in the context of smart learning environments.   
 
3. CONSTRUCTIVIST LEARNING SYSTEMS: LITERATURE 
REVIEW  
 
This section conceptualises the most significant and supportive characteristics of 
constructivist learning. In our opinion, the following items are the most fundamental. 
They can be shared by Constructivism and SmartNess: 
 
a. Understanding the learner’s understanding; 
b. Respecting the learner’s background knowledge; 
c. Paying attention to the learner’s understanding of personal learning; and 
d. Focusing on the learner’s and mentor’s reliable universal knowledge in the 
context of their interactions. 
 
In fact, these items could, conceptually and epistemologically, relate the concept of 
‘Constructivism’ to the phenomenon of ‘SmartNess’. This section totally focuses on 
the concept of ‘Constructivism’. The next section, subsequently, will focus on the 
actuality of the junction between constructivist learning and smart learning systems.  
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3.1.  UNDERSTANDING THE LEARNER’S UNDERSTANDING  
 
The most fundamental point is the concept of ‘understanding’. This concept is very 
complicated and sensitive in psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, 
cybernetics, philosophy, and epistemology. There has not been any absolute, decisive, 
or independent description and specification of ‘understanding’. Anyhow, it shall be 
stressed that (i) we can potentially describe our grasp (and our conceptions) of the 
concept of ‘understanding’, e.g., (Foerster, 2003). This is relying on the fact that it is 
possible to support the understanding (and the realisation) of understanding within 
various specific areas. Furthermore, (ii) we could describe ‘understanding’ in order to 
support its representation (e.g., (Peschl and Riegler, 1999; Webb, 2009)). Finally, (iii) 
some descriptions could focus on specifying the components and constituents of 
understanding (i.e., from the perspectives of cognition and affects), see (Chaitin, 
1987; Kintsch et al., 1990; Di Pellegrino et al., 1992; MacKay, 2003; Zwaan and 
Taylor, 2006; Uithol et al., 2011; Uithol and Paulus, 2014). We believe that the first 
item is the most crucial one. In addition, it shall be claimed that (ii) and (iii) could 
logically be subsumed under (i). 
 
Let us focus on our own realisation of the concept of ‘understanding’. Assessing from 
the epistemological point of view, it could be concluded that there has always been a 
very strong bi-conditional relationship between ‘understanding something’ and 
‘explaining something’. The dependency between understanding and explanation is 
considerable in analytic sciences (e.g., mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, 
computer science) as well as in the humanities and social sciences. The explanation 
or the actual explaining of a phenomenon [and of an object, event and process] can 
shed light on the produced personal understanding of that thing. The relationship 
between understanding and explanation is bi-directional. Therefore, there is also a 
path from understanding to explanation. In fact, the well-understood phenomena [and 
objects, events, processes] could be explained more properly in order to be interpreted 
and realised by other agents (mentors and other learners). It is worth mentioning that 
there have been some descriptive models that focus on the concepts of explanatory 
proofs and explanatory systems along with their interrelationships with the concept of 
‘understanding’, see (Grosholz and Breger, 2013).   
 
In our opinion, “a human being who tackles to understand something—directly or 
indirectly—becomes concerned with the taxonomy of various concepts relevant for 
that thing and, thus, she/he needs to move toward the chain of various related concepts 
in order to approach to the more specified concepts”, see (badie, 2015b). Additionally, 
she/he must be able to propose strong explanations of those related concepts. We shall, 
therefore, say that ‘concept’ and ‘generality’ could be interpreted as the most 
significant ideas that could support the structuralist account of understanding and 
could support understanding the concept of ‘understanding’. Consequently, 
constructivist learning (based on a constructivist epistemology and constructivist 
models of knowing) is highly concerned with an individual’s knowledge building 
processes based on her/his own produced understandings. The constructivist learning 
systems make the learners and the mentors concerned with the understanding of more 
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specific concepts with regard to the special focuses on their understanding of more 
general concepts. In fact, the constructivist learning systems focus on developing the 
concept of ‘understanding of more specific concepts’. 
 
3.2. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LEARNER’S BACKGROUND 
KNOWLEDGE 
 
Any background knowledge, by activation, becomes actualised and directed to the 
more-developed construction of knowledge. Living and experiencing different things 
are the first metaphorical teachers of all human beings. Additionally, in the context of 
learning environments, background knowledge could be defined as knowledge that 
learners have. This may come either from their previous learning environments and 
learning materials or from their own life experiences, see (Marzano, 2004; Fisher and 
Frey, 2009). Constructivist learning systems focus on knowledge building over 
learners’ background knowledge. In fact, through the lens of constructivism, the 
concept of ‘learning’ is seen as the ‘process of construction’ over personal background 
knowledge. Furthermore, constructivism focuses on the individual learners’ 
comprehensions (in the shadow of their constructed meanings) of their own objectives 
with regard to insights based on their background knowledge. The theory of 
constructivism could also focus on the individual mentors’ comprehensions of their 
own objectives with regard to insights based on their background knowledge and on 
knowledge of what will be taught. 
 
3.3. THE LEARNER’S UNDERSTANDING OF PERSONAL LEARNING 
 
Here, the focus is on learners’ conceptualisations and realisations of the phenomenon 
of ‘learning’ (e.g., (Säljö, 1979; Rossum and Schenk, 1984; Rossum and Hame, 
2010)). More clearly, learners are concerned with:  
 
i. their own conceptions of the phenomenon of ‘learning’, as well as their 
conceptions of their personal learnings, and 
ii. the reflection of their personal learning on themselves and society.  
 
It shall be stressed that the most significant matter in constructivist learning is 
transforming the phenomenon of ‘learning’ into the constructions of knowledge. In 
fact:  
 
 Constructivism focuses on transformation of the phenomenon of ‘learning’ into 
the learners’ comprehensions of their personal constructed meanings.  
 Constructivism focuses on transformation of the mentors’ comprehensions of 
their personal constructed meanings into the phenomenon of ‘mentoring’. 
 
3.4. THE LEARNER’S AND MENTOR’S RELIABLE UNIVERSAL 
KNOWLEDGE IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR INTERACTIONS  
 
Constructivist learning could work as an explanatory, heuristic, and developmental 
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framework. It must be considered that there exists a kind of reliable global and 
universal knowledge between constructivist learners and constructivist mentors. It is 
constructed and developed by both groups. For example, this knowledge evolves in 
learners’ and mentors’ action-grounded conversational exchanges, see (Pask, 1980; 
Boyd, 2004). According to our research in (Badie, 2016c, p.174), the produced 
meanings by learners and mentors support the constructions of their own worlds. 
Subsequently, regarding Laurillard’s conversational learning framework (see 
(Laurillard, 1993; Laurillard, 2002)), the learners’ and the mentors’ constructed 
worlds become interacted and the learner-mentor interactions manifest themselves 
between their constructed worlds. The outcomes of these interactions become 
reflected in the learners’ and the mentors’ conceptual knowledge that support their 
reliable universal knowledge. These processes express how the constructed meanings 
(by learners and mentors) could be reflected in their constructed reliable universal 
knowledge. 
 
4. SMART CONSTRUCTIVISM: RESEARCH PROJECT 
OBJECTIVES 
 
This section, based on the identified concepts in the last section, investigates some 
conceptual and epistemological linkages between constructivist learning and smart 
learning systems. The conclusions could potentially express how educationalists and 
educators in smart learning environments could benefit from constructivist learning 
systems. 
 
4.1. SMART CONSTRUCTIVISM: UNDERSTANDING THE LEARNER’S 
UNDERSTANDING  
 
As mentioned, we believe that comprehending the learner’s understanding is the most 
crucial conception relevant to the concept of ‘understanding’. According to (Hwang, 
2014), ‘learning behaviour and learning pattern analysis’ could be one of the most 
significant research issues of smart learning. It shall be taken into consideration that 
these outcomes are applicable to understanding learners’ behaviours and learning 
patterns in the integrated real-world and virtual-world environments. Comprehension 
of learners’ understandings, as the consequences, could support educationalists and 
educators in designing and developing more effective learning strategies. In fact, this 
issue is a very good example of grasping the idea of learners’ understanding within 
smart learning environments. 
 
In addition, we interpreted the concepts of ‘concept’ and ‘generality’ as the most 
significant concepts that could support the structuralist account of understanding (and 
understanding the concept of ‘understanding’). Taking into consideration the concept 
of ‘generality’, the smart learning approaches must motivate deeper (and more 
complicated) levels of learners’/mentors’ understandings. Accordingly,  
 
 supporting any individual learner in producing her/his own deeper understanding 
of the world, and  
 
203 
 supporting any mentor in producing her/his own deeper understanding of the 
learners’ understandings and of the problems of the learners  
 
could be considered to be the most important objectives of smart learning systems. 
The most salient characteristic of smart constructivist learning systems is their special 
attention to the learners’ understandings (and, respectively, to the mentors’ 
understandings) with respect to their own produced meanings and with regard to their 
own generated meaningful understandings. An individual’s understanding of more 
specific concepts could be achieved with regard to her/his understanding of more 
general concepts. For example, a learner’s understanding of the concept of 
‘InductiveLogicProgramming’ is absolutely dependent on and supported by her/his 
understanding of the concept of ‘LogicProgramming’. Therefore: 
 
i. Smart constructivist learning systems must focus on explaining more general 
concepts and, inductively, move toward explaining more specific concepts.  
 
Also, similar to what (Hwang, 2014) suggests for recording the details of the 
students’ learning behaviours, we can conclude that: 
  
ii. Since smart constructivist learning systems respect the learners’ and 
mentors’ produced understandings of the world, these learning systems can 
record the individuals’ understandings of the world in order to provide good 
opportunities for educationalists to achieve valuable understandings of the 
learners’ understandings. Note that the educationalists, educational 
psychologists, and learning theorists could also achieve valuable 
understandings of the learners’ and the mentors’ understandings.  
Furthermore, the long-term analysis of multiple levels of the 
learners’/mentors’ understandings can definitely support researchers in 
knowing more about the efficiencies and productivities of any smart 
educational system. 
 
4.2. SMART CONSTRUCTIVISM: THE LEARNER’S BACKGROUND 
KNOWLEDGE  
 
In the framework of smart learning, any learner must be informed about the learning 
program’s objectives. Subsequently, she/he could be able to identify her/his personal 
objectives. Accordingly, she/he  
 
 activates her/his background knowledge,  
 compares her/his own objectives with the program’s objectives,  
 focuses on processing different kinds of information, and  
 works on self regulating and organising her/his self.  
 
We shall claim that activating the background knowledge is the most crucial process 
within these processes. Furthermore, referring to (Spector, 2014) and relying on 
constructivist theory of learning, one of the most important characteristics of an 
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effective, efficient, and engaging smart learning environment is one that can adapt to 
the learner/mentor and can personalise instruction and learning support. This 
characteristic is highly relevant to:  
 
i. the wide variety of learners with different levels of prior knowledge, different 
psychological backgrounds, and different interests, and  
ii. the attitudes and policies of mentors with their background knowledge of any 
learning environment, their background knowledge of any learner, and their 
knowledge of what they are going to teach/train.  
 
It shall be concluded that:  
 
 Smart constructivist learning systems must respect the learners’ and the 
mentors’ background knowledge and attempt to construct, as well as develop, 
knowledge over their existing background knowledge. These systems do not 
destruct or destroy the pre-constructed knowledge of learners. Rather, they 
only focus on repairing, mending, and developing.  
 Smart constructivism must produce and develop a kind of self-organisation 
process for any learner with respect to her/his own insights (based upon her/his 
life experiences, her/his previous learning experiences and her/his identified 
personal objectives).  
 Smart constructivist learning systems can adapt to any learner in order to 
support her/his learning process by suggesting her/him the right learning 
strategies with regard to her/his background knowledge. The outcomes could, 
to a very high degree, support and advance the learners’ lifelong learning.  
 Smart constructivist learning systems can be adapted to the mentors (also, to 
the adaptive teachers and smart programs) and personalise their own 
instruction and teaching strategies with regard to the personalised learning 
environments and the conceptualised learners. 
 
4.3. SMART CONSTRUCTIVISM: THE LEARNER’S UNDERSTANDING OF 
PERSONAL LEARNING  
 
In smart learning environments, any learner transforms the phenomenon of ‘learning’ 
into ‘demonstrations of understanding of what she/he is learning’. Accordingly, the 
learner reflects on her/his own learning strategy and promotes it over time. 
 
Smart constructivism must consider the transformation of the phenomena of 
‘learning’ and ‘mentoring’ into knowledge constructions. Smart constructivist 
learning systems must support learners/mentors in reflecting their own conceptions of 
‘what they assume they have to do as learners/mentors’ on their learning/mentoring 
processes and, respectively, on their knowledge constructions and, consequently, on 
themselves and on their society. 
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4.4. SMART CONSTRUCTIVISM: THE LEARNER’S AND MENTOR’S 
RELIABLE UNIVERSAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR 
INTERACTIONS 
 
Smart constructivist learning systems must aim at supporting learners and mentors 
in developing their universal conceptual knowledge. By taking into consideration  
 
i. the learners’ constructed worlds,  
ii. the mentors’ constructed worlds,  
iii. the learners’ conceptual knowledge, and 
iv. the mentors’ conceptual knowledge,  
 
smart constructivist learning systems must support the development of their reliable 
universal knowledge. It shall be stressed that any learner and any mentor can try to 
adapt the universal conceptual knowledge to her/his own constructed world. This 
means there is always a bi-directional relationship between ‘own constructed worlds’ 
and ‘the universal conceptual knowledge’ in the form of ‘reflections’ and 
‘adaptations’, respectively. 
 
5. SMART CONSTRUCTIVISM: METHODS USED IN RESEARCH 
PROJECT AND THEIR OUTCOMES 
 
5.1. LEARNERS’ DEVELOPING CONCEPTIONS OF LEARNING IN SMART 
CONSTRUCTIVISM  
 
This section focuses on learners’ conceptions of the phenomenon of ‘learning’ and, 
subsequently, on their conceptions of the phenomenon of ‘smart learning’. Note that 
any learner’s conception(s) of the phenomenon of ‘learning’ play(s) a fundamental 
role in her/his study behaviour, see (Pratt, 1992; Rossum and Hame, 2010). Regarding 
behavioural and cognitive analysis of human beings’ qualitative interpretations of the 
phenomenon of ‘learning’, any learner observes, interprets, and evaluates the world 
through the lenses of her/his own conceptions. In fact, the amalgamation of her/his 
mental images of the concept of ‘smart learning’ and her/his mental representations 
of the words ‘smart’ and ‘learning’ in ‘smart learning’ are manifested in the form of 
her/his conceptions. Accordingly, they are expressed in her/his actualisations and 
interpretations that all support her/his own understandings of smart learning. 
(Götzsche, 2013) provides information about the amalgamations of ‘mental images’ 
and ‘linguistic expressions’ regarding the philosophy of mind and language. 
 
Note that the design and development of any smart constructivist learning system 
must be learner-centered, see (Coccoli et al., 2014). Considering the significant 
importance of learner-centered analysis of the concept of ‘smart learning’, and in 
order to propose more analytic descriptions of smart learning, we need to put ourselves 
into the learners’ shoes and observe the phenomenon of ‘learning’ from their 
perspective. Regarding this requirement, we take into account the significant products 
of (Säljö, 1979; Rossum and Schenk, 1984; Rossum and Hame, 2010). The model 
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sketches in Säljö’s seminal studies on the concept of ‘learning’ in the learners’ 
perspective. In more proper words, this model, qualitatively, focuses on adult learners’ 
experiences of (and thoughts about) the phenomenon of ‘learning’. This model could 
be interpreted as a layered model, see Figure 1. Any of this model’s inner (deeper) 
layers is supported by its outer (shallower) ones.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Learners’ Developing Conceptions of the Phenomenon of ‘Learning’ 
 
Let us describe and analyse them: 
 
1. On the shallowest layer, the learner recognises that the phenomenon of ‘learning’ 
is equivalent to ‘knowing more and knowing new things’. Such a learner is strongly 
dependent on her/his learning environment, learning materials, and teachers 
(trainers, instructors, tutors and mentors). This learner heavily needs to to be 
expressed, be explained, and be imparted. Furthermore, she/he needs her/his 
teacher/mentor to isolate and classify the flow of (as well as well-structured) 
information into separated and individual facts. Such a learner needs the 
teacher/mentor to break down the procedures into isolated facts. On this layer, the 
learner needs to know more (and more) isolated and realisable facts. This learner 
needs to attain the abilities of ‘naming’ and ‘identifying’. Identifying multiple facts 
(and, respectively, primary procedures) prepare the learner for ‘describing’ facts 
and primary procedures.  
 
2. The second layer could be identified by the concept of ‘keeping in mind’. The 
concept of ‘keeping’—indirectly—relates the learner to ‘reusability’ (the ability of 
reusing) and ‘reproduction’ (the ability of reproducing). In fact, she/he aims to 
memorise an acquired and known fact in order to apply and activate it regarding 
her/his own requirements and tasks. The one who attempts to keep something in 
mind is still trying to know more. Reusing and reproducing prepare the learner for 
‘describing’ and ‘combining’ various facts [and, respectively, procedures].  
 
3. The third layer is identified by the concept of ‘selecting’. The ability of selection 
(and refinement) prepares the learner for pragmatism and for practical approaches. 
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The learner expects her/his teacher (trainer, instructor, tutor and mentor) to 
motivate her/him through selection processes. Selection and refinements connect 
the learner with ‘comparing’, ‘contrasting’, ‘relating’, and ‘explaining’. 
Additionally, it—indirectly—makes connection with ‘justifying’ and ‘analysing’. 
 
4. The fourth layer is identified by ‘meaning construction’. She/he has become 
concerned with interpretation, analysis, justification, primary reasoning, and 
primary criticising. In our opinion, this layer is the most crucial one due to the fact 
that it makes a linkage between learners’ fundamental and their advanced 
conceptions of the concept of ‘learning’. We shall extremely emphasise that 
identifying this level by ‘meaning construction’ is not equivalent with ignoring the 
fact that meaning construction is an infinite process of any learner. The fourth layer 
is identified by ‘meaning construction’, because the process of meaning 
construction reaches its highest point and finds its most extreme significance on 
this layer. This layer provides a crucial interval for signifying the phenomenon of 
‘learning’ (by any individual learner) within her/his learning processes. 
 
5. The fifth layer makes the learner concerned with ‘interpreting the reality’. Learning 
as an interpretative, explanatory and expository process must be capable of 
supporting the learner in ‘interpreting’, ‘explaining’ and ‘understanding’ the 
reality of the world; So, she/he has become concerned with explaining the causes 
and reasons, criticising, formulating and theorising. On this layer, many learners 
characterise ‘learning’ as the process of self development.  
 
6. The sixth layer is identified by ‘self realisation’. The learner has become concerned 
with ‘creation’, ‘generation’ and ‘reflection/mirroring (on her/his self and on 
society)’. It’s very important to know that learning as the transcendental process 
of self realisation and self organisation is continual, successive and concatenated. 
 
Regarding the described layers of learners’ conceptions, we can realise that any 
shallower (outer) conception—logically, conceptually, and cognitively—supports its 
deeper (inner) layer. Assessed by logics, the conjunction of the outer layers is 
subsumed under their inner ones.  For instance, the conjunction of the concepts of 
‘knowing more’, ‘keeping in mind’ and ‘selecting’ are subsumed under ‘meaning 
construction’. Then, through the lens of [formal] semantics, the provided logical 
model by ‘meaning constructing’ satisfy ‘knowing’, ‘keeping in mind’ and 
‘selecting’. Informally, the one who has become concerned with meaning 
construction, has already been concerned with ‘knowing’, ‘keeping in mind’ and 
‘selecting’. Accordingly, the succession of the layers’ contents from ‘knowing more’ 
to ‘self realising’ could represent the flow of the concept of ‘understanding’ in 
learners’ perspectives. In fact, there is a succession which could be considered as a 
flow of understanding regarding the expressed model. The succession could be 
described as:  
 
(1) knowing new isolated facts …  
(2) identifying them …  
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(3) keeping them in mind …  
(4) describing them …  
(5) reusing them …  
(6) combining them …  
(7) selecting them …  
(8) comparing them with each other …  
(9) relating them to each other …  
(10) explaining them and explaining by applying them …  
(11) interpreting them and interpreting by using them …   
(12) analysing them and analysing other things using them …  
(13) justifying for their existences and justifying by employing them …  
(14) reasoning for [and based on] them …  
(15) criticising for [and based on] them …  
(16) theorising for [and based on] them …  
(17) developing them and developing other things based upon them …  
(18) reflecting on selves and on society (with regard to them). 
 
An important question is “How could we establish a connection between a flow of 
understanding with regard to the learners’ developing conceptions of the phenomenon 
of ‘learning’ and the phenomenon of ‘smart learning’?”. In other words, “how could 
we characterise the concept of ‘understanding’ with regard to the learners’ 
conceptions of learning within smart learning environments?”. In answer to these 
questions we shall stress that any smart learning environment should be filled with 
available and well-organised learning materials and should be aesthetically pleasing. 
Any smart learning environment must be ‘effective’, see (Spector, 2014; Bates, 2008; 
Merrill, 2013). What is likely to make a learning environment effective, efficient and 
engaging for a wide variety of learners with different levels of background knowledge, 
psychological backgrounds and interests, is one that can adapt to the learner and to 
personalise instruction and learning support. This suggests that appropriate adaptation 
is a hallmark of smart behaviour. According to (Hwang, 2014), the concept of ‘smart 
learning environments’ has been presented as one “… that make(s) adaptations and 
provide appropriate support (e.g., guidance, feedback, hints or tools) in the right 
places and at the right time based on ‘individual learners’ needs, which might be 
determined via analysing their learning behaviours, performance and the online and 
real-world contexts in which they are situated. …”. Furthermore, (Hwang, 2014) 
states that a smart learning environment is able to offer adaptive support to learners 
by immediate analyses of the “needs of individual learners from different 
perspectives”. It shall be taken into consideration that any smart learning environment 
meets the personal factors (e.g., learning styles and preferences) and learning status 
(e.g., learning performance) of individual learners. In fact, all individual learners and 
their needs are the most central components and incorporators of smart learning 
environments. It is worth mentioning that IBM (see (IBM)) has also recognised smart 
educations as student-centric education.  
 
Taking all these characteristics of smart learning into consideration, any smart 
learning system, as a student-centric system, must prepare a background for the 
 
209 
learners’ flow of understanding and support them within different aspects of their 
understandings. Also, as mentioned earlier, the most central focus of constructivist 
smart learning systems is on learners’ understandings with regard to their own 
produced meanings and their generated meaningful comprehensions. At this point, we 
shall state that smart constructivist learning systems must be developed over the 
individual learners’ conceptions and requirements. These developments must be 
supported by the special focus on the flow of understanding of learners. 
 
Let us take into consideration some significant results of our discussions with 
undergraduate students. A number of students wanted to know which facts would be 
required and helpful for them? We can transform this requirement into (i) ‘How could 
a learner know the required and helpful facts?’.  
 
Also, a few students told us that they know that they need to select some facts in order 
to conceptualise them and to have a better understanding of them, but they don’t know 
which facts must be selected. Again, we can transform this requirement of learners 
into (ii) ‘How could a learner find the ability to select the rightful and beneficiary facts 
in order to construct meaning over them?’.  
 
Also, a student wanted to know how she could let her mentor know about her 
constructed meanings? (Actually she wanted to know how she could express her 
meanings). This question could be translated into (iii) ‘How could a learner announce 
her/his constructed meanings’ to her/his mentor or to other learners?’.  
 
Questions such as (i), (ii), and (iii) are prevalent to any learner. Smart constructivist 
learning systems must be able to provide a kind of requirement analysis and to suggest 
rightful choices to individual learners. This could be actualised by standing beside the 
learners. In fact, in the beginning, the learning system, the learner (and the mentor) 
should not look at each other, but should look at the same point and discover the 
appropriate facts together. Accordingly, the conceptions of the mentor could influence 
the learner and vice-versa. Furthermore, the learner’s and the mentor’s conceptions 
could be influenced (and modified) with regard to what the system has suggested to 
them. Smart constructivism must be capable of locating the learner in her/his best 
position to go toward her/his production of meaningful comprehension. Respectively, 
the mentor must be guided to find her/his most appropriate position in relation to the 
learners’ positions. 
 
In order to express and analyse the concepts of ‘meaning’, ‘meaning construction’, 
and ‘meaningful comprehension’, our theoretical model needs to be supported by a 
proper educational and pedagogical model. This can provide an organised framework 
for representing different levels of learners’ understandings. We need to employ a 
model of learning concerned with various complexities of understanding at its 
different levels/layers in order to support the conceptualised idea of ‘understanding’, 
to analyse the flow of understanding (in experts’/educationalists’ points of view), and 
to model it in smart constructivist learning systems.  
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5.2. SMART CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE STRUCTURE OF OBSERVED 
LEARNING OUTCOMES  
 
The Structure of Observed Learning Outcomes (SOLO) taxonomy is a proper model 
that represents multiple layers of learners’ understandings within learning and 
knowledge acquisition processes, see (Biggs and Collis, 2014). SOLO provides an 
organised framework for representing different levels of learners’ comprehensions. It 
is concerned with various complexities of understanding at its different layers. In the 
framework of SOLO, learners are concerned with five levels of understanding, see 
Figure 2.  
 
As an analytic example, we focus on a learner, Martin, who is learning Java 
Programming: 
 
 Pre-structured knowledge: Martin does not really have any knowledge about 
Java. This kind of knowledge about Java has been constructed over his mental 
backgrounds and from his previous experiences, e.g., experiencing different 
products that are developed in Java, meeting Java’s official and related websites, 
discussing with Java programmers. The most important fact is that Martin does 
not have any special constructed knowledge about Java. 
 
 Uni-structured knowledge: Martin has a limited knowledge about Java and may 
know few isolated facts. Thus, he mainly focuses on identifying those isolated 
facts. For example, he knows that Java works based on classes (of objects) and 
that Java is an object-oriented language. He may know that Java derives its syntax 
from C. Based on this, Martin has a very shallow understanding of Java. The 
known facts are isolated and he is not able to either relate them together or apply 
them. 
 
 Multi-structured knowledge: Progressing from the previous level to this level 
simply means that Martin knows a few facts about Java, but he is still unable to 
find logical and conceptual linkages between them. Martin (i) has extended the 
domains of his factual knowledge about the isolated facts, (ii) has become 
concerned with combinations of various isolated facts (but not on relating them), 
and (iii) has become concerned with descriptions of the results of those 
combinations. For example, he knows about object-oriented languages, he knows 
that object-oriented programming is a paradigm based on the concept of ‘objects’ 
and ‘things’, and he knows that object-oriented programming languages focus on 
‘objects’ rather than ‘subjects’ and ‘actions’. Martin has produced some mental 
combinations of these facts. He is preparing himself for producing logical and 
relational models based on his produced combined facts. 
 
 Related Knowledge: Martin has started to move towards higher levels of 
conception about Java. He has also begun moving towards deeper levels of 
understanding of Java. At this level, he is able to link different facts together and 
to explain several conceptions of Java. The important fact is that he has become 
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concerned with analysis, argumentation, explanation, justification, comparison, 
and applications relevant to Java. Now, Martin can explain and analyse the 
elements of the set of his factual knowledge and can relate them together. Now, 
he is able to relate the characteristics of object-oriented systems and Java 
programming. He knows why object-oriented paradigms are in favour of 
‘objects’ and not in favour of other phenomena. He is able to explain and analyse 
the characteristics of Java as well as apply different methods to them. 
 
 Extended Abstract: This layer is the deepest and the most complicated level of 
Martin’s understanding. Here, Martin is not only able to link a huge number of 
related conceptions together, but he can also link them to other specified and 
complicated conceptions. Now, he is able to link multiple explanations and 
justifications in order to produce more complicated extensions relevant to Java. 
Martin has become concerned with theorising, hypothesising, creating, and 
criticising.  
 
According to Figure 2, the extended abstracts are the products of deeper realisations 
and understandings of relational structures (and constructed related knowledge). 
Relational structures are the products of deeper comprehensions of multi-structures 
(and constructed multi-structured knowledge). In a similar manner, the multi-
structures are the products of deeper comprehensions of uni-structures (and 
constructed uni-structured knowledge). Finally, the uni-structures are the products of 
deeper pre-structures (and pre-structured background knowledge).  
 
 
Figure 2. SOLO Taxonomy: Levels of Constructed Knowledge and Levels of Produced 
Understanding. 
 
At this point, we need to focus on the HowNess of satisfaction of the flow of 
understanding from ‘pre-structured and background knowledge’ to ‘constructed 
knowledge over extended abstracts’ by smart learning development and design. Smart 
constructivist learning systems must be able to support the development of knowledge 
constructions over any learner’s background and pre-structured knowledge. The 
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central idea is that smart constructivism must generate a kind of self-updating process 
for any learner (with respect to her/his own insights based on her/his background 
knowledge) in order to prepare her/him for her/his individual processes of semantic 
interpretation and meaning construction and, subsequently, for understanding 
production. Let us be more specific on the concepts of ‘semantic interpretation’ and 
‘meaning construction’.  
 
As characterised earlier, one of the most significant features of smart constructivist 
learning systems is their special focus on the learners’ understandings with regard to 
their own produced meanings and generated meaningful comprehensions. In addition, 
we have mentioned that there is a bi-conditional relationship between ‘understanding 
production’ and ‘meaning construction’. Therefore, we shall stress that the following 
items have a logical bi-conditional relationship: 
 
 The process of knowledge construction as “pre-structured knowledge ⟶ uni-
structured knowledge ⟶ multi-structured knowledge ⟶ related knowledge 
⟶ knowledge over extended abstracts”. 
 
 The learners’ meaning construction. 
 
At this point, we employ a linguistic approach to explain and analyse this bi-
conditional relationship. This approach, in dynamic semantics, has considered 
meaning as a context-update function, see about this feature in dynamic semantics in 
(Chierchia, 2009; Gabbay et al., 2010). You can also find one of its particular 
applications in (Larsson, 2012). Considering meaning as a context-update function, 
the input of the Meaning function is a context and the output is its updated form. Any 
context comprises different types and different numbers of conceptions. 
Terminologically, we can consider conceptions as the sub-class of contexts. 
Therefore, we describe any ‘meaning’ as a conception-update function like  
 
Meaning: Conception ⟶ Conception´. 
 
This function iteratively organises itself in multiple loops and repetitions. It shall be 
claimed that the constructed meanings of any learner, based on her/his constructed 
knowledge over extended abstracts, are the updated forms of her/his constructed 
meanings within relational structures. Also, the constructed meanings in the ground 
of her/his related knowledge (on mental relational structures) are the products of 
her/his constructed meanings based on her/his multi-structured knowledge (on mental 
multi-structures). In a similar manner, the constructed meanings based on multi-
structured knowledge (and on mental multi-structures) are the updated products of the 
constructed meanings based on uni-structured knowledge (on mental uni-structures). 
Finally, the constructed meanings on uni-structured knowledge (on mental uni-
structures) are the updated constructed meanings over mental pre-structures and pre-
conceptions. 
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When it comes to semantic interpretations, our approach recognises the learner’s 
semantic interpretation as the connector of her/his various levels of constructed 
meanings, see ‘interpretation’ in (Simpson and Weiner, 1989). In other words, the 
interpretations, semantically, support the succession of the [updated] meanings. 
Relying on this conception, an interpretation could be known as the continually 
adjusted relationship between two things. It is quite important to consider the 
following when it comes to smart constructivism: 
 
1. The learner’s intention behind her/his conceptions. 
2. The learner’s actual mental universe of her/his conceptions, which are based 
on her/his accumulated experiences.  
 
As concluded earlier, smart constructivism must consider the fact that any individual 
learner—by doing learning—transforms ‘what she/he is learning’ into “uni-structures 
of knowledge, multi-structures of knowledge, related structures of knowledge, and 
constructed knowledge over extended abstracts”. In fact, any learner, based on her/his 
tasks and roles as a learner, increases the complexities of her/his constructed meanings 
in order to be closer to her/his own deepest understanding. Smart constructivist 
learning systems must be capable of supporting learners in reflecting their own 
multiple conceptions of a phenomenon (and object, process, event) and in mirroring 
the concatenation of their produced conceptions on their own learning as well as on 
different levels of their constructed knowledge. 
 
6. KNOWLEDGE IN SMART CONSTRUCTIVIST LEARNING 
SYSTEMS: ANALYSIS OF METHODS’ OUTCOMES  
 
Relying on the framework of constructivism, the current theoretical analysis of smart 
learning is not focusing on ontologies or the existence of knowledge. The central 
focus, though, is on the tenets of humans’ knowledge construction and development. 
This involves the creation of mental models when encountering new, unusual, or 
otherwise, unexplained experiences, see (Spector, 2014). We have taken into account 
that learners create their own mental representations in order to make sense of their 
experiences and learning tasks. By interpreting the phenomenon of ‘learning’ as the 
process of knowledge construction, we need to put any individual learner at the center 
of the proceeding of knowledge construction. The personal characteristics of any 
learner, the mental backgrounds, personal experiences, and the pre-structured and uni-
structured knowledge support the foundations of knowledge construction. This 
section deals with how multiple categories of knowledge can be assumed to be 
constructed in the framework of smart constructivism.  
 
6.1. CATEGORIES OF KNOWLEDGE IN SMART CONSTRUCTIVISM  
 
We adopt Bloom’s taxonomy in order to clarify what we mean by ‘categories of 
knowledge’. Bloom’s taxonomy is a framework for classifying educational and 
pedagogical objectives, which could be interpreted as the statements of what 
educators and educationalists expect the learners to have dealt with, see (Bloom, 1956; 
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Krathwohl, 2002). Considering Bloom’s taxonomy and taking into account the 
constructivist theory of learning, we could express the view that the concept of 
‘knowledge’ has a strong relationship with ‘recognition’ of multiple phenomena (as 
well as objects, processes, and events). In fact, knowledge construction is supported 
by any individual’s insights, based on her/his own recognition of various materials, 
methods, procedures, processes, structures, and settings [in the form of her/his 
conceptions]. According to (Cambridge Dictionary, 2017), having knowledge about 
something or about some phenomenon could be realised as being related to the 
following items:  
 
(i)  Having a piece of knowledge about that thing/phenomenon, and  
(ii) judging about that thing/phenomenon based on personal experiences and 
information. 
 
We shall claim that we are allowed to divide knowledge into separated classes (for 
example, into Class1, Class2, …, Classn) if and only if we have aimed at clarifying and 
specifying the humans’ conceptions of any of them (e.g., Classi) and, respectively, of 
all of those separated classes (i.e., Class1, Class2, …, Classn). In the end, we must 
consider the union of all classes as the phenomenon of ‘knowledge’. Let us focus on 
analysing how Bloom has dealt with the phenomenon of ‘knowledge’. Bloom’s 
taxonomy categorises knowledge into multiple classes, e.g., distinct classes for 
knowledge of terminologies, knowledge of ways and means, knowledge of trends and 
sequences, knowledge of classifications and categorisations, knowledge of criteria, 
knowledge of methodologies, knowledge of quantifications, knowledge of principles, 
knowledge of generalisations and specifications, and knowledge of theories and 
structures. Since then, (Krathwohl, 2002) has proposed a knowledge dimension in the 
revised version of Bloom’s taxonomy. The revised taxonomy consists of (i) factual 
knowledge (e.g., terminological knowledge), (ii) conceptual knowledge (e.g., 
knowledge of theories, models and structures), procedural knowledge (e.g., 
knowledge of methods and algorithms), and (iv) meta-cognitive knowledge (e.g., 
contextual knowledge, conditional knowledge).  
 
We strongly believe that these four classes could support us in clarifying and 
analysing the interconnections between the phenomena of ‘learning (and knowledge 
acquisition)’ and ‘knowledge building’. We shall, therefore, claim that the 
phenomenon of ‘learning’ consists of a sort of transformations from constructed 
knowledge in the world (e.g., by experts, by theoreticians) into the sets of ‘facts’, 
‘procedures’, and ‘concepts’ in different ‘contexts’. We believe that procedures are 
constructed over the chain of separated, connected, and related facts. In our opinion, 
any procedure is just the concatenation of a number of facts. Therefore, learning 
provides multiple functions from constructed knowledge into ‘facts’ and ‘concepts’. 
Learners need to deal with those facts and concepts and, subsequently, they need to 
construct their own knowledge with their insights based on what they construct over 
those facts and concepts. In (Badie, 2017b), we have argued as following: “… In our 
opinion, there is a concept behind every fact. Then any factual knowledge can be 
supported by a conceptual knowledge. For instance, according to a fundamental 
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characteristic of terminological knowledge (as a type of factual knowledge), we can 
represent terminologies by means of taxonomies. A taxonomy could be constructed 
based upon concepts. Then a terminological knowledge has been supported by a 
conceptual knowledge. Also, as another instance, we can define a body of the related 
elements and interpret it as a set of constructors for denoting various concepts and 
their interrelationships. That’s how the concept languages and descriptive languages 
appear. Then, we could be able to represent knowledge over concepts, their instances 
and their relationships …”. Thus, we shall claim that everything is translatable into 
(and [mentally] representable in the form of) a concept. Accordingly, concepts are 
manifested in the learners’ conceptions and, respectively, they could be declared in 
learners’ hypotheses. A concept might be interpreted to be a linkage or 
interconnection between the mental representations of linguistic expressions and the 
other mental images (e.g., representations of the world, representations of inner 
experiences) that a learner has in her/his mind, see (Götzsche, 2013).  
 
It shall be concluded that the phenomenon of ‘smart learning’ must provide multiple 
transformations from ‘knowledge’, either ‘received from outside’ or ‘experienced 
within inside’, into concepts. Learners represent those concepts in their minds and, 
subsequently, propose their own conceptions of those concepts. Consequently, 
learners construct their own knowledge with insights based on their produced 
conceptions. It is a fact that learners’ conceptions could elucidate others (other 
learners and mentors) and could be shared with them through internet, social 
networks, virtual classes and media. Learners can propose/announce their own 
conceptions of what they have constructed in the form of texts, voices, videos, etc. 
The collection of these processes could be identified by ‘construction of own packages 
of knowledge by learners’ in smart constructivist learning systems.  
 
6.2. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR KNOWLEDGE BUILDING IN 
SMART CONSTRUCTIVISM   
 
The main objective of this section is to propose a conceptual framework for 
representing the stream of understanding within knowledge construction processes in 
smart constructivist learning systems. First, we shall refer the readers to our research 
in (Badie, 2016b), which is dealt with formal semantic analysis of interrelationships 
between multiple categories in learners’ developing conceptions of the phenomenon 
of ‘learning’ (as modelled in (Säljö, 1979; Rossum and Schenk, 1984; Rossum and 
Hame, 2010)). We need to employ the results of that research. More particularly, that 
research has focused on conceptualisation of the phenomenon of ‘learning’ within the 
top-ontology of adult learners’ developing conceptions of learning. Self realisation 
(and self awareness) is the most excellent conception of learners. It can conclude all 
other conceptions within its lower categories. Assessed by logics, all conceptions of 
learners (within lower categories of conceptions) are subsumed under ‘self 
realisation’. Relying on Description Logics, (Badie, 2016b) has focused on 
discovering the main constructive concepts and their interrelationships under ‘self 
awareness’. Subsequently, a semantic representation of adult learners’ developing 
conceptions has been sketched out. Figure 3 represents a network that has been 
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developed over an important piece of the proposed semantic representation in (Badie, 
2016b). Figure 3 is sketched out for structural analysis of ‘smart learning’ on the 
highest conceptual level and from the perspective of the most excellent learning 
conceptions; this semantic representation is meaningful in the context of 
‘conceptualisations’.  
 
 
Figure 3. A Semantic Representation of Concept of ‘Understanding’ in Smart Learning 
Environments   
 
This network shows that the concept of ‘smart learning’ is a kind of expectation. In 
some cases, it is an ‘outlook’. Smart learning as an expectation, supports learners’ 
interpretations and understandings of the world. In fact, this expectation—relying on 
individuals’ interpretations—produces a strong belief that the phenomenon of ‘smart 
learning’ will be valid and meaningful. Furthermore, humans’ interpretations support 
their personal understandings; it is possible to say that any personal understanding is 
a kind of limited interpretation in the context of conceptualisations. Learners—relying 
on their conceptualisations and by engaging their interpretations—explicate what they 
mean by classifying a thing, process, event, or phenomenon as an instance of a 
concept. The interpretations prepare learners for producing their personal meaningful 
(and understandable) descriptions over their own conceptions, and, in fact, over their 
constructed concepts. Therefore, an ‘understating’ could be realised to be the sub-
process of an ‘interpretation’. 
 
On the other hand, though, all interpretations are not necessarily understandings. In 
fact, all the interpreted concepts may not be understood, but all the understood 
concepts certainly have been interpreted, see our research in (Badie, 2016d). Then, 
understanding, in the framework of smart constructivism, is produced over 
‘interpretations’ of things, processes, events, and phenomena as well as within smart 
learning environments. Additionally, as analysed, understanding could be considered 
as constructed over individuals’ constructed meanings. Meanings on the deepest 
layers of understanding, as well as on highest floor of the constructed knowledge, 
support ‘abstractions’ and ‘production of knowledge over the extended abstracts’ by 
learners. These abstractions support individual meaningful comprehensions over 
individual constructed meanings. Figure 4 is structurally and conceptually supported 
by Figure 3. Figure 4 represents a conceptual framework for ‘knowledge creation’ 
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over the stream of learners’ understandings within smart constructivist learning 
systems. It represents a conceptual description of ‘knowledge building’ toward 
‘deepest understanding levels of learners’ within smart learning environments.   
 
 
 
Figure 4. A Conceptual Framework for Knowledge Building within Smart Constructivist 
Learning Systems 
 
7. CONCEPTUALISING A SMART CONSTRUCTIVIST PEDAGOGY: 
TESTING OF RESEARCH OUTCOMES  
 
This section employs the outcomes of (Glasersfeld, 1995; Wasson, 1996; Fosnot, 
1996; Boethel and Dimock, 2000; Fox, 2001; Maclellan and Soden, 2004; Yilmez, 
2008) in order to conceptualise a smart constructivist pedagogy based on the proposed 
model of knowledge building. According to Figure 3, the phenomenon of ‘smart 
learning’ in the framework of constructivism is an expectation that is supported by 
any individual’s interpretations and meaningful understandings. Consequently, both 
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learners and mentors are interpreters, organisers, and constructors within the process 
of smart constructivist learning and in the context of smart learning environments. In 
fact, they are the developers of a collaborative process of constructing. Therefore, it 
shall be emphasised that smart constructivism doesn’t assess the phenomenon of 
‘learning’ as an outcome of a development. It does, however, recognise it as a 
development. Here, learners are inventors. They must be allowed to generate their 
hypotheses based on their own conceptions of the world. The main characteristics of 
the conceptions are as follows: 
 
1. Conceptions are learner-centered (individual-centered). 
2. Conceptions are central-organising. 
3. Conceptions are generalised across experiences and direct observations. 
4. Conceptions require re-organisable pre-conceptions.  
5. Conceptions make sense to communities by becoming shared. 
 
In the framework of smart constructivist pedagogy, learners must have opportunities 
to announce their pre-conceptions, their presuppositions, their hypotheses based on 
their presuppositions, and their possible suggestions over them. Learners, as 
constructors of meanings, need to organise their experiences and, correspondingly, 
generalise and specialise the experiences into their personal hypotheses. Furthermore, 
mentors, adaptive teachers, and smart programs must be able to: 
 
i. work on conceptual and logical analysis of learners’ hypotheses,  
ii. check the validity and definability of learners’ hypotheses, and  
iii. find reasonable descriptions and specifications for denying and refusing the 
learners’ hypotheses.  
 
The third item could be done deductively (based on rules) or inductively (based on 
different cases of study). In other words, learners’ hypotheses must be illuminated and 
explored in order to be disclaimed. Any kind of error, mistake, or inaccuracy would 
be assessed as an outcome of learners’ misconceptions. The learners’ misconceptions 
could be found and organised. Thus, their mistakes would—evidentially—be explored 
for themselves. Note that counterexamples are quite efficient in resolving learners’ 
misconceptions and errors. It shall be concluded that smart constructivist mentoring 
focuses on: 
 
i. discovering conceptions/misconceptions of any individual learner, 
ii. discovering the common conceptions/misconceptions among a group of 
learners, 
iii. conceptualising learners’ conceptions/misconceptions,  
iv. conceptualising and attempting to understand learners’ understandings over 
their conceptions/misconceptions, and 
v. motivating proper conceptions and resolving misconceptions.  
 
It shall be stressed that smart constructivism could consider ‘improvable and re-
organisable conceptions of learners’ as the main building blocks of its knowledge 
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building pedagogy. (Caswell and Bielaczyc, 2001) is in line with the conceptualised 
theory and has had a special focus on the learners’ productive use of the principle of 
improving their conceptions within their relationships with their ‘constructed 
knowledge’. At this point, we shall conclude that the presented conceptualisation of 
knowledge building has had a special attention to ‘re-organisable conceptions of 
learners within their connections with their collaborative constructed knowledge’. 
Table 1 is presented in order to itemise the most important components of Smart 
Constructivist Pedagogy and its significant characteristics. Later on, Figure 5 schemes 
the conceptual interrelationships between those components and the phenomena of 
‘knowledge’ and ‘conception’.  
 
Table 1. Main Components of Smart Constructivist Pedagogy  
 
Components Characteristics 
 
Smart 
Constructivist 
Learning  
  
 
 The phenomenon of ‘learning’ in the framework of smart 
constructivism is interpreted as a process of knowledge 
construction. The constructed knowledge is idiosyncratic. 
 Smart constructivist learning is strongly concerned with self-
regulation, auto-organisation, self-development and, finally, with 
self-learning. 
 Learning in the framework of smart constructivism is an active 
and dynamic (not passive) process. 
 In the framework of smart constructivism, the constructed 
knowledge [by any individual learner] is not innate, passively 
absorbed, or invented, but it is ‘constructed’ and developable. 
 In the framework of smart constructivism, learners interpret their 
world and, correspondingly, construct their own versions of the 
world based on their personal conceptions.  
 The most significant objectives of smart constructivist learning 
are ‘meaning construction’ and ‘meaningful understanding 
production’.  
 Smart learning in the framework of constructivism proceeds 
toward developing constructed structures. 
 Experiences and prior understandings of learners play 
fundamental roles in smart constructivist learning. 
 Smart constructivist learning encourages and motivates any 
individual learner to explore and discover the world by 
her(him)self. 
 Smart constructivist learning encourages any individual to make 
her/his own sense of the world. 
 In the framework of smart constructivism, the phenomenon of 
‘learning’ is situated in the context in which it occurs. 
 Smart constructivist learning is strongly supported by social 
interactions and conversational exchanges. 
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Smart 
Constructivist 
Mentoring (by 
Human Beings, 
Adaptive Mentors, 
Smart Programs) 
 
 The phenomenon of ‘mentoring’ in the framework of smart 
constructivism is a process of knowledge construction.  
 Mentoring in the framework of smart constructivism is an active 
and dynamic (not passive) process. 
 Smart constructivist mentoring conceptualises learners’ 
conceptions of the world. 
 In the framework of smart constructivism, the constructed 
knowledge by mentors is not innate, passively absorbed, or 
invented, but it is ‘constructed’ and developed by the mentor with 
regard to the learners’ opinions, actions, transactions, questions, 
and answers. 
 In smart constructivist learning systems, the mentor is an expert 
and advanced learner and has a special respect for learners’ 
choices. 
 In smart constructivist learning systems, the mentor is an 
organiser around significant conceptions that could motivate 
learners.   
 In smart constructivist learning systems, the mentor must get to 
know about any individual learner and her/his backgrounds.  
 In smart constructivist learning systems, the mentor assists 
learners and links them with their background knowledge. 
 In smart constructivist learning systems, the mentor mainly 
focuses on (i) constructing meanings for her(him)self, (ii) giving 
feedbacks to learners with regard to their constructed meanings, 
(iii) developing meaningful understandings for her(him)self.  
 In the framework of constructivism, smart mentoring 
conceptualises learners’ understandings based on their 
conceptions of the world. 
 In the framework of constructivism, smart mentoring builds a 
world of developed understandings. 
 In the framework of constructivism, smart mentoring proceeds 
toward developing constructed knowledge structures. 
 In the framework of smart constructivism, any learner must be 
driven (by her/his mentor) to understand the world and to change 
her/his understanding with regard to her/his misconceptions. In 
fact, smart mentoring discovers/recognises learners’ 
misconceptions, mistakes, and errors.  
 In the framework of constructivism, smart mentoring focuses on 
making senses. It’s highly affected by the learners’ senses of the 
world. 
 In the framework of constructivism, smart mentoring is situated 
in the context in which the phenomenon of ‘smart learning’ 
occurs. 
 In the framework of constructivism, smart mentoring is strongly 
supported by social interactions and conversational exchanges. 
 In the framework of constructivism, an effective smart mentoring 
aims at presenting open-ended identifiable, describable, 
specifiable, justifiable, and analysable problems to learners.   
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Figure 5. The Conceptual Relationship between Main Components of Smart Constructivist 
Pedagogy 
 
8. LINKING SMART CONSTRUCTIVISM AND COLLABORATIVE 
LEARNING STRATEGY: VERIFICATION OF RESEARCH 
OUTCOMES 
 
This section picks up the collaborative learning strategy (that is highly relevant to 
smart education) in order to focus on explaining its possible connections with ‘the 
smart constructivist model of learning’. This section describes why ‘collaborative 
learning strategy’ could cope with and could be furnished by the presented and 
conceptualised approach. 
 
The central focus of this research has been on knowledge building. This means we 
need to take into consideration the phenomenon of ‘knowledge building’ in order to 
check the validity and reliability of the constructivist model of learning in junction 
with ‘collaborative learning strategy’ and smart learning environments. First, it seems 
useful to take a look at Popperian epistemology (Popper, 1972) in order to work on 
conceptual analysis of knowledge building in smart learning. More specifically, the 
concept of ‘knowledge building’ could derive from an epistemology that treats 
conceptions of human beings as entities in their own right that can have properties, 
connections, and potentialities. Consequently, it’s quite important to be concerned 
with the concepts of ‘pervasive knowledge building’ and ‘knowledge of community’. 
In fact, we need to focus on the fact that in collaborative learning, or ‘Learning-and-
Constructing-Together’, the constructed knowledge must be capable of becoming 
spread widely throughout a group of learners. In the context of collaborative learning, 
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any individual learner constructs her/his own knowledge. This means she/he attempts 
to construct the universal knowledge and also develop the construction of the 
knowledge of her/his community. This section  
 
- relies on (Baker et al., 2013) and its conceptual analysis of the phenomenon of 
‘togetherness’ in learning environments, 
- follows the analysed policies of (Scardamalia et al., 1994; Bereiter and 
Scardamalia, 2012; Scardamalia and Bereiter, 2014), and 
- uses the methodological notions of (Sorensen, 2005),  
 
to focus on conceptualisation of ‘Learning-and-Constructing-Together’ while it’s 
concerned with knowledge building within junctions of ‘smart constructivism’ and 
‘collaborative learning’. 
 
8.1. ESSENTIAL VALUE 1: THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
Creative knowledge work could be interpreted as a work that advances the state of 
knowledge of a community. The ‘state of knowledge’ is an emergent collective 
phenomenon and might be interpreted for a group of people. According to the concept 
of ‘state of knowledge’, knowledge building pedagogy is supported by the premise 
that authentic creative knowledge work can take place in any learning environment 
and, respectively, in any smart learning environment. The state of knowledge of a 
group of learners within a smart learning environment only indirectly reflects the 
knowledge of individual learners. This conclusion could be implicated by smart 
constructivism. In fact, relying on smart constructivism, the state of knowledge of an 
individual learner, based on her/his constructed meanings, could highly reflect the 
knowledge of the community. Also, inversely, the state of knowledge of the 
community could—only indirectly (and not directly)—reflect the knowledge of the 
individual learners. Then, learners could re-organise and update their constructed 
meanings. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that individuals’ achievements go 
along with developments and advancements of community knowledge. This 
conclusion seems to be in parallel with the proposed approach of Zhang and 
colleagues in (Zhang et al., 2009). This characteristic, based on the state of knowledge, 
could highly affect course-by-course, program-by-program, and semester-by-
semester changes in plans and strategies of any smart learning environment. Note that 
the mentor, adaptive mentor, or the smart program, is another member of any learning 
community and, therefore, her/his/its constructed meanings reflect the knowledge of 
the community. In addition, it shall be considered that the mentor’s knowledge is, 
regarding the feedbacks and transactions of learners, developable. 
 
8.2. ESSENTIAL VALUE 2: THE PHENOMENON OF ‘DISCOURSE’ 
 
According to (Scardamalia and Bereiter, 2014), discourse could come from sharing 
knowledge and subjecting conceptions to criticism. For example, in online meetings, 
web conferences, webinars, and Massive Open Online Courses (MOOC), any 
individual learner could become concerned with a kind of discourse which could be 
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interpreted as ‘a filter that determines what could be accepted into the canon of 
justified beliefs’, see (Latour and Woolgar, 1979). However, it could be argued that 
modern learning strategies must support any individual learner and, also, any 
individual mentor, in playing her/his own creative roles in order 
 
i. to improve her/his own conceptions, and  
ii. to judge and to make decisions more rationally beside her/his manners of 
criticism.  
 
We shall claim that this kind of discourse-based judgement and decision making is 
the consequence of any individual’s and, consequently, of a community’s construction 
of factual [and, respectively, conceptual] knowledge. It can be labelled as ‘Social 
Constructivism in the Framework of Smart Constructivism’. Relying on practical and 
empirical approaches, this kind of social constructivism would be more concerned 
with shared goals of advancing understanding beyond what is currently interpreted 
and understood. In fact, the practices could support the processes of meaning 
construction. Consequently, the produced social meanings, in the context of 
interactions and conversational exchanges between individuals within a smart 
learning environment, could be updated and be more-organised. 
 
8.3. ESSENTIAL VALUE 3: AUTHORITATIVE INFORMATION AND THEIR 
RELIABILITY  
 
Smart constructivism in collaborative learning supports learners in:  
 
i. using their own authoritative information that are achieved based on their 
own experiences, explorations, studies, etc. and  
ii. bringing other authoritative information (e.g., from other individuals, from 
e-books and e-references, from learning applications) as evidences of their 
own authoritative information.  
 
The latter supports the development and re-organisation of all individuals’ 
constructions based on received authoritative information from others within their 
social interactions. It shall be claimed that the interconnections between (i) and (ii) 
elaborates the ‘state of knowledge of community’ in the long term. Accordingly, the 
interrelationships between (a) and (b) increases the state of knowledge of the 
community: 
 
a. a learner’s constructions based on her/his own authoritative information. 
b. a learner’s development of her/his constructions with regard to others’ 
authoritative information.  
 
8.4. ESSENTIAL VALUE 4: EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING 
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has 
emphasised the importance of conceptual understanding as a basis for creative 
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knowledge work of all kinds: “Educated workers need a conceptual understanding of 
complex concepts, and the ability to work with them creatively to generate new ideas, 
new theories, new products, and new knowledge”, see (OECD, 2008, p. 1). It might 
be assumed that any individual learner has to understand appropriately in order to 
develop her/his own knowledge constructions. Similarly, as discussed earlier, 
learners’ understandings are strongly supported by explanations. Accordingly, it must 
be stressed that the development of knowledge building in smart learning societies is 
highly related to the phenomena of ‘explanation’ and ‘understanding’. 
 
Smart constructivism, as a theory of learning, must support conceptual understanding 
of learners in different communities and organisations. Special attention must be 
given to guiding, instructing, and mentoring any individual learner. Any learner, in 
such a framework, must be guided in order to construct her/his own meanings and to 
support her/his society with her/his constructed meanings. In addition, the smart 
constructivist theory of learning within collaborative strategies focuses on developing 
the communities’ understandings. In our opinion, a proper strategy must follow the 
conceptual framework presented in Figure 4. Besides them, smart constructivism must 
focus on developing ‘knowing HowNess combined with knowing WhyNess’ as 
‘explanatorily coherent practical knowledge’. A similar principle for practical 
knowledge has been analysed in (Bereiter, 2014). 
 
9. SMART CONSTRUCTIVIST LEARNING COMMUNITIES: 
VALIDATION OF RESEARCH OUTCOMES  
 
According to (Adamko et al., 2014), smart learning communities must be sensible, 
connectable, accessible, ubiquitous, sociable, sharable, and visible/augmented. We 
shall claim that our research has interconnections with the features of ‘being 
connectable’, ‘accessibility’, ‘being sharable’, and ‘visibility’. 
 
At this point, we shall draw your attention to Vygotsky’s theory of social 
constructivism, see (Vygotsky, 1978a; 1978b; 1987). We shall claim that Vygotsky’s 
ideas are quite helpful in conceptualising smart constructivist learning communities. 
Vygotsky’s theory, based on his ideas in human cultural and bio-social development, 
has supported the development of social constructivism. Vygotsky believed that 
‘social interaction’ plays a fundamental role in the process of humans’ cognitive 
development. In his opinion, an individual who has stronger understandings and 
higher abilities in particular domains could be a so-called ‘teacher’. He specified the 
concept of ‘teacher’ by defining the notion as an MKO (i.e., More Knowledgable 
Other). Additionally, Vygotsky defined ZPD (i.e., the Zone of Proximal 
Development) in order to express the concept of ‘learning’ by an individual learner 
under MKO’s supervisions and/or in her/his collaborations with other individuals. 
Vygotsky believed that learners could learn (could do ‘learning’) in this zone. It shall, 
therefore, be concluded that we can have a similar conception of smart learning 
communities. In fact:  
 
i. A mentor, an adaptive mentor, or a smart program, as a more knowledgable 
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other and as an individual who has stronger understandings and higher abilities 
in particular domains, supervises learners. 
ii. Learners have interactions and conversational exchanges with each other and 
develop their personal constructions of knowledge. 
iii. The phenomenon of ‘smart learning’ occurs over actions, transactions, 
questions, and answers between any learner and mentor as well as between 
any learner and other learners.  
 
9.1. CONCEPTUALISING SMART CONSTRUCTIVIST LEARNING 
COMMUNITIES  
 
The Fundamental Characteristics of Smart Constructivist Learning Communities are as 
follows: 
 
 Smart learning communities are communities using a discourse engaged in 
activity, reflection, interaction, and conversation. 
 
 The main goals of any smart learning community are (i) Learning-and-
Constructing-Together and (ii) producing the Collaborative Understanding. 
 
 The main belief of any smart learning community is that the phenomena of ‘smart 
learning’ and ‘development’ are integrally tied to any individual’s 
communicative and social interactions with other individuals.  
 
 The second important belief of smart learning communities is that the use of 
information technologies (IT) and information communication technologies 
(ICT) is more likely to make a constructivist perspective towards the 
phenomenon of ‘smart learning’. 
 
 Smart learning communities must be given senses by (i) learners’ made senses of 
the world based on their own experiences, explorations, and discovered key 
concepts and by (ii) their shared conceptions of the world.  
 
 In the context of smart learning communities, any individual learner must be 
permitted to express, explain, defend, prove, and justify her/his conceptions of 
the world. Subsequently, all learners must be allowed to communicate their 
conceptions to each other as well as to their smart learning community. 
 
 Smart learning communities must involve instructed interactions that guide any 
individual learner to recognise and resolve her/his conceptual inconsistencies and 
to modify conceptions through her/his interactions and conversational exchanges.  
 
 In the context of smart learning communities, interactions and conversational 
exchanges between two agents support bi-directional meaning constructions and 
collaborative understanding developments.  
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 In the context of smart learning communities, any constructed knowledge by an 
individual learner supports collaborative knowledge construction. 
 
9.2. SMART CONSTRUCTIVIST LEARNING COMMUNITIES AND 
KNOWLEDGE BUILDING TECHNOLOGIES 
 
In the context of smart constructivist learning communities, any conception is a 
building block of a knowledge construction. Any conception of an individual learner 
must be connected to and related to all others’ conceptions. For example, any 
conception of a learner could be expressed in the form of her/his notes, paintings, 
sound clips, and video clips. Accordingly, the conceptions can be recorded and 
archived in the digital library of the relevant smart learning environment. 
Subsequently, the smart learning environment must record a huge collection of 
conceptions. These could be represented by, e.g., data models, conceptual models, 
graphical models, statistical models, and concept maps. This can be seen in Figure 6. 
Consequently, any conception would be viewable in multiple views as well as from 
different perspectives. For example, John’s conception could be viewed from the 
perspective of Bob’s and Mary’s conceptions or from the perspective of their mentor’s 
conception. In addition, there could be different possible interpretations for any 
linkage between two conceptions. These all could be recorded in the digital library. 
For example, Elizabeth may have an interpretation of John’s conception while she has 
observed and conceptualised John’s conception from the perspective of Mary’s 
conception. Accordingly, Elizabeth’s interpretation, over the arc/line between John’s 
and Mary’s conceptions, could produce a new conception that could be recorded in 
the digital library.  
 
The ‘Knowledge Forum’ is a proper knowledge building environment, see 
(Scardamalia et al., 1994; Caswell and Bielaczyc, 2001; Scardamalia, 2004; 
Scardamalia and Bereiter, 2014). This multimedia knowledge building environment 
could be recognised as a kind of smart learning environment. Such a smart learning 
environment focuses mainly on knowledge building. Knowledge Forum becomes 
organised by all of its users. All users are the constructors and developers of a huge 
collaborative knowledge construction. It might be assumed that such an environment 
can be an appropriate developable environment for ‘knowledge building within smart 
constructivist learning communities’. Such a smart system can represent the 
advancing knowledge of any individual and of any community. 
 
It’s undeniable that smart learning communities are dependent on discourse engaged 
in activity, reflection, and interaction. We cannot deny that the most important 
objective of a modern learning community like Knowledge Forum is Learning-and-
Constructing-Together. It must be taken into consideration that a smart constructivist 
learning community believes that ‘smart constructivist learning’ and ‘knowledge 
development’ are integrally dependent on any individual’s interactions and 
collaborations with other agents. Furthermore, we cannot ignore the importance of 
Collaborative Meaning Construction and Understanding Production in smart 
constructivist learning communities. 
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Figure 6. Knowledge Building View in Knowledge Building Communities 
 
10. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This research is focused on the area of Smart Learning Environments. Our theory has 
been presented (i) based on traditional constructivist theory of learning and (ii) by 
considering new requirements of learners in the digital age. It has, with special focus 
on ‘constructivist epistemology’ and ‘constructivist models of knowing’, 
conceptualised Smart Constructivist Learning Systems.  
 
In this research, knowledge acquisition has been recognised as the process of seeking 
knowledge [by human beings] about different phenomena, objects, processes and 
events with regard to their personal background knowledge. The concepts of 
‘knowledge building’ and ‘understanding production’ have been the most sensitive 
terms in this article. More clearly, our theoretical model deals with:  
 
i. how knowledge may reasonably be assumed to be built by an individual, and 
ii. how her/his meaningful understandings could be assumed to be produced.  
 
The constructivist theory of smart learning and, respectively, the smart constructivist 
theory of learning is a modern learning theory that is conceptualised over the 
phenomenon of ‘smartness’. What we have offered has been a ‘conceptual, logical 
and epistemological description’ which has justified the importance of Smart 
Constructivist Knowledge Building Strategies. More specifically, this research has 
presented a specification of conceptualisation of  
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a. smart constructivism, 
b. smart constructivist learning,  
c. meaning construction and understanding production in the framework of smart 
constructivism, 
d. knowledge building in the framework of smart constructivism, 
e. smart constructivist collaborative learning, 
f. smart constructivist learning communities, 
g. smart knowledge building environments, and  
h. collaborative meaning construction and understanding production in the 
framework of smart constructivism.  
 
As for the structural characteristics of smart constructivism, knowledge construction 
is conceived of as a type of active process, and it can be informally described in terms 
of personal understanding in multiple actions. Furthermore, it has been theorised that 
the phenomenon of ‘understanding’ could be valid and meaningful based on learners’ 
[and mentors’] constructed meanings in the framework of constructivism and in the 
context of smart learning environments. Accordingly, the concept of ‘knowledge 
building’ is interpreted as the consequence of ‘meaning construction’, ‘understanding 
production’, and ‘sense making’ by any individual learner.  
 
Subsequently, this chapter has worked on designing a conceptual (and logical) 
framework for analysing knowledge building in the framework of smart 
constructivism and over the flow of learners’ understandings. Considering that 
framework, we have identified the most significant characteristics of a smart 
constructivist pedagogy. It has been assumed that the conceptualised theory must be 
able to support other learning/mentoring strategies as the products of the phenomenon 
of ‘smartness’. Accordingly, we have—relying on the characterised concept of ‘smart 
learning communities’—picked up the ‘collaborative learning strategy’ and worked 
on checking the validity of Learning-and-Constructing-Together (as a model of 
learning) within smart learning communities. Subsequently, the most fundamental 
characteristics of knowledge building within smart learning communities are 
conceptualised. We shall claim that smart constructivism, besides Learning-and-
Constructing-Together, could support some strategies like, e.g., Learning-and-
Constructing-by-Doing and Learner-based programs of study with variable structures 
adaptable to types of learners. 
 
We strongly believe that the theory of smart constructivism and, subsequently, the 
constructivist model of learning within smart learning environments can support 
subsequent developments of smart learning strategies. This theory could support 
renewed qualitative developments of knowledge building and understanding 
production within smart learning environments.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
In this research, Description Logics (DLs) will be employed for logical description, 
logical characterisation, logical modelling and ontological description of concept 
understanding in terminological systems. It’s strongly believed that using a formal 
descriptive logic could support us in revealing logical assumptions whose discovery 
may lead us to a better understanding of ‘concept understanding’. The Structure of 
Observed Learning Outcomes (SOLO) model as an appropriate model of increasing 
complexity of humans’ understanding has supported the formal analysis. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The central focus of this research is on concepts. My point of departure is the special 
focus on the fact that there is a general problem concerning the notion of ‘concept’, 
in linguistics, psychology, philosophy and computer science. This research aims at 
providing a logical description (and analysis) of the use of concepts in terminological 
knowledge representation systems and, thus, I need to assume concepts’ applications 
in order to be comprehensible in the context and in my logical formalism. Taking into 
consideration (Baader et al., 2010) and (Rudolph, 2011), a concept might be correlated 
with a distinct ‘entity’ or to/with its essential features, characteristics and properties. 
Note that an entity’s properties express its relationships with itself and with other 
entities. Through the lens of Predicate Logic, a concept might be considered to be 
equivalent to a [unary] predicate. It shall be emphasised that this remark is not about 
language, but this is how concepts are perceived by logicians. Accordingly, it could 
be claimed that predicates could, logically, express the characteristics of concepts in 
terminological systems. More specifically, predicates assign characteristics, features 
and properties of concepts into some subjects. It’s believed that predicates may 
determine the applications of logical descriptions. As all logicians know, predicates 
play fundamental roles in reasoning processes and in giving satisfying conditions for 
definitions of [logical] truth. By taking into consideration that ‘a predicate expresses 
a condition that the entities referred to may satisfy, in which case the resulting 
sentence will be true (see (Blackburn, 2016))’, predicates can be applied in expressing 
meanings within formal semantics. Subsequently, the formal semantics could focus 
on multiple conditions through definitions of truth (and falsity). The central objective 
of formal semantics can be said to be formalising and manipulating the relationships 
between the signifiers of a description and what the signifiers do [or have been 
designed to do], see (Jackendoff, 1990; Gray et al., 1992; Barsalou, 1999; Resnik, 
1999). 
 
As mentioned, the central focus of this research is on concepts (and through the lens 
of Predicate Logic). Concepts and their interrelationships will be used to establish the 
basic terminology adopted in the modelled domain regarding the hierarchical 
structures. My logical descriptions will have a special focus on my methodological 
assumption that expresses that  
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• human beings’ grasps of their constructed concepts (in the form of their 
conceptions) provide foundations for producing their own conceptualisations. 
Accordingly, they can find out that an individual thing/phenomenon is an instance 
of that concept.  
 
This article will focus on describing and characterising humans’ concept 
understandings and will deal with a formal-semantic model for figuring out the 
underlying logical assumptions of ‘concept understanding’. The term ‘understanding’ 
will be observed from multiple perspectives and, subsequently, the expressiveness of 
the semantic model’s descriptions will be improved. The Structure of Observed 
Learning Outcomes (SOLO) taxonomy is an appropriate model of increasing 
complexity of humans’ understanding. SOLO as a descriptive model of knowing and 
understanding can support my formalism. Additionally, its taxonomical structure 
could be expressed in the form of some logical inclusions.  
 
In this research, the formal semantic analysis of [concept] understanding is based on 
Description Logics (DLs). I believe that DLs can support me in proposing an 
understandable logical description for clarifying concept understanding. DLs as the 
profound formalism are used for representing predicates and for formal reasoning over 
them. They mainly focus on terminological knowledge. It is of a terminological 
system’s particular importance in providing a logical formalism for knowledge 
representation systems and, also, for semantic representations and ontologies (as 
formal and explicit specification of a shared conceptualisation on the domains of 
interest), see (Davies et al., 2003; Staab and Studer, 2009). 
 
The main contributions of this research are:  
 
i. providing a formal semantics (relying on DLs) for conceptual analysis of 
concept understanding, and analysing a knowledge representation formalism 
for expressing concept understanding, and 
ii. designing and formalising an ontology that provides a structural 
representation of concept understanding within the analysed semantic model. 
 
2.  DESCRIPTION LOGICS  
 
First, I shall mention that (Baader et al., 2010) is my main reference to Description 
Logics. Description Logics (DLs) represent knowledge in terms of individuals 
(objects, things), concepts (classes of things), and roles (relationships between things). 
Individuals correspond to constant symbols, concepts to unary predicates, and roles 
to binary (or any other n-ary) predicates and relations in Predicate Logic. 
Reconsidering the predicate P in Predicate Logic, we have [possibly specified] 
concept C in DLs. There are two kinds of atomic symbols, which are called atomic 
concepts and atomic roles. These symbols are the elementary descriptions from which 
we can inductively (by employing concept constructors and role constructors) build 
the specified descriptions. Considering NC, NR and NO as the sets of atomic concepts, 
atomic roles and individuals respectively, the ordered triple ⟨NC, NR, NO⟩ represents a 
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signature. The set of main logical symbols in ALC (Attributive Language with 
Complements: the Prototypical DL, see (Schmidt-Schauss and Smolka, 1991)) is: 
{Conjunction (⊓: And), Disjunction (⊔: Or), Negation
 
(¬: Not), Existential Restriction 
(∃: There exists ... ), Universal Restriction (∀: For all ... )}. We also have Atomic 
Concepts (A), Top Concept (⊤: Everything) and Bottom Concept (⊥: Nothing) in 
ALC.  
 
In order to define a formal semantics, we need to apply terminological interpretations 
over our signatures. More particularly, any [terminological] interpretation consists of  
 
i. a non-empty set ∆ (that is the interpretation domain and consists of any 
variable that occurs in any of the concept descriptions), and 
ii. an interpretation function .I (let me call it ‘interpreter’).  
The interpreter assigns to every individual (like a) a ‘aI
 
∈ ∆I’. Also, it assigns to every 
atomic concept A (or every atomic unary predicate) a set A I
 
⊆ ∆I, and to every atomic 
role P (or every atomic binary predicate) a binary relation
 
PI
 
⊆ ∆I
 
× ∆I. Table 1 
reports the syntax and the semantics of ALC. 
 
 
Syntax Semantics 
A AI
 
⊆ ∆I 
P PI
 
⊆ ∆I × ∆I 
⊤ ∆
I 
⊥ ∅ 
C ⊓ D (C ⊓ D)I  = CI ∩ DI 
C ⊔ D (C ⊔ D)I  = CI ∪ DI 
¬C (¬C)I  = ∆I  \ CI 
∃R. C { a | ∃b.(a,b) ∈ RI
 
∧ b ∈ CI
 
} 
∀R. C { a | ∀b.(a,b) ∈ RI
 
⊃ b ∈ CI
 
} 
 
Table 1. The Prototypical Description Logic 
 
A knowledge base in DLs usually consists of a number of terminological axioms and 
world descriptions (so-called ‘assertions’), see Table 2. The terminological 
interpretation I is called a ‘model’ of an axiom (or a model of a basic world 
description) if and only if it can semantically satisfy it, see Tables 2 and 3. In the 
following Tables P is an atomic role, R and S are role descriptions, A is an atomic 
concept, and C and D are concept descriptions. 
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Name Syntax Semantics 
Concept Inclusion Axiom C ⊑ D CI
 
⊆ DI 
Role Inclusion Axiom R ⊑ S RI
 
⊆ SI 
Concept Equality Axiom C ≡ D CI
 
= DI 
Role Equality Axiom R ≡ S RI
 
= SI 
Concept Assertion C(a) aI
 
∈ CI 
Role Assertion R(a,b) (aI, bI) ∈ RI 
 
Table 2. Axioms and World Descriptions in DLs 
 
 
Over Concept Over Role 
AI
 
⊆ ∆I PI
 
⊆ ∆I × ∆I 
⊥I = ∅ ⊥I = ∅ 
(¬C)I = ∆I  \ CI (¬R)I = (∆I × ∆I) \ RI 
(C ⊓ D)I = CI ∩ DI (R ⊓ S)I = RI ∩ SI 
 
Table 3. Inductive Concept Descriptions 
 
Let me start the logical analysis with two examples: 
 
Example 1 
 
Mary has verified that ‘there is a young student’ and ‘there is a non-old student’ are 
expressing the same matter. Her verification between these two propositions is 
expressible in DLs by:  
 
∃hasStudent.Young ≡ ∃hasStudent.¬Old. 
 
It’s realisable that Mary has assumed the axiom stating that Young and Old are two 
disjoint concepts and, in fact, the logical term ‘Young ⊓ Old ⊑ ⊥’ has formed a 
terminological axiom for Mary. It’s obvious that Mary’s interpretation over:  
 
i. Young ⊓ Old ⊑ ⊥ (meaning that Young and Old are disjoint concepts), and 
ii.  Person ⊑ Young ⊔ Old (meaning that every person is either young or old)  
has played crucial roles here. In fact, Mary has interpreted and, respectively, 
understood that these two sentences (‘there is a young student’ and ‘there is a non-old 
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student’) have the same meanings. More specifically, Mary’s terminological 
interpretation (over i and ii) has produced her understanding of an equivalence 
between the concept descriptions ∃hasStudent.Young and ∃hasStudent.¬Old. We 
can see that Mary’s interpretation has been restricted (limited) to her understanding 
of disjointness of the concept descriptions ∃hasStudent.Young and 
∃hasStudent.¬Old.  
 
At this point, I shall claim that the concepts (concept descriptions) C and D are 
logically and semantically equivalent, when ‘for all’ possible terminological 
interpretations like I, we have: CI
 
= DI
 
. In this example, if one person, say John, does 
not assume the axioms stating that ‘Young and Old are two disjoint concepts’ and 
‘every person is either young or old’, then there will not be an equivalence relation 
between ∃hasStudent.Young and ∃hasStudent.¬Old. 
 
Let me conclude that Mary’s and John’s understandings are dissimilar, because they 
have had different terminological interpretations in their minds (and it is because of 
their different conceptions and concept formations). For example, regarding John’s 
terminological interpretation, the proposition ‘there is a middle-aged student’ could 
be added beside ‘there is a young student’ and ‘there is a non-old student’. In fact, 
John could have the axiom  
 
• ‘Person ⊑ Young ⊔ MiddleAged ⊔ Old (meaning that every person is young or 
middle aged or old)’  
in his mind. Consequently, John by taking this axiom (based on his own conception) 
into consideration doesn’t understand ‘∃hasStudent.Young’ and 
‘∃hasStudent.¬Old’ as equivalent concept descriptions. 
 
Example 2 
 
Mary has verified that ‘Anna has a child who is a philosopher’ and ‘Anna has a child 
who is a painter’ could be jointly expressed by ‘Anna has a child who is a philosopher 
and painter’. Translated into DLs we have her expression as followings: 
 
∃hasChild.Philosopher ⊓ ∃hasChild.Painter  
≡  
∃hasChild.(Philosopher ⊓ Painter). 
 
Suppose that Anna has two children and one is a philosopher and the other one is a 
painter. Then, ∃hasChild.(Philosopher ⊓ Painter) is not equivalent to 
∃hasChild.Philosopher ⊓ ∃hasChild.Painter. Actually, Mary has not proposed a 
correct description, and this is because of her inappropriate terminological 
interpretation. Accordingly, her understanding has followed her inappropriate 
interpretation. In fact, she incorrectly (semantically: False) has understood that the 
proposition ‘Anna has a child who is a philosopher and painter’ expresses the same 
matter. Reconsidering the proposed formalism, ∃hasChild.Philosopher ⊓ 
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∃hasChild.Painter and ∃hasChild.(Philosopher ⊓ Painter)  are not—semantically—
the same and there should not be an equivalence symbol between them. Thus, Mary’s 
interpretation has not been satisfactory. Subsequently, her understanding is not 
satisfactory and appropriate.   
 
3.  A SEMANTIC MODEL FOR CONCEPT UNDERSTANDING  
 
In this section I clarify my logical conceptions of ‘concept understanding’. The term 
‘understanding’ is very complicated and sensitive in psychology, neuroscience, 
cognitive science, philosophy and epistemology. There has not been any complete 
model for describing this term, but there are some proper models of:  
 
a) understanding of understanding, see (Foerster, 2003), 
b) understanding representation, see (Peschl and Riegler, 1999; Webb, 2009), and 
c) specification of the components of understanding (i.e., from the cognition’s and 
from the affects’ perspectives), see (Chaitin, 1987; Kintsch et al., 1990; di 
Pellegrino et al., 1992; MacKay, 2003; Zwaan and Taylor, 2006; Uithol et al., 
2011; Uithol and Paulus, 2014).  
 
This research, by analysing a formal semantics, focuses on the junctions of 
‘understanding of concept understanding’ and ‘concept understanding representation’ 
in terminological systems and, more specifically, it focuses on logical analysis of 
concept understanding and its terminological representation. 
 
3.1.  CONCEPT UNDERSTANDING AS A RELATION (AND FUNCTION) 
 
I shall claim that ‘concept understanding’, as a relation, could relate ‘the 
characteristics and attributes of a concept’ with ‘a description’. More specifically, 
understanding is a function (mapping) from a concept into some propositions (and 
statements) which could be interpreted as ‘concept descriptions’. In fact, the 
characteristics and properties of a concept by means of the understanding function 
become mapped into concept descriptions. Let me be more specific: 
 
A. A human being—by concept understanding—attempts to map the significant 
characteristics of concepts into some concept descriptions. For example, ‘breathing’, 
as a biological and psychological process, is a characteristic and trait of all animals 
and, thus, breathing (that is a role) is the characteristic of the concept Animal. Then, 
 
i. knowing the fact that the individual horse is an instance of the concept Animal 
(Formally: Animal(horse)), and  
ii. drawing the [concept subsumption] inference ‘Horse ⊑ Animal’,  
 
collectively, lead us to knowing and to understanding that ‘horses breathe’ (or 
equivalently: ‘horses do breathing’). The role breathing could be manifested in the 
concept Breath. Therefore, (i) and (ii) collectively lead us to expressing the concept 
description ‘Animal(horse) ⊓ ∃hasTrait.Breath’ for the individual horse (as an 
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instance of the concept Animal) and, respectively, for the concept Horse (as a sub-
concept of Animal). 
 
B. A human being—by concept understanding—attempts to map the concepts’ 
properties and their interrelationships with themselves into some concept descriptions. 
For example, the one who knows that ‘male horses breathe’, by taking the 
terminological and assertional axioms  
 
{ 
Animal(horse),  
Horse ⊑ Animal,  
MaleHorse ⊑ Horse,  
FemaleHorse ⊑ Horse 
} 
 
into consideration, can know and understand that ‘female horses breathe’ as well.  
 
C. A human being—by concept understanding—attempts to map the concepts’ 
properties and their relationships with other concepts into some concept descriptions. 
For example, the one who knows that ‘horses breathe’ (and as described: 
Animal(horse) ⊓ ∃hasTrait.Breath), could, respectively, know and understand that the 
individual rabbit (that is an animal) breathes as well. So, she/he could express that 
‘rabbits breathe’ and, in fact, Animal(rabbit) ⊓ ∃hasTrait.Breath. 
 
Conclusion. Relying on Predicate Logic (and DLs), the phenomenon of ‘concept 
understanding’ could be interpreted as:  
 
• a binary predicate and  
• a role of human beings on expressing some concept descriptions. Let me 
represent this role by ‘understanding’. 
 
3.2.  CONCEPT UNDERSTANDING AS A CONCEPTUALISATION  
 
The concept understanding could be interpreted to be the limit/type of 
conceptualisation. Accordingly, humans need to conceptualise concepts in order to 
understand them. According to (Badie, 2016a) and (Badie, 2016b), any concept 
understanding could be interpreted as a local manifestation of a global 
conceptualisation. Additionally, human beings’ grasps of concepts could provide 
proper foundations for generating their own conceptualisations. I shall claim that 
‘concept understanding’ could be acknowledged as a limited type of humans’ concept 
constructions, when the concept constructions are supported by their own 
conceptualisations. Therefore, ‘conceptualising’ is a role of human beings. This 
conclusion, relying on DLs, could be represented by the ‘role inclusion (or role 
subsumption)’:  
 
understanding ⊑ conceptualising. 
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In other words, ‘understanding a concept’ has been acknowledged as the sub-role of 
‘conceptualising that concept’. On the other hand, ‘it is not the case that all 
conceptualisations are understandings’. In fact, all the conceptualised concepts could 
not be understood.  
 
3.3.  CONCEPT UNDERSTANDING AS AN INTERPRETATION-BASED 
MODEL  
 
Generally, an interpretation is the act of elucidation, explication and explanation, see 
(Simpson and Weiner, 1989). According to (Honderich, 2005) and through the lens 
of philosophy, “…in existential and hermeneutic philosophy, 
‘interpretation’ becomes the most essential moment of human life: The human being 
is characterised by having an ‘understanding’ of itself, the world, and others. This 
understanding, to be sure, does not consist—as in classical ontology or 
epistemology—in universal features of universe or mind, but in subjective-relative 
and historically situated interpretations of the social. …”. Regarding (Blackburn, 
2016) and through the lens of logic, an ‘interpretation’ of a logical system assigns 
meanings (or semantic values) to the formulae and their elements. At this point, I shall 
take into consideration that the phenomenon of ‘interpretation’ could have a 
conjunction with the phenomenon of ‘terminological interpretation’ in formal 
languages. More specifically, the one who has engaged her/his interpretations to 
explicate [and justify] what [and why] she/he means by classifying a 
thing/phenomenon as an instance of a concept, needs to interpret the non-logical 
signifiers of different concept descriptions within her/his linguistic expressions. 
 
Considering any set of non-logical symbols (that have no logical consequences) in a 
terminology, a terminological interpretation over humans’ languages could be 
described to be constructed based on the tuple  
 
⟨Interpretation Domain, Interpretation Function⟩. 
 
The interpretation domain (or the universe of interpretation) might be called ‘universe 
of discourse’. As mentioned in previous section, the interpretation domain must be 
non-empty. This non-empty set forms the range of any variable that occurs in any of 
the concept descriptions within linguistic expressions. It’s a fact that the collection of 
the rules and the processes that manage different terms and descriptions in linguistic 
expressions, cannot have any meaning until the non-logical signifiers and constructors 
are given terminological interpretations. The interpretations prepare humans for 
producing their personal meaningful [and understandable] concept descriptions. 
Hence, I have recognised all ‘concept understandings’ as ‘concept interpretations’. 
This conclusion, relying on DLs, could be represented by the ‘role inclusion’:  
 
understanding ⊑ interpreting. 
 
Therefore, ‘concept understanding’ has been expressed as the sub-role of ‘concept 
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interpreting’. But, on the other hand, not all interpretations (of concepts) imply 
understandings (of concepts). Equivalently, ‘it is not the case that all interpretations 
are understandings’. In other words, all the interpreted concepts may not be 
understood. Accordingly, considering any interpretation as a function, ‘concept 
understanding’ is recognised as an ‘interpretation function’. 
 
From this point, I apply the function UND (as a limit of the interpretation function I)
 
in my formalism. Then, CUND
 
represents ‘Concept Understanding’, where C stands for 
Concept. Consequently, considering UND as a kind of interpretation, there exists a 
tuple like ⟨DU, Cunderstood⟩, where:  
    
i.   DU represents the understanding domain (that consists of the variables that 
occur in any of the concept descriptions which are going to be understood), 
and 
ii.   Cunderstood is the understood concept.  
 
Cunderstood is achievable based on the understanding function -
UND. Relying on the 
function -UND,  
 
 CUND
 
⊆ CI ⊆ ∆I, and 
 DUUND
 
⊆ ∆I. 
 
It shall be stressed that DUUND expresses ‘understanding all concepts belonging to the 
understanding domain’. Note that -UND, as a function, can provide a model for a 
terminological (and assertional) axiom. Therefore, the desired model  
 
i. is a restricted form of a terminological (and interpretation-based) model, and  
ii. can satisfy the semantics of the terminological and assertional axioms (read 
‘UND ⊨ Axiom’: UND satisfies the axiom), see Table 4.  
 
Consequently:   
 
 CUND ⊆ CI
  
⊆ ∆I, and         
 -UND
 
: C → CUND 
 
, where:  
 
 CUND
 
⊆  DUUND
  
⊆ ∆I
 
. 
I shall emphasise that we are not able to conclude that CI
 
⊆ DUUND
 
. On the other 
hand, we certainly know that CUND
 
⊆ ∆I (because CUND ⊆ CI 
 
and CI
  
⊆ ∆I). 
According to the analysed characteristics, the UND understanding model in my 
terminology is constructed based upon the tuple ⟨Understanding Domain, 
Understanding Function⟩ as: 
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UND = ⟨DUUND, -UND⟩. 
 
Name Description, Semantics 
 
Understanding a Concept Inclusion UND ⊨ (C ⊑ D)  ⇒                                     
CUND
 
⊆ DUND 
Understanding a Role Inclusion UND ⊨ (R ⊑ S)  ⇒                                    
RUND
 
⊆ SUND 
Understanding a Concept Equality UND ⊨ (C ≡ D)  ⇒                                  
CUND
 
= DUND
 
 
Understanding a Role Equality UND ⊨ (R ≡ S)  ⇒                                  
RUND
 
= SUND
 
 
Understanding a Concept Assertion UND ⊨ C(a)  ⇒                                     
aUND
 
∈ CUND 
Understanding a Role Assertion UND ⊨ R(a,b)  ⇒                                 
(aUND, bUND) ∈ RUND 
 
Table 4. Understanding Model: Terminologies, World Descriptions and their Semantics 
 
 
Table 5 is based on Table 4 and itemises inductive concept descriptions and their 
semantics as the products of the understanding model. 
  
 
Model Satisfies the Vocabulary Semantics 
UND ⊨ ⊤ ⊤UND= ⊤ 
UND ⊨ ⊥ ⊥UND
 
= ∅ 
UND ⊨ ¬R  (¬R)UND = ⊤ \ RUND 
UND ⊨ ¬C  (¬C )UND  = DUUND  \ CUND   
UND ⊨ (R ⊓ S)  (R ⊓ S) UND
  
=
 
RUND
 
∩ SUND
 
 
UND ⊨ (C ⊓ D)  (C ⊓ D)UND
 
= CUND
 
∩ DUND
 
 
 
Table 5. Understanding Inductive Concept Descriptions 
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3.4.  CONCEPT UNDERSTANDING AS A PRODUCT OF FUNCTIONAL 
ROLES 
How could we employ DLs in order to describe an understanding function as a 
[functional] role of a human being? Let me interpret functional roles (features) as the 
roles that are existentially functions and, thus, they can express ‘functional’ actions, 
movements, procedures and manners of human beings. Let NF be a set of functional 
roles and NR be the set of role [descriptions]. Obviously: NF ⊆ NR and informally, 
functional roles are some kinds of roles. 
   
Lemma. The UND understanding model is—semantically—structured over:  
 
a. the understanding domain (or DU), 
b. the understanding function (or -UND), and 
c. the set DUUND (or equivalently, the effect of the understanding function -UND on 
the Top concept)
 
that represents understanding all atomic concepts (everything) 
in the understanding domain.  
 
Analysis. The UND understanding model associates with each atomic concept a 
subset of DUUND, and with each ordinary atomic role a binary relation over DUUND
 
× 
DUUND. Note that any functional role can be recognised as a partial function. More 
specifically, considering F = f1 ○ ··· ○ fn (F is a chain of functional roles), the chain 
f1
UND
 
○ ··· ○ fn
UND represents the composition of n partial understanding functions. In 
fact, by employing UND, any fi
UND—semantically—supports the [overall] functional 
role FUND. Note that for all i in (1,n), fi+1 produces the input of fi. Therefore, the 
understanding of fi+1 (the output of fi+1) provides the input of the understanding of fi. 
In particular, any concept description could be understood over the subsets of DUUND. 
This characteristic is very useful in making a strong linkage between the terms 
‘understanding’ and ‘chain of functional roles’. It supports my semantic model in:  
 
 scheming and describing the ‘understanding’ as the ‘product of a chain of 
functional roles, where the functional roles are the partial understanding 
functions’. 
 
You will see how it works. 
 
3.5.  HUMANS’ FUNCTIONAL ROLES THROUGH SOLO’S LEVELS 
 
According to (Biggs and Collis, 2014), the Structure of Observed Learning Outcomes 
(SOLO) taxonomy is a proper model that can provide an organised framework for 
representing different levels of humans’ understandings. This model is concerned with 
various complexities of understanding on its different layers. According to SOLO and 
focusing on humans’ levels of knowledge with regard to a concept, we have: 
 
 Pre-structured knowledge. Here humans’ knowledge of a concept is pre-
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structured (and is the product of their pre-conceptions).  
 Uni-structured knowledge. Humans have a limited knowledge about a concept. 
They may know one or few isolated fact(s) about a concept.  
 Multi-structured knowledge. They are getting to know a few facts relevant for a 
concept, but they are still unable to link and relate them together.  
 Related Knowledge. They have started to move towards deeper levels of 
understanding of a concept. Here they are able to link different facts and to 
explain several conceptions of a concept.  
 Extended Abstracts. This is the most complicated level. Humans are not only 
able to link lots of related conceptions [of a concept] together, but they can also 
link them to other specified and complicated conceptions. Now they are able to 
link multiple facts and explanations in order to produce more complicated 
extensions relevant for a concept.  
 
Obviously, the extended abstracts are the products of deeper comprehensions of 
related structures. Related structures are the products of deeper comprehensions of 
multi-structures. The multi-structures are the products of deeper comprehensions of 
uni-structures, and the uni-structures are the products of deeper comprehensions of 
pre-structures.  
 
Let me select a process (as a sample of humans’ functional roles) from any of the 
SOLO’s levels and formalise it. According to SOLO, creation (with regard to an 
understood concept) is an instance of ‘extended abstracts’, justification (with regard 
to an understood concept) is an instance of ‘related structures’, description (with 
regard to an understood concept) is an instance of ‘multi-structures’ and identification 
(with regard to an understood concept) is an instance of ‘uni-structures’. Therefore, 
Creation, Justification, Description, and Identification are four processes which could 
be analysed as functions in the model. Any of these functions can support a functional 
role as a ‘partial understanding function’: 
 
i. Creation has interrelatedness with creatingOf that is a functional role and 
extends the humans’ mental abstracts. 
ii. Justification has interrelatedness with the functional role justifyingOf that 
relates the lower structures. 
iii. Description has correlation with the functional role describingOf that produces 
the multi-structures. 
iv. Identification has correlation with the functional role identifyingOf that 
generates the uni-structures. 
 
It shall be emphasised that identifyingOf, describingOf, justifyingOf, and creatingOf are 
only four examples of functional roles within SOLO’s categories and, in fact, the 
SOLO’s levels are not limited to these functions. For example, followingOf and 
namingOf are two other instances of uni-structures, combiningOf and enumeratingOf 
are two other instances of multi-structures, analysingOf and arguingOf are two other 
instances of related structures, and formulatingOf and theorisingOf are two other 
instances of extended abstracts. 
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As mentioned, the functional roles creatingOf, justifyingOf, describingOf, and 
identifyingOf represent the equivalent roles of the creation, justification, description, 
and identification functions respectively. Furthermore, these functions are the partial 
functions of the understanding function. Obviously, the understanding function (that 
is a process) could also be considered to be equivalent to a functional role like 
understandingOf. Employing the ‘role inclusion’ axiom we have: 
 
1. creatingOf ⊑ understandingOf, 
2. justifyingOf ⊑ understandingOf, 
3. describingOf ⊑ understandingOf, and 
4. identifyingOf ⊑ understandingOf.  
 
Equivalently:  
 
1) creation ⊆ understanding,  
2)  justification ⊆ understanding,  
3) description ⊆ understanding, and  
4) identification ⊆ understanding.  
 
It shall be claimed that understandingOf, conceptually and logically, supports ‘the 
understanding function based on the analysed understanding model (or UND)’. 
Similarly, we can define CRN, JSN, DSN, and IDN as sub-models of UND for 
representing creation, justification, description and identification respectively. Any 
of these models can—semantically—satisfy the terminologies and world descriptions 
in Table 4. Accordingly—relying on inductive rules—they can satisfy concept 
descriptions in Table 5.  
 
Note that CRN (as a model) fulfils the desires of UND better (and more satisfying) 
than JSN, DSN, and IDN. Considering DU as the understanding domain, we have:   
 
DUUND   ⊆   DU
CRN 
⊆ DU
JSN 
⊆ DU
DSN 
⊆ DU
IDN. 
 
More specifically: 
 
 DUCRN
 
represents the model of creation over the understanding domain. It 
consists of concepts which are (or could be) ‘created’ by human beings. 
Formally: CCRN
 
∈ DUCRN. 
 
 DUJSN represents the model of justification over the understanding domain. It 
consists of concepts which are (or could be) ‘justified’ by human beings. 
Formally: CJSN
 
∈ DUJSN.       
        
 DUDSN represents the model of description over the understanding domain. It 
consists of concepts which are (or could be) ‘described’ by human beings. 
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Formally: CDSN
 
∈ DUDSN. 
 
 DUIDN represents the model of Identification over the understanding domain. It 
consists of concepts which are (or could be) ‘identified’ by human beings. 
Formally: CIDN
 
∈ DUIDN. 
 
Proposition. The terminological axioms and the world descriptions (in Table 4) and 
inductive concept descriptions (in Table 5) are all valid and meaningful for CRN, JSN, 
DSN, and IDN. Therefore, inductive concept descriptions are also valid and 
meaningful over the concatenation of the creation, justification, description and 
identification functions that have supported these terminological models.  
 
Proposition. All satisfactions based on IDN are already satisfied by DSN, JSN and 
CRN over
 
DUDSN, DUJSN, and DUCRN respectively. Informally, if a human being is able 
to describe, justify and create with regard to her/his conception of a concept, so, she/he 
is already capable of identifying that concept. Furthermore, she/he might be able to 
identify something else with regard to her/his conception of that concept.  
 
Formal Analysis. The semantics of the composite function ‘creation (justification 
(description (identification (C))))’, that is the product of the chain of functional roles, 
supports the proposed semantic model on DUUND, which is the central domain of the 
understanding (central part of the understanding domain). Considering all the roles 
relevant for the concept C, we have: 
 
    1. (∀R1.C)
CRN  = { a ∈ DUCRN 
  
|  ∀b.(a,b) ∈ R1
CRN →  b ∈ CCRN
 
}.   
 
Therefore: 
 
    2. (∀R2.C)
JSN  = { a ∈ DJSN
  
|  ∀b.(a,b) ∈ R2
JSN  →  b ∈ CJSN
 
}.   
 
Therefore: 
 
    3. (∀R3.C)
DSN  = { a ∈ DUDSN
  
|  ∀b.(a,b) ∈ R3
DSN  →  b ∈ CDSN
 
}.   
 
Therefore: 
 
    4. (∀R4.C)
IDN  = { a ∈ DUIDN
  
|  ∀b.(a,b) ∈ R4
IDN  →  b ∈ CIDN
 
}. 
 
In the afore-itemised formalism, R1, R2, R3 and R4 stand for creatingOf, justifyingOf, 
describingOf, and identifyingOf respectively. Consequently, CRN, JSN, DSN, and IDN 
have been observed as roles of human beings. Accordingly, it’s possible to represent 
the chain of functional roles in the form of a collection of implications as following:  
 
(∀R1.C)
CRN   ⇒  (∀R2.C)
JSN   ⇒  (∀R3.C)
DSN   ⇒  (∀R4.C)
IDN. 
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It must be concluded that ‘any role based on a conception of C’ to the left of any of 
arrows makes a logical premise for ‘other roles based on conceptions of C’ to the right 
of that arrow. It shall be stressed that this is a very important terminological fact. The 
concluded logical relationship represents a flow of concept understanding from deeper 
layers to shallower layers.  
 
4.  AN ONTOLOGY FOR CONCEPT UNDERSTANDING  
 
According to (Grimm et al., 2007; Staab and Studer, 2009), an ontology, from the 
philosophical point of view, is described as studying the science of being and 
existence. Ontologies must be capable of demonstrating the structure of the reality of 
a thing/phenomenon. They check multiple attributes, particularities and properties that 
belong to a thing/phenomenon because of its natural and structural existence. An 
ontology, from another perspective and through the lenses of information and 
computer sciences, is described as an explicit and formal specification of a shared 
conceptualisation in a domain of interest. However, in my opinion, there could be very 
strong relationship between these two descriptions of ontologies. In fact, ontologies 
in information sciences attempt to mirror the things’/phenomena’s structures in virtual 
and artificial systems. The ontological descriptions in information sciences tackle to 
provide appropriate logical and formal descriptions of a phenomenon [and of its 
structure] considering various concepts relevant for that phenomenon. From this 
perspective, an ontology can be schemed and demonstrated by semantic networks and 
semantic representations. A semantic network is a graph whose nodes represent 
concepts (e.g., unary predicates) and whose arcs represent relations (e.g., binary/n-ary 
predicates) between the concepts. Accordingly, semantic networks provide structural 
representations of a thing/phenomenon. In Figure 1, I have designed a semantic 
network as an ontology for ‘concept understanding’. This hierarchical semantic 
representation,  
 
1. specifies the conceptual relationships between the most important ingredients of 
this research, 
2. demonstrates the logical representation of concept understanding.  
It shows how the proposed model attempts to represent concept understanding. This 
semantic representation can be interpreted as a specification of the shared 
conceptualisation of concept understanding within terminological systems. The 
proposed ontology can be reformulated and formalised in ALC in the form of a 
collection of fundamental terminologies as following: 
 
A Formal Ontology for Concept Understanding 
 
{   
UnaryPredicate ⊑ Predicate,  
BinaryPredicate ⊑ Predicate,  
Concept ⊑ UnaryPredicate,  
Concept ⊑ ∃hasInstance.Individual,  
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BinaryPredicate ⊑ (∃hasNode.Individual ⊓ ∃hasNode.Individual),  
Role ⊑ BinaryPredicate,  
Relation ⊑ BinaryPredicate,  
Function ⊑ Relation,  
Interpretation ⊑ Function,  
Conceptualisation ⊑ Function,  
ConceptUnderstanding ⊑ Interpretation,  
ConceptUnderstanding ⊑ Conceptualisation,  
PartialFunction ⊑ Function,  
FunctionalRole ⊑ Role,  
FunctionalRole ⊑ hasEquivalence.PartialFunction,  
FunctionalRole ⊑ Function,  
SubModel ⊑ Model,  
SemanticModel ⊑ Model,  
InterpretationSemanticModel ⊑ SemanticModel,  
UnderstandingSemanticModel ⊑ SemanticModel,  
UnderstandingSemanticSubModel ⊑ SubModel,  
UnderstandingSemanticSubModel ⊑ SemanticModel,  
InterpretationSemanticModel ⊑ ∃hasSupport.Interpretation, 
UnderstandingSemanticModel ⊑ ∃hasSupport.InterpretationSemanticModel, 
UnderstandingSemanticModel ⊑ ∃hasSupport.UnderstandingSemanticSubModel,   
UnderstandingSemanticSubModel ⊑ ∃hasSupport.FunctionalRole  
} 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
The readers of this article may ask “if the term ‘understanding’ in this research is 
related to the real human beings, or if this research’s domain is only information and 
computer sciences?” Actually, that’s why I have employed Description Logics. Under 
a plethora of names (among them terminological systems and Concept Languages), 
Description Logics (DLs) attempt to provide descriptive knowledge representation 
formalisms based on formal semantics to establish common [conceptual and logical] 
grounds and interrelationships between human beings and machines. Description 
Logics supported me in revealing some hidden conceptual assumptions that could 
support me in having a better understanding of ‘concept understanding’. DLs, by 
considering concepts as unary predicates and by applying terminological 
interpretations over them, have proposed a realisable logical description for 
explaining the humans’ concept understanding.  
 
The central contribution of the article has been providing a formal semantics for 
logical analysis of concept understanding. According to the logical analysis, a 
background for terminological representation of concept understanding has been 
expressed. Consequently, a semantic representation [as an ontology and a 
specification of the shared conceptualisation of ‘concept understanding’] has been 
designed and formalised.  
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Figure 1:  An Ontology for Concept Understanding 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The central focus of this article is the epistemological assumption that knowledge 
could be generated based on human beings’ experiences and over their conceptions of 
the world. Logical characterisation of human inductive learning over their produced 
conceptions within terminological systems and providing a logical background for 
theorising over the Human Concept Learning Problem (HCLP) in terminological 
systems are the main contributions of this research. In order to make a linkage between 
‘Logic’ and ‘Cognition’, Description Logics (DLs) will be employed to provide a 
logical description and analysis of actual human inductive reasoning (and learning). 
This research connects with the topics ‘logic and learning’, ‘cognitive modelling’ and 
‘terminological knowledge representation’. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The point of departure is my special focus on the conceptualisation of ‘learning’. In 
this research, learning will be seen as the process of construction, and thus, learning 
will be assumed to be supported by an epistemology which argues that knowledge is 
constructed based on human beings’ experiences, and over their conceptions of the 
world, see (Piaget, 1967; Husén and Postlethwaite, 1989; Glasersfeld, 1989; Sjoberg, 
2007; Sawyer, 2014).  
 
According to (Bartlett, 1932), concepts might be understood as representations of 
(aspects of) reality in human beings’ minds. Frederic Bartlett, in his studies in 
experimental psychology, arrived at the phenomenon of ‘concept’ with his focus on 
memory analysis. In memory studies subjects recalled details of stories that were not 
actually there. Considering concepts as mental representations, any concept could be 
recognised to be equivalent to a psychological entity, see (Peacocke, 1992; Zalta, 
2001). Furthermore, concepts could be studied by the representational theory of the 
mind (and the theory of mental representation), see (Stich, 1992; Margolis and 
Laurence, 2007; Margolis and Laurence, 2010). In this research, the term ‘concept’ is 
suggested as following: “a concept could be said to be a linkage [and interconnection] 
between the mental representations of linguistic expressions and other mental images 
(e.g., aspects of representations of the world, and of inner experiences) that a human 
being has in her/his mind”, see (Götzsche, 2013). Kindly observe that the ontological, 
existential and structural analysis of these linkages is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but it could be assumed that humans’ conceptions are the outcomes and manifestations 
of their constructed concepts.  
 
Let me begin with an example; Suppose that one (say John) has a visualisation of 
‘Book’ in his mind. Regarding his mental image, he describes (and defines) ‘Book’ 
by “Set of written Sheets”. Note that I am not interpreting the truth/falsity of John’s 
description (definition) of ‘Book’, but I am just analysing the logical structure of his 
description (definition). First, I shall mention that Description Logics (see (Baader et 
al., 2010)) and concept languages recognise a definition of a concept as a definition 
of a new (and/or more specified) concept in terms of other previously definition 
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concepts. More precisely, a definition could be defined as an equation between a 
concept and its description (based on one’s conceptions). Obviously, John’s 
conception of the concept ‘Book’ is transformable into a hypothesis like “Book is a 
Set of written Sheets”. The most important word of this hypothesis is the distinct entity 
‘Book’. Therefore, John has established the correspondence “Set of written Sheets” 
to the entity ‘Book’. More particularly, John has created a mental assignment from 
the description “Set of written Sheets” to the entity ‘Book’. In fact, John, by means of 
“is a”, has made a logical relation between the distinct entity ‘Book’ and the 
description “Set of written Sheets”. More specifically, he has made two parallel 
relationships, i.e.,  
 
i. a hyperonym-hyponym or SuperClass-SubClass relationship, and  
ii. a hyponym-hyperonym or SubClass-SuperClass relationship  
 
between a distinct entity and a description. Consequently, all characteristics, features 
and properties of ‘Set of written Sheets’ are assigned to ‘Book’, and vice-versa. From 
John’s point of view (that has supported him in producing his pre-conception of 
‘Book’), all applications of ‘Book’ are determined and supported by his primary 
mental expression and definition “Book is a Set of written Sheets”. 
 
This article will—by considering concepts as the amalgamations of mental images 
and linguistic expressions—focus on analysing the logical characteristics of “humans’ 
inductive1 reasoning (and learning) over their conceptions”. In fact, it will focus on 
logical analysis of how terminological knowledge could reasonably be assumed to be 
built based on an individual’s conceptions of the world. It attempts to offer an 
explanatory framework to draw a linkage between logic and cognition. It aims at 
providing a logical background for providing a terminological scheme and for 
theorising over the Human Concept Learning Problem (HCLP) in terminological 
systems. 
 
2. ON HUMAN CONCEPT LEARNING 
 
In my opinion, one of the most fundamental characteristics of human concept learning 
is using background knowledge, which is formed and shaped over humans’ pre-
formed concepts and, respectively, over their pre-conceptions. So, this article relies 
on the idea that humans’ pre-formed concepts form their background knowledge. In 
general, referring to (Matthews, 2014), the term ‘background knowledge’ represents 
the knowledge of the world in general, or the knowledge of the life in the specific 
society, the understanding of which people can be assumed to share as a framework 
for talking with each other. It shall, therefore, be claimed that any background 
knowledge could represent an individual’s  
                                                 
1 An inductive logic is a system of evidential support that extends deductive logic to less-than-certain 
inferences, see [8]. The premises of a strong inductive argument should be capable of providing some 
degree of support for the logical conclusion, where such support means that the truth of the premises 
indicates, with some degree of strength, that the conclusion is (could be) true.  
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i. universal knowledge of the world in general, or 
ii. any local knowledge of a specific part of the world in particular.  
 
Furthermore, in the learning sciences, the background knowledge can be defined as 
‘the knowledge that learners have (learned) both formally in the learning 
environments as well as informally through their life experiences’, see (Marzano, 
2004; Fisher and Frey, 2009). Therefore, the background knowledge of any individual 
can be constructed based on: 
 
a. her/his descriptions of the world based on her/his pre-formed concepts (and 
pre-concept descriptions), and 
b. her/his own conceptions which are generated with regard to the structures of 
different phenomena/things in her/his mind. 
 
However, there are strong dependencies between  
 
a. pre-concept descriptions (and, thus, pre-conceptions), and 
b. the structural conceptions of different phenomena/things. 
 
More specifically, any pre-concept description could be interpreted as an expression 
of a human’s conception of a phenomenon’s/things’s structure. For example, pre- 
[concept-descriptions] could be produced based on humans’ qualitative and 
phenomenographic realisations of different phenomena/things. Furthermore, human 
beings, within processes of concept learning, are concerned with their explanatory, 
structural, existential and comprehensive conceptions of different phenomena/objects. 
According to the mentioned characteristics of background knowledge, human concept 
learning could be suggested as following. 
 
2.1. HUMAN CONCEPT LEARNING  
 
Concept learning is an inductive learning theory that is supported by humans’ 
inductive reasoning processes. Concept learning is logically shaped over a system of 
evidential support, which is structured over less-than-certain inferences of human 
beings. This theory is supported by humans’ reasoning processes based on their 
constructed concepts (and their produced conceptions). Concept learning could be 
generated based on humans’ background knowledge (and over their pre-formed 
concepts and preconceptions) and with regard to their conceptualisations of the 
characteristics and properties of concepts and through experiencing (e.g., observing, 
hearing, touching, reading about) various groups of examples of those concepts. 
Accordingly, humans could focus on hypothesis generation. It shall be concluded that 
humans become concerned with specification of the conceptualisation of their 
constructed concepts within their concept learning.  
 
It is worth mentioning that some approaches (in educational and social sciences) have 
focused on applications of the analysed notion in inductive teaching and inductive 
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learning strategies, see (Taba, 1971; McCracken, 1999; Du and Ling, 2011; Sell et al., 
2014). As mentioned, humans could focus on hypothesis generation within their 
concept learning. The next section will focus on logical analysis of hypothesis 
generation. In this research, the main references to logic of induction, inductive 
reasoning and inductive concept learning paradigm are (Lavarac and Dzeroski, 1993; 
Lavarac and Dzeroski, 1994; Mitchell, 1997; Lehmann, 2009; Lehmann et al., 2011; 
Lehmann et al., 2014; Lehmann and Voelker, 2014). Also, (baader et al., 2010) is the 
main reference to Description Logics and Concept Languages. At this point, I shall 
state that Description Logics (DLs)—under a plethora of names (among them 
terminological systems and Concept Languages)—attempt to provide descriptive 
knowledge representation formalisms based on formal semantics. They can support 
us in revealing some hidden conceptual assumptions that could support us in having 
a better understanding of ‘concept learning’ and in proposing more realisable logical 
descriptions for it in terminological systems. That’s why I have employed DLs in this 
research. 
 
3. A TERMINOLOGICAL BASIS 
 
A series of inductive learning approaches make humans concerned with three kinds 
of non-monotonic processes: 
 
1. The process of producing their descriptions of more specified concepts regarding 
their descriptions of more general concepts. For example, Mary could describe 
her own constructed concept (and conception of) ‘Red Dog’ regarding her 
descriptions of her constructed concepts (and conceptions of) ‘Red’ and ‘Dog’. 
Also, Ann could describe her own constructed concept (and conception of) ‘Big 
Brown Horse’ regarding her descriptions of her constructed concepts (and 
conceptions of) ‘Big’, ‘Brown’, and ‘Horse’. 
 
2. The processes of reforming and re-organising their conceptions of the same 
concepts with insights based on their acquired knowledge and new experiences. 
For example, James could describe his constructed concept (and conception of) 
‘Spring’ by the term “a Season; when all the Trees are Green”, or equivalently: 
Season ⊓ ∀hasTree.Green. Later on, he may reform his conception of ‘Spring’ 
and may produce the description “a season; when some (and, in fact, not all) trees 
are green”, or equivalently: Season ⊓ ∃hasTree.Green.  
 
3. The process of producing their more specific descriptions of the same concepts 
with insights based on acquired knowledge within their interactions with new 
experiences. For example, James could describe the concept ‘Spring’ by “a 
season; when some trees are green”, or equivalently: Season ⊓ ∃hasTree.Green. 
Later on, he may produce the more specific description “a Season of the Moderate 
Weather; when some Trees are Green”, or equivalently: Season ⊓ 
∃hasTree.Green ⊓ ∃hasWeather.Moderate. 
 
Analysing the processes involved in human concept learning can be interpreted as a 
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comprehensive study [of humans’ minds] and as an explanatory and structural study 
[of humans’ selves] that enable them to develop their own understanding of different 
phenomena’s/things’ realities within the world. It shall, therefore, be suggested that 
the phenomenon of ‘human concept learning’ has strong interrelationships with an 
existential and structural consciousness (that is related to a kind of ontology, see 
(Staab and Studer, 2004)). It might, then, be said that any human being actively deals 
with this ontology in her/his concept learning processes, and becomes concerned with 
its specification on various levels of her/his conceptualisation. Relying on this 
ontology, human beings focus on specification and categorisation of their 
conceptualisation, and accordingly, they induce and learn from the [more, and more] 
specific descriptions of their conceptions. It shall be stressed that this kind of ontology 
is shaped over the interrelationships between humans’ mental images of the world and 
their linguistic expressions of the world. Here I focus on analysing terminological 
knowledge construction (and describing the world based on constructed 
terminological knowledge) over humans’ conceptualisation. The analysis consists of 
two main categories:  
 
I. The produced conceptions of human beings support them in modifying their 
terminologies. Suppose that Mary already knows about (and recognises) the concept 
‘Cyan’. The general concept ‘Cyan’ is the amalgamation of the mental word ‘Cyan’ 
and the mental image of Cyan. In this research, it’s assumed that the word ‘Cyan’ 
belongs to Mary’s terminologies and, respectively, to her terminological knowledge. 
The concept ‘Cyan’  
 
i. is already experienced and known by Mary, 
ii. is existing in her terminological knowledge, and 
iii. could be, terminologically, interpreted by her (in order to produce a 
meaningful comprehension for her).  
 
Then, it can provide a terminological principle in her mind. For example, she could 
identify (and interpret) ‘Cyan’ as a kind of ‘Colour’ (i.e., Cyan ⊑ Colour) in her 
terminology2. Consequently, Mary can apply the terminological principle Cyan ⊑ 
Colour in creating the new more specified world descriptions over the concept ‘Cyan’. 
For example, she may describe a ‘Cyan Stone’ by “a Stone that has Cyan Colour”, 
formally: CyanStone ≐ Stone ⊓ ∃hasColour.Cyan. This concept description (in the 
form of a concept definition) is expanded over her conception of the concept ‘Cyan’. 
In Description Logics, a concept definition (represented by ≐) is a definition of a new 
(or more specified) concept in terms of other previously defined concepts.  
 
II. The produced conceptions of human beings support their developmental processes 
of terminological construction. Suppose that Simon does not know about the concept 
‘Cyan’. Then, he, as a basis for his reasoning (and inducing) processes, generates the 
general concept ‘Cyan’ and categorises it into his terminology T (let T be a set), i.e., 
                                                 
2  It is worth mentioning that the concept inclusion Cyan ⊑ Colour presupposes so-called ‘colour realism’.  
 
 
261 
Cyan ⊑ T. In fact, he tries to provide a background for satisfying the concept ‘Cyan’ 
by his terminology. Relying on Cyan ⊑ T, T could satisfy Cyan (i.e., T ⊨ Cyan); It 
means that his developed terminology could provide a model for satisfying ‘Cyan’ 
based on his terminological interpretations. In particular, Cyan ⊑ T (as a set 
membership) could be developed by designing different world descriptions (in the 
form of assertive principles). For example, Simon may construct assertions like 
Cyan(c) and Colour(d), where the individuals c and d are the instances of the concepts 
‘Cyan’ and ‘Colour’ respectively. Note that producing Cyan(c) and Colour(d) are the 
products of his conceptions and based on his experiences. Therefore, he—mentally—
satisfies the assertions Cyan(c) and Colour(d) by semantic models like  
 
 Terminological Knowledge ⊨ Cyan(c), and  
 Terminological Knowledge ⊨ Colour(d).  
 
For example, according to the semantic model ‘ ⊨ Cyan(c)’, Simon  
 
i. has experienced the individual c,  
ii. has interpreted that c is an instance of his constructed concept Cyan, and 
iii. has made a mental principle based on the assertion Cyan(c).  
 
Consequently: 
 
iv. Simon’s terminological knowledge could satisfy Cyan(c). 
 
Furthermore, he will be able to—inductively—subsume more specified concepts and 
their instances under his comprehension of Cyan. For example, he could induce that 
the Cyan Chairs are all Cyan (i.e., CyanChair ⊑ Cyan). 
 
As another example, Simon, by following his mental principle ‘Cyan ⊑ Colour’ and 
by considering the fact that ‘all chairs are some kinds of furnitures’, could induce that:  
 
(CyanChair ⊑ Colour)  
&  
(CyanChair ⊑ Furniture).  
 
This logical term means that all Cyan Chairs are Colourful and Furnitures. 
Accordingly, he can induce that:  
 
CyanChair ≐  
(Chair ⊓ ∃hasColour.Cyan) ≡  
(Furniture ⊓ ∃hasColour.Cyan). 
 
3.1. HUMAN CONCEPT LEARNING AND HYPOTHESIS GENERATION  
 
In concept learning, human beings, with regard to a set of experienced examples and 
over their background knowledge, focus on generating hypotheses. Subsequently, 
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they focus on their generated hypotheses in order to adopt them in their world 
descriptions and for their reasoning processes. More specifically, they construct large 
numbers of hypotheses and record them in their minds. Accordingly, they search 
through the huge space of their hypotheses in order to find the most proper and useful 
ones and to describe and specify their constructed and developed knowledge based on 
them.  
 
Assessed by mathematical logic, the search spaces are capable of archiving the 
reflexive and transitive relations. In fact, these spaces must be expressed by:  
 
a. strictly-less-than (as well as less-than), and 
b. proper-subset (as well as subset) relations.  
 
Recording the relations: 
 
 a is less than b (and b is greater than a), and  
 A is the subset of B (and B is the superset of A) 
 
are expressible over reflexive and transitive relations. Focusing on these 
characteristics, the search spaces could be represented by the binary quasi-order 
relation (Q , ≼), where Q is a set and ‘≼’ is a relation defined over Q. Any infinite 
sequence of the elements of Q could contain an increasing pair like (pi , pj), where i ≼ 
j, see (Higman, 1952; Kruskal, 1972).  
 
In my opinion, the most significant characteristic of a binary quasi-order relation is 
that ‘if p and q are two elements of a binary quasi-order relation, then they will be 
comparable and, in fact, the relations p ≼ q and q ≼ p support the comparability’. 
 
According to the mentioned features of search spaces, the binary relation (C , ≼) over 
the set of a human’s constructed concepts (represented by C) is quasi-order and it is 
reflexive and transitive. The main reason for applying quasi-order relations is the fact 
that any concept learning relies on ‘induction’ and on ‘comparability’, and inductive 
reasoning is expressible over ‘less-than’ and ‘subset’ relations. More specifically, a 
quasi-order, as a well-founded induction, can be applied to the set of humans’ 
constructed concepts (or C) in order to express concept subsumption (or concept 
inclusion). It shall be emphasised that concept subsumption is the most fundamental 
feature of hierarchical structures in terminological knowledge. Accordingly, the 
terminological principles based on concept subsumptions could be expressed.  
 
Mechanism 
 
In concept learning, human beings generate mental mappings (like L) from their 
primary constructed set of concepts (or C) into all its subsets (or 2C) such that:  
 
∀p ∈ C,  L(p) ⊆ { q ∈ C  |  q ≼ p }. 
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L is a proper mental mapping if and only if for all constructed concepts A and B,  
 
B ∈ L(A)  ⇒  A ≢ B. 
 
Going back to the example of Cyan, for human beings, it is conceptualisable and, thus, 
understandable that there is a subsumption relation between Cyan and CyanStone like:  
 
CyanStone ⊑ Cyan. 
 
Furthermore, it’s conceptualisable and understandable that:  
 
Cyan ∈ {Cyan, Stone}. 
 
Obviously, Cyan and CyanStone are not equivalent (they are not the same based on 
all possible terminological interpretations). 
 
It shall be stressed that there are two kinds of mental mappings3:  
 
1. Complete Mapping: Considering Cyan and CyanStone, humans could 
conceptualise, interpret and, respectively, understand that CyanStone ⊑ Cyan 
(i.e., all Cyan Stones are Cyan). For example, Maria can reach the concept 
CyanDoor from Cyan (regarding CyanStone ⊑ Cyan) by means of a complete 
mental mapping. Then, she can induce: CyanDoor ⊑ Cyan. 
 
2. Weak Mapping: Regarding isA(Cyan, Colour) ⊑ ⊤4, Michael could induce the 
world description isA(Cyan, Paint) based on his own conception of ‘the 
equivalence relation between the world descriptions isA(Cyan, Colour) and 
isA(Cyan, Paint)’. In fact, the world description isA(Cyan, Paint) could be induced 
from a Tautology by means of a weak mental mapping. 
 
4.  THE HUMAN CONCEPT LEARNING PROBLEM (HCLP) 
 
Suppose that the function 𝕮K(C) describes that ‘a human being has constructed (𝕮) 
the concept C on a basis provided by her/his constructed knowledge (K)’. I shall draw 
your attention to the following components of knowledge: 
 
 Component I (Terminologies) 
 
T stands for humans’ terminological knowledge, which is represented over 
constructed concepts (in humans’ minds). The terminological component of 
                                                 
3  I define a mental mapping as a mapping (function) from a concept into another concept.  
4  isA(Cyan, Colour) is a role assertion (= a world description over a role in Description Logics). It expresses 
that “Cyan is a Colour”. This world description is a tautology (it is true for all possible interpretations), and 
thus, it belongs to the top concept (or ⊤).  
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knowledge is highly concerned with concept subsumption (concept inclusion) and 
concept equality. 
 
A. Concept Subsumption (Concept Inclusion). Human beings, by interpreting 
concept subsumptions (like E ⊑ F), produce their terminological models (like I) 
in order to [mentally] satisfy the concept subsumptions. Formally, they produce 
I ⊨ (E ⊑ F). This model is semantically valid (and it is logically meaningful) if 
and only if the interpretation of E is the subset of the interpretation of F, or 
formally: EI ⊆ FI. Accordingly, human beings by limiting their terminological 
interpretations to their meaningful understandings could—terminologically—
understand5 that E is the sub-concept of (sub-concept description of) F, or 
formally: E ⊑ F. In fact, humans focus on producing semantic models (like UND) 
in order to satisfy E ⊑ F. Formally: UND ⊨ (E ⊑ F). Subsequently, EUND ⊆ FUND. 
For example, a terminological interpretation like I could be produced in order to 
provide a terminological model and to support CyanI ⊆ ColourI (regarding 
concept subsumption Cyan ⊑ Colour). Subsequently: CyanUND ⊆ ColourUND. In 
fact, it has been understood that ‘Cyan is a Colour’. 
 
 
B. Concept Equality. Human beings, by interpreting concept equalities (like C ≡ 
D), produce their terminological models (like I) in order to satisfy the concept 
equalities. Formally, I ⊨ (C ≡ D). This model is semantically valid (and it is 
logically meaningful) if and only if the terminological interpretation of C is equal 
to the terminological interpretation of D, or formally: CI = DI. Subsequently, 
humans by limiting their terminological interpretations to their meaningful 
understandings could understand that C and D are equal (C = D). In fact, they 
produce understanding models (like UND) in order to satisfy C ≡ D. Formally: 
UND ⊨ (C ≡ D). Subsequently, CUND = DUND. For example, a terminological 
interpretation like I could be produced in order to provide a terminological model 
and to support ColourI = PaintI (regarding Colour ≡ Paint). Subsequently, 
ColourUND = PaintUND. In fact, it has been understood that ‘Colour and Paint are 
equivalent’.  
 
 Component II (World Descriptions) 
 
The symbol W stands for humans’ World Descriptions over their constructed 
concepts. This component of knowledge is concerned with (i) instance assertion (or 
identifying a phenomenon/thing as a member of a constructed concept) and with (ii) 
relation assertion (or relating the instances of various concepts to each other). 
 
A. Humans, by interpreting that the individual a is an instance of the constructed 
                                                 
5  This ‘understanding’ is a limit of a ‘terminological interpretation’ based on own ‘conceptualisation’. 
Therefore, it is—existentially—terminological and conceptual.  
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concept C, produce their terminological interpretations (like I) in order to satisfy 
the concept assertions C(a). Formally, they produce semantic models like I ⊨ 
C(a). This model is logically meaningful if and only if the terminological 
interpretation interprets the individual a as an element of (and as a kind of) the 
concept C, or formally: aI ∈ CI. Humans by limiting their terminological 
interpretations to their meaningful understandings could understand that a is a 
kind of C. In fact, they produce understanding models (like UND) in order to 
satisfy C(a) (ie. UND ⊨ C(a)). Subsequently, aUND ∈ CUND. For example, 
Elizabeth can interpret and, respectively, understand that her personal computer 
(represented by pcez) is a Machine. Formally: I ⊨ Machine(pcez). So, pcezI ∈ 
MachineI. Therefore, UND ⊨ Machine(pcez) and, thus, pcezUND ∈ MachineUND. 
In fact, Elizabeth has understood that her personal computer is a machine. 
 
 
B. Humans, by interpreting that the relation (a,b) is an instance of (is a kind of) the 
relationship R, produce their interpretation models (like I) in order to satisfy the 
role assertion R(a,b). Formally, they produce semantic models like I ⊨ R(a,b). 
This semantic model is logically meaningful if and only if the interpretation of 
the tuple (a,b) belongs to the interpretation of R, or formally: (a,b)I ∈ RI. Humans 
by limiting their terminological interpretations to their meaningful 
understandings could understand that the individuals a and b are related by a 
relation like R(a,b). In fact, they produce understanding models (like UND) in 
order to understand the relation R(a,b). Formally: UND ⊨ R(a,b). Subsequently, 
(a,b)UND ∈ RUND. For example, Bob could interpret and, respectively, could 
understand that his magnet (represented by magb) attracts a pin (represented by 
pinb). Then: I ⊨ Attract(magb, pinb) and, thus, (magb, pinb)I ∈ AttractI. 
Accordingly, UND ⊨ Attract(magb, pinb) and, thus, (magb, pinb)UND ∈ AttractUND. 
In fact, Bob has understood that his magnet attracts his pin. 
 
 Component III (Rules) 
 
Suppose that the symbol R stands for Rules. First, I shall claim that any rule (in such 
a terminological system) is logically dependent on (and supported by) a logical 
implication. For example, considering ‘Thirst’ and ‘Drinking’ as two concepts, the 
logical term ‘R ⊨ (Thirst ⇒ Drinking)’ denotes that if one (say John) has been 
interpreted and, respectively, has been understood to be thirsty and be an instance of 
(and described by) the concept ‘Thirst’, then John is, also, an instance of (and 
described by) the concept ‘Drinking’. Formally: 
 
[ (john ∈ Thirst) ⊓ (Thirst ⊑ Drinking) ]    
⇒   
 john ∈ Drinking. 
 
This logical term expresses that ‘John is thirsty and the thirst will be followed by 
drinking, so, John is supposed to drink’. 
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4.1.  KNOWLEDGE 
 
Regarding the components I, II and III (terminologies, world descriptions, and rules), 
the triple K = ⟨T, W, R⟩ could represent the humans’ constructed knowledge. However, 
it could be believed that the third component (R) is expressible based upon the 
components T and W. Let me be more specific: 
 
a. Considering the logical term ‘R ⊨ (C ⇒ D)’, where R stands for a rule, and C and 
D stand for two concepts (concept descriptions), we can understand that there 
exists an individual (like c) for which, there is a logical implication between C(c) 
and D(c). Formally, ∃c; R ⊨ (C(c) ⇒ D(c)). Obviously, R satisfies an implication 
[and indication] from a concept assertion (as a world description) into another 
concept assertion (as a world description). Therefore, the rule ‘R ⊨ (C(c) ⇒ D(c)’ 
has been split into two world descriptions and over a terminology (i.e., it has been 
expressed in the form of two world descriptions and based on a terminology). 
 
b. Considering the logical term ‘R ⊨ (P ⇒ Q)’, where R stands for a rule, and P and 
Q stand for two roles (role descriptions), we can understand that there are two 
individuals (like a and b) for which a logical implication between P(a,b) and 
Q(a,b) is satisfied. Formally, ∃a, b; R ⊨ (P(a,b) ⇒ Q(a,b)). This formalism 
expresses that the rule R satisfies “P implies Q” (where P and Q are two relations 
between a and b). Again, this implication has been described from a role assertion 
(as a world description) into another role assertion (as a world description). 
Therefore, such a rule has been split into two world descriptions and over a 
terminology (i.e., it has been expressed in the form of two world descriptions and 
based on a terminology).  
 
Taking a and b into consideration, it shall be concluded that the constructed 
knowledge could be expressed in the form of world descriptions and based on 
terminologies. Therefore, the component R could be eliminated and, thus, it could be 
concluded that the tuple K = ⟨T, W⟩ represents the humans’ constructed knowledge. 
 
4.2.  KNOWLEDGE CREATION – MECHANISM   
 
The mechanism of knowledge construction must be checked over concepts and roles. 
 
A. Construction over Concepts 
 
In concept learning, human beings become concerned with a set of experienced 
phenomena/things in order to form new building blocks of their knowledge 
construction. Expressing new concept descriptions is highly dependent on 
 
 a set of Experienced Constructive examples of Concepts (or Exp+c), and 
 a set of Experienced Non-Constructive examples of Concepts (or Exp-c) 
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over pre-formed concepts (and pre-conceptions). Accordingly, humans become 
concerned with a unifying set (like Expc) of their multiple constructive and non-
constructive examples. Therefore: 
 
Expc = { Exp+c , Exp
-
c }, where: 
 
 Exp+c = { a ∈ Expc(W) | C(a) ∈ W } ⊆ 𝕮K(C), and 
 Exp-c = { b ∈ Expc(W) | ¬C(b) ∈ W } ⊆ 𝕮K(¬C). 
In fact, any Exp+c consists of the individuals which could be described by humans’ 
constructed concepts. Any member of Exp+c can be supported by humans’ world 
descriptions (based on concept assertions). Also, Exp-c consists of the individuals 
which could not be described by humans’ constructed concepts and cannot be 
supported by their world descriptions (based on concept assertions). 
 
For example, considering Exp+Dog as the set of Martin’s experienced constructive 
examples of ‘dogs’, Martin’s German Shepherd belongs to Exp+Dog. Also, considering 
Exp-Dog as the set of Martin’s experienced non-constructive examples of ‘Dogs’, a 
friend’s rabbit belongs to Exp-Dog. Martin, by increasing the number of his experienced 
constructive and non-constructive examples of ‘Dogs’, could develop his knowledge 
of dogs over his own construction, conception, interpretation, and meaningful 
comprehension of ‘Dogs’. 
 
B. Construction over Roles 
 
Describing more specified roles is dependent on 
 
 a set of Experienced Constructive examples of Roles (or Exp+r), and 
 a set of Experienced Non-Constructive examples of Roles (or Exp-r) 
 
over pre-formed roles (as the relations between the instances of preformed concepts). 
Accordingly, humans become concerned with a unifying set of their multiple 
constructive and non-constructive examples with regard to their pre-constructions of 
roles. This unifying set is denoted by Expr. Then: 
 
Expr = { Exp+r , Exp
-
r}, where: 
 
 Exp+r = { p, q ∈ Expr(W) | R(p,q) ∈ W } ⊆ 𝕮K(R), and 
 Exp-r = { p, s ∈ Expr(W) | ¬ R(p,s) ∈ W } ⊆ 𝕮K(¬R).  
 
In fact, any Exp+r consists of the individuals which could be described by humans’ 
constructed concepts and, respectively, by relating the instances of the constructed 
concepts. Accordingly, any member of Exp+r can be supported by their world 
descriptions (based on role assertions). Additionally, Exp-r consists of the individuals 
which could not be described by humans’ constructed concepts and, respectively, 
cannot be described by relating the instances of the constructed concepts. Thus, they 
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cannot be supported by humans’ world descriptions (based on role assertions).  
 
For example, consider Exp+marriedTo as the set of David’s experienced constructive 
examples of ‘people who are married to each other’. David knows that Ronald and 
Susan are married. So, the relation (rolnad, susan) belongs to David’s Exp+marriedTo. 
Now let Exp-marriedTo be the set of David’s experienced non-constructive examples of 
‘people who are married to each other’. David knows that Peter and Rebeca are not 
married. So, the relation (peter, rebeca) belongs to Exp-marriedTo. David, by increasing 
the number of his experienced constructive and non-constructive examples of ‘people 
who are married to each other’ (and by knowing more married and more non-married 
pairs of people), could develop his knowledge. 
 
Conclusion 
 
According to K = ⟨T, W⟩, human beings, by generating T and W, support their 
knowledge (= K) construction. Consequently:  
 
 if a concept assertion (like D(a)) is satisfied by the constructed knowledge, then: 
∀a ∈ Exp+c(W); K ⊨ D(a), 
 
 if a concept assertion (like D(b)) is not satisfied by the constructed knowledge, 
then: ∀b ∈ Exp-c(W); K ⊭ D(b), 
 
  if a role assertion (like R(a,b)) is satisfied by the constructed knowledge, then: 
∀a, b ∈ Exp+r(W); K ⊨ R(a,b), and 
 
 if a role assertion (like R(a,c)) is not satisfied by the constructed knowledge, then: 
∀a, c∈ Exp-r(W); K ⊭ R(a,c). 
 
4.3.  FROM CONCEPTIONS TO PREDICATES  
 
According to my research in (Badie, 2016), there is a sort of reflector functions from 
humans’ conceptions into predicates. Obviously, we could not directly move from 
‘concepts’ to ‘predicates’ (and, respectively, to ‘truth’), but, I shall stress that the 
central focus of this research is on a logical analysis of concept learning and 
hypothesis generation (and not on an ontological analysis of concepts). So, logics 
allow me to relate conceptions and predicates. My focus is on the logical fact that 
human beings can transform their conceptions [of their constructed concepts] into the 
[logically] equivalent ones in the form of predicates. Subsequently, the expressed 
predicates provide reasonable logical models that—semantically—can satisfy the 
collections of their generated hypotheses. Representing Concepts, Predicates and 
Hypotheses by C, P and H respectively, we formally have:  
 
[Reflection: C → P]  ⊨  H. 
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4.3.1. The Detailed Examination I 
 
A. Experienced Concepts 
 
The set of experienced concepts (or ExpConcept) is equal to the union of the following 
sets: 
 
Set 1: The set of experienced constructive examples of constructed concepts that 
could be represented by  
 
Exp+Concept  = { individual ∈ ExpConcept(W) | Concept(individual) ∈ W }. 
 
Exp+Concept is subsumed under humans’ constructed concepts. They could be generated 
over humans’ constructed knowledge (or 𝕮K (Concept)). Consequently, the humans’ 
constructed knowledge satisfies their own world descriptions based on their concept 
assertions and over their experienced constructive examples. 
 
Set 2: The set of experienced non-constructive examples of constructed concepts that 
could be represented by  
 
Exp-Concept  = { individual ∈ ExpConcept(W) | ¬Concept(individual) ∈ W }. 
 
Exp-Concept is subsumed under humans’ non-constructed concepts. They could not be 
generated over humans’ constructed knowledge (or 𝕮K (¬Concept)). Consequently, 
the humans’ constructed knowledge doesn’t satisfy their own world descriptions 
based on their concept assertions and over their experienced non-constructive 
examples.  
 
B. Experienced Roles 
 
The set of experienced roles (or ExpRole) is equal to the union of the following sets: 
 
Set 1: The set of experienced constructive examples of constructed roles that could 
be represented by: 
 
Exp+Role  = { individual1 & individual2 ∈ ExpRole(W) |           
Role(individual1,individual2) ∈ W }. 
 
Exp+Role is subsumed under humans’ constructed roles and, in fact, under humans’ 
constructed concepts. They could be generated over humans’ constructed knowledge 
(or 𝕮K (Role)). Consequently, the humans’ constructed knowledge satisfies their own 
world descriptions based on their role assertions and over their experienced 
constructive examples. 
 
Set 2: The set of experienced non-constructive examples of constructed roles that 
could be represented by:  
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Exp-Role  = { individual1 & individual2 ∈ ExpRole(W) |           
¬Role(individual1,individual2) ∈ W }. 
 
Exp-Role is subsumed under humans’ non-constructed roles. They could not be 
generated over humans’ constructed knowledge (or 𝕮K (¬Role)). Consequently, the 
humans’ constructed knowledge doesn’t satisfy their own world descriptions based 
on their role assertions and over their experienced non-constructive examples. 
 
4.3.2. The Detailed Examination II 
 
Humans’ conceptions [of their own constructed concepts] could be represented in the 
form of ‘unary predicates’ in order to be described and represented. Similarly, 
humans’ conceptions [of their own constructed roles] could be represented in the form 
of ‘binary (or any other n-ary) predicates’ in order to be represented. A predicate could 
be interpreted to be an expression and assigner of concepts’ different characteristics. 
Then, it could assign different characteristics to [and transmit them into] propositions 
(and statements) or even into truth-values. Consequently, regarding humans’ 
constructed knowledge (K) and reflecting (mirroring) the conceptions in predicates, 
the tuple ⟨T, W⟩ could be expressed and analysed by predicate logic. Therefore, the 
terminological knowledge (T) could be structured over:  
 
1. predicate symbols (e.g., unary, binary, …, n-ary), 
2. variable symbols, 
3. constant symbols, and 
4. function symbols. 
 
It is worth mentioning that these four kinds of symbols are identified as non-logical 
symbols in Predicate Logic, because they—independently—don’t cause any logical 
consequence in logical descriptions. Also, all world descriptions are shaped by 
utilising multiple descriptions over the provided terminologies. Subsequently:  
 
1. a predicate symbol denotes something which is a predication of the subject, 
2. a variable symbol is what a human asserts the predicate to it, and  
3. the constant symbols could be asserted to any variable.  
 
Beside them,  
 
4. function symbols operate the variable symbols. 
 
Taking the translated terminological knowledge and, subsequently, the translated 
world descriptions into consideration, we could express the components of the 
detailed examination I as follows: 
 
A. Experienced Unary Predicates  
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The set of humans’ experiences could be represented in the form of unary predicates 
(ExpPredicate) and be acknowledged as the union of the following sets: 
 
Set 1: The set of humans’ experienced constructive examples of their described unary 
predicates. It could be represented by:  
 
Exp+Predicate  = { constant ∈ ExpPredicate(W) | Predicate(constant) ∈ W } 
 
for expressing world descriptions based on unary predicates. The experienced 
constructive examples are expressed by humans’ described predicates within their 
constructed knowledge (i.e., 𝕮K (Predicate)). Consequently, 𝕮K satisfies the humans’ 
world descriptions based on their concept assertions and over their experienced 
constructive examples.  
 
For example, consider the constant palm as an experienced constructive example of 
the concept Tree. Formally: palm ∈ Tree within 𝕮K. Note that this constructive 
example could be subsumed under the described binary predicate (relation) ‘is a’ 
within constructed knowledge. In fact, isA(palm, Tree) supports ‘palm ∈ Tree’. 
 
Set 2: The set of humans’ experienced non-constructive examples of their described 
unary predicates. It could be represented by:  
 
Exp-Predicate  = { constant ∈ ExpPredicate(W) | ¬Predicate(constant) ∈ W }. 
 
The experienced non-constructive examples could not be expressed by described 
predicates within constructed knowledge (i.e., 𝕮K (¬Predicate)). Consequently, 𝕮K 
doesn’t satisfy the world descriptions over experienced non-constructive examples.  
 
For example, consider the constant rose as an experienced non-constructive example 
of the concept Tree. Formally: rose ∉ Tree. This non-constructive example is not 
expressible and is not satisfied by the binary predicate (relation) “is a” within 𝕮K. In 
fact, 𝕮K doesn’t satisfy the world description “rose is a tree”. Therefore, we have 
¬isA(rose, tree) over the experienced non-constructive example rose ∉ Tree. 
 
B. Experienced Binary Predicates 
 
The set of humans’ experiences could be represented in the form of binary predicates 
(ExpPredicate) and be acknowledged as the union of the following sets:  
 
Set 1: The set of humans’ experienced constructive examples of their described binary 
predicates. It could be represented by:  
 
Exp+Role  = { constant1 & constant 2 ∈ ExpPredicate(W) |                        
Predicate(constant1, constant 2) ∈ W } 
 
for expressing world descriptions over binary predicates. The experienced 
A THEORETICAL MODEL FOR MEANING CONSTRUCTION THROUGH CONSTRUCTIVIST CONCEPT LEARNING 
272
 
constructive examples are expressed by humans’ described predicates within their 
constructed knowledge (i.e., 𝕮K (Predicate)). Consequently, 𝕮K satisfies the humans’ 
world descriptions based on their concept assertions and over their experienced 
constructive examples.  
 
For example, the constants bob and mary could be the experienced constructive 
examples of the role fatherOf. Formally: (bob, mary) ∈ fatherOf. This constructive 
example could be subsumed under a binary predicate within constructed knowledge. 
Equivalently, we have the world description fatherOf(bob, mary).  
 
Set 2: The set of humans’ experienced non-constructive examples of their described 
binary predicates. It could be described by: 
 
Exp-Predicate  = { constant1 & constant 2 ∈ ExpRole(W) |                          
¬Predicate(constant1,constant 2) ∈ W }. 
 
The experienced non-constructive examples could not be expressed by described 
predicates within constructed knowledge (i.e., 𝕮K (¬Predicate)). Consequently, 𝕮K 
doesn’t satisfy the world descriptions based on role assertions and over experienced 
non-constructive examples.  
 
For example, the constants bob and silvia could be the experienced non-constructive 
examples of the role fatherOf. Formally: (bob, silvia) ∉ fatherOf. We have the world 
description ¬fatherOf(bob,silvia). Thus, 𝕮K doesn’t satisfy the world description ‘Bob 
is the father of Silvia’. 
 
4.4.  SUMMARISATION  
 
Let me go back to the example of Martin’s conception of ‘Dogs’. In this example, 
ExpDog is the set of Martin’s experienced examples of ‘Dogs’ and it is equal to Exp+Dog. 
Relying on ExpDog, we have: 
 
a. Exp+Dog  = { i ∈ ExpDog (Martin’s description of dogs) | Dog(i) ∈  Martin’s 
description of dogs } ⊆ Martin’s constructed knowledge of dogs. 
Consequently, Martin’s knowledge of dogs satisfies the concept assertion 
Dog(i), where the individual i belongs to his constructive examples of dogs 
within his own description of dogs. 
 
 
b. Exp-Dog  = { j ∈ ExpDog (Martin’s description of dogs) | ¬Dog(j) ∈  Martin’s 
description of dogs } ⊆ Martin’s knowledge of NOT-dogs. Consequently, 
Martin’s knowledge of dogs doesn’t satisfy the concept assertion Dog(j), 
where the individual j belongs to his non-constructive examples of dogs 
within his own description of dogs. 
 
According to the logical term ‘[Reflection: C → P] ⊨ H’, a Reflection has been 
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described as a function that mirrors the humans’ conceptions [as the outcomes of their 
constructed concepts] in predicates. These predicates could be used in expressing 
humans’ constructed concepts in terminological systems. A sort of reflector functions 
from human beings’ constructed concepts and conceptions into predications (and 
described predicates) could [formal-]semantically satisfy the logical hypotheses.  
 
It shall be claimed that the transmission of concepts from the detailed examination I 
to the detailed examination II, is a kind of logical reflection that semantically forms 
new hypotheses. The generated hypotheses could be used to describe humans’ grasps 
of the world in terminological systems (and terminological knowledge representation 
systems). 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this article, the phenomenon of ‘learning’ has been assumed to be supported by an 
epistemology which argues that knowledge could be constructed from an interaction 
between human beings’ experiences and over their conceptions of what they have 
experienced (e.g., studied, seen, heard, felt, touched). Accordingly, in this research, 
the term ‘concept learning’ has been expressed as “the developmental process of 
concept construction and specification of the constructed concepts”. Note that I have 
not focused on an ontological analysis of concepts, but I have—by considering the 
theoretical idea that concepts might be said to be a linkage between the mental 
representations of linguistic expressions and the other mental images that a human 
being has in her/his mind—focused on conceptual and logical analysis of how 
terminological knowledge could reasonably be assumed to be built based on an 
individual’s conceptions of the world and over her/his constructed terminological 
basis. Consequently, a logical background for theorising over the Human Concept 
Learning Problem (HCLP) has been provided. It has been concluded that the problem 
of human concept learning could be expressed in the form of a function that expresses 
a human who constructs a concept on a basis provided by her/his constructed 
knowledge. Also, her/his knowledge is constructed based upon her/his terminological 
basis and over her/his descriptions of the world. Accordingly, humans are concerned 
with a set of experienced information in order to form new building blocks of their 
knowledge. Then, the union of the:  
 
 Experienced Constructive Examples of their Constructed Concepts and 
 Experienced Non-Constructive Examples of their Constructed Concepts  
 
have been considered as the set of Experienced Concepts that support the 
developmental processes of knowledge construction. Assessed by logics, a function 
(which I have called ‘reflector’) mirrors the humans’ conceptions in predicates. The 
predicates could be used in expressing humans’ constructed concepts within 
terminological systems. A sort of reflector functions from humans’ ‘constructed 
concepts and conceptions’ into ‘predications and described predicates’ could 
semantically satisfy the collections of humans’ hypotheses. The succession:  
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‘Concept → Conception → Predication → Predicate’ 
 
represents a logical flow that attempts to satisfy the collection of logical hypotheses. 
More specifically, the transmission of concepts from the detailed examination I to the 
detailed examination II, has expressed a kind of logical reflection that semantically 
forms new hypotheses in order to describe humans’ grasps of the world in 
terminological systems. It could make sense in terminological knowledge 
representation systems and terminological knowledge bases. 
 
REFERENCES  
 
F. Baader, D. McGuinness, D. Nardi, and P. Patel-Schneider, editors. (2010). The 
Description Logic Handbook: Theory, Implementation and Applications. 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
F. Badie (2016). Logical Characterisation of Concept Transformations from Human 
into Machine Relying on Predicate Logic. Proceedings of ACHI 2016: 9th 
International Conference on Advances in Computer-Human Interaction (pp. 376-
379). International Academy, Research and Industry Association (IARIA). 
Venice, Italy. 
 
F.C. Bartlett (1932). A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology. Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Jun Du and Charles X. Ling (2011). Active Teaching for Inductive Learners. In SDM, 
pages 851–861. SIAM / Omnipress. 
 
D. Fisher and N. Frey (2009). Background Knowledge: The Missing Piece of the 
Comprehension Puzzle. NH: Heinemann, Portsmouth. 
 
E. Glasersfeld (1989). Cognition, Construction of Knowledge, and Teaching. 
Synthese, pages 121–140. 
 
H. Götzsche (2013). Deviational Syntactic Structures. Bloomsbury Academic: 
London / New Delhi / New York / Sydney. 
 
J. Hawthorne (2017 Edition). Inductive Logic. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. 
 
G. Higman (1952). Ordering by Divisibility in Abstract Algebras. Proceedings of the 
London Mathematical Society. pp. 326–336. 
 
T. Husén and T. N. Postlethwaite (1989). Constructivism in Education. The 
International Encyclopaedia of Education. Supplement Vol.1. Oxford/New York: 
Pergamon Press. 
 
J. B. Kruskal. (1972). The Theory of Well-Quasi-Ordering: A Frequently Discovered 
 
275 
Concept. J. Comb. Theory, Ser. A, pages 297–305. 
 
Lavrac, N., Dzeroski, S. (1993). Inductive Logic Programming: Techniques and 
Applications. Routledge, New York, NY, 10001. 
 
Lavrac, N., Dzeroski, S. (1994). Inductive Logic Programming: Techniques and 
Applications. Ellis Horwood, New York, USA. 
 
Jens Lehmann (2009). DL-learner: Learning Concepts in Description Logics. Journal 
of Machine Learning Research (JMLR), pages 2639–2642.  
 
Lehmann, J., Auer, Sö., Bühmann, L. & Tramp, S. (2011). Class expression learning 
for ontology engineering. Journal of Web Semantics, 9, 71–81. 
 
Jens Lehmann, Nicola Fanizzi, Lorenz Bu ̈hmann, and Claudia  d’Amato. (2014a) 
Concept learning. In Jens Lehmann and Johanna Voelker, editors, Perspectives 
on Ontology Learning, pages 71–91. AKA / IOS Press. 
 
Jens Lehmann and Johanna Voelker (2014b). An Introduction to Ontology Learning. 
In Jens Lehmann and Johanna Voelker, editors. Perspectives on Ontology 
Learning, pages ix–xvi. AKA / IOS Press. 
 
E. Margolis and S. Laurence (2007). The ontology of concepts – abstract objects or 
mental representations? Nouˆs, pages 561–593.   
 
E. Margolis and S. Laurence (2010). Concepts and Theoretical Unification. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, pages 219–220. 
 
R.J. Marzano (2004). Building Background Knowledge for Academic Achievement: 
Research on What Works in Schools. VA: ASCD, Alexandria. 
 
P. H. Matthews (2014). The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Linguistics. Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Daniel D. McCracken (1999). An Inductive Approach to Teaching Object-Oriented 
Design. In Jane Prey and Robert E. Noonan, editors. SIGCSE, pages 184–188. 
ACM. 
 
Tom Mitchell (1997). Machine Learning. McGraw Hill. 
 
Christopher Peacocke (1992). A Study of Concepts. MIT Press. 
 
J. Piaget (1967). Six Psychological Studies. Random House, New York, USA. 
 
K. Sawyer (2014). The Cambridge Handbook of the Learning Sciences. Cambridge 
Handbooks in Psychology. 
A THEORETICAL MODEL FOR MEANING CONSTRUCTION THROUGH CONSTRUCTIVIST CONCEPT LEARNING 
276
 
 
Raivo Sell, Tiia Rtmann, and Sven Seiler (2014). Inductive Teaching and Learning in 
Engineering Pedagogy on the Example of Remote Labs. iJEP, pages 12–15. 
 
S. Sjoberg (2007). Constructivism and Learning. In P. Peterson and  B. Baker, E. 
McGaw, editors. International Encyclopaedia of Education, pages 485–490. 
Elsevier. 
 
Steffen Staab and Rudi Studer, editors (2004). International Handbooks on 
 Information System. Springer. 
 
S. Stich (1992). What is a Theory of Mental Representation? Mind, pages 243–261. 
 
H. Taba (1971). A Teacher’s Handbook to Elementary Social Studies: An Inductive 
Approach. Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. 
 
E. Zalta (2001). Fregean Senses, Modes of Presentation, and Concepts. Philosophical 
Perspectives, pages 335–359.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
277 
PAPER O. LOGICAL FOUNDATION OF 
INDUCTIVE MEANING CONSTRUCTING 
IN CONSTRUCTIVIST INTERACTIONS 
 
 
 
Farshad Badie 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
This paper is submitted  
 
 
  
A THEORETICAL MODEL FOR MEANING CONSTRUCTION THROUGH CONSTRUCTIVIST CONCEPT LEARNING 
278
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In the framework of constructivism, learners with insights based on their pre-
structured knowledge and pre-conceptions could actively participate in an interaction 
with their mentors. In such a framework, constructing and developing meanings and 
producing meaningful understandings of the world are the central objectives. This 
research, by employing Description Logics, will analyse inductive meaning 
constructing as a valuable product of constructivist interactions between mentors and 
learners. The main idea is based on a new scheme for interpretation based on 
semantics, induction and interaction.  
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
My point of departure is the special focus on Activity-based Communication Theory 
(see (Allwood, 2007; Allwood, 2013)) that argues that “any communication is a 
sharing of information, cognitive content and understanding with varying degrees of 
consciousness and intentionality”. Correspondingly, an interaction between a learner 
and a mentor can be interpreted as their co-activation (consisting of their shared 
actions and transactions). More specifically, in an interaction between a learner and a 
mentor, they, both, become concerned with their co-activations (i.e., their 
collaborations, co-operations, and co-ordinations). In such a framework, mentor and 
learner exchange questions, answers, actions and transactions concerning their 
multiple descriptions, specifications, explanations and justifications. 
 
The central focus of this article is on a constructivist theory (and model) of learning 
in the context of mentor-learner interactions. This model of learning could work as an 
explanatory, heuristic and developmental framework. For more information, see 
(Pask, 1975; Pask, 1980; Simpson, 1989; Scott, 2001; McIntyre Boyd, 2004). Relying 
on this model of learning, the learner-mentor interactions might be described as a 
constructivist account of their understandings. In addition, constructivist interactions 
could be described and specified over their conceptions and intentions. Such a 
framework explains how learner-mentor interactions could lead them to produce their 
own meaningful understandings based on their produced conceptions of the world. 
The produced local meaningful understanding (of any concept) give opportunities to 
the agents to produce their deeper personal understandings within their collaborative 
process of knowledge construction. For example, the learner is given an opportunity 
to produce her/his more proper understanding of applications of a mathematical 
formula, or the mentor is given an opportunity to produce a better understanding of 
the current problems of the learner concerning that mathematical formula’s 
applications. I shall claim that:  
 
 the negotiation of the learner’s and the mentor’s produced meanings, 
 the reflection of their produced meanings on their background knowledge, 
and  
 the affection of their personal developed knowledge on their universal 
knowledge  
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are the most significant products of constructivist interactions. 
 
Let me be more specific on the expressions ‘constructivism’ and ‘constructivist 
interaction’. According to (Glasersfeld, 1989; Glasersfeld, 2001), constructivism was 
introduced in the modern era by Jean Piaget (see (Piaget and Cook, 1952)) as a way 
of thinking about cognition and knowledge. It is worth mentioning that Piaget’s 
developmental theory of learning argues that the constructivist model of learning is 
concerned with how the individual learner goes about the construction of knowledge 
in her/his own cognitive apparatus, see (Phillips, 1995). Furthermore, I shall stress 
that Vygotsky’s theories about humans’ interactions and humans’ minds in society 
(see (Vygotsky, 1978a, Vygotsky, 1978b)) have strongly supported the concept of 
‘social constructivism’. Vygotsky believed that ‘social interaction’ plays a 
fundamental role in the process of humans’ cognitive development. According to 
Vygotsky’s theory, it’s believed that an individual who has stronger understandings 
and higher abilities in particular domains could be a so-called ‘mentor’. The concept 
of ‘mentor’ could be labelled by the abbreviation MKO (i.e., More Knowledgable 
Other). It shall be drawn into consideration that mentors are advanced learners who 
are always constructing and developing their personal knowledge through their 
constructivist interactions. Additionally, Vygotsky introduced ZPD (i.e., the Zone of 
Proximal Development) in order to express the concept of ‘learning’ by an individual 
learner (i) under MKO’s supervisions and/or (ii) with her/his collaborations with other 
individuals. It shall be concluded that learners can learn (could do ‘learning’ as their 
main task and role) in this zone. 
 
This research will focus on a logical analysis of meaning construction within 
constructivist interactions relying on my own semantic framework. I will employ a 
Concept Language (Description Logics: DLs) in order to conceptualise my main 
logical ideas behind that framework. Accordingly, I will provide a logical and 
[formal-]semantic specification of ‘concepts’, ‘definitions’ and ‘meanings’. 
Subsequently, a conceptual and logical background for ‘semantic interpretation’ and 
‘meaning construction’ will be provided. The main contribution of this research is that 
it provides a backbone for formal semantic analysis of meaning construction (that 
supports meaningful understanding production) within constructivist interactions. 
 
2.  CONCEPTS  
 
From educationalists’ and educational psychologists’ perspectives, a concept (as a 
conceptual entity) can be identified by critical characteristics and properties shared by 
its examples, see (Parker, 2008; Parker, 2011). At this point, I need to focus on the 
concept of ‘meaning’ in order to be more clear on the concept of ‘concepts’. Section 
6 will be more specific on logical analysis of meanings. In the framework of 
constructivism, meanings—to a large extent—influence any individual human’s 
knowledge constructions based on her/his background knowledge. In fact, meanings 
are some conceptual structures that are constructed based on conceptual entities. Thus, 
any conceptual entity can be interpreted to be a building block and a basic material of 
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a conceptual structure. My theoretical model names these conceptual entities 
‘concepts’. A conceptual entity, as a representation of a piece of reality/fiction in 
individual’s mind, can be interpreted to be a basic material of [to-be-constructed] 
meanings. 
 
Human beings, with regard to their own concept constructions, can reason whether 
their different experienced phenomena could come under the label of their own 
constructed concepts. It shall be stressed that only an activated conceptual entity can 
be an instance of a concept and, thus, it shall be claimed that the learner transforms 
her/his experienced phenomena into some mental entities (and activates them in 
her/his mind) in order to consider them as the instances of concepts. Subsequently, 
individuals’ understandings and, also, their following acts and reacts materialise in 
virtue of their personal grasp of their constructed concepts. Regarding my theoretical 
model, human beings express their constructed concepts in the form of their 
conceptions. 
 
From the point of view of logics, a concept (conceptual entity) could correspond to a 
distinct entity or to its essential features, see (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2007). More 
specifically, in the framework of constructivism, the agents’ conceptions [of their 
constructed concepts] could be expressed in the form of predicates, see (Clapham, 
2014; Blackburn, 2016). Predicates could be interpreted as assigners of conceptions’ 
characteristics. They can assign those characteristics to statements or even into truth-
values. Relying on this assumption, conceptions and their interrelationships are 
hierarchically describable. Let me offer an example:  
 
Mentor: Who is a teacher? 
Sarah: Teacher is a person who has—at least—one student.  
 
Relying on Predicate Logic, the predicate Teacher has been described as the specified 
form of the predicate Person. Translated into Description Logics (DLs), the concept 
Teacher is described by Teacher ≐ Person ⊓ ∃hasStudent.Person. Also, as you will 
see in next section, the concept Teacher can be described by Teacher ⊑ Person ⊓ 
∃hasStudent.Person (considering the concept Teacher as a sub-concept of the 
concept Person). This description has provided a concept construction that supports 
Sarah’s specification of the conceptualisation of the concept Teacher. 
 
It’s assumed that human beings’ mental images of concepts are displayed (in their 
minds) based on their mental structures. Also, the mental structures are constructed 
based on mental entities (or schemata).  
 
3.  DESCRIPTION LOGICS 
 
My main reference to DLs is (Baader, 2010). DLs represent knowledge in terms of 
concepts, individuals (as instances of concepts) and roles (of concepts that relate two 
or more individuals). The basic step of any construction is provided by atomic 
concepts and atomic roles. In this research, we will see that the general conceptions 
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of human beings could be represented by atomic concepts (that are equivalent to 
atomic literals in Predicate Logic).  
 
The fundamental set of the main connectors in DLs is: {Conjunction (⊓), Disjunction 
(⊔), Negation (¬), Existential Restriction (∃), Universal Restriction (∀)}. Atomic 
Concepts, Atomic Roles, Top concept (⊤) and Bottom concept (⊥) are the other 
constructors of a basic DL. 
 
Knowledge in DLs is mainly constructed based upon terminological axioms and world 
descriptions. The terminological axioms are introduced to make statements about how 
concepts and roles are related to each other, and world descriptions describe the world 
over concepts, roles and individuals. A terminological interpretation (like I) is called 
a ‘model’ of an axiom if it can satisfy the statement in the conclusions of the six 
fundamental axioms and world descriptions in Table 1. Any interpretation is a 
function that is extendable based on concept descriptions by inductive rules. 
Interpretations are employed to define formal semantics. I observe and specify the 
formal semantics through the usual and standard notion of the interpretations. The pair 
(∆I, .I ) represents the structure of a terminological interpretation, where the 
interpretation function (.I) assigns to each concept C a subset (like CI) of ∆I, and to 
each relation R a subset (like RI) of ∆I  × ∆I . 
 
 
Name Syntax Semantics 
Concept Inclusion Axim C ⊑ D CI
 
⊆ DI
 
 
Role Inclusion Axiom R ⊑ S  RI
 
⊆ SI 
Concept Equality Axiom C ≡ D  CI
 
= DI 
Role Equality Axiom R ≡ S  RI
 
= SI 
Concept Assertion C(a)  aI
 
∈ CI 
Role Assertion R(a, b)  (aI, bI) ∈ RI
 
 
 
Table 1. Terminological Axioms and World Descriptions in Description Logics 
 
4.  CONCEPT CONSTRUCTION  
 
It could be assumed that learning in the framework of constructivism and in the 
context of learner-mentor interactions is—heuristically—supported by:  
 
1. factual, structural and existential questions (that are concerned with 
WhatNesses),  
2. inferential questions (that are concerned with WhyNesses), and 
3. methodological and technical questions (that are concerned with 
HowNesses). 
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Note that any of these questions invite the responder (the interlocutor) to search 
through a hierarchy of multiple related concepts in order to produce an appropriate 
answer. Any appropriate answer shapes a part of a construction which is—mutually 
and collaboratively—becoming constructed by the learner and mentor. Any agent, by 
asking a heuristic question, manages to guide her/his interlocutor to producing the 
heuristic answers or some updated heuristic questions. 
 
Forming concepts [by the agents] over their mental structures is an initial step. 
Educationalists see concept formation as a process by which a person learns to sort 
specific experiences into general conceptions. More specifically, some 
educationalists and social scientists (like (Taba et al., 1971, Du and Ling, 2011)) 
define concept formation as “an inductive teaching and learning strategy that supports 
learners in learning something through studying a set of examples of that thing”, see 
some approaches in (McCracken, 1999; Sell et al., 2014). The process of concept 
formation is a sub-process of a greater process which I have called ‘concept 
construction’, see Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Meaning Construction within Constructivist Interactions 
 
According to (Badie, 2015a; Badie, 2015b; Badie, 2016a; Badie, 2016b), any concept 
construction process is structured over the union (and disjunction form) of three sub-
processes consisting of:  
 
a. concept formation (that is intra-psychological), 
b. concept transformation by, e.g., speaking, listening, hearing, touching, 
smelling, tasting (that is inter-psychological), and  
c. concept reformation (that is intra-psychological).  
 
Note that concept reformation happens either after transformation or at the more 
specific levels of conceptualisations of the formed concepts. According to the concept 
of ‘concept construction’ and its inductive essence, my approach considers the fact 
that learner and mentor generate multiple cases for their case-based reasoning and, 
respectively, multiple rules for their rule-based reasoning. Accordingly, they will be 
able to use their achievements for case-based and rule-based learning and mentoring. 
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Additionally, humans can interpret and make decision that whether their different 
experienced phenomena could come under the label of their own constructed 
concepts. Let me offer an example: 
 
John: Bats fly. 
Mentor: Do you know that bats are mammals? 
John: Really? 
Mentor: Yes! 
John: So, some mammals can fly.  
 
In this conversational exchange John has formed the concepts Bat, Fly and Mammal. 
Also, these concepts have been transformed between John and his mentor and, 
correspondingly, John has reformed the concepts Bat and Mammal with regard to his 
mentor’s question. Finally, John, based on his reasoning, has reformed the concepts 
Bat and Mammal, and has learned based on his conclusions. Additionally, he has 
generated the rule ‘there exists a mammal that can fly’ (formally: ∃isFlying.Mammal). 
I define the collection of characterised processes ‘Concept Learning’. 
 
5.  CONCEPT REFORMATION  
 
Suppose that James has a conception of ‘Spring’ (based on his constructed concept 
‘Spring’). Accordingly, he, with regard to his conception of ‘Spring’, may say 
something to his mentor, ask questions, and answer questions. It shall be emphasised 
that hearing different words from the mentor is conducive to developing his 
conception of ‘Spring’. See the following conversational exchanges:  
 
Mentor: James, what could you tell me about spring?  
James: Spring is the season of the moderate weather; when all the trees are green. 
 
James’ statement can be translated into:  
 
Spring ≐  
Season ⊓ ∃hasWeather.Moderate ⊓ ∀hasTree.Green. 
 
This description is structured over the elements of the set:  
 
C = {Season, ∃hasWeather.Moderate, ∀hasTree.Green}. 
 
Also, C is structured over:  
 
C´ = {Season, Moderate, Weather, Green, Tree}. 
 
These five concepts (in C´) has supported James’ conception of the concept Spring. 
In fact, the mentor could focus on these concepts in order to conceptualise James’ 
conception of Spring. 
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Note that in case the mentor and the learner look forward to achieving a satisfactory 
negotiation of a concept description, they will need to focus on the atomic concepts 
within that concept description. Accordingly, the mentor 
 
1. conceptualises the learner’s constructed atomic concepts,  
2. conceptualises the learner’s conceptions of those atomic concepts,  
3. observes other related concepts from the perspective of that conception,  
4. compares the results with her/his own conceptions, and  
5. guides the learner to improve (and re-form) her/his descriptions. 
 
6.  DEFINITION  
 
A definition is an equivalence (and, formal-semantically, an equation) between a 
concept and a description. Definitions assign concept descriptions to concepts. 
Inductive rules are employed in order to describe more specified concepts based on 
more general ones. A set of an agent’s definitions must be explicit in order to be 
meaningful. Any agent may revise and re-organise her/his definitions during her/his 
interactions. This process could be named ‘Definition Updating’ or re-organising and 
reforming the proposed concept description. Consequently, the more organised 
concept descriptions support the agents in constructing more understandable 
meanings on higher levels of their interaction. Note that the levels of interaction are 
as follows: 
 
Level 1: learner says/does something, 
Level 2: mentor says/does something,  
Level 3: learner says/does something,  
…   
 
or  
 
Level 1: mentor says/does something, 
Level 2: learner says/does something,  
Level 3: mentor says/does something,  
… 
 
6.1. TERMINOLOGY GENERATION   
 
A finite set of an agent’s definitions generates a terminology if and only if no atomic 
concept has been defined more than once by her/him on the same level of interaction. 
The indexes ‘L’ and ‘M’ denote ‘corresponded to learner’ and ‘corresponded to mentor’ 
respectively. TL and TM represent the finite set of the learner’s and the mentor’s 
definitions respectively. For every atomic concept AL (or AM), there will be at most 
one axiom in TL (or TM). Accordingly, there will be [at most] one AL (or AM) to the 
left-hand side of any individual definition that shapes an axiom. The agents 
interchange any member (or any subset) of their own terminologies (TL and TM) during 
their interactions. Formally:  
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 Considering CL as the product of the learner’s conceptualisations of the concept 
C, the learner creates a terminological set like DCL = {D1, D2, …, Dn} for her/his 
multiple definitions of C. Accordingly, for i∈[1,n], Di denotes learner’s 
definition of C on the ith interaction level.  
 
 Considering CM as the product of the mentor’s conceptualisations of the concept 
C, the mentor creates a terminological set like D´CM = {D´1, D´2, …, D´n} for 
her/his multiple definitions of C. Accordingly, for i∈[1,n], D´i denotes mentor’s 
definition of C on the ith interaction level. 
 
Therefore, the definitions Di and D´i are located on the same level of interaction based 
on learner’s and mentor’s conceptualisations respectively. Both agents move to one 
upper level. Consequently, the learner’s definition becomes modified (from Di to Di+1) 
and the mentor’s definition becomes modified (from D´i to D´i+1). Therefore, learner 
and mentor approach their more satisfactory agreements on their developed 
definitions. At any level of the interaction, the learner/mentor selects one element or 
a subset of DCL / D´CM  in order to exchange it with the interlocutor. Thus: 
 
A. For learner: ∀i, j ∈ [1,n],  ∃ DCL*
  = {Di, …, Dj}  ⊆  {D1, D2, …, Dn}. Therefore, 
she/he interacts with mentor. Accordingly, there is a ‘definition transformation’ 
like tL from the set of her/his selected definitions (from her/his terminology) into 
the mentor’s set of definitions, and subsequently, into the mentor’s terminology. 
Formally, TL: {Di , … , Dj} →  D´CM . 
 
B. For mentor : ∀p, q ∈ [1,n],  ∃ D´CM*
  = {Dp, …, Dq}  ⊆  {D´1, D´2, …, D´n}. 
Therefore, she/he interacts with learner. Accordingly, there is a definition 
transformation like t´M from the set of her/his selected definitions (from her/his 
terminology) into the learner’s set of definitions, and subsequently, into the 
learner’s terminology. Formally, T´M: {D´p, …, D´q} →  DCL .  
 
Consequently, the multiple definition transformations—collectively—lead both 
agents to their more negotiable conceptions of atomic concepts and, subsequently, of 
concept descriptions over the atomic concepts. 
 
Example. Suppose that Martin says/does something regarding concept ‘Information 
System’ and, accordingly, produces a definition transformation function like 
T1(InformationSystem). T1(InformationSystem) expresses the affect of Martin’s first 
definition (that is an element of his terminology) on ‘InformationSystem’. 
Subsequently, the mentor transacts and produces a transformation function like 
T´1(InformationSystem). T´1(InformationSystem) expresses the affect of Mentor’s first 
description (that is an element of his terminology) on InformationSystem (and with 
regard to Martin’s definition). This procedure is sequentially continued. In fact, any 
statement (and, of course, any question) will cause a transaction (and an answer). 
Ultimately, the concatenation of the multiple functions conduces the mentor and 
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Martin to their most negotiable understandings of the definition of the concept 
‘Information Systems’. Such an understanding is the product of the ‘Composite 
Definition Transformation Function’ (of the concept ‘Information System’) or 
CDTF(InformationSystem).  
 
Formally, the Composite Definition Transformation Function of the concept C is 
equal to: 
 
CDTF (C) =  
[ T´i ○ Ti (C) ]   ○  [ T´i-1   ○ Ti-1(C) ]   ○  … ○ [ T´1 ○ T1(C) ] =               
[ T´i  ○ Ti  ○ T´i-1  ○ Ti-1  ○ … ○ T´1  ○ T1 ] (C)  =   
T´i  ( Ti  ( T´i-1  ( Ti-1  ( … ( T´1  ( T1 (C) ) ) … ) ) ) ) . 
 
This conclusion supports definition developments (and, in fact, conception 
developments) on higher levels of mentor-learner interactions. CDTF(C) prepares the 
agents for approaching a more satisfactory understanding of each other’s conceptions 
of concept description C.  
 
7.  MEANING  
In this approach, meanings are some conceptual structures that are shaped based on 
concepts. More specifically, a meaning is a ‘Concept-update Function’ (CUF). This 
function accepts a concept as an input, updates it, and returns the updated concept. It 
is worth mentioning that some approaches [in dynamic semantics] have considered 
meaning as the context-update function, see (Chierchia, 2009; Gabbay, 2010; Larsson, 
2012). 
 
Suppose that C stands for a concept and M represents a meaning function. Considering 
meaning as a concept-update function we have:  
 
M(C) = C´. 
 
Example. Suppose that an agent (say Maria) has initially produced a meaning for C 
in her mind. So, she has followed M1(C) = C´. Maria, after more interactions with her 
mentor and on higher and more specified conceptual levels, might be able to produce 
the mental function M2(C´) = C˝. Obviously: 
 
M2  (M1  (C) ) = M2 (C´) = C˝. 
 
It shall be concluded that C˝ is the most updated meaning of C. Such a procedure 
could be continued and, thus, the function M(C) develops itself during Maria-mentor 
interactions.  
 
Note that the meaning function M(C) is inherently a ‘Composite Concept-update 
Function’. Let me represent it by CCUF. Suppose that Mi(C) is a CCUF, where i 
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belongs to [1,n]. Then, Mi(C) represents the ‘meaning of C on level i’ of the mentor-
learner interaction. Formally:  
 
M (C) =  
(Mi ○ Mi-1 ○ … M1) (C) =  
Mi ( Mi-1( … ( M1(C) ) … ) ) =  
Mi ( … (C) … ). 
 
Subsequently, the agents on the ith level of their interactions achieve the most 
satisfactory agreement on the meaning of the concept description C (in their minds). 
In fact, Mi(C) is more satisfactory than Mi-1(C).  
 
8.  SEMANTIC INTERPRETATION  
The interpretations assign meanings to the non-logical symbols [and words], see 
(Arthur N. Prior, 1955; Simpson, J. A., 1989). These symbols [and words] have no 
logical values. On the other hand, the logical ones (e.g., if, is, then, so, therefore, 
hence) have logical consequences. It shall be stressed that the proposed definitions are 
highly influenced by interpretations. In order to analyse the formal semantics, I need 
to focus on an interpretation (like I) that consists of:  
 
a. a non-empty set D (as the domain of the interpretation), and 
b. an interpretation function (like .I).  
 
Therefore, considering the individual a as an instance of the concept C, an 
interpretation assigns CI(aI) to the concept description C(a). It also assigns to every 
role description R(p,q) (where p and q are the instances of two concepts), a binary 
relation like RI(pI,qI), which is a subset of DI × DI.  
 
Example. Suppose that Mary has proposed the definition:  
 
Spring ≐  
Season ⊓ ∃hasWeather.Moderate ⊓ ∀hasTree.Green. 
 
This definition is the product of her own interpretation of the concept ‘Spring’. 
Subsequently: 
 
i. the concept ‘Season’, 
ii. the description ‘∃hasWeather.Moderate’, and 
iii. the description ‘∀hasTree.Green’  
 
have been, logically, connected to each other to shape her definition of the concept 
‘Spring’. It shall be drawn into consideration that Mary has interpreted the concept 
‘Spring’ over the elements of the set:  
 
D = {Season, Moderate, Weather, Green, Tree}, 
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and, in fact, she has focused on her semantic interpretation of all the members of D. 
Actually, she has—mentally—produced the set:  
 
DI = {SeasonI, ModerateI, WeatherI, GreenI, TreeI}. 
 
Note that if an interpretation could satisfy a definition, then that interpretation will be 
identified as a ‘model’ of that definition. It can also satisfy the semantics of the 
terminological axioms and world descriptions in Table 1. Actually, Mary—at least—
attempts to design a mental model in order to validate and authenticate her definition 
of ‘Spring’. Hence, the interpretability of her definition by her mentor’s mental 
models determine the acceptability of that definition over the mentor’s conceptions.  
 
8.1. FORMAL ANALYSIS OF SEMANTIC INTERPRETATION IN THE 
CONTEXT OF MENTOR-LEARNER INTERACTIONS  
 
According to the structure of the Composite Definition Transformation Function of 
the concept C or CDTF(C) (which is presented in the ‘Definition’ section), the 
combination of the agents’ terminologies could balance their personal sets of 
terminologies. The most optimistic result is approaching the unified terminology for 
both of the agents that supports them in re-organising and updating their definitions. 
In addition, the interpretation I could be employed in order to interpret the concept-
update function (meaning function) as a ‘functional role relevant for a concept’. The 
learner and the mentor at any level of their interactions aim at finding a proper 
[mental] model in order to:  
 
a. follow the concept update-functions, 
b. certify their constructed concept-update functions as some ‘functional roles’, 
and  
c. satisfy the interlocutor’s terminology.  
 
Subsequently, the agents will be able to activate their interpretations in order to 
support the role inclusions (find them in Table 1). Accordingly, the meaning M, as a 
concept-update function M(C) = C´, could be represented by the functional role  
 
M (C,C´). 
 
Then:  
 
(CI,C´I) ∈ M I. 
 
This conclusion expresses that the agent’s interpretations certify M as a functional 
role. Employing the Composite Concept-update Function (CCUF) and the role 
inclusion axiom, we have: 
 
 Level 1 of interaction:  M1 (C, C´)   ⇒   (C I , C´ I ) ∈ M1I1     
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 Level 2 of interaction:  M2 (C´, C˝)  ⇒   (C´ I , C˝ I ) ∈ M2I2  
… 
 Level n of interaction:  Mn (C (n-1), C (n))   ⇒   (C (n-1) I , C (n) I ) ∈ MnIn  
 
, where:  
 
a. ‘In’ represents the desired model of an agent on the nth level of her/his 
interaction with the interlocutor,  
b. C stands for the concept, and also, represents the co-domain of functions M1, 
M2, …, Mn, 
c. C(n) represents C after n times of being updated, and 
d. C(n)I represents the interpretation of C after n times of being updated.  
 
So, in fact, there is a meaning construction over the agent’s interpretations on any 
level of her/his interaction.  
 
Now I need to check how the collection of n interpretations (on n levels of interaction) 
works. Suppose that a learner and her/his mentor have participated in an interaction. 
I inductively focus on the conclusion of the following processes and propose the 
definition of ‘Composite Interpretation Transformation’ (or CIT): 
 
- The Process 1. The learner utters her/his description of her/his conception. 
Subsequently the mentor interprets the learner’s conception. This semantic 
process involves determining whether the mentor’s understanding (or M(1)) of that 
concept description could produce a concept inclusion with the learner’s 
understanding (or L(1)). Semantically: MI(1) ⊆ LI(1). In fact, the first domain of the 
mentor’s interpretation must be the subset of the domain of the learner’s 
interpretation.  
 
- The Process 2. The mentor transacts and utters her/his own interpretation of the 
learner’s conception. The learner has to interpret the mentor’s uttered 
interpretation. Actually, the first semantic process is inversely becoming 
organised on the second level. This higher (and more specified) semantic process 
involves determining whether the learner’s understanding of the mentor’s 
interpretation (or L(2)) could produce a concept inclusion with the individual 
understanding (or M(2)). Semantically: LI(2) ⊆ MI(2) . I shall emphasise that the 
second domain of the learner’s interpretation must be the subset of the domain of 
the mentor’s interpretation. 
 
- The Process i. According to the logical characteristics of the first and the second 
processes and their interrelationships, we can, inductively, specify the 
‘Composite Interpretation Transformation’ (CIT) as follows: 
 
 If i represents the learner’s utterance, then:  MI(i) ⊆ LI (i)    &    LI(i+1) ⊆ MI(i+1). 
 If i represents the mentor’s utterance, then:  LI(i) ⊆ MI(i)    &    MI(i+1) ⊆ LI(i+1). 
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Collectively, we can induce that:  
 
(MI(1) ⊆ LI(1))  ∩  (LI(2) ⊆ MI(2))  ∩    
…   ∩   
(MI(n) ⊆ LI (n))  ∩  (LI(n+1) ⊆ MI(n+1)).  (*) 
 
Proposition. An agent’s interpretations at any lower level of her/his interactions with 
another agent is the subset of her/his own interpretations at the upper levels. Formally:  
 
LI(1)  ⊆  LI(2)  ⊆ … ⊆  LI(n)       
&       
MI(1)  ⊆  MI(2)  ⊆  … ⊆  MI(n). 
 
Relying on (*) and taking the afore-mentioned proposition into account, we have:  
 
(MI(1)  ⊆  MI(n) )   ∩  (MI(n) ⊆ LI (n))        
&        
(LI(1)  ⊆  LI(n))   ∩  (LI(n+1) ⊆ MI (n+1)). 
 
Therefore:  
 
MI(1)  ⊆  MI(n) ⊆ LI (n)       
&       
(LI(1)  ⊆  LI(n))  ∩  (LI(n+1) ⊆ MI (n+1)). 
 
In fact, both mentor and learner have optimised and restricted their individual 
interpretations by activating inclusions over their interpretations. Considering ‘n → 
∞’ we will have: 
 
MI(1) ⊆ MI(n) ⊆ LI (n)  
     &     
 LI(1)  ⊆  LI(n)  ⊆ MI (n). 
 
Therefore:  
 
MI(n)  =  LI(n). 
 
This conclusion is the most valuable product of the frequent interpretation 
transformations in the context of mentor-learner interactions. MI(n) = LI(n) encodes the 
fact that both agents have had the interlocutor’s interpretation satisfied (by their own 
interpretation). This result is the most excellent valuable conclusion of the 
interpretations in the context of mentor-learner interactions. 
 
9.  CONCLUSIONS  
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This research has focused on conceptual and logical analysis of constructivist 
interactions between mentor and learner within an explanatory and developmental 
framework of meaning construction. The paper has focused on conceptual and logical 
description of how interactions lead agents to construct their own meaningful 
understandings based on their constructed meanings (with regard to their personal 
conceptions of their own constructed concepts). The main contribution has been to 
provide a logical support for the formal semantic analysis of meaning construction 
within constructivist interaction.  
 
More specifically, it has been concerned with logical analysis of agents’ 
conceptualisations, constructed concepts, produced conceptions, expressed concept 
descriptions, described definitions, generated terminologies, provided semantic 
interpretations (and mental models), constructed meanings and produced meaningful 
understandings.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
Constructivism is a philosophical approach that appears in a variety of guises, some 
of them pedagogical, some epistemological and some in complex combinations. This 
article is based on constructivist epistemology. More specifically, constructivist 
epistemology provides a ground for conceptual analysis of humans’ concept 
constructions, conceptions and concept learning processes. It will focus on conceptual 
specification and logical description of a flow from concepts to predicates. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION  
 
My point of departure is the special focus on the assumption that human beings aim 
at constructing knowledge using insights based on their background knowledge. I 
shall therefore claim that human beings construct their personal knowledge and 
produce their own understanding of the world through experiencing various 
phenomena and reflecting on their own experiences.  
 
Constructivist epistemology (as a way of thinking about cognition and knowledge) 
focuses on the question of whether, and under which conditions, human beings may 
construct their own knowledge structures. In addition, it holds that humans can know 
[about] their personal built up constructions. 
 
Jean Piaget was highly interested in expressing the HowNess of ‘meaning making’ 
(by human beings) with regard to their own experiences and ideas of the world and, 
subsequently, he became concerned with the concept of ‘constructivism’. The central 
assumption of Piaget’s constructivist theory of learning (based on his theory of 
Cognitive Development and developmental theory of learning) is that human beings 
produce their own understanding of the world primarily based on their background 
knowledge, over their experiences and through their interactions with their 
environment, see (Piaget, 1936; Piaget and Cook, 1952). Constructivism takes into 
consideration that the processes of knowledge acquisition and knowledge building 
involve the active (and dynamic) creation of mental structures, rather than the passive 
internalisation of information acquired from others. Note that the active creation of 
mental structures means that the mental structures could either change or tend to 
change. In addition, from the perspective of radical constructivism, knowledge is not 
a representation of objectives (e.g., objective facts, objective procedures), but a 
compendium of concepts, conceptual relationships, and rules that have proven useful 
in domesticating humans’ experiential world, see (Foerster, 1981; Glasersfeld, 1984). 
One of the most significant objectives of the constructivist model of knowing (based 
on constructivist epistemology) is the study of the growth of knowledge and Genetic 
Epistemology, see (Berly, 1977).  Genetic epistemology is concerned with ‘the 
developmental theory of knowledge’ and with ‘how knowledge may reasonably be 
assumed to be built in an individual’s cognitive systems’. It shall, therefore, be 
concluded that genetic epistemology has a strong connection with the expression 
‘conceptual change’ within knowledge acquisition and knowledge building. In the 
context of cognitive developmental psychology, conceptual change is a kind of 
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process that focuses on the conversion of humans’ conceptions and the 
interrelationships between their old and new conceptions, see (Chi, 1992; Vosniadou 
and Brewer, 1992; Nersessian, 1992; Limon, 2002; Vosniadou and Verschaffel, 
2004). 
 
At this point, I feel the need to take into consideration Bruner’s theoretical framework 
which could be believed to be one of the most modern constructivist theories of 
knowledge in education and psychology, see (Bruner et al., 1956; Bruner, 1974; 
Bruner, 1986; Bruner, 1990; Bruner and Kalmar, 1998). Jerome Bruner believed that 
“knowing is how human beings get beyond the information given” and, that 
“knowing, getting to know the world, is not just perceiving something; it’s 
constructing it”. In fact, this is how Bruner described the concept of ‘constructivism’. 
It’s possible to conclude that knowledge building, as an active process of construction, 
includes information ‘selection’ and information ‘transformation’, decision making, 
generating ‘hypotheses’, and making ‘meaning’ from information and experiences. 
 
The core presupposition of my research is that the new conceptions (as the products 
of developed constructed concepts) always emerge from the old ones; albeit with the 
proviso that in this context I will say nothing about how first concepts in children are 
established. My central focus is on the assumption that we can—reasonably and 
logically—employ a constructivist model of knowing in order to describe ‘knowledge 
construction’ over concepts as a kind of ‘conditional reasoning’. I will focus on 
conceptual analysis of Concepts, Concept Construction, Conceptions, and Concept 
Learning in order to make a logical linkage between conceptions and predications. 
Therefore, I shall claim that this research—relying on a constructivist model of 
knowing—will make an epistemological and logical linkage between concepts and 
predicates. Such a linkage could specify why logicians perceive concepts as 
predicates. I want to stress that I will not deal with the historical and basic 
epistemological treatment of concepts by, e.g., Locke or Kant. This is taken up by, 
e.g., (Gauker, 2011) including the modern relevance of the historical notions. 
 
2.  CONCEPTS  
 
It is difficult to think of a foundational scientific concept about which there is more 
controversy among experts (in philosophy, linguistics, psychology, cognitive science 
and computer science) than the concept of a ‘concept’, see (Hampton and E. Moss, 
2003; Margolis and Laurence, 2015). Furthermore, over the years, the concept of 
‘concepts’ has not been used consistently, and it is not always transparent if:  
 
a. what is meant by the expression ‘concept’ is some mental representation of 
phenomena in the world, for example as mental pictures of ‘red dog’, or 
b. whether a concept always has to be bound up with some linguistic 
expression, e.g., the words ‘dog’ and ‘red’ in the concept ‘red dog’, or 
c. concept refers to something understandable like, for instance, membership 
of sets and classes, for example as sets of animals. 
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So, it’s obvious that the concept of ‘concepts’ is vague and imprecise. Anyway, it 
seems to be plausible that concepts could be the primary units of knowledge—the 
basic materials, it is often said—out of which humans’ thoughts are built and 
developed. At this point, I take into consideration a few descriptions relevant for 
concepts and concept representations and, subsequently, I will focus on my 
understanding of the use of the expression ‘concept’ and I will assume its application 
in order to be comprehensible in my epistemological and conceptual analysis. I want 
to emphasise that the ontological analysis of concepts is beyond the scope of this 
research.  
 
In Kant’s words, a concept is the “unity of the act of bringing various representations 
under one common representation”. Kant believed that “no concept is related to an 
object immediately, but only to some other representation of it”, see (Kant, 1781: 1924 
edt.). Frederic Bartlett—in his studies in experimental psychology—arrived at the 
phenomenon of ‘concept’ with his focus on memory analysis, see (Bartlett, 1932). In 
memory studies, subjects recalled details of stories that were not actually there. 
Bartlett believed that concepts might be understood as “representations of [parts and 
pieces of] reality in mind”, see (Peacocke, 1992; Zalta, 2001). Concepts as the 
conceptual entities could be studied by the representational theory of mind and the 
theory of mental representation, see (Stich, 1992; Margolis and Laurence, 2007; 
Margolis and Laurence, 2010). According to (Götzsche, 2013), a concept might be 
said to be “a linkage between the mental representations of linguistic expressions and 
the other mental images (e.g., representations of the world, representations of inner 
experiences) that a human being has in her/his mind”. 
 
In order to express my conception of ‘concepts’ I need to focus on the concept of 
‘meaning’. It shall be taken into consideration that any meaning, in the framework of 
constructivism, is a ‘conceptual structure’ and, as such, meanings, to a large extent, 
influence any individual human’s constructions and developments of her/his 
individual experiential reality. Therefore, in the framework of constructivism, 
meanings could be interpreted as conceptual structures that are constructed over 
conceptual entities. Consequently, any conceptual entity can be interpreted to be a 
building block and a basic material of a conceptual structure. Note that we can have 
different perceptions of conceptual entities and, of course, there is no absolute schema 
for conceptual entities. In my opinion, conceptual entities might be labelled ‘concepts’ 
and, subsequently, a conceptual entity, as a representation of a piece of reality (or even 
fiction) in individual’s mind, can be interpreted to be a basic material of [to-be-
constructed] meanings.  
 
2.1.  CONCEPT FORMATION 
  
Referring to (Colman, 2016), concept formation is defined as “a process by which a 
concept is acquired or learnt, usually from exposure to examples of items that belong 
to the concept category and items that do not belong to it. Concept formation involves 
learning to distinguish and recognise the relevant attributes according to which items 
are classified and the rules governing the combination of relevant attributes”. 
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Furthermore, some educationalists and social scientists (like (Taba et al., 1971, Du 
and Ling, 2011)) define concept formation as “an inductive teaching and learning 
strategy that supports learners in learning something through studying a set of 
examples of that thing”, see some approaches in (McCracken, 1999; Sell et al., 2014). 
 
According to (Colman, 2016), the labels ‘concept identification’ and ‘concept 
learning’ are equivalent to ‘concept formation’. In my opinion, ‘concept formation’ 
and ‘concept learning’ (especially in the framework of constructivism) are not 
equivalent. From my perspective, concept learning is a consequence of concept 
formation. In fact, the process of concept formation ‘might’ be followed by the 
process of concept learning. Let me elaborate and specify my conception of Concept 
Learning. 
 
3.  FROM CONCEPT CONSTRUCTION TO CONCEPT LEARNING 
 
The process of concept formation is a sub-process of a greater process which I have 
called ‘concept construction’, see (Badie, 2015a, Badie, 2015b; Badie, 2016a; Badie, 
2016b). Any concept construction process is structured over the union of three sub-
processes consisting of:  
 
i. concept formation, 
ii. concept transformation, and 
iii. concept reformation.  
 
Note that concept reformation happens  
 
- either after transformation,  
- or at the more specific levels of conceptualisations (of the formed concepts) 
and as the outcome of conceptual change.  
 
In fact, concept construction is equivalent to the union (and the disjunctive form) of i, 
ii and iii. For example, the concept ‘red dog’ could be constructed by Bob based on 
the following items: 
 
1. Bob’s self-based and intra-psychological processes, e.g., thinking about red dogs, 
studying about red dogs, searching about red dogs on google, and comparing and 
analysing different breeds of red dogs. In fact, the concept ‘red dog’ could be 
reflected (i.e., epitomised and represented) in Bob’s mind in order to be developed, 
expanded, and promoted. 
 
2. Bob’s interactions with other humans, nature, animals, dogs, and red dogs, e.g., in 
conversational exchanges with other humans about their conceptions of red dogs, 
watching red dogs, playing with red dogs, feeding red dogs, and walking red dogs. 
In conversational exchanges with other individuals, the concept ‘red dog’ could be 
transformed in order to be analysed, argued and criticised. Subsequently, the 
conclusions could be transformed back to Bob’s mind. 
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In fact, Bob—by getting from (1) to (2) and vice-versa and, by modifying his 
conception of ‘red dog’ over time—becomes concerned with the development of his 
mental construction of the concept ‘red dog’. Bob can, at anytime, make inferences 
based on his most modified conception. Note that ‘conception’ is interpreted as the 
product of concept construction. Therefore, Bob’s most modified conceptions are 
produced based on his most specified constructed concept ‘red dog’. As concluded, 
moving from (1) to (2) and vice-versa and, in fact, making a logical connection 
between the concepts of ‘concept formation’ and ‘concept transformation’ is the most 
significant characteristic of concept construction processes. Relying on this 
characteristic, Bob develops the concept ‘red dog’ in his mind. 
 
This conclusion of mine is in line with Vygotsky’s theory of social constructivism. 
Lev Vygotsky was the founder of a theory of human cultural and bio-social 
development. It is in general taken for granted that he was one of the developers of 
the theory of constructivism. Vygotsky in (Vygotsky, 1978) stated that “Every 
function in the child’s cultural development appears twice: first, on the social level, 
and later, on the individual level; first, between people (inter-psychological) and then 
inside the child (intra-psychological)”.  
  
3.1.  CLASSIFICATION  
 
Bruner believed that “To perceive is to categorize, to conceptualize is to categorize, 
to learn is to form categories, to make decisions is to categorize”. Obviously, Bruner 
believed that perceiving, conceptualising, learning and making decision are the 
consequences of classifications. In fact, regarding his idea, 
 
i. there is a strong correlation between ‘perceiving something’ and ‘classifying 
that thing’, and 
ii. conceptualising some phenomenon is strongly correlated with classifying that 
phenomenon and putting it into a class.  
 
This conclusion (based on Bruner’s statement) is strongly in line with my idea. In my 
opinion, this is where ‘concepts (as conceptual entities and basic materials of 
meanings) become manifested within constructivist model of knowing’. 
Consequently, in such a framework, the concept of ‘classification’ can be interpreted 
as a process of ‘constructing’, which is dependent on ‘representations’. Furthermore, 
any classification corresponds with an ‘assignment’ and, in fact, any individual human 
being is capable of classifying a phenomenon into one or multiple classes (with her/his 
determined and specified labels) on the basis of her/his own outlooks. Accordingly, 
it’s possible to claim that humans form and produce multiple classes of different 
phenomena in order to construct knowledge over those phenomena. Note that 
classifications are strongly dependent on mental representations of any individual’s 
personal (to-be-constructed) constructions based on her/his own conceptions (as the 
products of her/his constructed concepts). It is worth mentioning that “the term 
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‘construction’ also expresses the creation of an abstract entity”, see (Oxford, 2017; 
Cambridge, 2017).  
 
An abstract entity as a product of the activity of construction could be realised to be 
another linkage between ‘concepts as classes’ and ‘constructivist model of knowing’. 
Taking the concepts of ‘classification’ and ‘construction’ into account, we could 
realise that there is a strong bi-conditional relationship between the following items: 
 
i. Classification (= classifying a phenomenon into a class) regarding hierarchical 
viewpoints. 
ii. Construction (= providing a mental construction and representation of a 
phenomenon). 
 
3.2.  CONCEPT LEARNING  
 
The expression ‘concept learning’ can, by observing concepts as classes, be seen as 
the developmental process of concept construction and as the specification of the 
conceptualisation of the constructed concepts. Concept learning is activable with 
regard to humans’ specification of the conceptualisations of the characteristics and 
properties of concepts and through experiencing various groups of examples of those 
concepts. As mentioned, regarding Bruner’s statement, learning is a consequence of 
classification. So, again, I shall stress that his idea has been in line with mine and, in 
fact, I recognise ‘concept learning’ as a consequence of classification. Furthermore, I 
shall claim that—through concept learning—the phenomena of ‘classification’, 
‘representation’, ‘construction’ and ‘abstraction’ are linked together. In addition, I 
want to stress that the conceptual interrelationships between ‘concepts’ (as basic 
materials of meanings) and ‘meanings’ (as conceptual structures) establish a 
semantics based upon humans’ concept constructions within their concept learning 
process in the framework of constructivism. 
 
4.  SOME STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS  
  
As mentioned, a concept might be said to be “a linkage between the mental 
representations of linguistic expressions and the other mental images (e.g., 
representations of the world, representations of inner experiences) that a human being 
has in her/his mind”, see (Götzsche, 2013). Suppose that the function C(c) denotes 
concept construction (where the capital C stands for ‘construction function’ and the 
small c stands for ‘concept’), and the relation (I , L) denotes the relationship between 
the mental images and the linguistic expressions. The relation (I , L) is constructed 
over the conjunctions of ‘implying linguistic expressions from mental images’ and 
‘implying mental images from linguistic expressions’. Therefore, (I , L) could be 
expressed by:  
 
(I → L)  ∧  (L → I) 
 
and, equivalently, by: 
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I ⇔ L. 
 
Consequently, there exists an inductive model (like ⊨), such that:  
 
(I ⇔ L)  ⊨  C(c). 
 
Informally, the constructed concept has been induced (and satisfied) by relating and 
matching ‘linguistic expressions’ and ‘images of the world’. In fact, the constructed 
concept is semantically satisfied by ‘I ⇔ L’, and this satisfaction is the source of 
meanings in the constructor’s mind. In other words, meanings are constructed based 
upon these constructed concepts. 
 
Representing Concept Formation, Concept Reformation and Concept Transformation 
functions by F(c), F´(c) and T(c) respectively, we have:  
 
(I ⇔ L)  ⊨  [ F(c) ⋁ T(c) ⋁ F´(c) ]. 
 
According to this formal semantic model,  
 
a. the collections of the representations and illustrations of mental linguistic 
expressions in mental images, and 
b. the epitomisations of mental images (that make an epitome of mental images) 
in the form of linguistic expressions,  
 
could—semantically—satisfy the human’s concept constructions. And, in fact, the 
disjunction form of ‘concept formation’, ‘concept transformation’ and ‘concept 
reformation’ is semantically satisfied by a one to one relation between ‘linguistic 
expressions’ and ‘mental images’. It shall be concluded that any ‘concept 
construction’ is meaningful with regard to ‘I ⇔ L’. The formal semantic model ‘(I ⇔ 
L)  ⊨  [ F(c) ⋁ T(c) ⋁ F´(c) ]’—in broad sense—describes how the succession ‘Concept 
… Conception’ could be structured in humans’ minds. 
 
5.  FROM CONCEPTIONS TO PREDICATES  
 
In the framework of constructivism, knowledge can be interpreted to be constructed 
and developed by humans with their insights based on their constructed concepts. This 
research follows my central belief that the constructed concepts could be followed by 
the humans’ produced conceptions and, in fact, I have claimed that the constructed 
concepts could be manifested in the form of conceptions for becoming expressed. But 
how could we draw a logical junction between humans’ constructed concepts and their 
conceptions? In fact, we need a concept language (like Description Logics, see 
(Baader, 2010)) that could describe this logical junction properly.  
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By considering any conception as a class (and, in fact, as a mathematical set) and, 
subsequently, by representing that set in the form of a predicate, that conception can 
be expressed and stated. More specifically, a unary set and its superset make a class 
inclusion/subsumption relationship in the form of:  
 
SubClass ⊆ SuperClass. 
 
For example: 
 
Dog ⊆ Animal     
&     
Red ⊆ Colour. 
 
Accordingly, that class inclusion relationship can be expressed in the form of a 
[Unary] Predicate inclusion/subsumption. For example, Dog ⊆ Animal and Red ⊆ 
Colour can—terminologically—be represented in the form of:  
 
Dog ⊑ Animal     
& 
    Red ⊑ Colour 
 
respectively. Subsequently, that terminological [Unary] Predicate inclusion can be 
expressed in the form of a predicate assertion. For example, Dog ⊑ Animal and Red ⊑ 
Colour can be represented in the form of:  
 
Animal(Dog) 
&     
Colour(Red) 
 
respectively. Note that the relation Animal(Dog) expresses that the class Animal covers 
the class Dog and, in fact, all Dogs are Animals. Therefore, the class Dog is subsumed 
under the class Animal. Furthermore, relying on inductive rules, the class inclusions 
Dog ⊑ Animal and Red ⊑ Colour can be merged in order to produce:  
 
RedDog ⊑ ColouredAnimal 
 
and, respectively: 
 
ColouredAnimal(RedDog). 
 
Let me focus on the terminological description ‘Dog ⊑ Animal’ and its equivalent 
assertional description (or ‘Animal(Dog)’). Representing the logical description ‘Dog 
⊑ Animal’ is strongly dependent on the following items:  
 
a. Constructing Dog and Animal in one’s mind and, respectively, producing a 
conception of them. 
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b. Scheming some individual dogs and animals (as the instances of Dog and 
Animal respectively) in one’s mind and, accordingly, producing a conception 
of them. 
c. Constructing logical relationships between Dog and Animal in one’s mind 
and, subsequently, producing a conception of that. 
 
It shall be emphasised that any semantic interpretation could be given sense over the 
collection of (a), (b), and (c). Logically, a triple like ⟨a, b, c⟩ is equivalent to:  
 
⟨ 
classes,  
inclusions and memberships in classes,  
the interrelationships between the members of various classes 
⟩.  
 
5.1.  PREDICATES  
 
There are different perspectives from which predicates are observable and 
interpretable. Assessed by mathematical and formal logics, a predicate is an 
expression that makes a kind of ‘assignment’. It could be believed that humans—by 
their semantic interpretations—assign their own conceptions and the 
interrelationships between their conceptions to values. In particular, [Clapham, 2014] 
describes a predicate as:  
 
 an expression, which ascribes a property to one or more subjects.  
 
Furthermore, according to (Blackburn, 2016),  
 
 a predicate might be any expression that is capable of connecting with one or 
more singular terms to make a proposition.  
 
Also: 
 
 predicates express the conditions that the entities referred to may satisfy, and 
in the case the conditions are satisfied the resulting sentence will be true.  
 
In fact, semantic interpretations map the conceptions and their interrelationships into 
true/false values. In more proper words, predicates, by employing semantic 
interpretations (i.e., generated interpretation functions from words and symbols into 
truth values), transmit the characteristics and properties (of conceptions) into 
statements or into truth-values. By taking these characteristics into consideration, 
unary predicates could stand in the place of conceptions and n-ary predicates could 
stand in the place of conceptions’ interrelationships.  
 
It can therefore be concluded that a predicate is an assignment function from 
characteristics, features and properties of a conception (and respectively, of a 
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constructed concept) into subjects. Furthermore, “a subject is something which is—in 
a situation/setting—the conceptual entity (i.e., a configuration) of the act of linguistic 
communication (i.e., transfer of information) or cognition (i.e., transformation of 
information) of the interlocutor uttering the statement. Therefore, subjection is an 
assertive predication”, see (Götzsche, 2013: 90). Figure 1 represents the analysed 
conceptual relationship between concepts and predicates. 
 
 
 
Figure1. From Concepts to Predicates in the Framework of Constructivism 
 
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  
Predication (see Link a) of a conception (or, equivalently: a to-be-created class) is 
concerned with the question ‘what is it to state something about that conception?’ and, 
thus, a predication tackles to find an answer for describing and expressing the question 
‘what is there and what does exist relevant for a constructed concept and a produced 
conception?’. Heuristically, the latter question focuses on the existence of a 
constructed concept. This question is concerned with ontological descriptions of a 
constructed concept, while the first question is concerned with a structural description 
of that constructed concept. I shall acknowledge that there is a strong correlation 
between predication of a conception and that concept’s ontology. Relying on 
constructivist ontology, any individual human being has her/his personal constructed 
concepts, and hence, it is reasonable to assume that the constructed concepts are valid 
and existing. 
 
It could be said that a predication, indirectly, focuses on a kind of ontological 
underpinning of a conception and, respectively, of a constructed concept. 
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Additionally, in the framework of constructivist epistemology, knowledge is 
recognised to become constructed over the background knowledge. It must be 
assumed that the background knowledge has strong interrelatedness with humans’ 
ontological conceptions that are generated with regard to the nature and structure of 
the pieces of reality in their minds. And, in fact, there are strong correlations between 
‘pre-concept descriptions and pre-conceptions’ and ‘ontological conceptions’. In fact, 
the pre-concept descriptions and pre-conceptions could be realised as the outcomes of 
ontological conceptions. Furthermore, the supportive processes involved in human 
concept learning can be seen as an explanatory ontology [of mind] and as a 
comprehensive ontology [of selves]. Obviously, we can see that there is a triangle 
covering: 
 
a. ontological realisation of a concept, 
b. concept construction, and 
c. predication of a conception.  
 
Accordingly, in my opinion, the realisation of characteristics, features and properties1 
of concepts, tackle to deal with their ontologies. Therefore, the predication functions 
are from those characteristics [, features and properties] into subjects. Based on these 
understandings, I propose the following definitions:  
 
 Philosophy of constructivism is a kind of comprehensive and explanatory 
ontology of human beings, and the constructivist epistemology provides a 
model of knowing over this ontology.  The central focus of constructivist 
epistemology is the origin of an individual’s constructed knowledge.  
 
Subsequently,  
 
 the pure grasp of a concept in constructivist epistemology describes an 
individual’s comprehension of the unity of the act of bringing various 
representations under one common representation in the framework of 
constructivism. 
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TERM 
 
DESCRIPTION 
 
Classification  
 
Classification is the process of constructing classes. There is 
a bi-conditional relationship between ‘learning’ and 
‘constructing classes’. Cognitive activities of human beings 
involve their constructed classes. Classification is highly 
correlated with representation and assignment. Human 
beings can classify different phenomena/things as belonging 
to multiple classes and under specific labels. Classification 
is strongly tied to conceptualisation. 
 
Complete Mental 
Mapping 
 
If there is a mental mapping (like M) from a concept (like C) 
into another concept (like D), then it could be conceptualised, 
interpreted, and understood that M is also valid from a sub-
concept of C into D. Such a mental mapping is Complete.  
 
Composite 
Concept-update 
Function 
Meanings as concept-update functions develop and organise 
themselves during human-human interactions. The 
Composite Concept-Update Function (CCUF) expresses that 
the constructed meanings are always in the process of 
developing themselves. The previous situations are the 
domains of this function. Therefore, CCUF becomes 
constructed based on the concatenation of the constructed 
meanings.   
 
Composite 
Definition 
Transformation 
The concatenation of the multiple ‘definition transformations 
functions’ between two (ore more) agents conduce them to 
their most negotiable comprehensions of the definition of the 
concept C. This comprehension is the product of the 
Composite Definition Transformation Function (of the 
concept C) or CDTF(C). 
 
Composite 
Interpretation 
Transformation 
The following conceptual and logical process is valid at any 
level of an interaction between two human beings:  
“Once an agent utters her/his description of her/his 
conception, the interlocutor interprets that conception. This 
semantic process involves determining whether the 
interlocutor’s understanding of that concept description 
could produce a concept inclusion with the agent’s 
understanding. Thus, the domain of the interlocutor’s 
interpretation must come under the set (i.e., be its subset) of 
the domain of the agent’s interpretation”. The concatenation 
of all these transformations, from agent into interlocutor and 
inverse, is called a Composite Interpretation 
Transformation. According to that, an agent’s interpretations 
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at any lower level of her/his interactions with another agent 
is the subset of her/his own interpretations at the upper levels 
of interaction.  
 
Concept A Concept is a conceptual entity that represents a part as well 
as parts of reality/fiction in a human being’s mind. Any 
concept might be said to be a linkage between the mental 
representations of linguistic expressions and the other mental 
images (e.g., representations of the world, representations of 
inner experiences) that a human has in her/his mind. In the 
framework of constructivist concept learning, concepts are 
conceptual entities and can be interpreted as the basic 
materials of conceptual structures (meanings). Subsequently, 
in the framework of constructivism, concepts could be 
recognised as the basic materials of meaningful 
understandings. 
 
Concept-update 
Function 
A Concept-update Function (CUF) accepts a constructed 
concept as an input, updates it, and returns the updated 
concept. CUFs develop and organise themselves over time. 
There is a strong connection between one’s mental concept-
update functions and her/his conceptual changes.  
 
Concept 
Construction 
Concept Construction processes are structured over the 
union of three sub-processes consisting of (i) the intra-
psychological process of ‘concept formation’, (ii) the inter-
psychological process of concept transformation, and (iii) the 
intra-psychological process of concept reformation. 
 
Concept 
Definition  
 
Any Concept Definition is a Definition. In Description 
Logics, a concept definition (represented by ≐) is a kind of 
equation. It expresses the definition of a new, as well as more 
specified, concept in terms of other previously defined 
concepts. 
 
Concept 
Description 
 
A Concept Description is structurally constructed based on a 
definition. A concept description attempts, inductively and 
based on logical connectors, to describe a concept. Logical 
connectors are logical symbols. Concept descriptions are the 
most common ways of expressing conceptions by human 
beings.  
  
Concept 
Equivalence 
 
If C and D stand for two concepts, the logical description ‘C 
≡ D’ is called a Concept Equivalence. Such a relationship 
means, semantically, that C and D are equal (i.e., C = D). The 
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expression ‘C = D’ represents a so-called ‘Concept 
Equality’.  
 
Concept 
Inclusion 
 
See Concept Subsumption.  
Concept 
Learning 
Concept Learning is a learning theory that is supported by 
humans’ inductive reasoning processes. Concept learning is 
logically shaped over a system of evidential support which is 
structured over humans’ less-than-certain inferences. This 
theory is supported by humans’ reasoning processes based 
on their constructed concepts as well as their produced 
conceptions. Concept learning could be generated based on 
humans’ background knowledge and over their pre-formed 
concepts and pre-conceptions. Also, concept learning is 
generated with regard to human’s conceptualisations of the 
characteristics and properties of concepts. Furthermore, 
concept learning could be structured through experiencing 
(e.g., observing, hearing, touching, reading about) various 
groups of examples of concepts. Accordingly, humans could 
focus on hypothesis generation. Human beings become 
concerned with specification of the conceptualisation of their 
constructed concepts within their concept learning processes. 
 
Concept 
Learning 
Problem 
 
The Concept Learning Problem is expressible in the form of 
a function that describes a human being who constructs a 
concept on a basis provided by her/his constructed 
knowledge. Also, her/his knowledge is constructed based 
upon her/his terminological basis and over her/his 
descriptions of the world. 
 
Concept 
Subsumption  
 
The logical term ‘C ⊑ D’, where C and D stand for two 
concepts, expresses a Concept Subsumption. In equivalent 
words, C is subsumed under D. Therefore, C is the sub-
concept of D. More specifically, the idea of ‘being a concept 
and becoming subsumed under another concept’ is called a 
Concept Subsumption. Through the lenses of formal 
semantics, C is the sub-class as well as subset of D. 
 
Concept 
Understanding 
Concept Understanding is the product of (i) a 
conceptualisation and (ii) a semantic interpretation. The 
characteristics and properties of a concept by means of the 
concept understanding function become mapped into 
concept descriptions. In fact, a concept understanding can 
relate the characteristics of a concept to a description 
(concept description). Concept understanding could logically 
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be acknowledged to be subsumed under concept 
constructions.  
 
Concept 
Understanding 
Semantic Model 
A Concept Understanding Semantic Model is supported by 
interpretation-based semantic models. Also, any concept 
understanding semantic model supports and covers its sub-
models. Concept Understanding Semantic Sub-Models are 
some functional roles of human beings at different layers 
(with different complexities) of realisations as well as 
comprehensions of the world. 
 
Conception Human beings manifest their constructed concepts in the 
form of their Conceptions in order to express them. 
Conceptions are individual-centered, central-organising, and 
generalised across experiences and direct observations. They 
require re-organisable pre-conceptions. Conceptions make 
sense to communities by becoming shared. The most 
significant logical necessity for conceptions to be expressed 
is that any of them needs to be considered a unary predicate. 
Additionally, any interrelationship between two as well as 
more conceptions needs to be considered a binary as well as 
n-ary (n ≥ 3) predicate. 
 
Conceptual 
Change 
 
Conceptual Change is a psychological process that focuses 
on the conversion of humans’ conceptions (of their 
constructed concepts) and on the interrelationships between 
their old and new conceptions. 
 
Conceptual 
Knowledge  
 
Regarding the revised version of Bloom’s taxonomy, 
knowledge of theories, models, and structures are recognised 
as Conceptual Knowledge. Conceptual knowledge deals with 
‘the interrelationships between the constituents and the basic 
materials of constructed structures’. This means that 
learners, by their conceptual knowledge, can be able to do 
functionalising.  
 
Conceptual 
Representation  
 
Conceptual Representation is one’s epitomisation and, 
respectively, mental representation of her/his constructed 
concepts and the conceptual and logical interrelationships 
between the constructed concepts.  
 
Conceptualisation Humans’ grasps of their constructed concepts (in the form of 
their conceptions) are based on their own conceptualisations. 
Relying on such a conceptual and logical process, humans 
can find out that an individual thing/phenomenon is an 
instance of that concept. 
 
315 
An understanding expresses a local manifestation of a 
global/universal conceptualisation. In addition, any 
understanding (based on a concept) could be interpreted as a 
local manifestation of a global conceptualisation (of that 
concept). Therefore, it is not the case that all 
conceptualisations are understandings of concepts. 
 
Conformation 
Functions (from 
Machines’ 
Knowledge Bases 
into Minds) 
 
Suppose that (i) In denotes the n-component linear relational 
model for humans’ ideas (of their constructed concepts), (ii) 
Pn denotes the n-component linear relational model for their 
expressed predicates, and (iii) Hn denotes the n-component 
linear relational model for the generated hypotheses in 
machines’ knowledge bases. Accordingly, there are 
Conformation Functions like Cis from predicates into 
humans’ ideas (and in fact, into their constructed concepts). 
Representing the the set of Cis by C, we will have ‘C: Pn → 
In’ and, semantically: ‘Hn  ⊨ (C: Pn → In)’. 
 
Constant Symbol 
 
In Predicate Logic, a Constant Symbol is a non-logical 
symbol and can be considered an instance of any variable 
symbol.  
 
Constructed 
World  
 
Mental Constructed World is the product of one’s 
‘constructed meanings’. Such a world becomes reflected in 
the constructor’s ‘conceptual knowledge’. Additionally, it 
shall be emphasised that, in parallel to that reflection, the 
produced conceptual knowledge (with regard to any 
discussion with other agents) becomes adaptated in 
conceptual knowledge.   
 
Constructivism Constructivism is a style of thinking about knowledge. 
Constructivism, as an epistemology as well as a model of 
knowing, supports constructivist models of 
learning/mentoring and constructivist learning/mentoring 
theories. Constructivist models of learning/mentoring asses 
the phenomena of ‘learning’ and ‘mentoring’ the activities of 
construction. The constructivist models of learning don’t 
assess the phenomenon of ‘learning’ as an outcome of a 
development. They do, however, recognise ‘learning’ as a 
development. 
 
Constructivist  
Discussion  
 
According to Badie’s designed conceptual framework for 
meaning construction in the context of constructivist 
interactions (between two agents), the Constructivist 
Discussions appear between the agents’ constructed 
conceptual knowledge.   
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Constructivist 
Interaction 
 
A Constructivist Interaction between two or more aware, as 
well as intentional, agents could lead them to producing their 
own meaningful understandings (i) based on their produced 
conceptions of the world, (ii) through their collaborative 
meaning construction, and (iii) through the collaborative 
process of knowledge construction. Additionally, regarding 
Badie’s designed conceptual framework for meaning 
construction, the constructivist interactions relate the agents’ 
constructed worlds to each other. 
 
Constructivist 
Machine 
Training  
 
Training machines, by human beings, based on their personal 
mental images and linguistic expressions of the real world in 
the framework of constructivism and in the context of their 
interactions with machines, could be seen as Constructivist 
Machine Training. In such a framework, ‘training’ could be 
done by (i) giving examples (and expanding them) to 
machines’ knowledge bases and (ii) clarifying a set of tasks 
for a machine. Relying on (i) and (ii), machines generate 
hypotheses in order to focus on machine class expression 
learning. 
 
Definition A Definition is an isochronism of two logical implications in 
one’s mind: (1) Sub-Class implies Super-Class, (2) Super-
Class implies Sub-Class. Consequently, based on one’s 
interpretations, it would be an equivalence relation between 
a predicate and a sentence (where the predicate implies the 
sentence and the sentence implies the predicate). In Formal 
Semantics, such a logical concurrency generates an equation 
between a predicate and a sentence as well as a description. 
It’s worth mentioning that this logical concurrency is 
structured based on two concurrent assignments. In the 
framework of constructivist concept learning, produced 
meanings are heavily supported by one’s definitions of the 
world. 
 
Definition 
Transformation 
A Definition Transformation is a function/mapping from the 
set of a human’s selected definitions (from her/his 
terminology) into another agent’s set of definitions and, 
subsequently, into that agent’s terminology. 
 
Definition 
Updating 
Any agent may revise and re-organise her/his definitions 
during her/his interactions with other agents as well as the 
environment. This process is identified as Definition 
Updating. Definition updatings express the reformations as 
well as reorganisations of one’s proposed concept 
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descriptions over time. 
 
Experienced 
Constructive 
Examples of 
Concepts 
 
In concept learning, human beings are concerned with a set 
of experienced phenomena/things in order to develop their 
knowledge constructions. Expressing new concept 
descriptions is dependent on Experienced Constructive 
Examples of humans’ constructed Concepts (or Exp+c). Exp+c 
consists of the examples (= positive examples) of humans’ 
constructed concepts. 
 
Experienced Non-
Constructive 
Examples of 
Concepts 
 
In concept learning, human beings are concerned with a set 
of experienced phenomena/things in order to develop their 
knowledge constructions. Expressing new concept 
descriptions is dependent on Experienced Non-Constructive 
Examples of humans’ constructed Concepts (or Exp-c). Exp-c    
consists of the non-examples of humans’ constructed 
concepts. 
 
Factual 
Knowledge 
 
Regarding the revised version of Bloom’s taxonomy, the 
knowledge of terminologies and knowledge of specific 
details and elements are seen as Factual Knowledge. 
 
Function Symbol  In classical logics, Function Symbols are non-logical 
symbols that express the concept of ‘functionality’ (and the 
HowNess of becoming able to serve a purpose). Function 
symbols operate variable symbols. 
 
Functional Role Functional Roles (Features) are the roles that are inherently 
functions and, thus, they can express functional actions, 
movements, procedures, and manners of human beings. Let 
NF be a set of functional roles and NR be the set of role 
descriptions in Description Logics. Obviously: NF ⊆ NR. 
Informally, functional roles are some kinds of roles. 
 
Hypothesis A Hypothesis is a primary logical description of a 
class/concept in either humans’ minds or machines’ 
knowledge bases. A hypothesis arises and, accordingly, 
becomes more expanded and specified during concept 
learning and class expression processes. Hypotheses can 
describe different theories based on terminologies and world 
descriptions. They support inductive reasoning processes in 
order to satisfy different conditions for definitions of truth. 
 
Individual 
Symbol 
In Description Logics, an Individual Symbol is a non-logical 
symbol and can be asserted to any variable. Individual 
symbols are equivalent to constant symbols in Predicate 
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Logic. 
 
Induction An Induction provides humans with a mental system of 
evidential support that extends deduction to less-than-certain 
inferences. Human beings, by constructing logical premises 
for their own inductive inferences, become prepared to be 
capable of providing various degrees of support for their own 
logical conclusions. 
 
Interaction Level 
 
The levels of interaction are defined as follows: 
 
Level 1: Agent 1 says/does something, 
Level 2: Agent 2 says/does something,  
Level 3: Agent 1 says/does something,  
…   
 
Interpretation 
 
An Interpretation is seen as the act of elucidation, 
explication, and explanation. This PhD thesis has provided 
the following conceptions of interpretations: (A) The 
interpretations make bridges between (i) a human’s 
‘expressions and explanations’ and (ii) the phenomena of 
‘semantics’ and ‘meanings’. (B) An interpretation could be 
known as the continually adjusted relationship between (i) 
the human’s intention behind her/his conceptions and her/his 
actual mental universe of her/his conceptions that are based 
on her/his accumulated experiences. Subsequently, all 
understandings are interpreted as limits of interpretations. On 
the other hand, though, all interpretations are not necessarily 
understandings. (C) Through the lenses of logics, an 
interpretation is a mapping from a meaning into a non-logical 
symbol/word.  
 
Interpretation 
Function 
Interpretation Functions (like .I) are the most significant 
producers of terminological as well as semantic 
interpretations. Considering the individual a, the concept C, 
and the Role R, an interpretation function can generate aI, CI 
and RI in order to prepare a, C, and R, respectively, for 
becoming, terminologically and semantically, interpreted.  
 
Knowledge 
Construction  
 
Knowledge Construction is an active process of producing 
knowledge. In the framework of constructivism, the 
phenomena of ‘learning’ and ‘mentoring’ are interpreted as 
active and dynamic processes of knowledge construction. 
Knowledge construction is strongly dependent on 
interpretation, explanation, and arrangement.  
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Knowledge 
Development  
 
Knowledge Development is an active process of developing 
the constructed knowledge. In the framework of 
constructivist concept learning, knowledge development is 
equivalent to developing the constructed collections (like K) 
of terminologies and world descriptions. Therefore, through 
concept learning processes and based on logical inferences, 
K can be expanded as well as developed over concept 
constructions. 
 
Learner A Learner is an individual who attempts to be concerned 
with (as well be involved in) the process of learning. 
Therefore, she/he tackles to do ‘learning’ as her/his most 
general task/role.  
 
Learning Learning is the involvement of a self, by any individual, in 
increasing knowledge about a phenomenon as well as 
objects, processes, and events. This PhD dissertation 
analyses the phenomenon of ‘learning’ as follows: (A) 
Learning is a process of acquiring knowledge and 
constructing knowledge (over experiences) that could cause 
long-lasting or permanent changes at one’s level of 
knowledge as well as depth of understanding. (B) In the 
framework of constructivist concept learning, the 
phenomenon of ‘learning’ can be interpreted to be structured 
based on a collection of transformations from one’s personal 
constructed concepts into her/his own constructed 
knowledge. 
 
Logical Symbol 
 
Logical Words/Symbols have logical consequences in natural 
and formal languages. We cannot, semantically, interpret 
some terms like, e.g., ‘or’, ‘and’, ‘since’, ‘then’, ‘therefore’, 
‘so’, ‘but’, ‘not’. This means that they have the same logical 
consequences as well as meanings in all logical structures.   
 
Machine 
Learning  
 
A machine learning approach attempts to develop strong 
algorithms that allow machines to improve the productivity 
of their performances on a given goal. A machine program is 
said to learn from an experience if there is a set of tasks and 
a performance measure for it and, also, if its performance at 
those tasks, as measured, improves with its given 
experiences. 
 
Machine 
Inductive 
Concept 
Learning 
Machine Inductive Concept Learning (ICL) is a specified 
Inductive Learning paradigm. It attempts to describe, 
logically, concepts and their relationships. It employs the 
members (instances) and non-members of a class. A 
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(Machine Class 
Expression 
Learning) 
 
 
characteristic feature of most inductive learning approaches 
is the use of background knowledge. In concept learning with 
background knowledge, machines with regard to the given 
sets of training examples and background knowledge find 
different hypotheses. 
 
Meaning In the framework of constructivist concept learning, 
Meanings are some conceptual structures that are 
constructed based on concepts (conceptual entities). Then, 
concepts are the basic materials of meanings. More 
specifically, in the framework of constructivism and in the 
context of interactions, meanings are concept-update 
functions. 
  
Meaning 
Balancing  
 
Through the lenses of formal semantics, interpretation 
functions can be defined as mappings from ‘meanings’ into 
‘non-logical symbols/words’. This means that a meaning is 
considered as the product of the inverse of interpretation 
function. Human beings can, by following their mental 
interpretation functions and interpretations’ inverse 
functions (in multiple repetitive loops), be able to balance 
and adjust their initial meanings (in their minds) over time. 
Meaning Balancing is quite supportive in balancing personal 
definitions and vice versa.  
 
Meaning 
Construction  
 
Meaning Construction is the most salient product of 
constructivist models of knowing as well as constructivist 
models of learning. Meaning construction has strong 
connections with humans’ abilities of interpretation and 
construing. Humans, by constructing meanings, provide 
supportive backgrounds for their meaningful understandings. 
Sense Making is a valuable outcome of meaning 
construction.  
 
Meaning 
Formulation 
 
 
Humans formulate their balanced meanings (see Meaning 
Balancing) and do Meaning Formulation based on the 
balanced definitions of their personal constructed concepts. 
There is an appropriate relationship between formulated 
meanings and balanced definitions. This is based on the 
supposition that meanings would be given better shapes (in 
minds) with regard to balanced definitions. 
 
Meaningful 
Conceptual 
Structuring 
 
The formulated meanings (see Meaning Formulation) 
reorganise and reinforce humans’ mental structures. The 
formulated meanings are applicable prerequisites for 
Meaningful Conceptual Structuring based on personal 
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formulated meanings as well as personal constructed 
concepts.  
 
Meaningful 
Understanding 
 
Meaningful Understandings are the conclusions of the 
constructed meanings. Also, the constructed meanings are 
supported by humans’ constructed knowledge as well as their 
models of knowings. It shall be emphasised that one’s 
constructed meanings could be seen as an identification of 
the way which she/he moves on, in order to produce her/his 
meaningful understanding. 
 
Mental Mapping 
 
A Mental Mapping is a mapping/function from a concept into 
another concept. This means that this function is definable 
from a conceptual entity into another conceptual entity.  
Considering M as a mental mapping and C and D as two 
concepts, the function M: C → D represents a mental 
mapping. 
 
Mental Model Any human being attempts to design a Mental Model in order 
to validate and authenticate her/his descriptions. Note that 
the interpretability of one’s definitions by her/his 
interlocutors’ mental models determine the acceptability of 
those definitions over the interlocutors’ conceptions (Also, 
see Model). 
 
Mentor A Mentor, as a More Knowledgable Other (MKO), is an 
individual who has a better understanding as well as a higher 
ability level than the learner with respect to a particular task, 
process, or any other concept. Mentors can open the world to 
the learners and open the learners to the world. In the 
framework of constructivism, mentors are perceived as 
advanced learners. 
 
Model (in Logics) In Predicate Logic, in case an interpretation could assign the 
value True to a sentence (and satisfy it), that interpretation 
would be a Model of that sentence. Similarly, in Description 
Logics, in case a given [terminological] interpretation could 
assign the value True to a concept description, that 
interpretation is called a model of that description. 
Consequently, a terminological interpretation can be a model 
of a terminological (and, respectively, of an assertional 
description) if and only if it can satisfy them semantically. 
 
Overall 
Understanding 
Functional Role 
 
According to Badie’s designed semantic model for concept 
understanding, any partial understanding function of a 
human being like fi
UND  (see Partial Understanding 
Functions), semantically, supports her/his Overall 
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Understanding Functional Role (like FUND). This means that 
FUND is equal to the chain of n partial understanding 
functions. Formally: FUND = f1
UND
 
○ ··· ○ fn
UND. 
 
Partial 
Understanding 
Functions  
 
According to Badie’s designed semantic model for concept 
understanding, the function fi
UND,∀i∈[1,n], is a Partial 
Understanding Function, where UND stands for an 
understanding model (see Understanding Model). Any 
partial understanding function of a human being, 
semantically, supports her/his overall understanding 
functional role (see Overall Understanding Functional 
Role). 
 
Predicate A Predicate is an assignment function from characteristics, 
features, and properties of a conception and respectively, of 
a constructed concept into subjects. Also, predicates are non-
logical symbols in Predicate Logic. In Predicate Logic, 
predicates express something about the variables and, 
respectively, about the constants.  
 
Predication A Predication is a transformation/mapping from a 
conception (of a constructed concept) into a predicate. 
Formally, Predication: Conception → Predicate. 
 
Procedural 
Knowledge 
 
Regarding the revised version of Bloom’s taxonomy, the 
knowledge of methods, algorithms, and techniques that are 
all strongly dependent on humans’ skills, are recognised as 
Procedural Knowledge. 
  
RFC 
 
RFC is an abbreviation for Relation-Function-Constant. 
According to logical analysis of mentoring-learning 
relationships, any formal semantics within the relationships 
between two agents (as mentor and learner) is establishable 
over a ‘(Relation ↔ (Function ↔ Constant))’. 
 
Reflection 
Functions (from 
Minds into 
Machines’ 
Knowledge 
Bases) 
 
Suppose that (i) In denotes the n-component linear relational 
model for humans’ ideas (of their constructed concepts), (ii) 
Pn denotes the n-component linear relational model for their 
expressed predicates, and (iii) Hn denotes the n-component 
linear relational model for the generated hypotheses in 
machines’ knowledge bases. Accordingly, there are 
Reflection Functions like Ris from human being’s ideas into 
predicates. Representing the the set of Ris by R, we will have 
‘R: In → Pn’ and, semantically, ‘(R: In → Pn)     ⊨    Hn’. 
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Role Equivalence  
 
If R and S stand for two roles (role symbols), then the logical 
description ‘R ≡ S’ is called a Role Equivalence. Such a 
relationship, semantically, means that R and S are equal (i.e., 
R = S). The expression ‘R = S’ represents a Role Equality.  
 
Role Inclusion  
 
See Role Subsumption.  
Role 
Subsumption 
 
The logical term ‘R ⊑ S’, where R and S stand for two roles 
(role symbols), expresses that R is subsumed under S. More 
specifically, the concept of ‘being a role and becoming 
subsumed under another role’ is called a Role Subsumption. 
Equivalently, R is the sub-role of S.  
 
Role Symbol 
 
In Description Logics, Roles are non-logical symbols. They 
are equivalent to i-ary (for i∈[2,n]) predicates in Predicate 
Logic. Roles relate and connect the individuals (individual 
symbols) to each other. 
 
Rules 
 
Rules are structured based on logical implications. They 
directly/indirectly express ‘if X, then Y’, where X and Y stand 
for two symbols, propositions, predicates as well as 
concepts.   
 
Search for 
Meaning 
In the framework of constructivism, human beings Search 
for (i) the [initiative] Meanings of the class/classes of their 
personal constructed concepts and for (ii) their significant 
relationships in order to make a background for their 
semantic interpretations.   
 
Semantic 
Interpretation 
Semantic interpretations assign meanings to the non-logical 
symbols and words. A semantic interpretation (like I) must 
satisfy the terminological and, respectively, the assertional 
axioms (i.e., I ⊨ Axiom) in humans’ minds in order to assign 
meaning to the non-logical words/symbols within their 
natural/formal languages.  
 
Schema Schemata or Mental Entities are the constituents and the 
basic materials of mental structures. Accordingly, they are 
the ingredients of concepts (conceptual entities). According 
to constructivist models of learning, all learning and 
knowledge construction is mediated by the construction of 
schemata. 
 
Signature The collection of various conceptions (of the constructed 
concepts) and their interrelationships makes a Signature. 
More specifically, considering NC, NR, and NO as the sets of 
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atomic concepts, atomic roles, and individuals respectively, 
the ordered triple (NC, NR, NO) represents a signature. Any 
formal semantics is definable and analysable based on 
‘terminological interpretations over signatures’. 
 
Smart 
Constructivism  
 
Smart Constructivism is a modern learning theory introduced 
and conceptualised by Farshad Badie (see Article L). A smart 
constructivist model of learning is theorised (i) based on 
traditional constructivist theory of learning and (ii) by 
considering new requirements of learners in the digital age. 
This theory can support (a) the modern developments of 
smart learning strategies and (b) the renewed qualitative 
developments of knowledge building and understanding 
production within smart learning environments. 
 
Social 
Constructivism  
The concept of ‘Social Constructivism’ is conceptualisable 
in the framework of constructivism and in the context of 
social interactions. Social interactions between aware, as 
well as intentional, agents play fundamental roles in (i) the 
processes of their cognitive development and in (ii) how any 
of them goes about the construction as well as the 
development of her/his personal knowledge. Regarding 
social constructivism, conceptions (of the individuals) make 
sense to communities by becoming shared. Accordingly, 
individuals in communities can, collaboratively, focus on 
constructing meanings and producing meaningful 
understandings together.  
 
Subject A Subject is the concept which is, in a situation/setting, the 
conceptual (mental and cognitive) entity that is the object 
(i.e. the starting point) of a line of thought in transformation 
of information on the part of an interlocutor uttering a 
statement.  
 
Subjection Subjection is an assertive Predication. 
 
Supervised 
Machine 
Learning  
 
In Supervised Machine Learning method, the pairs 
(input,output) as the training examples are supplied by the 
trainer (who is a human being). Accordingly, the learner 
(which is a machine) searches for function mappings from 
the inputs into the outputs.  
 
Tautology 
[Model]  
 
In Predicate Logic, if a sentence can be assigned the value 
‘True’ for all possible interpretations, it would be a 
Tautology Model. Similarly, in Description Logics, if a 
concept description is assigned the value ‘True’ for all 
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possible terminological interpretations, it would be a 
tautology model. 
 
Terminology In the framework of constructivist concept learning, a finite 
set of a human’s descriptions (as well as definitions) 
generates a Terminology, if no atomic concept (literal) has 
been defined more than once by her/him at the same moment. 
Terminologies must be explicit in order to be meaningful. 
 
Terminological 
Axiom (Logic) 
 
In a logical-terminological system, the Terminological 
Axioms are introduced to make logical statements about (i) 
how concepts and roles are related to each other as well as 
(ii) how concepts and roles, logically, support each other.  
 
Terminological 
Interpretation 
Terminological Interpretations are generated based on (i) a 
non-empty set D that is the domain of the interpretation and 
(ii) an interpretation function (like .I). Terminological 
interpretations are linkages between syntax and formal 
semantics. More specifically, they are the constructors of 
formal semantics.  
 
Terminological 
Knowledge 
 
Human beings, by constructing their personal 
Terminological Knowledge, attempt to satisfy their 
terminological axioms [mainly] based on concept inclusion, 
concept equality, role inclusion, and role equality. 
Accordingly, they can satisfy their world descriptions based 
on their assertional axioms.  
 
Understanding  
 
 
Understanding or the ability to comprehend something is 
producible based on one’s personal knowings, knowledge 
constructions (ultimately, over the extended abstracts), 
interpretations of the world, constructed meanings of the 
world, and senses made of world. It shall be emphasised that 
the abilities of self awareness as well as interpreting the 
reality of the world could be interpreted as the most valuable 
products of the phenomenon of ‘understanding’.    
 
Understanding 
Function 
 
According to Badie’s designed semantic model for concept 
understanding, an Understanding Function is a function (like 
-UND) that is the most significant constructor of understanding 
models (See Understanding Model).  
 
Understanding 
Model  
 
According to Badie’s designed semantic model for concept 
understanding, an Understanding Model (like UND) is 
constructed based upon the tuple (Understanding Domain, 
Understanding Function). Then: UND = (DUUND, -UND). Any 
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UND (i) is a restricted form of a terminological 
interpretation-based model, (ii) must be able to satisfy the 
semantics of the terminological and assertional axioms (i.e., 
UND ⊨ Axiom) in humans’ minds, and (iii) associates with 
each atomic concept a subset of DUUND, and with each 
ordinary atomic role a binary relation over DUUND
 
× DUUND. 
 
Unified 
Conceptual 
Knowledge  
 
According to Badie’s designed conceptual framework for 
meaning construction in the context of constructivist 
interactions, the Unified Conceptual Knowledge is the 
product of the constructivist discussions between agents’ 
constructed conceptual knowledge. In the context of 
constructivist interactions, the unified conceptual knowledge 
always becomes extended and expanded.  
 
Variable Symbol In classical logics, Variables are non-logical symbols. In 
Predicate Logic, predicates are assigned to variable symbols. 
Any variable symbol can accept an infinite number of 
constant symbols. Similarly, in Description Logics, concepts 
are assigned to variable symbols and any variable symbol can 
accept an infinite number of individual symbols. 
 
Weak Mental 
Mapping 
 
If there is a mental mapping (like M) from a concept (like C) 
into another concept (like D), then it could be conceptualised, 
interpreted, and understood that M is also valid from a 
concept like C´ (that is equivalent to C) into D. Such a mental 
mapping is Weak.  
 
World 
Description 
(Assertion) 
World Descriptions express different facts based on accepted 
axioms and defined fundamental terminologies. In 
Description Logics, any world description (assertion) 
describes the world over concepts, roles, and individuals and 
in fact, over signatures. World descriptions are strongly tied 
to terminological axioms.  
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APPENDIX I (CLARIFICATIONS) 
 
I. IDEA 
 
In articles A, D, E, F, G, H, a ‘concept’ has been said to be interpretable as an ‘idea’. 
Accordingly, it’s assumed that an idea can be expressed in the form of a ‘distinct 
entity’ or ‘a class of entities’ as well as its/their ‘essential features and attributes’. 
Also, it’s mentioned that ideas can determine the application of a term, especially in 
the form of predicates. This means that an idea can play a fundamental part in the use 
of reason or language.  
 
Description Logics are a family of semi-formal languages and represent the 
interrelationships between nominals, logical, and non-logical symbols in order to 
focus on terminological knowledge. Description Logics are logically structured based 
on Predicate Logic. They have descriptive features and that’s why they are interpreted 
as a family of descriptive logical languages. According to Description Logics, a 
concept can be interpreted a class as well as an idea. Subsequently, such an idea can 
be described within a hypothesis. Consequently, the hypothesis makes an 
interrelationship between the idea and a distinct entity (as well as a class of entities) 
or to its (their) essential features.  
 
According to the afore-mentioned descriptions relevant to ideas, what this dissertation 
has brought under the label of ‘idea’, could be expanded to ‘idea of a concept’. In later 
publications (after H), I preferred to use the term ‘conception’ instead of ‘idea’ in 
order to express my assumption that human beings are able to ideate their constructed 
concepts (and in fact, to ideate their formed, transformed, and reformed concepts) in 
the appearance of their conceptions in order  
 
 to represent them in the form of logical hypotheses, and subsequently,   
 to utilise them in their reasoning and learning processes.  
 
I shall propose the following Figure in order to support what I have suggested.  
 
 
 
Figure a. Concepts and Ideas  
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II. SCHEMATA 
 
In articles A, B, C, E, F, H, I, J, P, the concept of ‘Schema’ has been taken into 
account. It shall be emphasised that the term ‘schema’ is very imprecise in cognitive 
and psychological sciences as well as learning sciences. Note that my theoretical 
model has attempted to focus on the concept of ‘schema’ and to assume the schema’s 
existentialities (as basic materials of concepts) in order to reach the phenomenon of 
‘concept’ and, subsequently, the phenomenon of ‘meaning’.  
 
My theoretical model has adopted Piaget’s idea and notion of ‘schema’ and has 
expanded it in order to arrive at the phenomena of ‘concept construction’ and ‘concept 
learning’ in the framework of constructivism. In addition, taking into account some 
standard descriptions of ‘schemata’, I have assumed that one’s designed schemata (i) 
provide backgrounds for her/his concept construction processes, (ii) could describe 
different theories based on terminological axioms and assertions, (iii) could give 
sufficient and satisfying conditions for definitions of truth, and (iv) could specify 
her/his inferences and reasoning processes based on personal constructed concepts. 
Let me be more specific.  
 
Regarding Piaget’s conception of schema, the expression ‘schemata first emerge as 
concrete actions and then gradually develop into more abstract (general) concepts’ 
can be accepted as a fundamental expression in my model. Since then, I have 
attempted to expand it logically. More specifically, I have concluded that human 
beings, mentally, design schemata and, then, gradually develop and divide them into 
more general concepts (conceptual entities). A proposed (designed) schema describes 
a pattern of the person’s thought.  As I have summarised in section I (Constructivism 
– Constructivism and Meaning Construction), “meanings (as conceptual structures) 
are constructed based on conceptual entities (concepts). More specifically, meanings 
are shaped based on an undetermined number of the developments and updatings of 
the linked collection(s) of conceptual entities. Furthermore, conceptual entities are 
made of mental entities”.  According to that, my theoretical model assumes that 
human beings’ mental images of conceptual entities are, mentally, designed and 
visualised based on their mental structures. Also, the mental structures are constructed 
based on mental entities. These mental entities are what I can bring under the label of 
‘schemata’. Therefore, what Piaget has expressed as mental objects which learning is 
mediatable based on them, would be labelled ‘mental entities’ in my semantic model. 
Consequently, in my model, conceptual entities and mental entities are not equivalent, 
but mental entities are the constituents of the conceptual entities (concepts).  
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APPENDIX II (REVISIONS) 
 
I. CONCEPT UNDERSTANDING AND CONCEPTUALISATION 
 
In the main versions of papers E and I, it was expressed that:  
 
“a conceptualisation is a uniform specification of separated understandings; a 
conceptualisation provides a global manifestation of local understandings in the 
context of a human’s thoughts. Additionally, a human’s grasp of concepts provides a 
proper foundation for generating her/his own conceptualisations”.  
 
Instead, in the current versions of papers E and I (in this dissertation), I have decided 
to substitute it by:  
 
“an understanding expresses a local manifestation of global conceptualisations” and 
“any understanding (based on a concept) could be interpreted as a local manifestation 
of a global conceptualisation (of that concept). It shall be claimed that human beings’ 
grasps of concepts could provide proper foundations for generating their own 
conceptualisations”.  
 
Additionally, in the main version of paper M, I had stated that:  
 
“human beings can find out that an individual thing/phenomenon is an instance of a 
formed concept and, thus, their individual grasp of that concept (in the form of their 
conceptions) provide foundations for producing their own conceptualisations”. 
 
Instead, in the current version of paper M (in this dissertation), I have decided to 
substitute it by: 
 
“human beings’ grasps of their constructed concepts (in the form of their conceptions) 
provide foundations for producing their own conceptualisations. Accordingly, they 
can find out that an individual thing/phenomenon is an instance of that concept”.  
 
II. CONCEPT UNDERSTANDING AS A RELATION 
 
In the main version of paper I, I had described that: 
 
“[Concept] understanding is a type of relation between person and concept. 
Therefore, this relation transforms the characteristics, attributes and qualities of that 
concept into the person’s mind. It also transforms the properties of that concept and 
its relationships with other concepts into mind”.  
 
Later on, I just interpreted that concept understanding is, definitely, a relation, but not 
between a human being and a concept. More clearly, I interpreted a ‘concept 
understanding’ as a relation between (i) characteristics of a concept and (ii) a 
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description, see Figure b. Hence, in the current version of paper I as well as paper M 
(where I focused on formal semantic analysis of concept understanding and proposing 
an ontology for concept understanding), I have stated that:  
 
“Concept understanding, as a relation, could relate ‘the characteristics and attributes 
of a concept’ with ‘a description’. More specifically, understanding is a function 
(mapping) from a concept into some propositions (and statements) which could be 
interpreted as ‘concept descriptions’. In fact, the characteristics and properties of a 
concept by means of the understanding function could become mapped into concept 
descriptions”.  
 
 
Figure b. Concept Understanding as a Relation  
 
 
III. FORMALISM 
 
In section 3 of the main version of paper B, there were two typing mistakes: 
 
1. The formalism ‘Spring ≡ Season ⊓ ∃hasModerate.Weather ⊓ ∀hasGreen.Tree’ 
has changed to ‘Spring ≡ Season ⊓ ∃hasWeather.Moderate ⊓ ∀hasTree.Green’ 
in the current version.  
 
2. The same problem goes to ‘Spring ≡ Season ⊓ ∃hasModerate.Weather ⊓ 
∀hasGreen.Tree ⊓ ∃hasApril.Month’. The right formalism, Spring ≡ Season ⊓ 
∃hasWeather.Moderate ⊓ ∀hasTreeGreen ⊓ ∃hasMonth.April, is considered for 
the current version. 
  
In addition, in section 4 of the main version of paper B, it was stated that:  
 
“considering R as a binary relation between two concepts C and D, there is a RI from 
D into DI × DI”,  
 
but, in the current version, I have changed it to: 
 
“considering R as a binary relation between two concepts C and D, there is a I, such 
that, I:  D → DI ✕DI”. 
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The central focus of this Ph.D. research is on ‘Logic and Cognition’ and, 
more specifically, this research covers the quintuple (Logic and Logical 
Philosophy, Philosophy of Education, Educational Psychology, Cognitive 
Science, Computer Science). The most significant contributions of this Ph.D. 
dissertation are conceptual, logical, terminological, and semantic analysis of 
Constructivist Concept Learning (specifically, in the context of humans’ in-
teractions with their environment and with other agents). This dissertation is 
concerned with the specification of the conceptualisation of the phenomena 
of ‘learning’, ‘mentoring’, and ‘knowledge’ within learning and knowledge 
acquisition systems. Constructivism as an epistemology and as a model of 
knowing and, respectively as a theoretical model of learning builds up the 
central framework of this research.
